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Thesis Abstract.
This thesis discusses the objectives and success of the disqualification of directors 
under section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. Disqualification 
under that provision is central to the state’s strategy for dealing with undesirable 
conduct by directors.
However, the objectives of disqualification under section 6 are unclear and is 
effectiveness can be contested. It is frequently stated that disqualification exists to 
‘protect the public and commercial’ world from abuse of limited liability yet the 
precise nature of the harm that such abuse causes has not been conclusively 
determined. As such, some have argued that disqualification seeks to sanction conduct 
that is ‘socially undesirable’.
This thesis set out to establish the nature of the harm that makes certain uses of 
limited liability undesirable. It argues that the harm the state seeks to eschew through 
its use of section 6 is conduct likely to result in financial loss to creditors. 
Consequently it is argued that section 6 exists to control a moral hazard created by the 
state’s policy of allowing entrepreneurs free access to limited liability.
Having established that a reduction in financial loss is the objective of section 6, the 
thesis processes to evaluate whether the section is likely to bring about a benefit (in 
terms of reduced loss) that is greater than the costs it generates. It is argued that 
disqualification under section 6 fails to bring about a meaningful reduction in losses 
generated by ‘unfit’ directs. However, it is also contended that there are significant 
costs associated with the application of the sanction. Consequently, the thesis 
contends that section 6 is an inefficient method of seeking to control undesirable 
conduct by directors.
The thesis concludes that the failure of disqualification to provide effective protection 
from the moral hazard created by limited liability ought to necessitate a review state’s 
policy of allowing free access to it. For, in so far as regulation exists to protect the 
public from abuse of limited liability, the state must feel that its policy creates losses 
that are unacceptable. Therefore the failure of that regulation ought to necessitate a 
review of the policy as the most desirable way of protecting the public from the harm 
inflicted by undesirable use of limited liability.
Information was collected fo r  this Thesis up to the 8th December 2004.
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Chapter 1: Introduction.
“The Government recognises that due to the nature of entrepreneurial risk
not every business succeeds. Honest directors- our future wealth creators- have 
nothing to fear from our crackdown. I want to give them every opportunity to start 
up again in business if they have acted within the bounds of the law. However 
those who are not fit to be in the privileged position of being a director should be 
under no illusions -  those who abuse the system, often for their own benefit and at 
the expense of others, will be brought to book”.
Dr Kim Howells, Minister for Competition and Consumer Affairs, 4th 
January 19991
As the state has sought to balance the perceived benefit of increased 
entrepreneurial activity with the costs of failed business ventures, the 
disqualification of directors of insolvent companies under section 6 of the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (‘the Disqualification Act’) 
has assumed an increasingly prominent role in the sphere of corporate 
regulation. There would seem to be little doubt that section 6 is now the 
state’s weapon of choice in its quest to ensure that its ‘system’ of allowing 
entrepreneurs free access to limited liability is not abused. To this end 
numerous ‘crackdowns’2, ‘clampdowns’3 and ‘offensives’4 have been 
launched against individuals who the state perceives to have crossed the line
1 DTI press release, Rogue Director “Hotline ” Hits 1,200 calls, 4th January 1999.
2 See for example, DTI press release, Crackdown on Unfit Directors Nets 13% rise and
1,275 Bans, 23rd July 1998 and ibid.
3 DTI press release, Clamp Down On Dodgy Directors Continues, 18th April 2000.
4 DTI press release, Rogue Directors Face New Offensive, 20th July 2000.
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between ‘unlucky wealth creating entrepreneur’ and ‘cowboy director’5. As 
such, public regulation now lies at the heart of the regulatory regime for 
directors with an average of over 1,000 disqualifications under section 6 
being obtained by the Secretary of State each year. Indeed, over the period 
1999-2004, the Secretary of State has secured disqualification orders against 
almost 8,000 individuals6 and in so doing has developed a sophisticated 
system for the reporting of suspected unfit conduct by directors of failed 
companies.
1.1 The Purpose of Disqualification.
The state’s purpose in disqualifying individuals from being directors 
is to prevent undesirable use of the corporate form. The court, have stated 
that “The whole purpose of the 1986 Act is to protect the public from the 
future activities of those who have...shown themselves unfit to act as
n # #
directors of a company” , and a former Minister for Competition and 
Consumer Affairs stated before a standing committee of the House of 
Commons that “The main purpose of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 is to provide the public with protection against
Q
those who abuse the privilege of limited liability” . According to the 
National Audit Office disqualification fulfils its objective of “protect[ing] 
the public and commercial world” by first preventing unfit individuals from
5 See for example, DTI press release, Griffiths Goes Gunning Against Cowboy Directors, 
5th June 1997.
6 See, Companies in 2003-2004 (London, HMSO, 2004), table D l.
7 Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry v Bannister [1996] 1 All ER 993 at page 988.
8 Hansard [HC], (Session 1999-2000), Standing Committee B, 7* November 2000, col 119.
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being concerned in the management of companies for a specified period of 
time and, second, by deterring unfit conduct by directors generally9.
However, it has sometimes been acknowledged that that whilst the
power to disqualify is not intended to be penal it does “involve a substantial
interference with the freedom of the individual”.10 Thus, disqualification
under section 6 has been described as “quasi-penal”11 and disqualification
proceedings have even been described by Hoffman J (as he then was) as
‘penal proceedings’12. However, the notion that disqualification equates to a
punishment was rejected by Morritt U , who in the case of R v Secretary o f
1 #
State for Trade and Industry, ex parte McCormick , considered that 
disqualification did not amount to a ‘depravation of liberty or property’ 
because disqualified individuals were not prevented from setting up a 
business as a sole trader or partner. It seems then that disqualification is 
seen as a protective measure, even if it sometimes strays towards 
punishment. However, whilst the judiciary has waxed lyrical about the 
nature of disqualification, the State is far clearer that protection is the 
objective of disqualification. Successive ministers at the DTI have 
emphasised this and statements such as that of Melanie Johnson MP that “It
9 National Audit Office, Report by the Auditor and Comptroller General: Insolvency 
Service Executive Agency, Company Director Disqualification, (House of Commons 
Papers, Session 1992-1993, 907), (London, HMSO, 1993), para 1.4. See also Lord Woolfe 
MR in Re Blackspur Group Pic [1998] 1 WLR 422, who declared that at page 426; “The 
purpose of the 1986 Act is the protection of the public by anticipated deterrent effect on 
further misconduct and by encouragement o f higher standards of honesty and diligence in 
corporate management, from those who are unfit to be concerned in the management of a 
company”
10 Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd [1988] 1 Ch 477 at page 486.
11 Re Cedar Developments Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 714 at page 719.
12 Re Swift 736 Ltd [1993] BCLC 1 at page 3.
13 [1998] BCC 379.
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is vital that the business community and consumers are protected from 
irresponsible, incompetent or rogue directors at the earliest opportunity”,14 
are commonplace.
Such ministerial rhetoric ensures that disqualification under section 6 
enjoys a high profile in today’s corporate arena. However, priority currently 
accorded to disqualification is very much the result of pressure exerted on 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the early 1990’s. For, whilst 
section 6 has been on the statute book since the mid-1980s, it was only after 
the Public Accounts Committee15 and the National Audit Office (NO)16 
published reports severely criticising the DTI for failing to ensure that 
section 6 ‘fulfilled its purpose of protecting the public’17 that 
disqualification under that section became a policy priority.
1.2 Criticism and Reform.
The reports of the NAO and Public Accounts Committee identified 
systematic failures in the management of section 6 by the division of the 
DTI responsible for bring disqualification cases on behalf of the Secretary of 
State (the Insolvency Service). The report of the Public Accounts 
Committee was particularly damming, expressing concern about multiple
14Insolvency Service, Annual Report and Accounts, (House of Commons Papers, session 
2002-2003, 963), (London, DTI, 2002), page 31.
15Committee o f Public Accounts 18th Report, (House of Commons Papers, session 1993- 
1994, 167), page 3. See also the minutes o f the evidence presented to the committee, 
(House of Commons Papers, session 1993-1994, 167-i).
16 National Audit Office, The Insolvency Service Executive Agency: Company Director 
Disqualification, (House of Commons Papers, session 1992-1993, 907), (London, HMSO, 
1993).
14
failures at all stages of the disqualification process. The committee noted 
that at the first stage of the disqualification process there were wide 
variations in the recording and reporting of unfit conduct by Official 
Receivers18 and that only an average of 1 in 22 cases where unfit conduct 
was identified were submitted to Insolvency Service for further 
investigation19. It also noted that many of the reports that were submitted 
were of a poor quality. The committee also expressed concern about the fact 
that the even a majority of unfit conduct reports received by the Secretary of 
State were submitted late and were often incomplete. As far as the 
Insolvency Service itself was concerned the Committee alleged that it was 
taking too long to obtain disqualification orders against unfit individuals, 
that it had not properly assessed the resources needed to carry out its 
responsibilities under sections 6 and 7 of the Disqualification Act and that it 
was not pursuing enough disqualification cases as it should do if section 6 
was to deliver effective protection. The criticisms of the Public Accounts 
committee reflected those made by the NAO.
The two reports prompted significant efforts by the Insolvency 
Service to enhance its management of the section 6 disqualification system 
in order to deliver more effective protection to the public. Guidance was 
issued to Official Receivers and Insolvency Practitioners with the intention 
of improving the quality, timeliness and consistency of reports of unfit
17 NAO report, ibid at Summary and Conclusions, paragraph 9.
18 The Committee’s report expressed particular concern about wide variations in the 
recording and reporting of unfit conduct between Official Receiver. See Report o f the 
Public Accounts Committee, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined, paras 16-25.
19 Ibid.
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conduct20 and procedures to deal with ‘office holders’ who failed to comply 
with their obligations satisfactorily were put in place. Steps were also taken 
to improve the Service’s own performance, such as the doubling of the 
budget allocated to disqualification work between 1994 and 199821 and 
reform of the procedures for dealing with reports of unfit conduct.
These efforts to improve the disqualification system appeared to 
have bom fruit by the time the NAO reviewed the progress of the 
Insolvency Service in meeting the concerns expressed by itself and the 
Public Accounts Committee. The NAO’s follow-up22 report into section 6 
disqualification noted that the number of disqualification orders obtained by 
the Secretary of State had risen from just 326 in 1992-1993 to 1,267 in 
1997-1998 and that Official Receivers and Insolvency Practitioners were 
submitting better quality reports more consistently than had been the case in 
1992-1993.
The rise in the number of disqualifications, coupled with 
improvements in the management of disqualification cases by the 
Insolvency Practitioners and Official Receivers, lead the NAO to conclude 
its follow-up report by stating that the Insolvency Service had ‘significantly’ 
improved its management of disqualification cases and, further, led it to 
claim that there were ‘direct benefits’ from disqualification. The NAO based
20 See, Insolvency Service, Guidance Notes for the Completion o f Statutory Reports and 
Returns, (London, Insolvency Service, 2001).
21 Insolvency Service, Annual Report and Accounts for the Year 1998, (House of Commons 
Papers, session 1997-1998, 644) (London, DTI, 1998).
22 See, National Audit Office, Insolvency Service Executive Agency, Company Director 
Disqualification -  A Follow Up Report, (House of Commons Papers, Session 1998-1999, 
424) (London, The Stationary Office, 1998).
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this conclusion on research which appeared to show that disqualification in 
1997-1998 had saved creditors £11 million, in terms of loss that disqualified 
individuals would have gone to cause had they not been disqualified24 . The 
NAO did, however, encourage the Insolvency Service to continue it efforts 
to enhance its management of disqualification, most notably by taking steps 
to reduce the period of time taken to secure a disqualification, which had not 
fallen between 1992 and 199725.
With the generally optimistic conclusions of the follow-up report, 
official inquiry into section 6 disqualification came to an end. However, the 
follow-up report’s favourable verdict on the reform agenda that had been 
pursued since 1993 has had an enduring influence upon the development of 
section 6 disqualification. Its legacy was to cement it in place the view 
that the more efficiently managed the disqualification system was, the more 
protection from the activities of unfit directors it would deliver. Thus, better 
quality reports by office holders, a higher number of disqualifications and 
speedier disqualification have continued to be the focus of efforts to reform 
section 6 disqualification.
Some notable successes have been achieved by this approach. For 
example, the annual number of disqualifications continued to increase after 
1998, up to a peak of 1,761 in 2001-2002, although there has been a
23 Ibid, fig 9.
24 Ibid, page 37. The veracity of the NAO’s figures are discussed below, see 6.2.
25 Ibid, page 6 and paras 2.28-2.34.
26The policy has also influenced academic discussion of section 6. See for example, S. 
Griffin, The Disqualification o f Unfit Directors and the Protection o f the Public Interest 
(2003) 53 NILQ 207, who, at page 230, cites ‘procedural constraints’ as a significant factor 
limiting the effectiveness of section 6.
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reduction in the annual number of disqualifications according to the two 
most recent raft of statistics. Nonetheless, the number of disqualifications 
obtained in 2003-2004 remained above the number achieved in 1997-199827. 
In addition to increases in the number of disqualifications since 1998, the 
average time between insolvency and disqualification has fallen from 5 
years to 2 years in 200328.
Reducing the delay between insolvency and disqualification has been 
very much the focus of reform since the late 1990s. The culmination of such 
reform was the introduction of a system of ‘disqualification undertakings’ in 
2001. the new system of undertakings was intended to remove many 
disqualification cases from court by allowing directors to give an 
undertaking to the Secretary of State that they will not act as a director, 
which if accepted by the Secretary of State, have the same effect as a 
traditional court ordered disqualification. The intention behind the new 
system was to reduce the delay associated with court proceedings and as 
such improve the effectiveness of disqualification. This was made clear by
27In 1997-1998 the Secretary o f State obtained 1,266 disqualifications under section 6, see 
Companies in 1997-1998 (London, The Stationary Office, 1998), table D l. In 2001-2002, 
1,751 disqualification orders were obtained under section 6, in 2002-03 the number stood at 
1,594 and in 2003-04 1,367 disqualifications were achieved, see Companies in 2003-2004, 
supra note 6 table D l. The spike in 2001-02 is explained by the insolvency service as a 
result of the introduction o f disqualification undertakings (see Insolvency Service, Annual 
Report and Accounts, (House of Commons Papers, Session 2002-2003, 963), (London, 
DTI, 2002), page 31). Therefore despite the headline fall in the number of orders obtained 
in 2002-2003, the overall trend in die number of disqualifications was up, although the 
annual rises are now a fraction of what they were in the late 1990’s when annual rises of 
20% or more were seen (see Companies in 2000-2001 (London, HMSO, 2002), table D l). 
The exception to the upward trend is the fall seen in 2003-04. However, the Insolvency 
Service explains the fall as a consequence o f the relocation of the disqualification unit from 
London to Birmingham (see Insolvency Service, Annual Report and Accounts 2003-2004, 
(House o f Commons Papers, Session 2003-2004, 812), (London, The Insolvency Service, 
2004), page 15.
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the minister responsible for steering the reforms through Parliament when he 
stated that undertakings were desirable in order to “achieve earlier 
disqualifications to protect the public and to save costs”29; “I am sure that 
the [select] Committee will agree” said the minister, “that unfit directors 
should be disqualified as soon as possible”.
The response to the criticisms of section 6 expressed by the Public 
Accounts Committee and the NAO, both before and after 1998, can 
therefore be summarised as having the intention of; (i) improving the 
performance of Official Receivers and Insolvency Practitioners, (ii) 
increasing the number of disqualification and (iii) increasing the speed at 
which disqualifications are obtained, with the allied goal of reducing the 
cost of disqualification.
The focus upon these three matters as the way to ensure that section 
6 effectively protects the public from undesirable use of limited liability is 
obviously built on the belief that a disqualification for unfitness under 
section 6 is a potentially effective method of achieving protection from unfit 
conduct. Thus, the ‘reform agenda’ has focused on improving the 
management of section 6 in order that this potential be fulfilled. For unless 
one believes that a section 6 disqualification is capable of effectively 
protecting the public from unfit conduct, a reduction in the time taken to 
secure a disqualification could hardly be cited improving public protection.
28 Insolvency Service, Annual Report and Accounts 2002-2003, (House of Commons 
Papers, session 2002-2003, 846).
29 Dr Kim Howells MP, Hansard [HC], Standing Committee B, 7th November 2000, col 
118. See also Griffin, supra note 31.
30 Ibid.
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Similarly, a belief in the potential of section 6 is necessary to sustain the 
view (popular in some quarters) that an increase in the number of 
disqualifications necessarily means an increase in the protective benefit of 
section 631.
However, the belief that section 6 is fundamentally effective way to 
deliver ‘protection’ must be challenged in the absence of any evidence 
suggesting that improvements in the management of disqualification have 
actually reduced instances of unfit conduct. Indeed, the ‘significant’ 
improvement in the reporting of unfit conduct by Official Receivers and 
Insolvency Practitioners and the huge rise in the number disqualification 
orders achieved in the mid 1990s, seem to have had little impact on 
instances of unfit conduct recorded in insolvent companies, as the number of 
recorded instances of unfit conduct has remained stable for the better part of 
the last 10 years. In 2002, for example, the Insolvency Service received 
5,555 reports of unfit conduct from Official Receivers and Insolvency 
Practitioners under section 7 of the Disqualification Act32. This compares to 
5,435 reports received in 200133 and 5,476 in 200034 and 5,253 in 199735.
31 See for example, DTI Press release, Crackdown On Unfit Directors Nets 13% Rise and
1,275 Ban, 23rd July 1998, and “FastTrack ” Disqualification Results in record Bans, 2nd 
January 2002. See also S. Griffin, The Disqualification o f  Unfit Directors and the 
Protection o f the Public Interest (2003) 53 NILQ 207 who, at page 217, ‘tentatively’ asserts 
that the success of section 6 can be measured by the number of disqualifications obtained. 
See also A. Hicks, Director Disqualification: Can it Deliver [2001] JBL 433. Hicks 
suggests at page 446, that the “obvious” response to weakness of disqualification is to 
increase the number of disqualifications. He does however, go on to suggest that more 
fundamental reform of disqualification may be needed to significantly increase its 
effectiveness, see pages 451 -  460.
32 See, Insolvency Service, Insolvency: General Annual Report for the Year 2002, (London, 
The Stationary Office, 2003).
33 Ibid.
34 Insolvency Service, Insolvency: General Annual Report for the Year 2000, (London, The 
Stationary Office, 2001).
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Thus, the increase in the number of disqualifications does not seem to have 
reduced instances of unfit conduct either by taking unfit individuals ‘off the 
road’ or by deterring unfit conduct amongst directors generally. As such the 
current focus on improvements the management of section 6 as the way to 
‘protect the public’ from unfit directors can be questioned.
Furthermore, doubt over the success, or the likely success, of the 
‘reform agenda’ is cast by careful reading of the NAO’s follow-up report, 
which suggests that even after the improvements made to the system of 
disqualification in the mid-1990’s, section 6 was far from an effective 
measure. Empirical research carried out for the report indicated that 
disqualification actually brought very little benefit in terms of protection and 
deterrence and that its costs were high. Thus, despite its bold conclusions the 
report did not resolve questions surrounding the utility of section 6 
disqualification.
Doubt over the effectiveness of disqualification has been expressed 
by academic commentators such as Andrew Hicks who concluded in an 
ACCA report36 published around the same time as the follow-up report, that 
section 6 was an ineffective sanction. Hicks argued that the impact of a 
thousand disqualifications each year was limited given that there are over 2 
million directors in the UK and suggests that most disqualifications were too 
short to be effective. He further claimed that section 6 was limited by the 
fact that only a relatively small number of directors fell with its purview.
35 Insolvency Service, Insolvency: General Annual Report for the Year 1997, (London, The 
Stationary Office, 1997).
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Some of the criticisms levelled by Hicks seem to follow in the 
footsteps of the Public Accounts Committee and the NAO, in that that 
problems with the number and quality of disqualifications being obtained 
are cited as harmful the effectiveness of the section. Others, however, (such 
as narrow range of directors falling within the disqualification system) 
suggest that more fundamental weaknesses with section 6 may be 
responsible for its failure to deliver effective protection (however, it should 
be noted that Hicks’ suggestions as to how the provision could be made 
effective also focused on reform of the administration of the sanction).
Therefore, in light of the failure of current policy to bring about any 
apparent reduction in instances of unfit conduct and doubts raised by the 
NAO and Hicks reports it can be questioned whether the reform agenda that 
has been pursued since the mid-1990s addresses the real problems with 
section 6 disqualification. Essentially this question can be asked because the 
success of section 6 can still be contested even though most of the failures 
identified by the Public Accounts Committee have been addressed. That is 
not to say that, however, that the policy pursued since the 1990s has not 
brought any benefits. The improvement in the reporting of unfit conduct, for 
example, has certainly brought a ‘benefit’ in the sense that unfit conduct is 
more likely to be identified, reported and sanctioned. What can be 
questioned however is whether these improvements have been sufficient to 
make disqualification an effective sanction, which is really a challenge to
36 A. Hicks, Disqualification ofDirectors: No Hiding Place for the Unit? (London,
Certified Accountants Educational Trust, 1998).
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the assumption that section 6 is capable of delivering effective protection 
from the activities of unfit directors.
However, in addition to the question of whether section 6 
disqualification is capable of effectively protecting the public from unfit 
conduct, dissatisfaction with the current approach to the section can also be 
expressed in light of the fact that the relationship between disqualification 
and the State’s desire to foster an ‘enterprise culture’37 is unclear. Indeed, it 
has never been conclusively stated what it is that makes it desirable for some 
directors of failed companies to allowed to use limited liability again whilst 
for others it is undesirable. Phrases such as a ‘ conduct demonstrating alack 
of commercial probity’ have been used to describe disqualification­
worthy conduct, but perception of ‘harm’ that must underlie such phrases 
has not been explored.
It is widely accepted that disqualification aims to protect the public 
and commercial world from ‘abuse of limited liability’, and well established 
precedents exist from which it is possible to identify many acts which will 
be held to be such abuse and therefore evidence of unfitness. However, what 
is not clear from the Act and the cases is the interest or interests that section 
6 disqualification seeks to protect Therefore the essence of what separates 
desirable, but ultimately unsuccessful, entrepreneurial activity from 
undesirable unsuccessful entrepreneurial activity is unclear. This lack of 
clarity about the ideological foundation of disqualification has caused real,
37 See for example, Department o f Trade and Industry, White Paper, Our Competitive 
Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy, Cm 4176, (London, DTI, 1998).
38 Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd [1988] Ch 477 at page 486.
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practical problems with the application of the sanction. Vanessa Finch, for 
example, has discussed two conflicting approaches to disqualification by the 
judges that are essentially borne of differing interpretations of the purpose of 
disqualification39. Similarly, the lack of clarity as to the nature of unfit 
conduct has lead to some judicial u-tums as the relevance of certain forms of 
conduct to a finding of unfitness40.
Therefore, section 6 is in a state of some confusion. The nature of 
unfit conduct is unclear and its effectiveness at protecting the public from 
such unfit conduct is, at the very least, open to question. Indeed, the success 
of the section must necessarily be open to doubt if the very nature of 
undesirable use of limited liability is not clear. For, if it is unclear what 
makes certain conduct ‘unfit’, then it is impossible to identify the harm that 
such conduct inflicts on the public, and consequently impossible to assess 
how successful section 6 is at protecting the public from that harm. 
Therefore, before the success of disqualification can be assessed it is first 
necessary to establish the harm that makes certain conduct so undesirable 
that directors are declared ‘unfit’.
This Thesis’ Discussion of Disqualification.
Therefore, this study of section 6 disqualification seeks to assess the 
success of the sanction by discussing the nature of the harm is seeks to 
address and then evaluating whether section 6 disqualification is likely to
39 See, V. Finch, Disqualifying Directors: Issues o f  Rights, Privileges and Employment, 
(1993) 22 Industrial Law Journal 35.
40 There has, for example, been a significant shift over the years in the way that non­
payment of tax is treated in disqualification cases. See Re Sevenoakes Stationers (Retail)
Ltd [1990] BCLC 668 and 4.8.6 below.
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provide the ‘public and commercial world’ with effective protection from 
that harm.
The thesis begins its analysis by discussing the reason why public 
regulation of directors is felt desirable by the State. The existence of public 
regulation (i.e. disqualification) implies a belief that private regulation fails 
to prevent undesirable conduct, which it is necessary to explore if the ‘harm’ 
in unfit conduct is to be identified. Thus, identification of the manner of 
private regulatory failure that gives rise to the apparent need for 
disqualification takes us some way to establishing the nature of undesirable 
use of limited liability in the context of disqualification. As such, the thesis 
begins with an analysis of the problems surrounding private law regulation 
of directors, particularly the problems in relation to the sort of director 
against which disqualification is directed. The thesis builds upon the 
analysis of the need for disqualification by discussing the significance of the 
link between disqualification and limited liability in terms of the harm that 
section 6 is intended to prevent. It will be recalled that it has been stated that 
“[t]he main purpose of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 is 
to provide the public with protection against those who abuse the privilege 
of limited liability”41, and as such limited liability would seem to be central 
to the need for disqualification and the ideological function of 
disqualification.
41 Hansard [HC], (Session 1999-2000), Standing Committee B, 7th November 2000, col 
119.
25
At the conclusion of its analysis of the role of limited liability the 
thesis presents its argument as to the nature of the harm that makes certain 
uses of limited liability undesirable and worthy of sanction. In the following 
chapter the common examples of ‘unfit’ conduct are discussed in order to 
support the thesis’ contention as to the nature of the harm condemned by the 
State. After advancing its argument as to the nature of undesirable use of 
limited liability, the thesis moves on to consider whether section 6 is likely 
to be an effective method of protecting the public and commercial world 
from such conduct.
It is argued that given the nature of the harm it is intended to prevent, 
the success of section 6 can be most satisfactorily assessed by means of a 
cost-benefit analysis that considers both the qualitative and quantitative 
costs and benefits of the section. The qualitative aspects of section 6 are 
discussed before a quantitative analysis of the costs and benefits of the 
section is made. The discussion of the quantitative costs and benefits of the 
section draws on work carried out by the NAO for its follow-up report. As 
part of this cost-benefit analysis of section 6 the thesis considers the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of an alternative system of disqualification. It 
then goes on the consider the impact of the recent introduction of 
disqualification undertakings. The discussion of the likely impact of the 
undertakings system on the effectiveness of section 6 disqualification is 
made within the broad context of the cost-benefit analysis, focusing 
particularly on the fairness of the system and its impact upon the 
effectiveness of the section. The final chapter of the thesis discusses the
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implications of the thesis conclusion as to the likely effectiveness of section 
6 in protecting the public and commercial world from the harm identified in 
earlier chapters.
It must be emphasised at the outset of the analysis that this thesis 
assesses the success of section 6 by reference to its stated goal o f protecting 
the public from abuse o f limited liability. For whilst some have argued that 
the effect of disqualification is to punish directors, punishment is not the 
declared objective of the State in its operation of section 6. Therefore, as the 
purpose of this thesis is to assess the extent to which section 6 effectively 
achieves it goals, the goal against which it is judged is that which the State 
professes to secure. That is not to say however, that the punitive effects of 
disqualification are overlooked in the following chapters, for where punitive 
aspects of disqualification are not linked to protection, it will be argued that 
this represents a failure of disqualification to fulfil its stated objective.
It is therefore to the substantive analysis of the effectiveness of 
section 6 by reference to its goal of protecting the public from abuse of 
limited liability that this thesis now turns. However, that analysis shall begin 
with a brief introduction to the main features of the Disqualification Act
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Chapter 2: Disqualification and the
Failure of Shareholder Monitoring.
2.1 A Brief Overview of the Disqualification Act.
The concept of disqualifying individuals from being company 
directors has a long pedigree in English law. The first disqualification 
provision was introduced in 192942 and over the next 60 years various 
Companies Acts introduced several other grounds for disqualification43. The 
current Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (‘the Disqualification 
Act’) was introduced to consolidate existing disqualification provisions 
alongside a new power allowing for mandatory disqualification of directors 
for unfitness that had been introduced by the Insolvency Act 198544. 
Consequently, the Disqualification Act contains 9 provisions that allow for 
directors to be disqualified by a court or, in the cases of sections 6, 8 or 9B,
42 Section 300 of the Companies Act 1929 Act provided for the automatic disqualification 
of undischarged bankrupts and gave courts a power to disqualify an individual from being a 
director if that individual had been found to be in breach o f the Acts’ fraudulent trading 
provisions. Section 300 was introduced following recommendations o f the Greene 
Committee, see, Report o f the Company Law Amendment Committee (Chairman, Adrian 
Greene), (Cmnd.2657), (London, HMSO, 1929).
43 For example, section 188 of the Companies Act 1947 introduced a new power allowing a 
court to order the disqualification of a director where he had been found guilty of any 
offence in relation to the fraudulent promotion, formation or management of a company. 
Section 9 of the Companies Act 1976 introduced a further power of disqualification which 
provided that a person could be disqualified for up to 5 years if he had been the director of 
company that had gone into insolvent liquidation and a court felt that the director’s conduct 
made him unfit to be concerned in the management o f a company.
44 A provision introduced following recommendations of the Cork Committee Report of 
1982. Insolvency Law and Practice: Report o f  the Review Committee, (Chairman, Sir
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by offering an undertaking to the Secretary of State. Section 11 of the Act 
provides for the automatic disqualification of undischarged bankrupts.
Disqualification under any of the Act’s provisions substantially 
restricts an individual’s right to be involved with the administration of a 
company incorporated under the Companies Act 198545. Section 1 (l)(a) of 
the Act states that a person subject to a disqualification order shall not “be a 
director of a company, act as a receiver of a company’s property or in any 
way, whether directly of indirectly, be concerned or take part in the 
promotion formation or management of a company unless (in each case) he 
has leave of the court”. Disqualified persons are also prohibited from acting 
as insolvency practitioners46. As is obvious from its wording, the prohibition 
imposed by section 1(1 )(a) is not absolute and, as such, it is possible for a 
disqualified individual to act in any of the prohibited capacities if he obtains 
leave of a court to do so47. It is not however possible for a disqualified 
individual to obtain leave to act as an insolvency practitioner as the 
prohibition imposed by section 1(1 )(b) is absolute. Section 17 of the Act 
therefore gives ‘a court having jurisdiction’48 unfettered discretion to grant 
leave of a disqualification order.
Kenneth Cork), (Cmnd 8558), (London, HMSO, 1982). The report devoted an entire 
chapter to the reform of disqualification; see chap. 45 paras 1807-1826.
45 Rule 4(2) of the Limited Liability Partnership Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1090) also 
extend the provisions of the Act to members and shadow members of Limited Liability 
Partnerships.
46 Section l(l)(b).
47 The same is true of the prohibition imposed by section 1 A(l)(a).
48 Defined in section 17 (l)-(7) as (i.e. that applications for leave of an order must be made 
to a court with jurisdiction to wind up companies, where the original order was made by 
such a court, or where the person is subject to a disqualification undertaking, a court which 
would have had jurisdiction to make a disqualification order had the Secretary of State not 
accepted an undertaking.
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Leave of a disqualification order under section 17 is an important 
aspect of the disqualification regime because leave clearly modifies the 
effect of disqualification and fact that leave is provided for under the Act at 
all indicates that the public interest is not seen to be best served by absolute 
disqualification.
The desire to ensure a degree of flexibility in the disqualification 
legislation is also evidenced by the fact that the majority of the Act’s 
disqualification provisions give a discretionary power to disqualify, which in 
most cases, is linked to specific breaches of the companies legislation. 
Section 2 and 5, for example, allow a court to order the disqualification of a 
person who has been convicted of an offence connected with the promotion, 
formation or management of a company. Section 3 allows disqualification 
for persistent breaches of the companies’ legislation and section 4 for fraud 
in winding up. Section 10 of the Act allows a court to make a 
disqualification order against an individual if that court has made a 
declaration under sections 213 or 214 of the Insolvency Act 198649, and 
section 12 provides that any person who fails to make a payment that is 
required under Part VI of the County Courts Act 198450, may be made 
subject to a disqualification order.
49 Section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 allows a court to make a declaration that a person 
is liable to contribute to the assets of an insolvent company if  that person is shown to have 
carried out the business with the intent to defraud creditors. Section 214 allows a court to 
make such a declaration if a person is found to have engaged in ‘wrongful trading’, on 
which see further chapter 4, below.
50 Part VI of the County Courts Act 1984 provides that where a debtor is unable to pay the 
amount o f a judgment made against him a court may make an order providing for the 
administration of his estate. Such an order may provide for the payment of his debts by 
instalments and it is such payments to which section 12 refers.
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However, in contrast to the discretionary nature of disqualifications 
under sections 2-5, 10 and 12, sections 6 and 8 provide for the mandatory 
disqualification of directors where they are found to be ‘unfit to be 
concerned in the management of companies’. Section 9A also provides for 
mandatory disqualification for unfitness, but only where unfitness is 
accompanied by certain infringements of the Competition Act 199851.
Of all the disqualification provisions in the Act, section 6 is by far 
the most important, as befits its status as the civil regulatory mechanism 
used by the State to ‘crackdown’ on unfit directors who abuse a regime 
apparently designed to assist ‘wealth-creating’ entrepreneurs. In 2001-2002, 
for example, disqualifications under section 6 accounted for 91.2% of all 
disqualifications made under the Act (excluding section 11), which is 
consistent with figures from previous years . According to a survey carried 
out by Andrew Hicks for his ACCA report , most of those disqualifications 
under section 6 concern directors of owner-manager companies. Hicks’ 
survey found that almost 75% of disqualified people were owner-managers 
and that 82% of the disqualified held shares in the companies they directed. 
Thus, disqualification is a sanction that appears to be targeted at ‘unfit’ 
conduct in owner-managed companies.
Section 6 itself provides that a person shall be disqualified from 
being a director in any case where a court is satisfied:
51 Sections 9A and 9B (competition undertakings), were inserted in the Act by the 
Enterprise Act 2002.
52 See Companies in 2001-2002, (London, The Stationary Office, 2002), table D l.
53 A. Hicks, Disqualification o f Directors: No Hiding Place for the Unit? (London,
Certified Accountants Educational Trust, 1998), chapter 3.
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“(a) that he is or has been a director of a company which has at any 
time become insolvent (whether while he was a director or 
subsequently) and;
(b) that his conduct as a director of that company (either taken alone 
or together with his conduct as a director of any other company or 
companies) makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of 
companies”
The section is given a wide scope by sub-section 6(3) of the Act, 
which states that the word ‘director’ in section 6(1) shall include a shadow 
director54. Indeed section 22(1) of the Act states that all references to 
‘directors’ in the Act shall include shadow directors. Under section 7 (1) of 
the Act an application for disqualification under section 6 (1) can be made 
by Secretary of State, or the Official Receiver, where it appears to the 
Secretary of State that it is “expedient in the public interest” that a person be 
disqualified. Following amendments to the Act introduced by the 
Insolvency Act 2000, it is now possible for a person to be disqualified by 
offering an undertaking to the Secretary of State that he will not act as a 
director. The Secretary of State may accept an offer of an undertaking, if he 
feels that it is “expedient in the public interest”55 to do so and if the 
conditions mentioned in section 6 (1) are satisfied56.
54 A shadow director is a person who acts as a director but who has not been formally 
appointed to the board. See section 741 (1) Companies Act 1985, see also section 251 
Insolvency Act 1986, and section 417(1) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Shadow 
directors are subject to the same duties as an appointed director.
55 Section 7(2A).
56 Ibid.
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Sections 6 and 7 therefore provide the State with a wide-ranging 
power to seek a disqualification order against (or accept an undertaking 
from) individuals who, in its opinion, have made undesirable use of limited 
liability as a vehicle for their entrepreneurial activities. The overwhelming 
majority of disqualifications under section 6 are now made in the form of 
undertakings. In 2003-2004, for example, undertakings accounted for 1,154 
of the 1,367 disqualifications obtained under section 6.57 The undertaking 
procedure is not however, limited to section 6. It is also possible for a person 
to be disqualified under section 8 by offering an undertaking to the Secretary 
of State58 and under section 9B by offering such an undertaking to the 
Director General of Fair Trading.
2.1.3 The Process of Disqualification.
It is a measure of the importance that disqualification under section 6 
has assumed that a sophisticated system for reporting suspected unfit 
conduct has been developed. Insolvency Practitioners and Official Receivers 
are at the centre of this system (thanks to the fact that section 6 provides for 
disqualification only after insolvency) and are responsible for investigating 
the conduct of directors and reporting evidence of unfitness to the Secretary 
of State, which in practice means the Disqualification Unit of the Insolvency 
Service. ‘Office holders’59 are therefore required by section 7(3) of the Act 
to report unfit conduct when it appears to them that the conditions
57 Companies in 2003-2004 (London, The Stationary Office, 2004), table D l.
58 Section 8(2A).
59 The class of persons qualifying as office holders for the purpose of the Act is set out in 
section 7 (3) (a) -(c).
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mentioned in section 6(1) are satisfied in relation to the conduct of a 
particular director. The Insolvent Companies (Reports on Conduct of 
Directors) Rules 199660, as amended, proscribe the manner in which the 
reporting obligation must be fulfilled. The rules provide that an office holder 
must make an ‘interim report’ to the Secretary of State under section 7(3) 
within six months of “the relevant date”61 if he feels that the conditions in 
section 6(1) are satisfied. This initial report is to be made on a form set out 
in schedule 1 of the 1996 rules and is called a D2 ‘Interim Return’. When an 
office holder submits an interim return he falls under an obligation to submit 
a final and full report on unfit conduct. It has now become the practice of the 
Insolvency Practitioner Control Unit (I.P.C.U)62 to notify the office holder 
of the date by which he is expected to submit a final report. In general, an 
office holder is expected to submit a final return within nine months of 
having filed an interim report. The final report is termed a Dl report by rule 
3 of the 1996 rules and the form that the Dl report is to take is again set out 
in schedule 1 of the rules. The duty on office-holders to report is reinforced
60 Statutory Instrument 1996/1909.
61 The relevant date is defined in rule 4 (4) as being :
“(a) in the case of a company in creditors' voluntary winding up (there having been no 
declaration of solvency by the directors under section 89 of the Insolvency Act 1986), 
the date of the passing of the resolution for voluntary winding up,
(b) in the case of a company in members' voluntary winding up, the date on which the 
liquidator forms the opinion that, at the time when the company went into liquidation, 
its assets were insufficient for the payment of its debts and other liabilities and the 
expenses of winding up,
(c) in the case of the administrative receiver, the date of his appointment,
(d) in the case of the administrator, the date of the administration order made in relation 
to the company.”
62The I.P.C.U., based in Birmingham, has responsibility for monitoring the activities of 
Insolvency Practitioners. All D2 reports are submitted to the I.P.C.U., which then forwards 
them to the Insolvency Service. Upon receiving a D2 report the unit will inform the 
Insolvency Practitioner of the date by which he must submit a lull D l report.
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by rule 4(7) of the 1996 Reporting Rules63, which makes it an offence for an 
office-holder to fail to comply with his duty without reasonable excuse. 
Similarly, office-holders who fail to submit reports promptly may be 
reported to his licensing authority or be himself disqualified from acting as 
an Insolvency Practitioner.64 Once a report has been received by the 
Secretary of State or the Official Receiver, section 7(4) of the Act permits 
the Secretary of State to require from the relevant office holder such further 
information and documentation as he may require.
After the Disqualification Unit has received a Dl report, it is vetted 
in order to determine whether there is sufficient prima facie evidence of 
unfitness to proceed with an investigation. If there is prima facie evidence, 
the Dl report is subject to a more detailed investigation. At the end of that 
investigation the Secretary of State again assesses whether it is in the ‘public 
interest’ to apply for a disqualification order65. However, section 7(2) of the 
Disqualification Act provides that, except with leave of court, an application 
under section 6, or the acceptance of a disqualification undertaking, must be 
made within 2 years of the date on which the company of which the person 
subject to a section 6 application was a director went into insolvency66.
63 Insolvent Companies (Reports on Unfit Conduct o f Directors) Rules 1996 (SI 
1996/1909).
64 See Insolvency Service, Dear Insolvency Practitioner Letter: Millennium Edition 
(London, Insolvency Service, 1999), chapter 10. Available at
http://www. insolvency.gov. uk/information/dearip/dearipmill/chapterl 0. htm
65 See, Guidance Notes for the Completion o f Statutory Reports and Returns, (London, 
Insolvency Service, 2001), appendix 3 ‘how a practitioner’s report is processed’.
66 Section 7(2) of the Disqualification Act states that an application for disqualification 
under section 6 must be made within 2 years of the date of insolvency, except where the 
court grants leave to bring proceedings out of time. The procedure for applications to bring 
and action under section 6 out of time is governed by Practice Direction: Disqualification 
Proceedings [1999] 1 BCLC 717.
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Thus, disqualification under section 6 is far from a token attempt to 
regulate directors. It is a serious form of ‘public interest’ regulation that 
plays a significant role in the government’s enterprise policy. However, as 
has been previously noted, the fact that public regulation of directors is felt 
necessary by the State suggests that private regulatory mechanisms fail to 
prevent undesirable conduct by directors. Thus, it is expedient to begin this 
evaluation of disqualification with a discussion of why public regulation of 
directors is needed. For, a proper understanding of the apparent ‘failure’ that 
creates the need for disqualification is essential if a meaningful analysis of 
the objectives and success of section 6 disqualification is to be made.
2.2 Agency Problems in the Company.
An essential function of company law is to control conflicts of 
interest that arise among the various actors within companies. The conflict 
that has pre-occupied most regulation of directors to date arises between 
shareholders and directors because of what economists call agency 
problems. An agency problem arises where the welfare of one party (the 
principal) depends upon the actions of another (the agent) and where the 
agent has an incentive to maximise his own welfare at the expense of his 
principal. Smith recognised that the structure of corporations created agency
A 7problems when he stated that :
67 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations. R. H. 
Campbell, and A.S, Skinner (eds). (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976). See also Fama, who 
states that the agency theory assumes that both directors and shareholders will be welfare 
maximises and will tend to act in a self interested way, as such controls need to be placed
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“The directors of... [joint-stock] companies...being the managers of 
other peoples’ money rather than their own, it cannot well be 
expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartney frequently 
watch over their own.. .Negligence and profusion must always
/TO
prevail, more or less in the management of such a company ”. 
However, in addition to the agency problem between shareholders and 
directors an agency problem can also arise between companies and third 
parties, such as trade creditors, employees and customers69, in so far as 
companies have an incentive to maximise their own welfare at the expense 
of their creditors.
2.2.1 Agency Problems and Shareholder Monitoring.
The existence of agency problems calls for principals to engage in 
monitoring (regulation) of their agents, which in the case of directors and 
shareholders, requires shareholders to monitor directors. Monitoring is 
therefore a form of private regulation that allows shareholders to safeguard 
their own welfare by preventing directors acting negligently or engaging in 
self dealing, which indeed, is the general rationale offered for shareholder 
monitoring of directors.
on agents’ activities. See E. Fama E Agency Problems and the Theory o f the Firm (1980) 88 
J. Pol. Econ. 288.
68 Ibid. page 741.
69 R. Kraaakman, P. Davies, H Hansmann. G. Hertig, K. Hopt. H. Kanda and E. Rock, The 
Anatomy o f Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, (Oxford, O.U.P. 
2004), chapter 2.
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In The Wealth o f Nations’, Smith was clear that shareholders had 
such a controlling influence over directors when he stated that:
“The trade of the joint stock company is always managed by a court of 
directors. The court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many respects, to the 
control of the general court of proprietors [shareholders]70”.
Similarly, in the models of the company presented by Alchain71, 
Alchian and Demsetz72 and Jensen and Meckling73 the primary 
responsibility for the disciplining of directors is placed on the shareholders. 
Markets provide some assistance in this task74, but fundamentally the burden 
is placed on shareholders and is justified by the proprietary nature of the
nc
shareholders’ interest in the company . Shareholder monitoring is also a 
central aspect of the model of the company put forward by adherents to the 
nexus-of-contracts theory who describe agency problems as problems which 
can be solved by shareholders negotiating sufficiently binding contracts with 
directors to ensure that directors act in a way which maximises shareholder
~ f f \welfare and prevents opportunism . Some assistance in preventing agency
7 7problems is also given by the effect of market forces . The emphasis on
70 Supra note 67 at page. 741.
71 A. Alchain. Corporate Management and Property Rights, in Economic Policy and the 
Regulation o f Corporate Securities, (Ed) G. Manne. (Washington, American Enterprise 
Inst. Public Policy Res. 1969).
12A. Alchain, H. Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization. 
(1972) A.E.R 62.
3 M. Jensen, & W. Meckling, Theory o f the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, (1976) J. Financial Econ. 305.
74 See, Alchian supra note 71.
75 The notion that shareholders have a proprietary interest in corporations has, however, 
been challenged by Paddy Ireland, see Ireland, Company Law and the Myth o f Shareholder 
Ownership (1999) 62 M.L.R. 32.
76Jensen and Meckling, supra note 73 and F. Easterborook, & D. Fischel, The Economic 
Structure O f Corporate Law, (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1991).
77 See for example Easterbrook and Fischel, ibid.
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private bargaining as a sufficient regulatory control fits well into the 
contractualists’ general view of the company as a complex web of contracts 
and allows monitoring problems to be explained away as problems of 
contractual negotiation, which can be solved by contractual re-negotiation. 
It is no surprise that a logical consequence of viewing director-monitoring 
problems as problems of contracting is the rejection of the need for
78mandatory regulation of directors .
The main assertion of contractual analysis is therefore that agency 
problems can be resolved thorough ex ante measures, rather than ex post 
through expensive monitoring of directors’ actions when in office. However, 
many scholars who analyse the firm in contractual terms recognise that 
shareholder monitoring through contract is supplemented by fiduciary 
duties, which are explained as necessary due to the prohibitive cost of 
reducing the elaborate terms necessary to solve all agency problems into a 
contract79
That private shareholder monitoring, based on proprietary notions, is 
a central aspect of the State’s approach towards the regulation of directors is 
evident from the government’s response to the recent resurgence of the ‘fat 
cat’ pay debate. In her forward to the consultation document “Rewards for 
Failure ” Directors Remuneration -  Contracts, Performance and
78 See, P. Ireland, Implicit Contract as Ideology, in D. Campbell, H. Collins and J. 
Wightman, (eds) Implicit Dimensions o f Contract, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003).
79 F. Easterborook, & D. Fischel, The Economic Structure o f Corporate Law, supra note 76, 
pages 90-93.
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Severance80, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Patricia Hewitt, 
declared that the Government has:
“made clear that setting directors’ pay...is a matter for those companies 
and their shareholders. It is for shareholders as the owners of the company 
to ensure that remuneration levels and structures provide the right 
incentives and that directors are held to account for company performance 
[my emphasis]81 ”
She further states that:
“The Government is committed to a fiamework of company law 
and corporate governance which enables the owners of companies to 
exercise their responsibilities in an effective way and promotes high 
standards of shareholder activism82”
The existence of a regulatory relationship between shareholders and 
directors is therefore clearly felt.
2.2.2 Agency Problems and Third Parties.
Other groups within the corporate sphere who suffer potential 
agency problems also have to utilise methods of private ‘monitoring’ to 
avoid agency costs. In this instance ‘monitoring’ will most likely have its 
basis in a contract concluded between the third party and the company and, 
as such, forms no part of the prevalent models of the company. However, 
third parties face two distinct monitoring tasks. First they must monitor the 
‘company’ as whole to ensure that it does not seek to maximise its own
80 (London, Department of Trade and Industry, 2003).
81 Ibid, ‘Forward by the Secretary o f State Patricia Hewitt’, page 5.
82 Ibid, page 6.
40
welfare at their expense. Second, however, third parties will need to monitor 
the conduct of directors to ensure that they do not seek to maximise their 
personal welfare (as distinct from the company’s welfare) in a manner that is 
detrimental to third parties. Self-dealing by a director (whereby he 
appropriates company assets for himself) is a good example conduct 
detrimental to third the welfare of shareholders and trade creditors, 
customers and employees83 because self dealing is likely to reduce the 
company’s assets and hence the ability of the company to settle its debts. 
However, in respect of this agency problem, shareholder monitoring of 
directors is of assistance to creditors because, if successful, it ought to 
reduce ‘negligence and profusion’ and consequently reduce the need for 
creditors to monitor directors. . Therefore shareholder monitoring of 
directors, benefits not only shareholders themselves, but also third parties 
who deal with the company. As such, shareholder monitoring is an 
important tool in establishing effective private regulatory controls on 
directors, which reduces the likelihood of undesirable conduct, to the benefit 
of several parties. Consequently, when shareholders monitoring fails several 
groups stand to lose out. If creditors wish to protect themselves from the 
agency problem arising between them and corporate controllers, they 
therefore have to incur the expense of attempting to control ‘negligence and 
profusion’ themselves. In so far as creditors are more remote from the
83 Unless otherwise indicated I shall use the general term ‘creditors’ to refer to all of these 
groups.
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company than shareholders those expenses could be considerably higher 
than then those incurred by shareholders.
It should, however, be stressed that shareholder monitoring does not 
erase all risk which third parties face from companies and their directors, as 
for example, in the situation where shareholder (i.e. company) and creditor 
interests directly conflict. In this situation the directors are, provided the 
company is solvent, bound to prefer the interests of shareholders because of 
their duty to act bona fide in the best interests of the company84, in which 
case creditors’ only protection from agency problems lies in bargaining with 
the company. Nevertheless, the monitoring of directors by shareholders lies 
at the heart of the corporate governance model in the Anglo-American legal 
tradition as the principal means to prevent opportunism by directors. This is 
clearly evident from the fact that the fiduciary duties of directors, developed
or #
by the common law, are owed the company , which essentially means the 
majority of the shareholders
84Generally directors are required to act “bona fide in what they consider.. .is the interests of 
the company and not for ant collateral purpose” per Lord Greene MR in Re Smith and 
Fawcett [1942] Ch. 304 at 306. Any act that is not bona fide in the interests of the company 
would be ultra vires, as was the case in Hutton v West Cork Railway Company (1883) 23 
Ch.D 654. However, in the final stages before a company becomes insolvent the duty to the 
company becomes subsumed by a duty to creditors. The precise instances where directors 
owe a duty to creditors have not been comprehensively defined, but it appears from the 
authorities that such a duty is owed; (i) when the company is insolvent {WestMercia 
Safetywear v Dodd [1998] 4 BCC 30; where the company is near to insolvency {Brady v 
Brady [1988] 3 BCC 535; where there is a ‘risk’ o f insolvency {West Mercia Saftywear v 
D odd) or even where the company is going through a period of financial instability ( Facia 
Footwear Ltd v Hinchcliff[1998] 1 BCLC 218). For academic discussion of the duty to 
creditors see D. Prentice, Creditors Interests and Directors Duties (1990) 10 OJLS 265 and 
A. Keay, The Directors Duty to Take into Account the Interests o f  Company Creditors:
When is it Triggered? (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 315.
85 Re Smith and Fawcett, ibid.
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However, whilst the prevalent model86 of the company clearly 
advocates private shareholder regulation as the means to control undesirable 
conduct by directors, it has long been recognised that such monitoring is far 
from guaranteed to be successful and in this, the roots of public regulation of 
directors can be found.
2.3 Passivity, Ignorance and Managerialism.
That shareholders are often unwilling or unable to monitor directors 
is an old story. Smith, for example, noted that:
“ the greater part of those proprietors seldom pretend to understand 
anything of the business of the company; and...give themselves no 
trouble about it, but receive contentedly such...dividend...as the 
directors think proper to make them”87.
In many ways Smith’s observation reflects the nature of 
shareholding in the eighteenth century, when Joint Stock Companies were 
viewed as a vehicle for the excess capital of the public to be put to good use 
by entrepreneurs and expert managers. The public at large who invested in 
railway companies, for example, could hardly be expected to understand the 
best way to manage a railway company. Therefore, the likelihood of them
86 See for example, M. Stokes, Company Law and Legal Theory in W. Twinning, (ed.)
Legal Theory and Common Law, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1986) in which the author describes 
shareholder regulation as part o f ‘the model’ o f company law. Stokes also draws an analogy 
between the regulatory nature of the shareholder -  director relationship and the relationship 
between a government (executive) and Parliament. The analogy has also been drawn in 
previous editions of a leading company law text. See, Gower’s Principles o f Modem 
Company Law, P. Davies, Gower’s Principles o f Modem Company Law, 6th Ed, (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), page 15.
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being effective monitors of management must always have been debatable. 
The advent of general limited liability in 1855 is likely to have reduced still 
further the prospect of active shareholder monitoring. For by allowing 
shareholders to put a cap on the financial risk that they face from 
investment, limited liability reduces the incentive for shareholders to 
monitor directors88.
The recognition that shareholders are often ‘passive and ignorant’ of 
the company’s affairs significantly undermines the notion that private 
shareholder monitoring is an effective control on undesirable conduct by 
directors in itself89. However the problems with shareholder monitoring do 
not stop with general passivity and ignorance, for the weakness of many 
shareholders in the face of powerful management represents a further set 
back for the notion of shareholder monitoring.
2.3.1 The Division of Ownership and Control.
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was a 
rapid expansion of share ownership such that the average number of shares 
held by investors, relative to the total shareholding in large companies 
declined to a very small percentage of the total. Berle and Means in The 
Modem Corporation and Private Property discussed the effects of this
87 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations, supra note 67, 
page 741.
88 Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure o f Corporate Law, supra, note 76.
89 On the changed role of the shareholder see, J. Hill, Changes in the Role o f the 
Shareholder, and R. Austin. Commentary on Hill, both in, R Grantham & C Rickett, (eds) 
Corporate Personality in the 2(fh Century, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998). For a 
comparative discussion of shareholder oversight as a regulatory control on corporate
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phenomenon90 and argued that the consequence of this fragmentation of 
shareholding was to attenuate communication and the flow of information 
between the board and shareholders and between the shareholders 
themselves to such a degree that effective discretionary power over large 
corporations lay in the hands of the active management, i.e. the directors91. 
This phenomenon was termed ‘managerialism’92. Of course, in a strict sense 
the ownership and control of large corporations always had been separate, at 
least in the eyes of the traditional corporate governance model. However, 
what Berle and Means claimed was that the smallness of the stake most 
shareholders held in such companies exacerbated the pre-existing problems 
of passivity and ignorance to such a degree that not only had it became 
unlikely that shareholders would exercise their monitoring powers (as Smith 
noted), it became almost impossible. In effect Berle and Means’ thesis 
demonstrated that shareholder monitoring, either ex ante or ex post could not 
solve ‘agency’ problems in large corporations93.
management, see, L. Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: the 
United States as a Model? also in Granthem and Rickett.
90 A. Berle, & G. Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property, 1967 edn, (New 
York, Macmillan, 1932).
91 For another view of the consequences of the division of ownership and control in 
companies see, M C. Jensen. & E. F. Fama, ‘Separation o f  Ownership and Control', (1983) 
26 Journal of Law and Economics 301.
92 According to Berle and Means ‘managerialsim’ could also arise where a company was 
completely owned by managers; through control o f the company by managers who hold a 
majority o f shares; through managers controlling the company by means of some legal 
device and through minority control. The majority o f their thesis, however, concerned the 
management control caused by the division of ownership and control.
93 It has also been argued that ‘managerialism’ illustrated that shareholders could no longer 
be looked upon as the ‘owners’ of the corporation. See for example Ireland, Company Law 
and the Myth o f Shareholder Ownership, supra note 75.
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In Britain the findings of Berle and Means were reflected in the 
report of the 1945 Cohen Committee94, which observed that the:
“illusory nature of the control theoretically exercised by shareholders 
over directors has been accentuated by the dispersion of capital 
among an increasing number of small shareholders.”95 
The committee’s research showed that, as was the case in the U.S, 
the share capital of many large British companies had become dispersed 
during the 1930’s and 40’s96 and recommended that the weakness of 
shareholder control this brought about necessitated reform of English 
company law. ‘Managerialism’, did not however, cause the committee to 
lose faith in shareholder monitoring as an effective way to prevent 
opportunism. Rather, the committee felt that the most desirable response to 
managerialism was to increase the flow of information to shareholders by 
forcing directors to disclose certain information and to increase the matters 
that the law required the general meeting to ratify.
2.2.2 The Response to Managerialism.
The response to failings in shareholder monitoring adopted by the 
Cohen committee continues to influence policy makers to the present day. 
The Company Law Review Group, for example, recently stated that it
94 The Board of Trade, Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, (Chairman 
Mr Justice Cohen) Cmnd. 6659 (London, HMSO, 1945). See also Report o f the Company 
Law Committee, (Chairman Lord Jenkins) Cmnd. 1749 (London, HMSO, 1962) para. 105, 
which documented the same phenomenon.
95 ‘Cohen Committee’, ibid. para 7
96 Ibid., paras., 40 and 125.
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believed that it was the “ultimate powers of control of shareholders” which 
should ensure corporate powers were not abused, and that:
“[f]or this approach to work effectively, shareholders need timely and high 
quality information to enable them to assess the performance of the company and 
the directors’ stewardship of their assets”97
Prevailing policy is therefore based on the belief that effective 
shareholder monitoring of directors is possible where shareholders are 
properly informed about the activities of directors. Thus, the State’s 
response to problems with private shareholder regulation has not been to 
completely replace it with public regulation, rather, it has sought to facilitate
• ORprivate regulation through the imposition of mandatory rules , such as 
forcing directors to disclose certain information to shareholders" and 
empowering the general meeting100, which is intended to create the ideal 
conditions in which shareholder monitoring will take place.
As such, one of the major themes of company law regulation for the 
past 60 years has been the proliferation of company law rules that force 
directors to disclose financial information to shareholders and increase the 
powers of the general meeting101. However, the effectiveness of this strategy 
must be questioned in light of the general tendency for shareholders to be
97 Company Law Steering Group, Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Completing the Structure, (London, Department of Trade and Industry, 2000).
98 The use of mandatory rules to minimise undesirable conduct by directors is the response 
to the failing of shareholder monitoring favoured by one eminent author. See M. A. 
Eisenberg, The Structure o f the Corporation (Boston, Little Brown, 1976).
99 See part VII Accounts and Audits, Companies Act 1985.
100 See for example the provisions of Part XI of the Companies act 1985.
101 See for example the Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/1986). 
These regulations sought to address concerns over excessive boardroom remuneration by 
requiring a remuneration report to be laid before the general meeting and to allow
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passive and ignorant noted by, amongst others, Smith. For, even if the 
particular problems of managerialism are overcome it is by no means certain 
that shareholders will be effective monitors. Indeed, the current emphasis on 
encouraging institutional investors102 to become active monitors suggests 
that increasing the flow of information to ordinary shareholders has not 
stimulated sufficient monitoring. However, even the likely effectiveness of 
institutional investors can be doubted as numerous studies and a recent 
report commissioned by the Treasury103, has cast doubt upon the likelihood 
of institutions being effective monitors of management.104 It must also be 
noted that institutional investment is only a possible source of increased
shareholders an ‘advisory vote’ on the report. The regulations also force enhanced 
disclosure of directors’ employment contracts.
102 The proportion of shares vested in institutional investors rather than private individuals, 
which was already substantial in 1970’s, rapidly expanded in the 1980’s and 90’s, such that 
by the late 1990’s well over 50% the UK equity market was owned by institutions. The 
importance of institutional investment for shareholder monitoring is that it concentrates 
share ownership in the hands of a few professional investment organisations This 
concentration ought to reduce ‘passivity and ignorance’ as well as alleviating the problems 
of managerialism in modem firms. For, as institutional shareholders hold shares on a 
professional basis it could be expected that they would be able to draw on a pool of 
expertise in assessing the successes of directors and thus could be effective monitors both 
ex ante through contractual bargaining and ex post in on-the-job monitoring.
103 P. Mynres, Institutional Investment in the UK; A Review, (London, HMSO, 2001). The 
report found evidence of a general reluctance amongst institutional investors to tackle 
under-performance in investee companies, particularly a reluctance to take pre-emptive 
action to prevent troubled companies developing serious problems, see paragraphs 5.73- 
5.94. The report noted {ibid. para. 5.84) that in 1999 the voting levels of Institutional 
Investors were low at around 50%.
104See, Stapledon G. Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1996), who, notes that institutional monitoring of directors is only one 
element of a complex system of corporate control which presents certain difficulties to 
effective monitoring by institutional investors. Stapeldon further states that if  an 
institutional investor is dissatisfied with company management he is much more likely to 
sell his shares in the company rather than attempting the difficult, expensive and time- 
consuming task of motivating his fellow shareholders into regulatory action. See also, B. 
Black, and J. Coffee, ‘Hail Britannia ’? Institutional Investor Behaviour Under Limited 
Regulation ’, (1994) 92 Michigan Law Review 1997. Black points out that the willingness of 
institutional investors to question the actions of the board could be limited by other 
relationships, both corporate and personal, which the institution has with the company.
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monitoring in listed companies and has no relevance to monitoring in other 
companies, where problems of passivity will remain.
Indeed, even as far as public companies with potentially active 
shareholders are concerned, the increasing prominence given to other 
monitoring strategies, such as increasing the role and effectiveness of non­
executive or independent directors105 would appear to be a response to the 
limitations of shareholder monitoring per se rather than the effects of 
managerialism. For, as the corporate scandals of the late 1980s and early 
1990s demonstrated106, the panoply of mandatory rules in company law did 
not prevent serous instances of undesirable conduct.
It is therefore surprising that shareholder monitoring continues lie at
1 07the heart of the Companies Act provisions and government policy . 
However, despite the faith that is placed on shareholder monitoring the 
existence of disqualification suggests at least some acknowledgement that 
undesirable conduct cannot be controlled through private regulation. How 
then, does disqualification fit with the focus on private shareholder 
monitoring?
105 On non-executive directors see generally B. Cheffins Company Law: Theory Structure 
and Operation (Oxford, Claredon Press, 1997), chapter 13. The Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance (London, Financial Reporting Council, 2003) assigns a special 
regulatory role to non-executive directors, particularly in terms o f nominating persons to the 
board and supervising remuneration packages. The provision A.3.1. of the code states 7 
factors against which the ‘independence’ o f directors should be judged. Principle A.3 of the 
code states that boards should include a balance of executive and non-executive directors, 
such that no individual or group of individuals is able to dominate the board. There has 
recently been a flurry of official activity concerning the regulatory potential of non­
executive and independent directors aimed at maximising their impact. See, D. Higgs, A 
Review o f the Role and Effectiveness o f Non-Executive Directors (London, The Stationary 
Office, 2003)
106 For example, the collapse of the Maxwell Group Pic and PolyPeck International.
107 See, for example, the statement of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, at 2.2.1, 
supra.
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The answer to this question would seem to be that disqualification is 
primarily aimed at companies where private monitoring is impossible and 
thus the policy that relies upon it ineffective. That is not to say that the focus 
on (private) shareholder regulation outlined above necessarily excludes 
public regulation in cases where shareholder monitoring can take place. For 
where private regulation fails due to passivity and ignorance there may be 
scope for public regulation of directors. However, it is suggested that 
disqualification largely responds to structural breakdowns in the theory of 
shareholder monitoring in many companies that prevents the regulatory 
devices discussed above from effectively tackling undesirable conduct.
2.4 The need to Regulate Directors of Owner-managed
Companies.
2.4.1 Shareholder Monitoring.
The corporate governance model at the heart of the Anglo-American
tradition is based upon the joint stock company of the 19th century, a central
feature of which (as I have discussed) was that directors’ conduct would be
monitored by a body of shareholders who were materially different persons
from the managers (directors) of the company. Most corporate theorists
108accept this as the basis for their models of monitoring and debate tends to 
focus on how to ensure adequate monitoring by shareholders takes place
108 See, Alchain, supra note 71, Jensen and Meckling, supra note 73 and Easterbrook and 
Fischel, supra note 79
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within this model. So, whilst some favour mandatory legal rules (such as 
disclosure obligations) to achieve this109, and some analyse it in terms of the 
nexus-of-contracts110 all appear to be agreed on the basic point that 
shareholders should monitor directors. In large companies with divided 
ownership and control the necessary conditions for such strategies to be 
successful exist and there is no reason why shareholders should not regulate 
should they be willing and able to do so. In many smaller companies 
however, the conditions for shareholder monitoring do not exist and any 
regulatory strategy that relies upon shareholder activism is simply not 
viable. For, where shareholders are also directors, the general meeting of 
‘shareholders’ cannot have an effective monitoring function.
2.4.2 The Dominance of Small Companies.
The DTI’s annual statistical publication ‘Companies in’ shows that 
over 99% of all registered companies in England and Wales are private 
companies111, and that most (1,235,000 out of the total 1,706,700) have an 
issued share capital of £100 or less112. Research carried out for the Company 
Law Review showed that 70% of registered companies had only one or two 
shareholders, and 90% had less than 5 shareholders113 and recent statistics 
from the Department of Work and Pensions estimate that there are one third
109 See, for example, M. Eisenberg, The Structure o f Corporation Law, 89 Col. Law. Rev, 
1461.
110 For example, Jensen & Meckling, supra note 73, Fama, supra note 122 and Easterbrook 
and Fishel, supra note 76.
111 Companies in 2003-2004 (London, HMSO, 2004), table A2.
112Ibid, table A7. The particular problems posed for shareholder oversight of directors in 
owner-managed companies are note by Lowenstein, supra, note 89.
113 See Company Law Review, Modem Company Law For a Competitive Economy, 
Developing the Framework (London, DTI, 2000), para 6.9.
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of a million companies which employ only their owners114. Thus, the 
‘average’ company is private with a very small share capital and only one or 
two shareholders, who in all probability, also sit on the board115. Such 
companies have often been called ‘quasi-partnership companies’, but this 
description would be misleading in companies with only one active director 
who owns a majority of the company’s shares,; such entities are little more 
than ‘incorporated sole traderships’. Of course in terms of capital, quoted 
public companies dominate the far greater number of private companies116. 
However, that does not mean that company law should ignore the regulatory 
problems that exist in non-quoted companies, for deficiencies in the control 
of directors in these companies has a significant impact on their creditors.
2.4.3 The Breakdown of the Model.
In their consideration of the monitoring of directors in small 
companies, emphasis is often placed on ex ante bargaining between 
shareholders as a safeguard against ‘negligence and profusion’ . Thus, is has 
been variously stated, in academic literature that “[i]n closely held 
corporations, shareholders often will bargain out at least some structural and 
distributional rules”117, or “[a]s well as having the legal status of contract the 
articles [of private Companies] can also be meaningfully described as
114 Department of Work and Pensions press release, “ Good News for Small Companies -  
Kennedy” 14th October 2004.
115 A situation common too many private companies since their inception. Indeed, this was 
so in the case which is seen by many as one o f the foundations of limited liability in English 
law: Salomon v Salomon [1897] A.C. 22, where Mr Salomon was both the majority 
shareholder and director of his (private) company.
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having been determined by a contractual process”,118 or even “[i]n their 
deliberations courts have in different ways acknowledged the personality- 
rich, contractual nature of shareholding in such [private] companies”.119
However, the claim that bargaining will take place (and hence act as 
a restraint on undesirable conduct) in small companies, must be doubted in 
companies that are owner-managed, of which there are many. In such 
companies shareholder monitoring, either ex ante through contractual 
bargaining or indeed ex post through on-the-job monitoring, is largely 
impossible. For, where there is unity of ownership and control between the 
board and the general meeting no ex ante bargaining over the structural rules 
of the company will take place and neither will ex post monitoring of 
directors by shareholders occur. As such, monitoring mechanisms that rely 
upon an independent body of shareholders for their effectiveness (such as ex 
ante bargaining), are useless in companies where both owners and managers 
are the same people. As such directors of owner-managed companies will 
not be subject to the discipline of private shareholder regulation.
Of course, one should take care to avoid too broad a generalisation 
about the probability of shareholder monitoring taking place in the ‘average 
company’. At one end of the spectrum, it is clear that no monitoring or ex 
post or ex ante will take place in the one man company, however, in the two
116 In 2004, for example, the issued capital of the largest 2% of registered companies 
accounted for over 98% of the total capital issued by English and Welsh companies, see 
Companies in 2003-2004 (London, DTI, 2004), table A7.
117 Eisenberg, The Structure o f Corporation Law, 89 Col. Law. Rev. 1461 at 1463.
118 J. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1993), at
page 183.
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shareholder, quasi-partnership, company we can be less certain. If both 
shareholders are on the board it is likely at least some ‘bargaining’, will take 
place. However, any such bargaining over structural rules is unlikely to 
constitute an effective monitoring mechanism. In such companies 
bargaining is likely to be self-interested and be unconcerned with preventing 
undesirable conduct so long as it benefits both owner-managers. In other 
‘quasi partnership’ companies shareholders may entirely passive and take no 
interest in the company’s affairs, a scenario similar to that in Salomon v 
Salomon Ltd120. Again, in such a company, no meaningful bargaining over 
structural rules, or ex post monitoring is likely to take place. Of course, the 
precise scope of monitoring by fellow owner-managers will vary from 
company to company. Nevertheless, what is obvious is that owner-managed 
companies do not conform to many of the assumptions that underlie the idea 
of shareholder monitoring as a mechanism to control undesirable conduct 
uses.
2.4.4 Agency Problems in Owner-Managed Companies.
However, before discussing the potential problems that the 
breakdown of shareholder monitoring in owner-managed companies causes, 
it is important to state that the complete unity, or a substantial overlap, of 
ownership and control in the ‘average’ company solves at a stroke the 
‘agency’ problems associated with a division in ownership and control. For,
119 P. Ireland, Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory, [2003] Legal 
Studies 453, at page 479.
120 [1897] A.C. 22.
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in owner-managed companies directors have control over their own money 
and in Smith’s words ‘negligence and profusion’ need not prevail in their 
management of the corporation121. Thus, the perfect alignment of welfare
1 99goals that owner-management brings removes the need for directors to be 
monitored either ex ante or ex post in so far as monitoring is intended to 
prevent directors acting opportunistically to the determent of shareholders.
This therefore brings us to the crucial question of whether there is 
‘need’ to regulate director/shareholders of owner-managed companies if the 
agency problem that has preoccupied the regulation of directors is resolved 
naturally. The answer to this question must be that in so far as regulation is 
intended to prevent directors from maximising their own welfare at the 
expense of shareholders, it is not needed in owner-managed companies. 
However, resolution of this agency problem is not the only factor supporting 
the idea that directors’ conduct should be regulated in some way.
2.4.5 Protecting Creditors.
Analysis of shareholder monitoring should not confine itself to 
viewing shareholder regulation solely in relation to the agency problem that 
arises between shareholders and directors, because whilst the shareholder- 
director agency question is the main motivating force behind shareholder 
monitoring it must also be viewed, in a broader context, as an important 
general control on undesirable conduct. The twin doctrines of separate
121 Smith, supra note 67.
122 See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory o f the Firm (1980) 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288, 
pages 295-296.
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corporate personality and limited liability make such control extremely 
important. For, the notion that those who exercise corporate power are 
constrained in their use of it is inherent in a model that divides power 
between shareholders and directors. In the ‘classical’ company, directors’ 
day-to-day management is subject to review by shareholders and also 
shareholders exercise of corporate power is to some extent curtailed by the 
need to ‘bargain’ with directors. Thus, each group within the company is to 
some extent accountable to the other for its activities. Of course, the extent 
to which the division of power between shareholders prevented the abuse of 
corporate power in relation to the workforce, for example, can be 
exaggerated. Welfare maximising shareholders and directors are free to 
conspire to satisfy their own welfare goals at the expense of such groups. 
However, where successful monitoring takes place it should at least protect 
creditors from dishonesty or negligence on the part of directors.
Therefore, in many private companies the absolute unity of 
ownership and control poses as many problems as does the separation of 
ownership and control in public companies. For, whereas the separation of 
ownership and control in larger companies creates the danger that a lack of 
monitoring will lead corporate managers (directors) to pursue their own 
welfare goals at the expense of shareholders, an absolute unity of ownership 
and control creates the danger that a lack of monitoring will cause owner- 
managers to pursue their own welfare goals in a fraudulent, negligent or 
reckless manner, to the detriment of creditors. In short, when shareholder
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monitoring fails, undesirable conduct by directors is more likely and this 
conduct primarily impacts on creditors.
This increased agency problem between owner-managed companies 
and their creditors is not resolved by the majority of company law rules 
which can be classed as regulatory in nature. For, much legal regulation of 
directors (as has been discussed) relies on action by independent 
shareholders to be effective123. Thus, in an owner-managed company the 
director need not be concerned even with his fiduciary duties, such as the 
duty to act honestly and for proper purpose, because such duties cannot 
effectively be enforced against him. For as the only shareholder, he owes 
such duties only to himself. Thus, he is free to engage in acts such as self- 
dealing with little risk of sanction124. However, whilst in this scenario the 
breach of fiduciary duties would clearly not harm ‘the shareholder’ of the 
company, it would have a detrimental impact upon the company’s creditors. 
Therefore, the lack of any monitoring in owner-managed companies leaves 
directors free of internal regulatory controls on their conduct and, as such, 
exposes creditors to a degree of negligence and profusion that is not the case 
where shareholder monitoring is effective.
123 An exception to this would be the criminal sanctions contained in Part X of the 
Companies Act 1985, which obviously do not rely on shareholder activism to be applied. 
However, the instances where the State imposes criminal sanctions are, on the whole, 
limited to breaches of specific provisions of the Act and not concerned with the task of 
ensuring that directors act honestly, for proper purpose and with due care.
124 The only instance in which owner-managers would be subject to ‘regulatory action’ for 
harm done to the company is in insolvency where the liquidator can apply to court for the 
recovery of certain proceeds of self dealing (e.g. transactions at an undervalue contrary to 
section 238 of the Insolvency Act 1986) as well as seeking a remedy for harm done to the 
company as a result of a breach of fiduciary duties.
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Thus, the failure of shareholder monitoring in owner-managed 
companies creates conditions in which undesirable conduct can occur and go 
unchallenged. As such it would appear to create a real need for regulation. 
However, before moving to a firm conclusion as to the impact this 
regulatory failure on the need for public regulation, it is worth pausing to 
consider whether other mechanisms can act as a break on undesirable 
conduct not only in owner-managed companies, but also in larger
I ' l r  I
companies. For, several authors such as Manne and Alchian , have 
asserted that shareholder monitoring is supplemented by discipline of 
markets, which can themselves resolve agency problems. If it were the case 
that markets could control undesirable conduct, then the need for regulation 
created by the structural failure of shareholder monitoring in owner- 
managed companies and failure due to passivity and ignorance in larger 
companies, could not so easily be seen as necessitating public regulation in 
the form of disqualification. The regulatory impact of three markets, the 
product market, the market for directors and the market of corporate control, 
have been particularly vigorously advocated as a mechanism to control 
directors conduct and will be considered here.
125 H. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, (1967) 53 Va. L. R. 
259.
126 A. Alchain, Corporate Management and Property Rights, in H. Manne, (ed), Economic 
Policy and the Regulation o f Corporate Securities. (Washington, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969).
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2.5 The Effect of ‘Markets’ on Directors’ Conduct.
2.5.1 The Product Market.
The central claim of other than financial economics is that the 
market for a company’s product will effectively prevent its directors from 
acting in an improper manner. For, when directors act improperly, the firm 
will become inefficient, its products uncompetitive and falling sales in the
1 9 7product market will plunge the firm into insolvency . However, Eisenberg 
doubts the effectiveness of product markets due to the fact that imperfect
1 98markets may not convert misconduct by directors into insolvency . In 
addition to such concerns, it is also unclear, for example, whether certain 
types of conduct that are regarded as undesirable in the current legal 
environment, would have the effect of making a firm uncompetitive and 
therefore be effectively sanctioned by the product market. Research 
undertaken in this thesis reveals that a large proportion of directors are 
disqualified because it is found that they have ‘retained crown money’, i.e.
1 9 0not paid taxes due by the company . It is unlikely, that the product market 
would ever have the effect of preventing this type of action because 
successfully withholding taxes would effectively cut a company’s cost-base 
and make it more competitive. However immoral or illegal such an action 
may be, it certainly could have the effect of making a company’s products
127 H. Butler, The Contractual Theory o f the Corporation, (1989) 11 Geo. Mason U.L. 99.
128 Eisenberg, supra, note 117.
129 See chapter 4, below.
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less expensive. Thus, the product market would not per se convert a 
common form of director misconduct into insolvency.
Nonetheless, even if the product market did convert misconduct into 
insolvency, the remedy provided is drastic and does not help satisfy the 
welfare goals of either creditors or shareholders. Indeed, insolvency 
represents a loss for all parties concerned. Thus, the operation of the product 
market is not an ideal or necessarily satisfactory response to directors’ 
misconduct and can only serve as a mechanism to prevent misconduct 
continuing indefinitely. The goal for regulation of directors, be it private or 
public, must surely be to prevent misconduct occurring or deal with it before 
it leads to insolvency, for insolvency really represents a failure of regulation.
Another problem with the product market, is that by simply 
converting self-dealing into insolvency (thereby putting an end to abuse of 
limited liability), it does not prevent the director from re-incorporating 
another company and continuing his self-dealing. This, however, is not 
necessarily the fault of the product market, or any other market. In truth, it 
may be argued that the fault lies with the law in allowing directors of failed 
companies to become directors without any automatic check on their 
conduct or even, with owner-managed companies, allowing limited liability 
status to be as freely available as it is. However, these are arguments that go 
much deeper than their relevance to product markets and will be analysed in 
greater depth below130. Nevertheless, the conclusion that the product market
130 See chapters 3 and 9 below.
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is not a convincing force to prevent misconduct by directors, either in public 
or private companies, is clear.
2.5.2 The Market for Directors as Disciplinary Mechanism.
Another ‘market’ that has the potential to discipline directors is the 
directors’ employment market. Several authors have commented upon the 
potential of the ‘market for managers’ as a device to control undesirable 
conduct, Eugene Fama being a particularly strong advocate of this type of 
monitoring. Fama131 argues that the market for managers exerts pressure on 
companies to reward directors according to their conduct. In this model 
good conduct by directors is rewarded with larger salaries etc, and bad 
conduct is penalised by lower wages, and in the worst-case scenario, 
unemployability. Fama's model seeks to demonstrate at length how the 
‘contractual settling up’ of directors’ past conduct would occur and thus 
seeks to establish that this mechanism aligns the interests of shareholders 
and directors. Detailed review of the economic calculations and assumptions 
that underpin Fama’s model are not properly the subject of this thesis, 
however, the likely success of the ‘market for managers’ as a disciplinary 
mechanism for directors in England is. Therefore, I assume that Fama’s 
model is empirically viable and that directors’ past conduct can be taken into 
account by the market in setting ‘price’ for a particular directors services, 
i.e. that settling up can occur. The focus of this analysis will be whether
131Fama, supra, note 122.
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such settling up is likely to occur in English companies. It will consider the 
market for managers in terms of private and public companies separately.
2. 5.2.1 The Market for Managers in Public Companies.
Empirical research carried out in the United States found a statistical 
relationship between company performance and directors/executive 
salaries132, however, as Eiesenberg notes133, the statistical relationship was 
not strong, showing only a 1.4 cent rise for every $1000 of change in 
shareholder wealth. However, the theory cannot stand or fall on the results 
of just one survey. More important are several factors that may conspire to 
prevent settling up occurring in practice.
In order for any ‘market’ to work in an efficient manner, it is 
desirable for sellers (in this case directors ‘selling’ their services), to be 
different persons from buyers. In the context of the market for managers, the 
buyers of directors’ services are most often the shareholders acting through 
the AGM. However, it has been argued in many companies these conditions 
are not in place because shareholder passivity and ignorance inhibits the 
control shareholders can actually have over the appointment of directors, 
because where boards have the power to nominate directors for office (as 
most do) and control the proxy voting machinery, de jure power to appoint 
directors will lie with existing directors. Therefore, those who may act as 
buyers of directors’ service have strong personal interests in ensuring that 
the price paid for directors’ labour is high. Such links between buyers and
132M. Jensen, and K. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 
(University of Rochester Managerial Economics Research Centre Working Paper No. 89- 
OS, 1989).
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sellers could prevent contractual settling up taking place as the buyers may 
take self-interested factors into account (such as personal wages 
expectations) when purchasing labour from the market.
In the UK this problem has been addressed by the Cadbury 
Committee134 in its recommendation that nominations for appointment to the 
board should be made by a committee comprising of a majority of non­
executive directors. This recommendation has found expression in principal 
A.5.1. of the Combined Code135. These efforts to resolve the conflict of 
interest, combined with some willingness by institutional shareholders to 
play an active part in corporate governance are welcome attempts to 
improve the functioning of the market for managers. However, significant 
problems remain, not least regarding the degree of independence that non­
executive directors really have. Such directors remain directors who are 
responsible for recommending the appointment and remuneration of other 
directors (including non-executives). Therefore, the appearance of a conflict 
of interest remains and the effectiveness of non-executive directors is still 
the subject of debate136. For example, the appointment of Rupert Murdoch’s 
son to the post of chief executive of BskyB in November of 2003 was
133 Eiesenberg, supra note 117, page 1490.
134 Report o f the Committee on the Financial Aspects o f Corporate Governance, (London, 
Gee Publishing, 1992). See also the Hampel Report, Committee on Corporate Governance: 
Final Report, (London, Gee Publishing, 1998).
135 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, (London, Financial Reporting Council, 
2003).
136 The events surrounding the collapse of PollyPeck International Pic demonstrated that it 
can often be unrealistic to expect non-executive directors to control powerful managers. See 
generally Re PollyPeck International (No 2) [1994] 1 BCLC 574. The effectiveness of non­
executives was most recently the subject of a report requested by the DTI and Treasury.
See, Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness o f Non-executive Directors, supra note 
105.
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tainted by accusations that the non-executive directors responsible for 
recommending the appointment were too close to the company 
chairman.. .who happened to be Rupert Murdoch. Further, the requirement 
that nomination to the board be dealt with by special committees is only 
binding on companies listed on the L.S.E., to which the Combined Code 
applies. Public companies not listed are not required to make this 
arrangement and the traditional problem of conflicting interests remain.
Therefore, the potential conflict of interest in a system that has 
directors' appointments and pay recommended by other directors (whether 
executive or non-executive) is a barrier to the effective functioning of the 
market for managers in many public companies. Perhaps the best hope for 
this form of monitoring would be to require genuinely independent 
shareholders to vet nominations to the board. However, even with 
increasing signs of institutional shareholder activism, it is likely that the 
high transaction costs involved in inquiring into a director’s past conduct 
and undertaking the ‘settling up’ process in determining his remuneration 
would be a disincentive even for institutional shareholders to undertake the 
‘settling-up’ process. Some reliance upon the recommendations of the board 
is therefore inevitable. Thus, the market for managers in public companies is 
an imperfect disciplinary mechanism.
2.5.2.2 The Market for Managers and Owner-Managed Companies.
In his analysis of the operation of the ‘market for managers’ in 
owner-managed companies, Fama recognises that traditional market 
principles do not apply. However, he argues that the owner-manager was
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still subject to market discipline because he “consumed on the job” and 
therefore “could not avoid full ex post settling up with himself as a security 
holder”137. His reasoning appears to be that any misconduct committed as a 
director will be paid for as a shareholder, presumably through decreased 
business or in the case of sustained misconduct, insolvency. However, 
insolvency or decreased company profits do not necessarily mean that the 
owner-manager suffers a pecuniary loss from misconduct. If, for example, 
the misconduct included self-dealing on the part of the owner-manager, 
insolvency would not per se deprive him of the benefits obtained through 
the self-dealing. Similarly a reduction in profits to the company would not 
automatically mean that the owner-manager pays for misconduct if he 
directly appropriates corporate assets that causes decreased profits. Further, 
mismanagement of the company would not, due to the privilege of limited 
liability, mean that an owner-manager would normally have to contribute to 
company debts138 if insolvency did occur. Also, insolvency would not 
prevent the owner-manager incorporating a new company and becoming a 
director again. Therefore, it is far from certain that any ‘settling up’ which 
may take place would be detrimental to the owner-manager in a meaningful 
and remedial sense. Indeed, the privilege of limited liability ensures that
137 E. Fama, Agency Problems in the Theory o f the Firm, (1980) 88 J. Pol Econ. 288.
138 Only in instances where the courts agree to ‘lift the veil’ will director/shareholders be 
required to contribute to debts in insolvency. See for lifting the veil, Adams v Cape 
Industries [1990] Ch. 433. Instances where statute imposes liability include wrongful of 
fraudulent trading contrary to sections 213 and 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, see 
generally, P. Davies, Gower and Davies ’ Principles o f Company Law, 7th Ed, (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), pages 194-200,
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most of the losses from misconduct would be borne by creditors and any 
settling up as far as the director is concerned would not be onerous.
Therefore, the extent to which the demand for the services of 
directors in owner-managed firms can lead to contractual settling is 
questionable. And the fact that normal market principles do not apply to 
owner-managed companies cannot be ignored. For, the ‘settling up’ process 
can only take place where an element of competition for managers exists. 
However, in owner-managed companies, there is no such competition for 
services as the owner simply appoints himself manager. An owner-manager 
is not likely to undertake the ‘settling up’ process in appointing himself a 
director and deciding his own salary. He is most unlikely to assess his past 
performance as a manager and pay himself an appropriately lower salary if 
his conduct was not good. Indeed, it is unlikely that he will attach much 
blame to himself for any past corporate mishaps. Further, even if some 
directors undertook this process, the settling up model hardly seems a 
sufficient monitoring mechanism in itself. In essence the incentive to behave 
well is removed in owner-managed companies because salary is not 
determined by an independent assessment of conduct. Therefore the 
discipline of the market for managers is not a sufficiently plausible 
regulatory strategy for owner-managed companies.
2.5 3 The Market for Corporate Control.
Another market that is said to exert control on directors’ conduct is 
the market for corporate control. Manne’s basic claim is that the market for
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corporate control is “extraordinarily important” to the corporate governance
1 OQ
system and that it makes a vital contribution to the regulation of directors . 
He argues that if the managers of a corporation act against the best interests 
of the corporation the value of the company’s shares will fall and it will 
become vulnerable to takeover, in so far as the lower share price presents an 
opportunity for other entrepreneurs to obtain the company at a reduced 
price. If a takeover should then occur it, would, in all probability, lead to 
existing mangers loosing their jobs. Consequently Manne asserts that 
operation of the ‘market for corporate control’ discourages managers from 
putting their own interests above those of the company140.
It is clear that Manne’s argument that the market for corporate 
control eschews self-dealing’ by corporate managers relies on three matters 
fro its it potency. First, if the market is to function as envisaged, it is 
necessary for shares in companies to be freely tradable, second, it is also 
necessary that the market accurately reflects directors’ conduct , and third, a 
buyer prepared to takeover the troubled company exists.
The first condition for the functioning of the market is a substantial 
impediment to its functioning in relation to private companies, however 
leaving this issue to one side for the moment, there are significant doubts 
over the likelihood of the second and third conditions being met in many 
cases.
139 H. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, in H. Manne, (ed) The 
Economics Of Legal Relationships, (New York, West Publishing, 1975).
140 Ibid.
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The efficiency with which markets translate managerial misconduct 
into a lower share price can be doubted. Information asymmetry is a 
substantial impediment to the functioning of such a market. Managers are 
unlikely to advertise their misconduct and those who are knowingly acting 
against the corporations’ best interests can go to great lengths to hide their 
actions. In such circumstances, accurate information will only be available if 
substantial transaction costs are in incurred. Thus, there are numerous 
examples of markets being unaware of any misconduct in companies before 
they spectacularly collapsed. The Maxwell Group, Enron and Worldcom are 
just a few well know instances where the first the markets knew of 
incompetence or fraud by directors was shortly before the companies went 
into insolvency. In such companies, one must presume that either those 
charged with monitoring management were complicit in a cover-up or that 
transaction costs prevented adequate inquiry into management’s activities. 
Either way, the information came out to late for any takeover bid to be either 
a practical or advisable course of action.
However, even where the market functions and the value of shares 
falls due to undesirable conduct, a hostile take-over is unlikely to succeed 
unless the price offered for shares includes a premium above the market 
value of the shares141. This may discourage would be bidders from 
attempting such a course of action, especially when one considers that the 
bidder would be trying to take over a failing company.
141 See J. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment o f  
the Tender Offereor’s Role in Corporate Governance. (1984) 84 Col L. Rev 1143.
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This brings us to a consideration of the third factor, the existence of a 
bidder willing to take over a company suffering from its managers’ actions. 
Manne asserts that any bidder would gain from taking over a company with 
a reduced share price in so far as the reduced share price is below the ‘true’ 
value of the company. Thus, if the company is taken over and the old 
management removed, the value of the shares in the company will rise and 
the new owner will have gained a healthy return on his investment142. 
However, whilst takeovers undoubtedly offer the prospect of making a 
healthy return on an investment if a company that is failing due to 
mismanagement is ‘rescued’, the decision to take over such a company is 
complex, with many factors other than potential gains needing to be 
considered by a would-be bidder.
The high transaction costs associated with a corporate take-over, 
such as bankers’, lawyers’ and accountants fees, are all likely to discourage 
a take-over bid whose only aim is to stop managerial misconduct143. It is 
also too simplistic to suggest that the prospect of financial gain from 
managerial misconduct will always prompt the take over of a company as a 
going concern. I would suggest that the response of a would-be bidder to a 
falling share price will depend upon the source of the financial advantage he 
believes he can obtain from the corporations troubles. Where the would-be 
bidder feels he could obtain the biggest return by taking over the company 
over as a going concern he is likely attempt to acquire the business as a
142 Supra, note 139
143 Eisenberg, The Structure o f Corporation Law, supra note 117, p. 1498.
69
complete legal entity. If, however, he feels his biggest return lies in 
obtaining the physical assets of the company at a reduced price he may well 
decide not to take over the company as a going concern, but to wait until it 
goes into insolvency and attempt to purchase the assets of the firm he values 
at a reduced price from the administrators. The particular nature of the assets 
that the would-be bidder values will heavily influence this decision. For 
example, physical assets are likely to be cheaper to obtain in insolvency, 
whereas intangible assets, such as brand loyalty or customer base, or simply 
the potential value of the company as a whole are likely to be better 
purchased through a take-over bid. In many cases the greatest gain may lie 
in taking over the company and ensuring good management, however to 
assume that this is the case for every company whose share price falls due to 
managerial misconduct is probably over-optimistic. After all, this market is 
concerned with companies who have suffered from managerial misconduct 
and the decision to take-over such a troubled firm is likely to be complex, as 
many factors are relevant to the decision to launch a takeover bid, not just 
the value of shares144. Thus, even if there were readily available information 
about managers’ activities, it is far from certain that a take-over would 
occur.
The market for corporate control is also limited by the fact that it can 
only function effectively where shares are freely transferable. Thus where 
shares cannot be easily transferred, the opportunity for takeover does not
144 See, M. Jensen, Take-Overs: Their Causes and Consequences. (1988) 2. J. Econ. Persp. 
2 1 .
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arise. Therefore, a negligent or dishonest owner-manager will be untroubled 
by the prospect of take-over because he, as the sole or majority shareholder, 
has absolute control over the company’s shares. If he does not wish to sell 
his shares, he will not sell them, thus any take-over that may occur can 
happen only with his consent. Indeed, the absence of a market for 
controlling shares in private companies has lead Manne to concede that 
illiquidity of shares in private companies “prevent[s] any smooth 
functioning of a market for corporate control”145.
Therefore there are sound reasons for doubting whether the market 
for corporate control, as well as those for directors’ service and the product 
market can provide a satisfactory mechanism for controlling undesirable 
conduct by directors in most companies. The prospects for effective control 
may be greater in public companies and large private companies and indeed, 
it is probable that these ‘market monitoring theories’ are addressed to such 
companies. However, they simply are not applicable to small private 
companies and particularly to owner-managed companies.
2.6 Concluding Remarks.
Therefore, there are obvious failings with the two forms of control 
on directors’ conduct considered so far that, at the very least, creates aprima 
facie ‘need’ for public regulation. In respect of shareholder monitoring, 
passivity and ignorance are rather obvious drawbacks in larger companies
145 Manne, The Economics o f Legal Relationships, supra note Error! Bookmark not
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that have been recognised for many years. However, despite this, 
shareholder monitoring still lies at the heart of the government’s policy 
towards controlling undesirable conduct by directors. As such many legal 
rules that aim to prevent undesirable conduct by directors are designed to 
facilitate shareholder monitoring rather than replace it with a mechanism for 
state regulation. However, there does seem to be some recognition that 
enduring problems with shareholder monitoring necessitates alternative 
regulatory strategies. In public companies alternative private regulatory 
strategies, such as enhancing the role of non-executive directors have been 
pursued as well as public regulation in the form of disqualification.
However, the failure of shareholder monitoring in large companies is 
not the main problem against which disqualification is aimed. Rather it is 
primarily aimed at owner-managed companies where shareholder 
monitoring fails ab initio. For, in such companies the unity of ownership and 
control leaves directors free of internal regulatory constraints on their 
conduct and renders mandatory rules such as fiduciary duties largely 
meaningless. This situation creates a clear need for regulation in so far as it 
exposes creditors to increased risk from negligence, recklessness or 
dishonesty.
It ought to be noted however, that allowing owner-managers to 
incorporate is seen as a desirable method of wealth creation by the State. 
Thus, it can only be presumed that the risks created by the obvious failure of 
shareholder monitoring in owner-managed companies are not sufficiently
defined., p 526.
72
serious to merit a change in that policy by preventing entrepreneurs from 
incorporating. As such, the need for section 6 disqualification cannot be 
narrowly viewed as a simple consequence of a breakdown in shareholder 
monitoring, rather, it ought to be seen as a consequence of the State’s 
broader policy of allowing free access to the benefits of incorporation, 
particularly limited liability. For, this policy creates not only conditions in 
which undesirable conduct can flourish (as has been shown in this chapter) 
but also creates an incentive for directors to engage in undesirable acts by 
allowing entrepreneurs to avail themselves of limited liability. It is this 
combination of the conditions for undesirable conduct and an incentive to 
engage in undesirable acts that creates an overwhelming need for some form 
of regulation in relation to directors of owner-managed companies. It is to 
the role of limited liability in disqualification that the next chapter therefore 
turns.
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Chapter 3: The Role of Limited
Liability in Disqualification.
“We have sought to...severely penalis[e] those who abuse the privilege of limited 
liability by operating behind one-man, insufficiently capitalised companies”
The Cork Report146.
3.1 Limited Liability in the UK and its Abuse.
A certain amount of undesirable conduct by directors, if it is defined 
as a ‘breach of commercial morality or negligence to a marked degree’147, is 
an inevitable consequence of the free availability of limited liability in the 
UK. The Companies Act 1985 allows any person to incorporate a private 
limited company quickly and very cheaply and what is more, there is no 
requirement for private companies to have anything other than a nominal 
amount of capital149. Such free availability of limited liability does nothing 
to prevent rogues, excessive risk takers or incompetents from obtaining the
146 Report o f the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, (Chairman Sir 
Kenneth Cork), Cmnd 8558, (London, HMSO, 1982), para 1815.
147 Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] 3 All ER 578.
148 Following the insertion of section 1 (3 A) into the Companies Act 1985, private limited 
companies can be incorporated with only 1 member. The registrars’ fee for incorporation is 
currently £20, and takes no longer than 5 working days. If, however, incorporators are 
prepared to pay a higher fee of £80 they can benefit from same day incorporation provided 
that the relevant documents are deposited with the registrar by 3pm. See <www. companies- 
house.gov.uk>. The availability of ‘off-the shelf companies allows individual to obtain 
corporate status without the inconvenience o f actually registering a company him self.
149 However, sections 117 and 118 of the Companies Act 1985 require public companies to 
have a minimum capital allocation of £50,000.
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benefits of incorporation. It is therefore unsurprising that limited liability 
should be ‘abused’. Indeed, the lax requirements of the Companies Act 
almost encourage such abuse; for the perception that the miracle of 
incorporation divests a businessman of all personal responsibility for his acts 
is bound to attract a certain number of fraudsters.
The common law, for its part has sought to deal with some 
fraudulent uses of the corporate form through lifting the veil, although the 
circumstances in which it will do so are limited150. Statute also seeks to 
restrain the worst abuses of limited liability through personal liability 
provisions such as sections 213 and 214 of the Insolvency Act151 and the 
sanctions contained in part X of the Companies Act 1985. However, in 
circumstances short of such fraud and misrepresentation etc, any person may 
incorporate a private company, limit their liability to a nominal sum and run 
the company as they like. However, many of the controls which are imposed
on directors’ conduct apply only ex post facto, as in the case of the
1 •Insolvency Act provisions . The justification for such light controls on
150 A comprehensive survey of the circumstances in which the court will lift the veil was 
given by the Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries Pic. [1990] Ch. 433. Generally, 
those circumstances fall into to 2 categories; first cases where incorporation is used to evade 
limitations imposed on person’s conduct by law (as in Gilford Motor Co. Ltd. v Home 
[1933] Ch. 935), and second where it is used to evade such rights of relief as a person may 
hold against an incorporator (as was the case in Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832).
151 Personal liability imposed on directors who are shown to have engaged in fraudulent or 
wrongful trading respectively. See further 4.8.1 below.
152 Actions under sections 213, (fraudulent trading, 214 (fraudulent trading, 245 (avoidance 
of a floating charge, 238 (setting aside of transactions made for an undervalue) and 239 
(setting aside transactions made at a preference) rely on action by an ‘office-holder’ and 
therefore can only be commenced dining insolvency proceedings, which, by definition, 
will be after wrongful conduct has taken place. Much the same can be said of directors’ 
duties to creditors in insolvency as creditors rely on a office holder to take action for the 
breach of such duties in most cases..
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directors during solvency appears to be the belief that free access to limited
153liability encourages entrepreneurship and economic growth .
Disqualification under section 6 is, however, an apparent 
acknowledgement that allowing some individuals’ access to limited liability 
can have undesirable results, consequently the ‘privilege’ ought to be 
withdrawn from them. This link between limited liability and 
disqualification is of crucial importance to the need for section 6 and hence 
to its objective. For, whilst the breakdown of shareholder monitoring creates 
circumstances in which undesirable conduct can flourish, it is the special 
circumstances of limited liability that justifies the use of disqualification.
3.1.1 Unincorporated Entities and Disqualification.
It is perfectly possible, indeed likely, that unfit conduct of the sort 
condemned in disqualification cases can occur in unincorporated entities 
such as partnerships and sole-traderships. Partners, for example, can 
continue to incur debts when their firm is insolvent in exactly the same way 
that owner- manager directors can do with their companies154. However, the 
is no provision prohibiting persons from entering partnerships even if they 
are unfit. In circumstances where a partnership firm is wound up as an 
unregistered company a disqualification order can be made a against a
153J. Freedman, Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms (2000) 63 MLR 
317 and A. Hicks, Corporate Form: Questioning the Unsung Hero [1997] JBL 306, see 
also DTI White Paper, Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy, 
Cm 4176, (London, DTI, 1998).
154 See for example Re C S Holidays Ltd [1997] BCC 172 where Chadwick J stated at page 
178:‘If it is established.. .that a director has caused a company trade when he knew or ought 
to have known that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going 
into insolvent liquidation, that director may well be held unfit... ’
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partner where the court decides that the partners conduct makes him 
‘unfit’155.However, whilst an order will prevent an ‘unfit’ partner from being 
involved in the management of a company (in accordance with section 1 of 
the Disqualification Act), such an order cannot prevent him from entering 
another partnership because a solvent partnership does not fall within the 
definition of a ‘company’ contained in the Disqualification Act.156. 
Consequently there is no provision to prevent unfit persons from conducting 
a business as a partnership, or indeed as a sole trader.
A proposal remedy this apparent anomaly by extending the 
prohibition of disqualification to unincorporated business was made during
1 ^7the passage of the Insolvency Bill 2000 , which already proposed
1 CO
significant amendments to the Disqualification Act , but was quickly 
rejected. The amendment to the Bill sought to alter section 1 of the 
Disqualification Act so as to prevent disqualified persons from engaging in 
any form or trade of business that provided services to the public159, and was 
intended to close what its sponsor called the ‘clear gap in law’ that allows 
disqualified persons to manage unincorporated businesses even after they 
have been declared ‘unfit’ to be concerned in the management of
155 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s6(4)-(4C) (as amended by Insolvent 
Partnerships Order 1994, schedule 8).
156 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 22(2)(b),. See also Re Chartmore Ltd 
[1990] BCLC 673 at 67.
157Hansard [HC], Standing Committee B, 7th November 2000, col 104.
158 The Bill proposed the introduction disqualification undertakings and other amendments 
to the 1986 Act. See further, 7.2, below.
159 The amendment proposed that a new subsection (c) be inserted into section 1(1) of the 
1986 Act stating “he shall not act as the principle of any trade or business engaged in 
providing services to consumers”.
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incorporated entities160. However, the amendment was opposed by the 
minister responsible for the Bill on the ground that it would be 
“inappropriate for the Bill to go further by restricting a person’s right to 
[trade on his own account]”161. The main purpose of disqualification, said 
the minister, was “to provide the pubic with protection from those who 
abuse the privilege of limited liability”162 and as unincorporated firms do not 
benefit from this privilege, it was not right to extend the prohibition of 
disqualification to them. However, the minister did declare ‘sympathy’ for 
the main argument made in favour of the amendment, i.e. that creditors of 
unincorporated firms can also suffer significant loss from unfit conduct.
From these exchanges it is clear that protecting the public from 
undesirable conduct by entrepreneurs per se is not the aim of section 6 
disqualification. Rather it is aimed at such conduct only where the unfit 
individual benefits from limited liability. The most obvious explanation for 
this distinction between misconduct in incorporated and unincorporated 
entities is that in the incorporated business limited liability allows the 
entrepreneur to partition his personal assets from his business assets thereby 
limiting his liability to make good the company’s debts in the event of 
insolvency. As such, it arguably exposes creditors to increased risk of 
suffering financial loss in the event of business failure163. However, the
160 Supra, note 157.
161 Supra note 157.
162 Ibid.
163 On asset partitioning see H. Hansmann, and R. Kraakman, The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law, (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 387. Hansmann and Kraakman describe statutory 
limited liability as an example o f ‘defensive asset partitioning’, which they claim increases
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simple fact of asset partitioning cannot be seen as the sole justification for 
the apparently special need to regulate managers of incorporated entities. 
For, it must be stressed that partners and sole traders can partition their 
assets, despite their unincorporated status, by creating limited liability 
through contracts with individual creditors164 and, indeed owner-managers 
may give up their limited liability165. Furthermore, whilst it reduces the pool 
of assets available to settle creditors’ claims in insolvency, a statutory 
position of unlimited liability does not guarantee that the claims of creditors 
will be met. So it is difficult to view the simple fact of asset partitioning as a 
convincing justification for the application of section 6 disqualification to 
incorporated entities alone. After all, it is perfectly possible to create limited 
liability in a partnership by contract but disqualification does not prevent an 
unfit person from becoming a partner166.. Rather, the real difference made 
by incorporation is that it gives incorporators the statutory right to partition 
their assets without the agreement of their creditors. It is this right to invoke 
limited liability that is the real ‘privilege’ of limited liability, rather than the 
simple fact of partitioning and which is crucial to the need for 
disqualification. Statutory limited liability exposes creditors of incorporated 
entities to unique risks of reckless or negligent conduct by directors, from 
which many creditors will find it difficult to protect themselves and which
the value of corporate assets as security for debt. They therefore reject the claim that it 
increases the risk of default for corporate creditors.
164 The ease with which incorporated status can be acquired in the UK makes it rare for 
partners to attempt to create general imitated their liability through contract. However 
instances o f firm creating limited liability are not unheard of, see, R. I’Anson Banks, 
Lindley and Banks on Partnership, 18th Edn, (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2002), page 
380, note 46.
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are particularly dangerous on owner-managed companies where directors’ 
conduct is free in internal regulatory controls.
However, before the precise effects of statutory limited liability are 
discussed and its relationship with disqualification analysed, it is useful to 
sketch out a little of the history of limited liability and the debate 
surrounding its desirability.
3.2 The Rise of Statutory Limited Liability167.
Statutory limited liability was first made available by the Limited 
Liability Act 1855 and, following the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 was 
made available to any company with 7 or more members . As is the case 
with the companies Acts before and since, the 1856 Act was drafted to suit 
the needs of large companies with divided ownership and control and, as 
such, it is highly unlikely that either the 1855 or 1856 Acts intended to 
extend limited liability to 1 or 2 person owner-managed firms where the 
‘power’ it gives can be exercised free of the constraint of shareholder 
monitoring. However, it was noted at the time of the 1856 Act that it was 
relatively easy for an individual to obtain limited liability by finding 6
165 By, for example, giving personal guarantees for company credit. See further 3.4 below.
166 Supra note 156 and accompanying text.
167 For a full account of the history of limited liability see J, Freedman, Small Business and 
the Corporate Form : Burden or Privilege? (1994) 57 MLR 555, O. Kahn-Freund, Some 
Reflections on Company Law Reform, (1944) MLR 54. See also D. Perrot, Changes in 
Attitude to Limited Liability -  the European Experience, in T. Orhnial (ed), Limited 
Liability and the Corporation (London, CroomHelm, 1982). Perrott discusses the 
fluctuating popularity of limited liability from Roman times to the twentieth century.
168 The Limited Liability Act 1855 originally restricted statutory limited liability to 
companies with 25 or more members.
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‘nominee’ members to take shares along side him169. Whether the courts 
would accept such a scheme was, however, unclear until the infamous case 
of Salomon v Salomon110. The ratio of this case hardly requires repetition 
here, but its legitimisation of the de facto one-man company with limited 
liability has profoundly influenced the use of limited liability in the UK, and 
indeed in the rest of the common law world171. Since Salomon, small owner-
• • • 172managed companies have come to dominate limited liability .
It is interesting to note the slowness of the legislature in recognising 
the implications of the decision in Salomon (it was not until the enactment 
of the twelfth company law directive that one-man companies were 
expressly allowed by statute173). For, the prevailing model of the company 
in the Companies Acts has manifestly failed to grasp the sea-change brought 
about by Salomon. Indeed, it is only with the ‘think small first’ approach 
advocated by the Company Law Review Steering Group that the legislation 
may catch up with Salomon114. However, the Steering Group was not
169 A leading textbook published at the time of the 1855-56 Acts was shrewd enough to 
include advice as to how individual traders may avail themselves of limited liability. See E 
W Cox, New Law and Practice o f  Joint Stock Companies, 4* edn (1857), Law Times 
Office, 1857), noted in D. Campbell and S. Griffin, ENRON and the End of Corporate 
Governance, in S. MacLeod and J. Parkinson, (eds), Global Governance and the Quest for 
Justice, vol 2, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004).
170 [1897] A.C. 22.
171 For a US perspective on Salomon v Salomon see, B. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One- 
Man Corporations and Subsidiary Corporations, (1953) 18 Law & Contemp. Probs 473.
172Research, carried out for the Company Law Review, showed that as of the 3 1st March 
1999, 70% of registered companies had only one or two shareholders, and 90% had less 
than 5 shareholders. See Company Law Review, Modem Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy, Developing the Framework (London, DTI, 2000) para 6.9.
173 89/667/EEC, implemented by SI 1992/1699.
174 See generally, Company Law Review Steering Group, Modem Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: Final Report, (London, DTI, 2001), chapter 2. See also, Freedman, 
Limited Liability and Small Firms, supra note 153, page 326. Freedman notes that the 
Steering Group posed the leading question ‘Is it agreed that it is not desirable to restrict 
access to limited liability’, to which it received an enthusiastic ‘yes’ from its employees.
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concerned with the lack of internal controls on directors of small companies 
and the increased opportunity for undesirable use of limited liability it 
created. Rather it proceeded on the basis that easy access to limited liability 
was desirable to stimulate economic growth and saw its task as being to 
propose reforms which ‘lightened the regulatory load’ on small limited 
liability companies rather than to evaluate the utility of the doctrine in 
owner-managed companies175.
3.2.1 Criticism of Limited liability.
The introduction of statutory limited liability in 1855 did not meet 
with universal approval176 and its extension to one-man companies in 
Salomon has been described as a ‘calamitous decision’177. However, despite 
such reservations, limited liability for large and small companies has 
become an entrenched feature of British company law and, according to the 
current author of Gower’s Principles o f Modem Company Law, “nobody
1 78seriously advocates the reversal of Salomon”. Rather, a broad consensus
seems to have been established that free access to limited liability is an
175Company Law Review Steering Group, Modem Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: The Strategic Framework, (London, DTI, 1999), chapter 5 (see particularly paras 
5.2.12 & 5.2.13).
176For example, The Times editorial of the 25th May 1824 claimed that “Nothing can be so 
unjust as for a few persons abounding in wealth to offer a portion of their excess for the 
information of a company, to play with that excess -  to lend the importance of their whole 
name and credit to the society, and the should the funds prove insufficient to answer all 
demands, to retire into the security of their unhazarded fortune, and leave the bait to be 
devoured by the poor deceived fish”. Cited in Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull, An 
Economic Analysis o f Limited Liability in Corporation Law, (1980) 30 U. Toronto L.J. 117. 
See also E W Cox who claimed that limited liability would lead to “enormous evils”. Cox, 
New Law and Practice o f Joint Stock Companies, quoted in Campbell and Griffin, supra 
note 169.
177 Kahn-Fraud, Some Reflections on Company Law Reform, supra note 167.
178 P Davies, Gower and Davies ’ Principles o f Modem Company Law, 7th Edn, (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) page 177.
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essential tool for encouraging entrepreneurship by increasing the incentive 
to engage in business activity179. As such, it has been described as an 
element of a laissez fairem  policy towards entrepreneurial activity. 
However, Campbell and Griffin have challenged the compatibility of limited 
liability with laissez faire and argue that limited liability imposed by statute 
is actually the antithesis of such an approach.181 They argue statutory 
limited liability is not the result of market transactions but of a statutory 
intervention that ousts the market by allowing one party to unilaterally 
partition his assets, regardless of whether he would be able to obtain limited 
liability status through bargaining with his creditors. As such they submit 
that it cannot be viewed as an incidence of laissez faire.
3.3 The Hazard of Statutory Limited Liability.
3.3.1 The Case Against Risk Shifting.
Critics of statutory limited liability assert that it is an inefficient rule 
because it allows shareholders to reap the benefits of risky activities without
1 S')bearing all of their costs . This, they claim, leads to uncompensated 
transfers of risk and significant moral hazard because by allowing 
entrepreneurs to unilaterally cap their liability the rule allows transfers of
179 See references, supra note 153.
180 For example, Farrar’s Company Law, 4th Edn (London, Butterworths, 1998), noted in 
Campbell and Griffin, supra note 169.
181 Supra note 169.
182 See for example, J. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent Subsidiary and Affiliate 
Questions in Banckrupcy (1975) 42 U. Chi. L.R. 499. See also Halpem, Trebilcock and 
Turnbull, supra note 176, T. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other 
Reflections on the Limited Liability o f Corporate Shareholders (1992) Vand. L.R. 1387.
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risk on to creditors183 and, as such, creates an incentive to engage in overly 
risky conduct. This moral hazard is widely recognised as being particularly 
acute in owner-managed companies because ‘incorporated individuals’ have 
a greater incentive to invest only a minimal amount of their total assets in 
their corporate alter ego and therefore to engage in very risky activity 
knowing that they will not be liable to make good any debts incurred184.
It has therefore been claimed that limited liability creates (or at least 
exacerbates) an agency problem between corporate owners/controllers and 
creditors185, in so far as the ability to cap liability for debt creates an 
incentive to engage in conduct that harms the welfare of creditors. It is 
argued that this ‘agency problem’ would not exist to the same degree in a 
situation of unlimited liability where the entrepreneur is not able to 
unilaterally cap his liability. Eucken, for example, states that:
“The purpose of the unlimited liability of the entrepreneur in a 
competitive economy is to make him careful in the disposition of his 
resource and in investing and producing, and automatically to 
eliminate him if unsuccessful. Unlimited liability is part of a
183 The nominal capitalisation of English and Welsh companies, (most of which have capital 
of less than £100 (see Companies in 2003-2004, (London, DTI, 2004), table A7.)) shows 
the extent to which entrepreneurs take advantage of the opportunity to put a very low cap on 
their liability, and as such transfer risk of loss to their creditors.
184 See for example, F. Easterbrook, and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure o f Corporate 
Law, (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1991), chapter 2 and Halpem, 
Trebilcock and Turnbull, An Economic Analysis o f Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 
supra note 176.
185 Landers, supra note 182.
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competitive system, and its destruction by legal policy endangers the
I  Q/T
functioning of this system”
The argument is essentially that personal liability of entrepreneurs naturally 
reduces their incentive to engage in reckless, negligent and even dishonest 
conduct because they will bear the costs of such conduct should they be 
unsuccessful. For, if the entrepreneur is both rational and welfare- 
maximising he will not hazard his entire fortune on reckless or negligent 
corporate gambles. Rather, the fear of personal bankruptcy will make him 
careful in the conduct of his business. As such he will weigh the costs and 
benefits of entrepreneurial activity and undertake only activities where the 
benefits outweigh the costs, and will only solicit credit where he has 
calculated that the likelihood of him being able to repay the credit is higher 
than the likelihood that he will not be able to repay from the proceeds of his 
business venture. For if this is not the case he would be liable to repay from 
his personal assets. As such, a moral hazard is less likely to arise where an 
entrepreneur has unlimited liability for his business acts. However, it must 
be noted that a rule of unlimited liability does not mean that moral hazard 
never arises, for where the entrepreneur’s debts have exceeded the total 
value of his assets, he has nothing to lose from engaging in very risky 
conduct and a moral hazard will arise. However, the likelihood of a moral 
hazard arising must be less under a rule of unlimited liability as the 
entrepreneur will have an incentive to protect his personal assets by limiting
186W. Eucken, The Foundations o f Economics (Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1992), cited in 
Campbell and Griffin, supra note 169.
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his exposure to debt and the point where debt exceeds available assets will 
be reached much later than is the case in a situation of limited liability. For, 
in the typical English company with less than £100 of capital, a moral 
hazard must arise very shortly after the company begins trading, if not 
before.
3.3.2 The ‘Compensation Theory’.
However, supporters of limited liability, such as Richard Posner, 
deny that statutory limited liability creates a moral hazard. They contend 
instead that creditors will not passively accept transfers of risk affected by a 
rule of statutory limited liability but will demand compensation from 
entrepreneurs for their increased risk of suffering loss should the company 
default187. Such compensation can, for example, take the form of higher
1 RRcharges for credit to companies that benefit from limited liability , which 
reflects the extra risk transferred. The effect of such compensation, it is 
claimed, is to prevent a moral hazard from arising. It is has therefore been 
argued that statutory limited liability actually leads to efficient sharing of 
risk between companies and their creditors189.
187 R. Posner, The Rights o f Creditors of Affiliated Corporations (1967) 43 U. Chi. L.R. 
499. Posner’s argument relates to creditors who have the ability to enter into contracts with 
debtor shareholders/entrepreneurs, so called ‘voluntary creditors’. The argument does not 
apply as Posner acknowledges to creditors who cannot contract, ‘involuntary creditors’. On 
the position of involuntary creditors in disqualification see ‘A Note on Creditors who 
Cannot Contract’, 3.X below.
188 Posner, ibid,, see also R Posner, Economic Analysis o f Law, 2nd Edition (Boston, Little 
Brown, 1977) and F. Easterbrook, and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure o f Corporate 
Law, (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1991), chapter 2.
189 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 188, pages 50-52. However, Easterbrook and 
Fischel’s argument is not that the necessity to pay for risk taking will prevent risk transfers. 
Instead, they argue that limited liability leads to risks being ‘swallowed’.
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Posner claims that the creditor’s demand for compensation eschews 
the incentive to engage in negligent or reckless conduct because of 
creditors’ ability to adjust the compensation he demands to the risk posed by 
particular debtors. Therefore, the higher the risk creditors face from an 
entrepreneur’s use of limited liability, the more compensation they will 
demand from him and vice-versa. As such, it is claimed that entrepreneurs 
will be forced to pay for their activities under a rule of limited liability and 
that, as such, they will be cautious in the risks they take and weigh the 
benefits of a particular activity against the compensation that will have to be 
paid for the freedom to engage in it. Therefore, as welfare maximising 
entrepreneurs will only engage in conduct where the expected benefits of the 
activity out weighs its costs, it is claimed that creditors’ demand for 
compensation ought to prevent overly risky conduct from occurring. For 
where the compensation that has to be paid for the freedom to engage in an 
activity is higher than its expected benefit, the act will not take place. In 
short, an optimal level of risk taking out to result from a rule of limited 
liability190.
In a market where transaction costs were zero and no information 
asymmetries existed, it is certainly likely that creditors would seek to 
compensate themselves for the increased risk they face from statutory 
limited liability in the manner envisaged by Posner. Under such ideal 
conditions each creditor would correctly assess the risk he faced from 
transacting with a particular company and calculate the rate of return
190 Posner, supra note 172.
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necessary to offset that risk. In the context of owner-managed companies 
this would mean that owner-managers would be forced to pay an appropriate 
price for any activities they wished to undertake. This in turn would prevent 
uncompensated transfers of risk, in which case the claim that the benefit of 
limited liability to owner-managers is exactly offset by a detriment to 
creditors would be unfounded. However, assuming for the time being that 
creditors are able to compensate themselves for the effects of limited 
liability, Posner’s thesis, whilst answering a common criticism of limited 
liability, suggests that under perfect conditions the main benefit that is 
claimed for limited liability would be illusory. For, if creditors demanded 
compensation that equated to the risk transferred by the rule of statutory 
limited liability, that rule would be unlikely to lead to a significantly 
increased risk taking and, as such would not increase the risk faced by 
creditors who deal with entrepreneurs with limited liability as compared to 
their dealings with entrepreneurs who do not have limited liability. As such 
the apparently unique need for public regulation of directors with limited 
liability would be unfounded.
3.3.3 Does Limited Liability Increase Entrepreneurial Activity?
Suppose an entrepreneur, A, wishes embark upon a new business 
venture but needs to borrow £1 million to finance his plans and that he 
approaches a bank to advance him the £1 million in the form of a loan. If the 
bank is welfare maximising it will demand a ‘price’ (i.e. compensation) for 
its credit that compensates it for the risk that it faces in advancing the loan to
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A. In fixing this ‘price’ the bank will essentially consider two variable 
factors which will be termed X and Y. X represents the probability that A’s 
proposed venture will succeed. In assessing this probability the bank will 
take into account a number of relevant factors, such as the strength of A’s 
business proposal, the profitability of the sector A proposes to enter as well 
as the likely conduct of A etc,. Y represents the assets that will be available 
to repay the loan should the business venture not succeed. The bank will 
demand a price for its credit that is equal to or greater than, the combined 
values of X and Y191. Thus, the higher the value of X (the probability that 
the venture will succeed) and the higher the value of Y (the assets available 
to satisfy the banks claim), the lower the ‘price’ for its credit the bank will 
demand from A, and vice-versa.
Assuming that A is also a welfare maximiser, once he is informed of 
the bank’s proposed terms he will weigh the price demanded by the bank for 
its credit (as well as other costs associated with his proposed venture) 
against the benefit he expects to obtain from the venture. Where the cost of 
the venture (including the cost of credit) is greater than the perceived benefit 
of the venture A will not undertake the business venture. Where the benefit 
is higher than the aggregate costs he will192. Thus, optimal risk-taking by A 
will be secured.
In the absence of transaction costs and information asymmetry this 
outcome will apply regardless of the liability rule that underlies the
191 See Posner, ibid, page 501.
192 R.H. Coase, The Problem o f Social Cost, in R.H. Coase, The Firm, The Market and The 
Law, (London, University of Chicago Press, 1991).
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transaction between A and the bank. Consequently, Posner’s model suggests
that so long as the bank can adjust its terms in line with the relative values of
X and Y, the same outcome will be secured regardless of the liability rule
1that underlies the transaction between A and the bank .
3.3.3.1 A with Unlimited Liability.
Where the default rule underlying the transaction between A and the 
bank is a rule of unlimited liability, the value of Y, i.e. the assets available to 
pay the bank should the venture fail, will be determined by the full extent of 
A’s assets, both corporate and personal. As such, the value of Y is likely to 
be higher in a situation of unlimited liability than a situation of limited 
liability. For under limited liability A is able to partition his personal assets 
from his corporate assets. Similarly, the value of X will be increased by 
unlimited liability. For, if Eucken’s thesis is accepted, the personal liability 
of A for his business is likely to, (i) make him more cautious in the risks he 
takes (or at least balance the costs and benefits of risks more carefully) and 
(ii) reduce the likelihood that he will be reckless, negligent or dishonest in 
the conduct of his business affairs. This natural reduction in agency 
problems brought about by unlimited liability ought to reduce the banks 
assessment of the risk of advancing the loan to A, and consequently lead it 
to charge (relatively speaking) a low rate for credit. Thus, the higher values 
of X and Y the lower the risk posed by lending to A is, and the lower the 
rate of interest on the loan will be. As such the cost of credit to A ought to 
be lower if under a rule of unlimited liability.
193 Posner, supra note 188.
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However, unlimited liability increases risk of personal bankruptcy 
that A faces from his venture. Consequently, the ‘personal’ cost to A of his 
venture will be higher than under a rule of limited liability and act as a 
disincentive to engage in entrepreneurial activity. As A bears the risk 
associated with business failure,( i.e. the risk that would be bom by the bank 
under limited liability), the higher personal cost of the transaction will 
equate to the lower cost of credit. In short the risk of the transaction merely 
passes from the Bank to A, and in so far as the bank would demand 
compensation from A that matched the risk, the reduction in the cost of 
credit ought to be of the same value as the increase in the personal cost to A. 
Nonetheless, in a situation of unlimited liability the cost to A of his business 
activity will be the aggregate of the lower cost of credit and the higher 
personal cost.
3.3.3.2 A with Limited Liability.
It is claimed that the increased ‘personal’ cost to A of engaging in 
entrepreneurial activity with unlimited liability decreases his incentive to 
engage in such activity, at least when compared to a mle of limited liability. 
For, the higher the perceived risk of the venture, the more likely that risk- 
averse (and even risk-neutral) individuals will be deterred from undertaking 
business activity194. As such, it is contended that a mle of limited liability 
would increase the likelihood that A would undertake his business venture 
because it would allow him to limit his exposure to risk by partitioning his
194Posner, ib id .
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assets195. As such A would be able to transfer the risk he faced from his 
venture to the bank and the perceived personal costs to A of his proposed 
venture (in terms of the risk of bankruptcy) would be decreased. However, 
the transfer of risk would affect the bank’s calculation of the risk that it 
faces from A. For, whilst the personal cost of entrepreneurial activity to A 
would be reduced by limited liability, his transfer of risk will come at the 
price of reducing in the value of both X and Y. For, the value of Y, (the 
assets available to satisfy the banks claim in the event of default) would be 
reduced by a rule of limited liability because asset partitioning would 
obviously reduce the pool of assets available to repay the bank in the event 
that the A’s venture fails. Further, limited liability will also decrease in the 
value of X (the likely success of A’s venture) by making A risk-preferring, 
and, as such, increasing the chances of negligent, reckless and dishonest 
conduct on his part (if Eucken’s thesis is accepted). Consequently, under a 
rule of limited liability the bank would demand higher price for credit and, 
in a perfect market, that higher price would be proportional to the amount of 
risk transferred. However, the bank would be likely find it difficult to obtain 
full compensation for the risk of undesirable conduct by A because it would 
face the residual risk that after the conclusion of the loan contract, A would 
increase the risk of default by engaging in unforeseen (delinquent) 
activities196. To protect itself from this risk the bank would have to seek to 
restrain the conduct of A through complex contractual provisions or through
195 Posner and Easterbrook and Fischel, both supra note 188.
196 Posner, supra, note 188, pages 503-504.
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monitoring197 or, in the most risky transactions, by demanding that A give 
up his limited liability by personally guaranteeing the loan to the bank.
Nonetheless, it is clear that if the bank were able to accurately adjust 
its charges for credit to reflect the rule of limited liability the reduced 
‘personal’ cost to A from engaging in entrepreneurial activity would be 
offset by the higher cost of credit which would force A to pay for the 
freedom to engage in that activity. In the worst cases A may even be forced 
to give up his limited liability completely.
Therefore, if the compensation model worked as envisaged by 
Posner, limited liability would not lead to increased entrepreneurial risk- 
taking. For, under rules of both statutory limited and unlimited liability the 
overall ‘cost’ of entrepreneurial activity ought to remain constant. Under 
unlimited liability the cost of credit will be lower, but the personal cost of 
business activity will be higher; under limited liability personal cost will be 
lower but the cost of credit will be correspondingly higher. In short, the 
theory suggests that parties will contract away from the either legal rule to 
the same level of optimal risk taking. Posner himself recognises this when 
he states that:
“If corporation law did not provide for limited shareholder liability, 
then in situations where the parties desired to limit that liability in 
exchange for a higher interest rate the loan agreement would contain 
an express provision limiting liability. Conversely, under existing 
law a firm asked to lend money to a corporation in which it lacks
197 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 188.
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confidence can insist.. .that the shareholders agree to guarantee
repayment personally...5,198
Thus, whilst the compensation theory may eliminate the risk of 
moral hazard that it has been claimed limited liability creates, it is also likely 
to eliminate the major benefit claimed for statutory limited liability i.e. 
increase entrepreneurial risk-taking. However, this has not induced 
proponents of limited liability to conclude that it is of no utility. Posner, for 
example claims that limited liability is nonetheless desirable because 
Tenders may be superior risk bearers’199 and therefore that limited liability 
has some utility in stimulating entrepreneurial activity. He advances two 
arguments to support this claim. First, he contends that creditors may be in a 
better position to appraise risk than borrowers and therefore that limited 
liability facilitates more efficient risk bearing. He cites the example of a 
shareholder in a public company as an example of a ‘borrower’ who lacks 
the skills to adequately appraise risk. Second he claims that creditors “may 
be risk averse and creditors less so”200 and therefore argues that unlimited 
liability would discourage entrepreneurial investments. In respect of both 
arguments, it is noteworthy that Posner asserts only that creditors may be 
better assessors of risk and that they may be less risk averse than borrowers. 
It is equally plausible that they may not, in which case statutory limited 
liability would have few advantages. In short Posner’s analysis is based on 
very weak assumptions. This is especially so in the case of owner-managed
198 Posner, supra, note 188, page 505. See also R. Mofsky and R. Tollinson, Piercing the 
Veil o f Limited Liability (1979) 4 Del. J. Corp. Law 351.
199 Posner, ibid, page 501.
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companies (the companies with which disqualification is primarily 
concerned). Posner’s first argument that creditors may be in a better 
situation to appraise risk is clearly inapplicable to an owner-managed 
enterprise because in such an enterprise the owner-manager’s complete 
knowledge of his business venture makes him the best risk assessor. Indeed, 
if an owner-manager were not the best risk assessor this would indicate that 
he was either ignorant of important information concerning his business or 
that he was incompetent. In either case he would pose a high risk of default 
to creditors who would be reluctant to deal with him, especially on a basis of 
limited liability. Posner’s second argument that creditors may be more risk 
averse than entrepreneurs would seem unlikely. More likely is that some 
creditors will be more risk averse than others, as some entrepreneurs will be 
more risk averse than other entrepreneurs. As such, ‘creditors’ are unlikely 
to be any more or less risk averse than entrepreneurs. In any case, Posner’s 
claim is somewhat undermined by his conclusion that the liability rule 
underlying corporate transactions is unlikely to “have a profound affect on 
the credit system or to alter the balance of advantage between debtor and 
creditor”201, which as I have suggested, I believe is the correct implication of 
the compensation theory.
3.3.4 The Compensation Theory and Disqualification.
If the impact of statutory limited liability were as benign as Posner 
suggests then the link between disqualification and limited liability would be
200 Ibid.
puzzling, for creditors of limited liability companies ought to be at no 
greater risk of loss than creditors of partnerships and sole traders. Because if 
they were able to secure compensation for any risk transferred to them by 
limited liability, there would be no need for the state to ‘protect’ them 
through disqualification. Indeed, if the compensation theory functioned as 
envisaged, abuse of limited liability, in terms of reckless, negligent or 
dishonest conduct ought not to occur because high charges for credit or 
contracting around limited liability should prevent unfit persons from using 
limited liability. Or at least if unfit conduct did occur, creditors should not 
suffer loss from it. However, it is precisely because the impact of limited 
liability is not as benign as the compensation theory suggests that 
disqualification exists.
3.3.4.1 The Conditions for Increased Risk-Taking.
If it is accepted that creditors seek compensation for risk transfers, it 
follows that statutory limited liability will only lead to increased 
entrepreneurial risk-taking where the ‘compensation theory’ outlined by 
Posner does not function as envisaged, for as I have stated, where creditors 
are able to alter the terms upon which they supply credit to exactly match 
the risk transferred by limited liability it is unlikely to lead to a significant 
increase in entrepreneurial activity. It is only where creditors are unable to 
obtain adequate compensation that increased risk taking is likely to result, 
for in such a scenario entrepreneurs are able to transfer risk without having 
to pay compensation. This opportunity to affect an uncompensated transfer
201 Ibid, page 505. See also Mofsky and Tollinson, supra note 197.
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of risk is the only way in which entrepreneurial activity will be increased by 
limited liability. For where an uncompensated transfer of risk is affected the 
cost of risk-taking is kept artificially low and more risk taking will result.
Thus, in the real market statutory limited liability is likely to result in 
more risk taking but only to the extent that real market conditions allow 
owner-managers to affect uncompensated transfer of risk to their creditors. 
This situation of sub-optimal risk-taking is what the state claims is a 
desirable mechanism of wealth creation202.
3.4 The Real Market and Compensation.
If the compensation theory functioned in the real market place with 
statutory limited liability we would expect to see higher charges for credit 
for the riskiest of companies and in the most dangerous companies, 
contracting around limited liability. And indeed, this is exactly what 
happens when banks demand a high price for advancing credit to owner- 
managers, such as higher interest rates or contracting around limited 
liability, a practice, which various authors have claimed, is widespread in 
the UK.203 Therefore, to the extent that personal guarantees and other forms
202 The fact that limited liability leads to risk-taking that would not occur under market 
conditions has been the cause of much criticism of the doctrine. Campbell and Griffin quote 
J.R. McCulloch who commented at the time general limited liability was introduced that “In 
the scheme laid down by providence for the government of the world, there is no shifting or 
narrowing of responsibilities, every man being personally responsible for his actions. But 
the advocates of limited liability proclaim in their superior wisdom that the scheme of 
Providence may be advantageously modified...”. Campbell and Griffin, supra note 169.
203 See for example, Freedman, Limited Liability and Small and Firms, supra note 153. See 
also V. Finch, Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price? (1999) 62 MLR 633 and 
S. Wheeler, Swelling the Assets for Distribution in Corporate Insolvency [1993] JBL 256. 
Both Finch and Wheeler note that powerful creditors will protect themselves from the risk
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of compensation are used in the riskiest of companies, it is clear that some 
compensation for the risk of statutory limited liability can be obtained under 
real market conditions. However, transaction costs and information deficits 
in the real market place have a significant impact on the ability of many 
creditors to obtain compensation for the effects of statutory limited liability 
and exposes them to significantly higher risk of delinquency than is the case 
under conditions of unlimited liability.
3.4.1 Transaction Costs and Information Deficits.
Under real market conditions creditors suffer from information 
deficits and transaction costs, which, if they cannot be overcome, will 
prevent them from properly assessing risk and securing appropriate 
compensation from directors204. Under such conditions creditors may seek 
compensation that is too high, too low or in the worst cases, fail to obtain 
any compensation at all. In the first scenario owners will bear 
disproportionate risk and in the second and third creditors will.
The default condition underlying market transactions between parties 
in the market place is that each party is fully liable for his bargain. The 
default rule applies unless the parties agree a different liability rule. This is 
not the case, however, for transactions involving incorporated entrepreneur’s
of loss by utilising a range of security devices. The Cork Committee also noted the 
tendency of banks to demand security (such as personal guarantees) for the majority of 
commercial loans. See Report o f  the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, 
Cmnd 8558 (1992), chapter 34. It has been argued that banks in the UK are more likely to 
contract around limited liability than is the case in other EU countries, see M. Binks, Small 
Businesses and their Banks in the Year 2000, in J. Curran and R. A. Blackburn (eds), Paths 
o f Enterprise: the Future o f Small Business, (London, Routledge, 1991).
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owner-managed companies where individuals or groups of individuals are 
able to invoke statutory partitioning of their assets, changing the default rule 
of the transaction to one of limited liability without the agreement of their 
counter party. The compensation theory suggests that this change in the 
liability rule should affect the conditions upon which credit is supplied to 
owner-managers so that creditors secure compensation for the risk 
transferred to them. However, where transaction costs and information 
deficits prevent the conditions of supply from shifting in line with the new 
liability rule, the terms of credit will become disproportionately focused on 
the entrepreneur’s demand for credit and, assuming he does not volunteer to 
pay more for credit in a situation of limited liability, an uncompensated 
transfer of risk will be affected to the supplier. For, assuming the owner- 
manager does nothing to give rise to personal liability, he has little incentive 
to give up his privileged position and will only do so to the minimum extent 
necessary to induce the creditor to contract.
In such an imperfect market, the resources, expertise and bargaining 
power of the creditor will determine the compensation he can secure205. The 
transaction costs of information gathering, for example, will present less of 
an obstacle to wealthier creditors than they will to less well off creditors. 
Similarly, where information can only be obtained at a cost, the extent of 
information gathering undertaken by each creditor is likely to be determined 
by the value of each transaction he enters in to. For example, if the cost of
204 Finch notes the problems facing small creditors, ibid. See also L. Bebchuck and J. Fried, 
The Case for the Priority o f Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, (1996) Yale LJ. 857.
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full information about the creditworthiness company X were £100, a 
creditor would be more likely to pay the full cost of information gathering in 
relation to a transaction that is worth £10,000 than he would with a 
transaction worth £150. The cost of information gathering in the larger 
transaction can be easily recovered by a small increase in interest, because 
the transaction costs are small relative to the total credit. However, with the 
small transaction the creditor would find it difficult to pass on the cost of 
information gathering as transaction costs represent two-thirds of the value 
of the transaction. Thus, the creditor may undertake only limited (cheaper) 
information gathering or in the worst-case scenario, no information 
gathering at all206.
The expertise of the creditor is also likely to determine his 
willingness for pay for information. Banks, for example, have the 
knowledge and experience that enables them to interpret information more 
accurately than many trade creditors and employees. They are consequently 
more likely to undertake information gathering as it represents a worthwhile 
expenditure. The position of banks and similar creditors is further 
strengthened by the fact that they have the power to extract more 
information from company owners who put a higher ‘price’ on their credit. 
This power enables such creditors to reduce the cost of information 
gathering and overcome the effects of information asymmetry. Indeed, 
where creditors are unable to gather sufficient information from the market
205 On the problems faced by small creditors see generally, Finch, supra note 203. See also 
L. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain (1994) Va. L.R. 1887.
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to shift the conditions on which they are prepared to supply credit in line 
with statutory limited liability, the value the incorporated individual places 
on each type of credit may come to determine the premium (i.e. 
compensation) that the creditor is able to secure for his credit. Because, in 
an imperfect market a significant part of a creditors’ ability to obtain 
information about the creditworthiness of an owner-manager will depend 
upon his ability to force the owner-manager to disclose information to him. 
In such a situation it is likely that suppliers of scarce credit will be more able 
to overcome information asymmetry than suppliers of plentiful credit, 
because scarcity increases the incentive for owner-managers to accede to 
creditors’ requests to disclose information. If such requests are acceded too, 
they will remedy information asymmetries.
Indeed, the effect of scarcity of credit in the real market place is 
demonstrated by the fact that it is quite common for owner-managers to 
disclose significant information to banks (whose credit is relatively scarce) 
but not for them to disclose much to employees (whose ‘credit’ is plentiful). 
Consequently, banks are more successful at obtaining compensation from 
owner-managers than employees, trade creditors and other suppliers of 
plentiful credit.
However, I should stress that the effect of scarcity and information 
asymmetry on bargains between debtors and creditors is not restricted to 
situations of statutory limited liability. For, in a situation of unlimited
206 A rational creditor will not undertake any information gathering where its lowest cost is 
equal to or greater than his expected gain from the bargain.
20 See, Freedman, Finch both supra note 203.
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liability an information deficit may cause a creditor to supply credit at too 
low a price and therefore cause him to bear uncompensated risk. However, 
in a situation of unlimited liability the creditor is assisted by two factors, 
first, because the owner-manager is unable to partition his assets and 
consequently the risk to the creditor of default is reduced, and secondly, 
because if the owner-manager wishes to create limited liability he can only 
do so with the creditor’s agreement. As such, the owner-manager has both 
an incentive to offer compensation to the creditor, to induce him to accept 
some of the risk of a transaction and also an increased incentive to accede to 
requests for information, thereby allowing the creditor to set his 
compensation at a level appropriate to the risk he faces. Scarcity of credit is 
still likely have an impact upon the amount of information disclosed and 
indeed, the amount of compensation offered, however, its effect would be 
less dramatic due the increased bargaining power of the creditor, who if he 
is a welfare-maximiser will refuse to agree to limited liability unless at least 
something approximating adequate information is disclosed and adequate 
compensation is obtained. Under statutory limited liability an owner- 
manager has no incentive to offer compensation or disclose information 
unless he is forced to do so, for he can invoke limited liability as of right. 
Therefore, creditors who are unable to force an owner-manager to pay 
compensation or force him to disclose information to them are less likely to 
obtain appropriate compensation in an imperfect market208. Consequently,
208 Finch, for example notes the tendency amongst weaker creditors to charge uniform 
interest rates for credit. See Finch, supra note 203.
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allocative inefficiency will occur and the owner-manager will be free to 
undertake excessively risky activity. In essence, optimal risk taking will not 
be secured.
3.4.2. Risk Loading.
Thus, in the real market place statutory limited liability is likely to
lead to a loading209 of risk on to certain creditors (such as trade creditors and
employees) who are unable increase their charge for credit or obtain other
security210. This externalising of risk obviously creates the scope for
excessive risk taking by directors, which, it must be noted, is particularly
undesirable because the sort of creditor who is unable to obtain
compensation for the effects of limited liability will be the least well
^11equipped of all a firm’s creditors to absorb losses . Creditors of owner- 
managed companies are particularly vulnerable to such excessive loading of 
risk as it widely recognised that, where they are able, owner-managers have 
a great incentive to invest only a minimum amount of their personal fortune 
in their companies, thereby transferring risk to third parties. This indeed, is 
recognised by leading proponents of limited liability212.
209 Freedman, supra note 205.
210 See Finch, supra note 203.
211 It has been argued by some that creditors are able to insulate themselves from the worst 
consequences of insolvency by using self-help measures such as supply goods under 
retention of title clauses. See for example, A Belcher and W. Beglan, Jumping the Queue 
[1997] JBL 1. Finch however, doubts die practical effectiveness of ‘self-help’ measures, see 
Finch, supra note 203.
212 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 188 at page 56. They suggest ‘piercing the corporate 
veil’ as an adequate remedy for the ‘moral hazard’ created by limited liability in owner- 
managed companies. See also Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull, supra note 176, who note 
that the risk of moral hazard is at its greatest in owner-managed firms.
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Nonetheless, this loading of risk is a necessary part of the state’s 
‘desirable’ policy of free access to limited liability. Indeed such 
uncompensated transfers of risk are essential if the policy is to bring the 
increase in wealth-creating entrepreneurial activity. For as the activities of 
the banks show, creditors who are able will seek compensation from 
directors and in so doing, they will preclude increased entrepreneurial 
activity213. However, whether the extra risk taking that is permitted is 
desirable is far from clear, for such extra risk by definition is only possible 
in a situation of sub-optimal risk taking. Limited liability is therefore likely 
to create a lottery of risk taking at the expense of weaker creditors that may, 
or may not, lead to effective wealth creation.
3.4.3. The Role of Disqualification.
Disqualification is a device used by the state to control the worst 
excesses of this lottery. It is a measure essentially bom of the inability of 
many creditors to protect themselves from corporate ‘gambles’ by reckless, 
negligent, incompetent or dishonest entrepreneurs. However, it must be 
stressed that it is not a measure designed to prevent uncompensated transfer 
of risk per se because, of course limited liability, relies on uncompensated 
transfers to stimulate increased entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, 
disqualification would appear to be designed to sanction only some 
examples of risk transferring.
213 Posner and Easterbrook and Fischel, both supra note 188. On ‘security’ as a device to 
control opportunism by directors see generally, G. Trisantis and R. Daniel, The Role of 
Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance (1995) 83 Calif. L.R. 1073.
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Posner claims that the “primary utility of corporation law lies in 
providing a set of standard, implied contract terms...so that business firms 
do not have to stipulate these terms every time they contract...”214. If 
company law does not reflect those terms then Posner claims that 
contracting parties will seek to contract around the law. Such contracting 
around the law creates transaction costs that could reduce the efficiency of 
business ventures. Disqualification is an attempt to prevent exactly this 
scenario.
We already see significant contracting around the limited liability of 
owner-managers by powerful creditors . However, a widespread 
perception that limited liability was being utilised by the incompetent or 
dishonest could ultimately increase such contracting around the statutory 
rule by weaker creditors, who may for example, simply refuse credit to 
limited liability owner-managers. In so far as the State views the limited 
liability of owner-managers as desirable, any increase in contracting around 
limited liability would be viewed as undesirable. Consequently, the State 
seeks to prevent limited liability from being undermined by creditors’ 
demands by assuring the ‘commercial world’ that unfit directors will be 
disqualified, which will ‘protect’ creditors from loss and ‘deter’ unfit 
conduct. Essentially, disqualification is a confidence building measure that 
seeks to prevent creditors from losing faith in limited liability companies,
214 Posner, supra note 203, page 506.
215 Freedman, supra note 203.
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particularly owner-managed companies216. Disqualification and limited 
liability are therefore inextricably linked. For, limited liability in the real 
market gives entrepreneurs a licence to effect uncompensated transfers of 
risk onto a particular class of creditor and disqualification would appear to 
be an attempt to rein in that licence. For, without such a control, confidence 
in limited liability may be severely tested and vulnerable creditors may 
simply refuse to deal with limited liability companies.
Therefore, it is clear that there is a need for disqualification, 
particularly in owner-managed companies where other controls on the 
conduct of directors are absent. Furthermore the link between limited 
liability gives a clear indication of what equates to undesirable conduct by 
directors, for disqualification would appear to be designed to ‘protect the 
public’ from the essentially economic harm that can result from limited 
liability. Thus, it is to a discussion of the sort of use of limited liability that 
the state seeks to eschew that the next chapter turns, however, before 
moving to this next stage of our analysis of section 6 it is necessary to note 
the position if involuntary creditors in disqualification.
3.4.4 A Note on Creditors who Cannot Contract.
The forgoing analysis of limited liability, its impact on risk taking and its
role in the apparent ‘need’ for disqualification or some similar regulatory
216 The National Audit Office, for example, has stated that “The disqualification 
arrangements are intended to promote confidence and risk-taking in the market, by assuring 
those who do business with limited liability companies that directors who are unfit will be 
disqualified” National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 
Insolvency Service Executive Agency, Company Director Disqualification -  A Follow Up 
Report, (House of Commons Papers, Session 1998-1999,424). (London, The Stationary 
Office, 1998), page 1.
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device, has been made largely in the context of the relationship between 
entrepreneurs and voluntary creditors, i.e. creditors who enter into a legal 
relationship with entrepreneurs of their own volition and who, therefore, 
have at least the opportunity to insulate themselves from the effects of 
limited liability through the use of contract (even though in many cases their 
ability to do so would appear to be limited). The analysis has not thus 
addressed the situation of the involuntary creditor, i.e. those who bear the 
risks of limited liability (as discussed above), but who has no realistic 
opportunity to use contract in this way. Tort creditors are the most obvious 
example of such a group, having no realistic opportunity to use contract to 
address the increased risk transferred to them by incorporation.
It is widely recognised in the academic literature that involuntary 
creditors are uniquely disadvantaged by a rule of limited liability and several 
authors have advocated a rule of unlimited liability of corporate 
shareholders in relation to involuntary creditors217. Posner’s, whilst 
advocating the retention of limited liability, nonetheless concedes that 
creditors who do not have the opportunity to contract with limited liability 
companies will not be able to recoup the risk shifted to the by limited
217 Hansmann H, and. Kraakman, R., Towards Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, (1991) 100 Yale LJ 1879; R. Meiners Piercing the Veil o f Limited 
Liability (1979) 4 Del. J. Corp. Law 351; A. Scwartz, Products Liability, Corporate 
Structures and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk relationship (1985) J. of 
Legal Studies 689;W. Bratton & J. McCahery, An Inquiry into the Efficiency o f the Limited 
liability Company : Of Theory o f the Firm and Regulatory Competition, (1997) 53 
Washington and Lee LR 629 (arguing that the case for unlimited liability in relation to tort 
creditors is stronger in relation to closely held companies). For a summary of the arguments 
in favour of retaining limited liability in relation to involuntary creditors see B. Cheffms, 
Company Law: Theory Structure and Operation, (Oxford, Claredon Press, 1997), pages 
505-508. On limited liability and tort victims see generally Note, Should Shareholders Be 
Personally Liable for the Torts o f their Corporations (1976) 76 Yale LJ 1190.
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liability, suggesting that ‘lifting the corporate veil’ should be used to prevent 
mischief in such cases218.
The limitations of ‘lifting the veil’ as a remedy for the mischief 
caused by limited liability been noted earlier219, as have the risk shifting and 
increased moral hazard associated with limited liability, thus in so far as 
involuntary creditors are exposed to exactly the same risks from limited 
liability as other creditors, but lack any prospect of protecting themselves, 
the case for disqualification (or similar regulation) to ‘protect’ them from 
limited liability would appear to be overwhelming220. Thus, to our 
conclusion that disqualification exists to protect voluntary creditors who are 
unable to satisfy their welfare goals through contract from the ‘moral 
hazard’ and risk shifting of by limited liability we might add that it also 
exists to protect involuntary creditors from the same mischief. Indeed 
voluntary creditors who cannot contract and involuntary creditors may find 
themselves in much the same situation. However, whilst logic dictates that 
concern for the position of the involuntary should be an integral 
disqualification’s objective of ‘protecting the public from abuse of limited 
liability’ is must be noted that instances of disqualification being used to 
sanction conduct causing loss to involuntary credits appear to be rare. The 
reported cases focus on damage done to voluntary creditors by abuse of
218 Posner, supra note 187 .
219 Supra note 138 and accompanying text.
220 Cheffins surmises the ‘areas of concern’ of limited liability in relation to involuntary 
creditors as increased risk of not being compensated in so far as tort damages exceed the 
assets of the company (i.e. risk shifting) as well as “attenuated incentive to make the 
expenditures necessary to implement optimal safety precautions” (i.e. moral hazard), 
Cheffms supra note 217 page 506.
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limited liability as with instances of trading whilst insolvent etc221. That is 
not to say that misconduct in relation to involuntary creditors is irrelevant to 
such grounds of unfitness as conduct that is detrimental to voluntary 
creditors with also be detrimental to involuntary creditors, ‘negligence’ in 
discharging the duties of director, e.g. failing to inform oneself to the
99 9company’s affairs or to generally supervise it management would be 
detrimental to all creditors in so far as it increased the risk of insolvency.
Nonetheless, specific instances of causing harm to involuntary 
creditors are rare in disqualification cases223 but this is likely to be a result of 
the fact that section 6 applications can only be made after insolvency and 
that the information leading to such applications stems from reports by 
Insolvency Practitioners. As such, it is unsurprising that disqualification 
should focus on voluntary creditors as insolvency necessarily almost 
invariably leaves trade creditors etc with claims against the company and the 
IP’s duty is to satisfy such claims to the greatest degree possible. However, 
that disqualification has a role in protecting involuntary creditors from abuse 
of limited liability is clear. Therefore references to the creditors whom 
disqualification aims to protect in the remainder of this thesis should be 
interpreted as refereeing to both voluntary and involuntary creditors.
221 For detailed explanation of this and other grounds of unfitness see 4.8 ‘The Conduct 
Sanctioned in Disqualification Cases’, below.
222 See for example Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 124.
223 The author is not aware of any such cases.
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Chapter 4: Sanctioning
Undesirable Conduct.
“It is beyond doubt that the purpose of section 6 is to protect the public, and in 
particular potential creditors of companies, from loosing money through companies 
becoming insolvent when the directors of those companies are unfit to be 
concerned in the management of companies”
Dillion LJ, Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd 
[1991] Ch 164, at page 176.
4.1 Introduction
Disqualification does not attempt to prevent undesirable use of 
limited liability by exactly mimicking the compensation model, or indeed by 
seeking to foster the conditions necessary for that model to function 
efficiently. For if it were to do so, limited liability would be less likely to 
bring about an increase in risk-taking. Thus, disqualification does not 
attempt to remedy information deficits by forcing directors to disclose 
information to creditors, nor does it require them to pay appropriate 
compensation for any risk that they actually transfer. Instead it provides 
general ‘public interest’ regulation by which the State seeks an ex post 
sanction against a director whose conduct it deems to be undesirable, or in 
the words of the Act, ‘unfit224.
224 See section 7 (1) of the Disqualification Act which states that the Secretary of State 
may apply for a disqualification order against a person where he feels that “it is expedient in 
the public interest” that a person be disqualified.
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However, this raises the obvious question of what the State regards 
as ‘undesirable’ use of limited liability that is contrary to the public interest. 
An answer to this question is essential because not only will it make clear 
the limits of ‘desirable’ risk shifting (at least as far as the State is 
concerned), but it is also essential for a meaningful analysis of the success of 
disqualification. For unless it is clear what harm the State seeks to prevent 
by disqualifying directors, it is impossible to discuss the extent to which 
section 6 likely to be successful.
The most obvious answer to the question just posed is simply to say 
that ‘the conduct sanctioned in disqualification cases is undesirable’ and 
contrary to the public interest, and this is certainly true. However, it is not a 
satisfactory answer because not only is it necessary to know the actual 
conduct sanctioned, but it is necessary to why that conduct is felt to be 
contrary to the public interest. There are two matters that are relevant to this 
issue in section 6 cases. The first concerns the identification of the ‘harm’ 
that makes certain uses of limited liability prima facie contrary to the public 
interest. The second matter concerns the degree of blameworthiness for that 
harm which is necessary to justify disqualification.
Both of these issues are important to the success of disqualification, 
but identifying the ‘harm’ that disqualification seeks to sanction is 
particularly important to this thesis for it is the key to determining how far 
the State is willing to tolerate the licence to take risk that statutory limited 
liability gives directors. An analysis of this issue is also important because 
the contested nature of the public interest in corporate regulation makes the
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task of establishing the nature of that harm more difficult than perhaps it 
needs to be, because it has caused some inconsistency in approach to 
disqualification on the part of the judiciary.
Therefore, this chapter discusses the perception of public interest 
regulation adopted in section 6 and argues that whilst different approaches 
to the degree of blameworthiness necessary to justify a disqualification 
undoubtedly exist, there is an obvious and settled understanding of what 
makes certain acts ‘undesirable abuse of limited liability’. It argues that this 
understanding is evident in the Act itself, that it is sometimes evident in 
judicial rhetoric but that it is almost always evident injudicial practice.
4.2 Public Interests in Company Law.
Arguments surrounding the legitimacy of corporate power are 
inextricably bound up with notions of the public interest. Those who view 
the company as a social enterprise and follow Dahl’s claim that “every large 
corporation...[is] an entity whose existence and decisions can only be 
justified insofar as they serve the public or social purposes”225, essentially 
assert that corporate power should only be exercised for social good. 
According to such theorists any exercise of power that cannot be justified 
against this goal would be ‘harmful’. They therefore define the public 
interest in company law in terms sufficient to justify intrusive public 
regulation of the exercise of corporate power. Such theorists often view the
225 R. A. Dahl, ''A Prelude to Corporate Reform ’ (1972) Business and Society Review 17, 
quoted in J.E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of 
Company Law, (Oxford, Claredon Press, 1993), page 23.
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company as resting on a concession of power by the State and consequently
• • 226 view the company in a framework that is conducive to state regulation
On the other side of the theoretical divide sit adherents to the nexus of
contracts view227 who describe the company as a product of a complex web
of private contracts and assert that the public interest role of the State is
limited to providing mechanisms for the contracting parties to enforce their
rights228. For them regulation which goes beyond this goal would be
‘harmful’. Property rights theorists come to a similar conclusion, but base
their reasoning on the supposed proprietary nature of shareholders’ interest
in companies, which they see as making the company a private association
in which the scope for State intervention is limited .
The goal that public interest regulation of directors ought to pursue is 
therefore not a subject capable of objective definition, but is instead 
determined by political, economic and social considerations, not least the 
political, economic and social climate in which the public interest debate
226 Parkinson, ibid, page 25.
227 See 2.2, supra.
228 In viewing the company as a creature of ‘market contracting’, proponents of the nexus- 
of-contracts theory can claim that any ‘public’ regulation will distort the market and lead to 
an inefficient outcome. That is not to say that they deny outside groups have an interest in 
the company. Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, concede that outside groups do have 
such an interest, however, they assert that protection of the interest of these groups is a 
matter for contractual negotiation see Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 188. For a 
critique of the nexus-of-contracts ‘private’ conception of the company see Ireland P, 
Implicit Contract as Ideology in D. Campbell, H. Collins, & J. Wightman, (eds), Implicit 
Dimensions o f Contract: Discrete, Relational and Network Contracts ( Oxford and 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2003). See also D. Campbell, The Role o f Monitoring and 
Morality in Company Law, (1997) 7 Aust. J. Corp Law 343, who subjects the market and 
contractual foundations of the theory to sustained criticism
229 Again, see Parkinson, ‘Corporate Power’, supra note 225, pages 33-39. For a general 
overview of the public and private theories of the firm, see A. Woolfe, The Modem 
Corporation: Private Agent o f Public Actor? 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev 1673. Woolfe 
considers the public and private characteristics of the firm and seeks to determine its true 
nature. He ultimately argues that both theories are flawed but that the starting point for
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takes place230. This is the reason why we encounter different perceptions of
231the public interest within capitalist economies. In Germany, for example 
policy makers view corporate power as legitimate only when exercised for 
social good, which has lead to a definition of the public interest that 
legitimises prescriptive legal regulation of the company’s structure. In the 
UK, on the other hand, policy makers view the company more as a private 
enterprise, which leads to quite a different perception of the public 
interest232. That two such different approaches have been sustained over a 
lengthy period of time is a testament to the contested nature of how a society 
views the role of the public interest in companies.
4.3 The Contested Public Interest in Disqualification.
In disqualification, conduct condemned as unfit is merely an expression of 
conduct that is felt not to be in the public interest. Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that different attitudes to ‘unfitness’ should be seen across the 
spectrum of disqualification cases and that these should appear to represent 
different interpretations of the public interest in corporate regulation. The 
difference in approach is most obvious in relation to the degree of
analysing company law should be to begin with its public side and only then consider its 
private characteristics.
30 On the role of politics of corporate governance see generally, M. Roe, Political 
Determinants o f Corporate Governance, (Oxford, O.U.P., 2004).
231 For a comparative study of the public interest in Germany and the UK see S. Donnelly, 
The Public Interest and the Company in Germany, in J. Parkinson, A. Gamble, & G. Kelly, 
(eds) The Political Economy o f the Company (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000).
232 As Parkinson notes (Corporate Power, supra note 6, pages 22-23) some authors deny 
that the public interest is the standard by which corporate activity should be judged in a 
market system of economic organisation. Some versions of the nexus-of-contracts view 
would adopt this ideology, however in that the public interest has many possible meanings^  
i would argue that ‘a’ public interest is relevant to all theories of the company, in that each
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blameworthiness necessary to justify a disqualification in the public interest. 
However, it is by no means clear whether these differences lead to 
conflicting perceptions of the ‘harm’ that causes a certain use of limited 
liability to be classed as undesirable.
Vanessa Finch233 has argued that two approaches to disqualification 
are evident across the spectrum of reported cases, which she terms ‘rights’ 
and ‘privileges’ approaches. Finch argues that the ‘rights’ approach reflects 
a “ ‘business enterprise’ perspective on company law” which sees 
managing a company as a valuable mode of wealth creation and only 
legitimates interference with that right (i.e. disqualification) where a high 
degree of blameworthiness is present for harmful conduct. As such, Finch 
appears to suggest that the rights approach adopts a perception of the public 
interest akin to that in contractual and proprietary analysis of the company
i.e. one that does not legitimate paternalistic regulation to achieve socially 
desirable outcomes. Finch argues that judges who adopt the rights approach 
view section 6 disqualification as a fundamentally penal process and that 
they emphasise the need for a high degree of blameworthiness and for 
retribution236 for it to be in the public interest to withdraw the desirable right
theory seeks to ensure that some ‘good’ comes from corporate activity. That ‘good’, be it 
profit maximisation or social equality must by definition be felt to be a public interest.
33 See, V. Finch, Disqualifying Directors: Issues o f Rights, Privileges and Employment 
(1993) 22 Industrial Law Journal 35 and V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives 
and Principles, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002).
234 Finch, ibid page
235 Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law, ibid,, page 522.
236 See for example Hoffman LJ who declared in Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry v 
Gray [1995] 1 BCLC 276 that die purpose o f making disqualification in section 6 
mandatory was to ensure that everybody whose conduct fell below the standard was 
disqualified whether ‘the individual court thought this was in the public interest or not’, see
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of entrepreneurs to incorporate. Broadly speaking, Finch’s analysis suggests 
that the rights approach, regards all risk-taking facilitated by limited liability 
as desirable, regardless of its detrimental impact on thirds parties, unless the 
director has acted in a manner worthy of punishment.
The privileges approach on the other hand, is said to reflect a social 
responsibility perspective on company law and as such “looks not merely at 
the interests of investors, managers, directors and creditors but to the 
‘legitimate needs, too, of the public interest, of the consumer and the 
employee’”237. As such Finch suggests that it is more concerned with public 
protection rather than ‘punishing’ the director for commercially 
reprehensible conduct and emphasises the privilege of limited liability is to 
be used responsibly. As such it would seem that Finch suggests a more 
sceptical attitude towards the ‘benefits’ of limited liability. Therefore, under 
the ‘privileges’ approach, uses of limited liability that adversely impact on 
third parties will be viewed as undesirable without the need for a high 
degree of culpability for any harm inflicted. Thus, the tenor of Finch’s 
analysis suggests that the privilege approach adopts a ‘pluralist’238
Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law, ibid, page 524. See also Re Imperial Board Products, 
[2004] EWHC 2096, see also Re Crestjoy Products Ltd [1991] BCC 268.
237 Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law, supra note ibid, page 522.
238 1 use the term ‘pluralist’ in the sense that disqualification is concerned with broader 
spectrum of interests than just profit maximisation. The same term was used by the 
Company Law Review Steering Group to describe the theory that company law should 
serve a broader range of interest than simply the shareholders (See Company Law Review 
Steering Group, Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic 
Framework, (London, DTI, 1999)). This theory is also commonly called the ‘stakeholder 
theory’. However, for the moment I only use the term pluralist in the general sense that it is 
concerned with more than profit maximisation. It is not intended to denote any specific 
form of ‘stakeholder’ theory.
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interpretation of the public interest such as that we expect to see in more 
social democratic systems of economic organisation.
The difference between the rights and privileges approach in terms 
of blameworthiness is clear and unambiguous. Finch cites several examples 
of judges who emphasis the need for culpability and retribution in their 
discussion of when disqualification is merited, and others who emphasis the 
need to protect the public even from simple incompetence . However, 
what is not clear is whether this difference in emphasis extends to 
philosophical differences as to the nature of harmful conduct.
It is certainly conceivable from Finch’s analysis that the two 
approaches would offer very different, and mutually exclusive, 
interpretations of what equates to harmful use of limited liability. The 
‘rights’ approach, would appear to be bom of the philosophy that sees 
limited liability as a valuable method of wealth creation, and as such define 
‘harm’ very narrowly, focusing perhaps on conduct that is economically 
harmful. The ‘privileges’ approach, on the other hand, would appear to owe 
much to the concession theory of the company and to emphasise the rights 
of creditors and others and as such define a broad spectrum of acts as 
harmful because they are socially undesirable. Concession theory asserts 
that companies are created by an exercise of state power that bestows 
privileges on those who own/control them240 and creates an environment 
conducive to paternalistic state regulation of companies to achieve public
239 Finch, supra, note 233.
240 D. Millon, Theories o f the Corporation, (1990) Duke L.J. 201. See also See J. Dewey,
‘The Historical Background Of Corporate Legal Personality’, (1926) 35 Yale LJ 655,
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interest outcomes that are felt to be morally or socially desirable, akin to the 
goals of the ‘privileges’ approach suggested by Finch. Indeed, such a broad 
interpretation of harmful conduct would seem inherent in Finch’s claim that 
the privilege approach “looks...to the ‘legitimate needs, too, of the public 
interest, of the consumer and the employee’” 241.
Concession theory has a long pedigree in disqualification. It was 
evident in the Cork report’s recommendation that disqualification be 
introduced to “severely penalis[e] those who abuse the privilege of limited 
liability by operating behind one-man, insufficiently capitalised 
companies”242, and in the declaration of the National Audit Office243 that 
disqualification existed to “protect the public and commercial world from 
those who abuse the privilege of limited liability [my emphasis]”. In terms 
of judicial philosophy, concession theory is also evident in many judicial 
statements which are cited as examples of the ‘privileges’ approach, such as 
that of Neil LJ in Re Grayan Building Services Ltd344, where his Lordship 
stated that “Those who trade under the regime of limited liability and who 
avail themselves of the privileges of that regime must accept the standards 
of probity and competence to which the law requires company directors to 
conform”.
and Parkinson, supra note 225, page 27.
241 Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law, supra note 233.
242 Department of Trade and Industry, Report o f the Review Committee on Insolvency Law 
and Practice, (Chairman Sir Kenneth Cork) Cmnd. 8558 (London, HMSO,1982), para 
1815.
243 National Audit Office, Insolvency Service Executive Agency, Company Director 
Disqualification -  A Follow Up Report, (House of Commons Papers, Session 1998- 
1999,424) (London, The Stationary Office, 1998).
244 [1995] Ch. 231.
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Given this frequent recourse to concession theory in disqualification, 
it might be thought that the ‘social responsibility’ element in the privileges 
approach ought to represent the perception of harmful conduct that was 
intended by the Disqualification Act. However, whilst the privileges 
approach may be desirable as being compatible with a frequently expressed 
philosophy of disqualification, and represent the correct approach to 
blameworthiness, the claim that it represents a ‘social responsibility’ 
perspective of harmful conduct that is materially different from that adopted 
under the ‘rights’ approach ought to be rejected. For, whilst the two 
approaches clearly differ in their appreciation of the degree of 
blameworthiness necessary to justify public interest disqualification, it does 
not necessarily follow that they differ markedly in their interpretation of 
what is harmful conduct. Indeed, the argument that the approaches follow 
distinctive objectives is somewhat undermined by the fact that examples of 
judges who have adopted both approaches at various times (sometimes even 
in the same case) are relatively common.245 Such an interchangeable 
approach to the two approaches would be highly illogical if they represented 
fundamentally different perceptions of the objective behind disqualification, 
if however, they represent only a difference in emphasis such inconsistency 
is less troubling.
245 Finch,Corporate Insolvency Law supra note 233, notes instances where Hannan J has 
taken into account ‘rights’ and privileges’ factors.
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4.4 The Public Interest in British Company Law.
The established view of the ‘public interest’ in British company law 
gravitates towards economic and proprietary arguments such as those 
suggested for the rights approach and has not historically recognised the sort 
of pluralist interpretation of the public interest suggested for the privileges 
approach. As such, our corporate governance regime is generally understood 
to legitimate the goal of profit maximisation in the interests of 
shareholders246. In keeping with this responsibility, the Company Law 
Review Steering Group recently stated that the law “requires directors to 
operate companies for the benefit of shareholders”.247 Profit maximisation in 
the shareholders interests is justified as a public interest goal because it is 
claimed to be the most effective way to ensure that corporate power is used 
to create wealth. The rules which accord special privileges to shareholders 
and which deny similar rights to third parties are therefore justified as being 
in the public interest in so far as they help to ensure that ‘desirable’ profit 
maximisation takes place.
The notion of profit maximisation for shareholders is an integral 
feature of many models of the company that originate from a contractual or 
proprietary analysis. Alchian and Demsetz248, for example, justify 
shareholders position as the beneficiaries of the directors’ profit maximising 
duty in terms of the need for a body to monitor the directors’ ‘output’. They
246 Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility, supra note 225.
247 Company Law Steering Group, Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy 
Developing the Framework (London, Department of Trade and Industry, 2000), para. 2.7
248A. Alchain, & H. Demsetz, Production Information Costs and Economic Organisation ’ 
(1972) 62 American Economic Review 111.
120
argue that the shareholder/monitor also needs an incentive to discharge his 
function and this is achieved by giving him privileged proprietary rights to 
the profit of the enterprise.
However, that is not to suggest that the perception of the public 
interest in UK company law is static in its approach to the rights of third 
parties. Rather the notion of what form of corporate governance is in ‘the 
public interest’ has evolved as the values of society have changed. Thus, the 
profit maximising duty has been interpreted in different legislative contexts 
over many generations. Profit maximisation with no regard to third parties, 
such as the rights of employees, has not been acceptable for many years, if it 
ever was. Each generation has interpreted the duty in the light of the 
legislative constraints it feels are necessary to ensure that corporate power is 
exercised in the most beneficial way. Thus, in modem times profit 
maximisation has remained the basic goal of directors but it has been 
interpreted in the light of a legal framework that seeks to protect specific 
outside interests, for example, certain rights of employees, health and safety 
standards249, environmental protection250 etc. However, it cannot be said that 
these developments represent a coherent move towards ‘social 
responsibility’ in company law such as that suggested by the privileges 
approach. Indeed, merely hemming in profit maximisation with legislation 
to protect certain third parties is a minimalist response to concerns about 
their rights. Of course, specific legislation to deal with employment rights
249 See for example the provisions o f the Health and Safety Act 1974, The Management of 
Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/3242).
250 See for example the provisions of the Pollution Prevention and Control Act 1999.
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and environmental protection would always be needed even if a pluralist 
notion of the public interest were adopted. However, if concerns over the 
rights of third parties were thought to outweigh the benefits of profit
^ c 1
maximisation, that duty itself would be changed . The fact that it has not 
indicates a continuing belief in profit maximisation, albeit within a more 
restrictive legislative context.
Of course in one instance, legislative change has affected the duty 
more directly. Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985 obliges directors to 
have ‘regard’ to the interests of employees of the company and as such 
represents a tacit acceptance of that employees have an interest in the 
running of companies. However, the section is weak and ensures that the 
duty is not enforceable by employees by stating that it is a duty owed to the
9^ 9company and is only enforceable by it . The proposed requirement that 
directors ‘have regard’ to the interest of a wider class of third party interests, 
proposed in the white paper Modernising Company Law253, suffers from the 
same singular defect. Thus, it is clear that the shareholder orientation of the 
law is likely to be preserved for the foreseeable future.
251 By, for example, adopting a stakeholder type duty under which, in the words of the 
Company Law Review Steering Group, “ it should be possible, or even obligatory, for 
directors to operate companies for other purposes, where the direct economic interests of 
those with business relationships with the company (such as the needs of employees, or 
suppliers, or the local community), or the wider public interest, demanded it”. Company 
Law Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, Developing the 
Framework, (London, Department of Trade and Industry, 2000) para. 2.7.
252 See Parkinson, supra note 225, chapter 3.
253The white paper proposes to include a clause in the codified statement of duties that
requires directors to ‘have regard’ to the company’s need to foster good relationships with
suppliers, customers and employees.; the impact of the company’s operations on the
environment; the need to maintain high standards of business behaviour and
the need to be fair between members, see White Paper, Modernising Company Law, Cmnd
5553-11.
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As such it would be difficult to reconcile any ‘social responsibility’ 
approach to the regulation of directors in section 6 disqualification with the 
State’s prevailing policy. For, there is no rule which says that corporate 
power should only be exercised to achieve socially desirable outcomes, as 
the Company Law Review Steering Group’s conclusion that the profit 
maximising duty should not be abandoned in favour of a more pluralist, 
stakeholder shows254. Recent policy statements from the government also 
show no sign of such a shift255.
Consequently, the more pluralist interpretation of the public interest 
in disqualification would be anomalous if it was used to condemn conduct 
that offended socially desirable goals set by the judges. For, there has been 
no proposal to alter the ‘market’ orientation of company law rules. 
However, if section 6 disqualification is examined closely it is clear that it 
does no such thing.
4.5 Social Responsibility in Disqualification.
Disqualification is certainly concerned with wider considerations 
than profit maximisation. This is obvious from even a cursory glance at 
schedule l 256 of the Act which cites a wide variety of matters as ‘relevant’ to
254 Company Law Steering Group, Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy. 
Completing the Structure, (London, Department of Trade and Industry, 2000), chap 3.
255 For example, the approach evidenced in the consultation document “Rewards for 
Failure” Directors Remuneration -  Contracts, Performance and Severance”, supra chapter
2 .
256 Schedule 1 of the Act direct the Courts attention to the following matters when 
assessing whether a disqualification is desirable;
“ 1. Any misfeasance o f breach of fiduciary duty in relation to the company.
2. Any misapplication, retention or conduct giving rise to an obligation to account 
for company money.
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a court’s consideration of unfit conduct. Many of the matters referred to in 
the schedule appear to have little relevance to a director’s duty to act bona 
fide in the best interest of the company257, and much more relevance to 
public policy considerations. Thus, the schedule lists a director’s failure to 
comply with various accounting and disclosure requirements as relevant to 
unfitness, his failure to ‘supply goods paid for’, as well as his breach of 
several provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 designed to prevent 
dispositions of assets prior to liquidation which are harmful to creditors. 
More general matters such as ‘the extent of a director’s responsibility for a
3. The extent of a director’s responsibility for the company entering into a 
transaction liable to be set aside under Part XVI of the Insolvent Act256.
4. The extent of a directors failure to comply with the following provisions of the 
Companies Act 1985,
a. section 221 (duty to keep annual accounts);
b. section 222 (where and how records are to be kept);
c. section 228 (register o f directors and secretaries);
d. section 352 (keeping up the register o f members);
e. section 353 (location of register of members);
f. section 363 (duty to make annual returns);
g. sections 399 and 415 (duty to register charges created).
5. The extent of a director's failure to comply with (a) section 227 of the CA 1985 
or (b) section 233.”
The matters that are mentioned in part 2 of schedule one are matters that are only to be 
taken into account where a company has become insolvent and are, therefore, more specific 
to section 6. These matters are:
“6. The extent of a director’s responsibility for the company becoming insolvent
7. The director’s responsibility for the company not supplying goods and services 
paid for.
8. The director’s responsibility for the company entering into any transaction or 
giving any preference that is (a) liable to be set aside under section 127 or sections 
238-240 of the Insolvency Act 1986256; or (b) challengeable under section 242 or 
243 of the Insolvency Act 1986256.
9. The extent of the director’s responsibility for any failure to comply with section 
98 of the Insolvency Act256.
10. Any failure to comply with any o f the following provisions of the Insolvency Act 
1986
a. section 22 (statement o f affairs in administration);
b. section 47 (statement to the administrative receiver);
c. section 66 (statement in a Scottish receivership);
d. section 99 (duty to attend wind up meetings);
e. section 131 (statement in a court winding up);
f. section 234 (duty to deliver up company property)
g. section 235 (duty to co-operate with liquidator).
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company becoming insolvent’ are also included. However, the bona fide 
duty is not ignored by the schedule, as a director’s breach of his fiduciary 
duties is cited as a relevant matter along with ‘any misapplication or 
retention of the company’s assets’.
Despite the inclusion of fiduciary duties in schedule 1 it is clear from 
that schedule that section 6 disqualification is intended to benefit both 
shareholders and other interest groups, for conduct that harms the welfare of 
groups such as customers and other creditors are obviously intended to be 
sanctioned by section 6. However, it does not necessarily follow that section 
6 adopts anything that could be characterised as a ‘social responsibility’ 
perception of the public interest. It is clear from the analysis of limited 
liability and disqualification that section 6 aims to control uses of limited 
liability that adversely impact upon creditors and which could undermine 
confidence in limited liability if left unregulated. The matters cited in 
schedule 1 are perfectly compatible with this aim and with the market 
interpretation of public interest that characterises English company law.
4.6 Public Interest Regulation, the Market and the Private Law.
In a predominantly market and private law system of economic 
organisation, such as that in the UK, ‘public interest’ regulation is only 
legitimate where there has been a failure of ‘private law’ and ‘market’ 
regulation258. ‘Market failure’ occurs where parties are unable to reach a
257 Re Smith and Fawcett [1942] Ch. 304.
258 A. Ogus, Regulation Legal Form and Economic Theory, (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1994).
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welfare maximising bargain through market transactions and private law 
failure occurs where a welfare maximising bargain is reached but is 
unenforceable because either party is unable to avail himself of the private 
law remedy he has, or that remedy is itself unavailing. Thus, in such a 
system the goal of public interest regulation would essentially be to restore 
the desirable market and private law outcome through public interest 
regulation. If the goals of public interest regulation were to achieve socially 
desirable outcomes that would not result from market transactions, this 
model would obviously not be applicable.
4.6.1. Loss and the Public Interest.
In section 6 cases disqualification is used to sanction conduct that 
has harmed the welfare of creditors, most usually by causing financial loss 
to them. The fact that such conduct has taken place indicates that there has 
been ‘market’ and ‘private law’ failure that has resulted in allocative 
inefficiency. For, loss shows either that creditors have failed to resolve 
agency problems through ex ante bargaining with directors or that they have 
failed to use ex post private law powers to prevent loss.
Therefore, there is clear scope for public interest regulation to 
remedy an allocative inefficiency that cannot be remedied by private law 
means in section 6 cases. As such it would appear easy to apply ‘market’ 
criteria for public interest regulation to instances of conduct that causes loss 
to creditors, particularly in owner-managed companies. Consequently, the 
desire to protect creditors from the exploitation of limited liability cannot of 
itself be characterised as a paternalistic interference in a predominately
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market system of economic organisation because where optimal risk taking 
is not secured through bargaining between creditors and owner-managers 
because of information asymmetries etc, there is prima facie market failure 
that leads to allocative inefficiency.
However, the ‘market failure’ that occurs in director-creditor 
relationships, is as I have discussed in chapter 3, largely the result of 
statutory limited liability, which the State has chosen to create because of its 
belief that limited liability is a desirable method of wealth creation. Thus, it 
must be emphasised that disqualification does not seek to prevent all 
allocative inefficiencies that arise from limited liability by, for example, 
exactly mimicking the compensation model because the ‘benefits’ of limited 
liability rely upon such inefficiencies. As such, disqualification is selective 
in the market and private law outcomes that it chooses to enforce. 
Nonetheless, it does seek to sanction conduct that would not occur under 
idealised market conditions i.e. risk-taking that results in loss to creditors, 
but only where there is some element of blameworthiness present. Of 
course, there is clear disagreement between the judges as to the level of 
blameworthiness necessary to justify disqualification, but this is a 
disagreement about the circumstances in which disqualification is desirable. 
It is not a disagreement as to the essential purpose of disqualification and 
therefore the nature of the harm that it seeks to eschew. Therefore, it is 
submitted that regardless of whether a particular judge adopts the rights of 
privileges approach, the essential objective of disqualification is settled and 
that objective is broadly economic in that section 6 seeks to ‘protect the
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public’ from loss caused by blameworthy exploitation of the opportunity to 
effect uncompensated transfers of risk allowed by limited liability.
The central role of loss in section 6 disqualification is clear from 
several cases in which the objectives of disqualification have been 
considered. For example, in the case of Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) 
Ltd259, Dillon LJ stated, in a passage that has been identified as emphasising 
the public protection (i.e. privileges), approach260, that:
“It is beyond doubt that the purpose of section 6 is to protect the public and 
in particular potential creditors of companies, from loosing money through 
companies becoming insolvent when the directors of those companies are 
unfit to be concerned in the management of companies [my emphasis]”
The importance of preventing loss is clear in this passage and, indeed, it 
would be difficult to interpret this passage as legitimating a social 
responsibility perspective on company law which “looks not merely at the 
interests of investors, managers, directors and creditors but to the ‘legitimate 
needs, too, of the public interest, of the consumer and the employee’”261. 
Rather, it clearly indicates that loss to creditors from insolvency is the 
‘harm’ that disqualification seeks to protect the public from.
The essentially economic focus of disqualification is also reflected in 
the test of unfitness that has been developed in the courts and which Finch 
attributes to the ‘rights’ approach. The test uses language of commercial 
accountability and responsibility such as that of Hoffman J in Re Dawson
259 [1990] BCC 765.
260 By Finch, Rights and Privileges, supra note 233
261 Finch, ibid.
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Print Group262, where it was stated that a director’s conduct would only be 
held unfit where it would be:
“regarded in the commercial world as breach of commercial morality such 
that it should require a conclusion that the director responsible is unfit to be 
concerned in the management of companies”[my emphasis]263.
The choice of the phrase commercial morality in this and subsequent cases 
indicates that responsibility and accountability are viewed very much in 
terms of a desire to sanction conduct that inhibits efficient market 
transactions. A sentiment expressed by the NAO when it stated that ““The 
disqualification arrangements are intended to promote confidence and risk- 
taking in the market, by assuring those who do business with limited 
liability companies that directors who are unfit will be disqualified”264.
The concentration on loss to creditors as the essence of a harmful use 
of limited liability is also clearly evident in schedule 1. Part 2 of the 
schedule, for example, cites a ‘director’s responsibility for insolvency’ and 
any conduct by him which is intended to unfairly reduce the assets of the 
company before insolvency proceedings as relevant to unfitness. More 
generally disqualification has been used to sanction instances of outright
262 [1987] BCLC 601.
263 Ibid at pages 604-605. Dillon LJ in Re Sevenoaks approved this statement, supra note 
259 at page 779. See also Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd [1988] Ch 477 where Browne- 
Wilkinson V-C stated at page 486 the : “Ordinary commercial misjudgement is not in itself 
sufficient to justify disqualification. In the normal case, the conduct complained of must 
display a lack of commercial probity, although I have no doubt that in an extreme case of 
gross negligence would.. .be appropriate”.
64 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Insolvency 
Service Executive Agency, Company Director Disqualification -  A Follow Up Report,, 
(House of Commons Papers, Session 1998-1999,424) (London, The Stationary Office, 
1998), page 1.
265 Schedule 1 part 2 rules 6 and 7, supra note 256.
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fraud or dishonesty266, the misuse of company bank accounts267, trading at 
the risk of creditors268 and where directors fail to ensure that goods that have 
been paid for are delivered269. All of these are prima facie examples of 
where disqualification sanctions unfit conduct that causes loss to creditors. 
As such they can be viewed as the product of an economic interpretation of 
the public interest, in that conduct that causes loss to creditors has evidently 
not been secured through bargaining.
Thus, there is significant evidence that indicates a settled 
appreciation of the harm that makes certain uses of limited liability 
undesirable, which, indeed, is borne out by closer analysis of common forms 
of misconduct sanctioned in cases brought under section 6 of the 
Disqualification Act270.
266 See for example Re Moorgate Metals Ltd [1995] BCC 143 where an attempt to procure a 
false complaint from a customer about good purchased from a supplier was held to be 
evidence of unfitness.
267 See for example Re Hitco 2000 Ltd [1995] BCC 161
268 Re CS Holidays Ltd [1997] BCC 172. Chadwick J stated at page 178 that “If it is 
established in proceedings under section 6 of the Act that a director has caused a company 
to trade when he knew or ought to have known that there were no reasonable prospects that 
the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation, that director may well be held 
unfit to be concerned in the management of companies”.
269 Schedule 1 part 2 paragraph 6, supra note 256. For a case example see Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry v Tjolle [1998] 1 BCLC 333.
270 Any survey of the disqualification cases reveals that certain types of conduct’ are very 
frequently cited as evidence of unfitness. Many of those matters are specifically mentioned 
in the schedule 1 list of matters ‘relevant to a disqualification application, (see note 256, 
supra), but others, such as a failure to pay tax are not. The types of misconduct cited in the 
following section as examples of ‘common’ forms of unfit conduct are therefore drawn 
from those cited in the leading publication on directors’ disqualification, i.e. Mithani: 
Directors ’ Disqualification, and comprise matters mentioned in schedule 1 as well as other 
common specific instances of unfitness. See A. Mithani, Directors Disqualification 
(Looseleaf Publication) (London, Butterworths, 1998), chapter 2 paras XX.X -  XX.X.
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4.8 The Conduct Sanctioned in Section 6 Cases.
4.8.1 Excessive Remuneration.
A good illustration of the economic focus of section 6 can be seen in 
the courts’ treatment of allegations that a director is unfit because he has 
‘drawn excessive remuneration’ from his company. At first sight such an 
allegation may seem to be a good example of the State using section 6 to 
further paternalistic goals by seeking to keep directors pay within 
‘reasonable’ limits. However, excessive remuneration has been held to 
constitute unfit conduct only in cases where it shown to cause actual or 
potential loss to creditors271. Thus, it has been held that excessive 
remuneration by a director who is also a sole shareholder will be unfit where 
it is merely a device to affect an unlawful return of capital or where a
• 97^director knows that that a company is insolvent or failing to meet its debts 
i.e. where they are likely to result in uncompensated loss to creditors. 
However, where a company is solvent and pays its debts promptly, the level 
of a director’s remuneration is seen as a matter for shareholders274 and will 
not be a matter of unfitness whatever its level.
271 See for example Re Mooregate Metals Ltd [1995] BCC 143 where Warner J stated “To 
my mind [the directors] helped themselves to remuneration and to benefits at the expense of 
the company and of its creditors to an extent that was in all the circumstances 
irresponsible”, at page 151.
272 Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd [1982] 3 All E. R. 1016.
211 Re McNulty’s Interchange Ltd (1988) 4 BCC 533.
274 See Re Halt Garage Ltd, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at page 1039, 
where it was states that “They [the creditors] have to accept the shareholders’ assessment of 
the scale of remuneration, by they are entitled to assume that, whether liberal or illiberal, 
what is paid is genuinely remuneration and that the power is not used as a cloak for making 
payments out of capital to the shareholders”. See also the recent DTI consultation paper 
‘Rewards for Failure ” Directors Remuneration -  Contracts, Performance and Severance,
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4.8.2 Trading Whilst Insolvent to the Detriment of Creditors.
Another frequently cited ‘matter of unfitness’ that has a clear focus 
on economic loss to creditors is the allegation that a director caused or 
permitted ‘trading whilst insolvent’. This is a matter of unfitness which is 
akin to ‘wrongful trading’ under section 214 of the Insolvency Act275. As far 
as disqualification is concerned, it has been held that unfitness lies in 
causing a company to continue to incur debts beyond the point at which it 
was obvious that it could not avoid insolvent liquidation. Thus, Chadwick J 
in Re C S Holidays Ltd276 stated:
‘If it is established.. .that a director has caused a company trade 
when he knew or ought to have known that there was no reasonable 
prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent 
liquidation, that director may well be held unfit...,277 
This formulation is extremely close to the test of liability under 
section 214 and is clearly intended to protect the economic well being of 
creditors, however, it has been established that disqualification is concerned 
with a director’s conduct as a whole and, that liability for trading whilst
(London, Department of Trade and Industry, 2003), in which the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry, Patricia Hewitt, declared at page 5 that the Government has:
“made clear that setting directors pay.. .is a matter for those companies and their 
shareholders. It is for shareholders as the owners o f the company to ensure that 
remuneration levels and structures provide the right incentives and that directors are held 
to account for company performance [my emphasis]”.
2750n section 214 see generally, D. Prentice, Creditors Interests and Directors Duties.
(1990) 10 O.J.L.S. 265. Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, permits a liquidator to 
apply to court requesting that a director be held liable to contribute to the assets of the 
company if it can be shown that at sometime before the winding up of the company the 
director knew, or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the 
company would avoid insolvency and that the director did not take reasonable steps to 
minimise loss to creditors. Section 214 was introduces following a recommendation firm 
the
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insolvent is wider than under section 2 1 4278. The guidance notes279 on unfit 
conduct issued to Insolvency Practitioners, for example, identify a number 
of matters that can amount to unfitness under this category, such as the 
amount by which company debts increased after a de facto insolvency, 
whether directors moderated their remuneration whilst the company was 
having trading difficulties, whether cash injections were expected as well as 
whether the directors had any “valid reason” to believe that the companies 
trading fortunes would change280. Any one of these matters may amount to 
unfit conduct even if it would not fall within the scope of section 214 .
Directors have however, been granted a degree of latitude when judging the 
trading prospects of their company. Hoffman J (as he then was), has 
expressed the opinion that the courts ought to recognise that directors of
98 9troubled companies tend to ‘cling to hope’ . However, as Hoffman J is a 
prominent adherent to the ‘rights’ approach, it is not certain that all judges 
will be prepared to give directors the benefit of any doubt. Nonetheless, the 
emphasis on preventing financial loss in this particular category of unfitness 
is clear.
277 Ibid at page 178.
278 Re Bath Glass [1988] 4 BCC 130.
279 In solvency Service, Guidance Notes for the Completion o f Statutory Reports and 
Returns, (London, Insolvency Service, 2001).
280 Ibid, page 12.
281 Mere trading whilst the company is technically insolvent is therefore not sufficient. See: 
Re Delta Distribution [2002] 1 BCLC 99.
282 Re C U Fittings [1989] BCLC 556.
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4.8.3 Breach of Duties
Schedule 1 of the Disqualification Act cites a director’s breach of his 
duties towards his company as a matter indicating potential unfitness and 
many examples of a director being found unfit because a breach of his duties 
can be found in the reported cases. For example, directors have been held 
unfit because of; a failure to declare an interest in a contract to which a 
company is a part,283; causing a company to enter into ‘sham’ 
transactions284; causing or permitting the misuse or misappropriation of the 
company’s money285; evidence that a director allotted shares to himself to 
retain control of a company286^  director’s failure to ‘manage the company 
properly’287, causing ‘transactions that were not in the best interests of the 
company’,288 causing or permitting transactions which were intended for the 
personal benefit of directors and causing what were described as 
‘improper transactions’290. Indeed, many other matters of unfit conduct 
represent potential breaches of fiduciary duties, such as drawing excessive
283 see Re Dominion International Group Pc (No 2) [1996] 1 BCLC 572 (a breach of the 
‘duty to disclose’, {Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros (1854) 1 Mac 461). See also 
Companies Act 1985 section 317)
284 Re Landhurst Leasing Pic [1999] 1 BCLC 286
285 By, for example, procuring the company to pay for work carried out on a private 
dwelling pace, Re Synthethetic Technology Ltd [1993] BCC 549
286 Re Looe Fish Ltd [1993] BCLC 1160.
287 This would appear to equate to a breach of the duty of care and skill, It was cited as 
evidence of unfitness in 70 cases.
288 An apparent breach of the duty to act bona fide in the best interests of the company {Re 
Smith and Fawcett [1942] Ch.304).
289 An apparent breach of the duty to act bona fide and/or the no conflict duty. See for 
example the case of J.J. Harrison (Properties) Ltd v Harrison [2002] 1 BCLC 162, where 
Chadwick LJ stated at page 173 that “.. .the powers to dispose of the company’s property, 
conferred, upon directors by the articles of association, must be exercised by the directors 
for the purposes, and in the interests of the company”.
290 Cited in 30 cases.
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remuneration from the company291 and the misuse of company bank 
accounts, which often included allegation of unexplained cash withdrawals 
and the issuing of cheques with out regard to whether they could be 
honoured292.
The ‘unfitness’ in a breach of fiduciary duties appears to lie in 
reducing the company’s prospects of successful trading through a failure to 
manage the business properly or through the appropriation of the company’s 
assets. As such, the focus on economically undesirable conduct that can 
adversely impact upon the company’s creditors is clear in this particular 
category of unfit conduct.
4.8.4 Transactions at a Preference or Undervalue.
Another prominent category of unfit conduct included in schedule 1 
that is clearly intended to sanction conduct that causes economic harm to 
creditors, is ‘causing or permitting transactions at an undervalue or a 
preference’.
Sections 238 and 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986 give ‘office 
holders’293 the power to request a court with competent jurisdiction to set 
aside any transaction which they believe was made at an undervalue or at a 
preference294. The aim of the court in making an order to set a transaction
291 A mater cited as evidence of unfitness in 78 cases, see table 1, supra.
292 See Re Hitco 2000 Ltd [1995] BCC 161.
293 ‘Office holders’ are defined by section 7(3) of the Disqualification Act as; the official 
receiver; a liquidator, an administrator or an administrative receiver.
294 Section 238 (4) defines a transaction at an undervalue as a transaction where a company 
enters into a transaction with a person and the company “makes a gift to that person or 
otherwise enters into a transaction with that person on terms that provide for the company 
to receive no consideration, or (b), the company enters into a transaction with a person for a
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aside is to ‘restore the position that would have existed had the transaction 
not been made’295 by ordering direct recovery from those who have 
benefited from the transaction296. This is obviously a highly beneficial 
measure for creditors, which provides a direct remedy for loss that result 
from this type of unfit conduct.
In the context of disqualification, the meaning of a transaction at a 
preference was considered in two cases, Re M  C Bacon Ltd297 and Re Living
} Q O
Images Ltd , where it was held that a preference is given when, (i) in 
making a particular transaction the company/director has a desire to improve 
the position of a particular creditor in the event of insolvency and, (ii) that 
desire influenced a transaction between the creditor and the company. 
However, it was established in Re Kaypack (No 2)299 that in accordance with 
the wording of paragraph 8300, evidence that a director is responsible for a 
transaction at a preference or an undervalue is not automatically evidence of
consideration the value of which, in money or moneys worth, is significantly less than the 
value, in money or moneys worth, than the consideration provided by the company” Section 
239 (3) defines a preference as “the company doing or suffering anything to be done 
.. .which has the effect of putting [a] person into a position which, in the event of the 
company going into insolvent liquidation, will be better than the position he would have 
been in if that thing had not been done”.
295 Section 238 (3).
296 Section 241 (1) (d), see foe example Phillips v Brewin Dolphin Bell Lawrie Ltd [2001] 1 
All ER 673, where a transaction at an undervalue could not be reversed so the court ordered 
the beneficiary of the transaction to pay the amount of the undervalue to the liquidator. This 
power extends to directors if it they who benefit from a preference or undervalue 
transaction: See Re Exchange Travel (Holidays) Ltd (No 3) [1996] 2 BCLC 524. A wide 
variety of other sanctions are set out in section 241, including: an order to transfer property 
(e.g. National Westminster Bank pic  v Jones [2001] 1 BCLC 55), sale of property and 
transfer of the proceeds to the liquidator as well as the release or discharge of ant security or 
charge granted by the company.
297 [1990] BCLC 324.
298 [1996] 1 BCLC 348.
299 [1990] BCLC 440.
300 Paragraph 8 stares that “The extent of a directors responsibility” for entering into a 
transaction at a preference or undervalue shall be taken into account. It therefore indicates
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unfitness, if his actions were bona fide intended to be in the best interests of 
the company301.
The desire to sanction dispositions of assets that harm creditors in 
section 6 cases has led to a flexible approach to actual or potential breaches 
of section 238 & 239 as evidence of unfitness. Thus, it has been held that a 
transaction does not have to have been previously set-aside in proceedings 
under section 238 or section 239 in order to be relied upon in section 6 
cases302 because the disqualification court can determine the nature of the 
transaction for itself. Likewise, if a transaction has been set aside in separate 
proceedings and remedies already proscribed under section 238 or section 
239, this does not prevent a court from determining that the transaction also
• m iconstitutes unfit conduct for the purposes of disqualification . Further, it 
was held in Re Sykes (Butchers) Ltd304 that it may be possible for the 
Secretary of State to rely upon a transaction that does not amount to a 
preference or undervalue within the meaning of the Insolvency Act but 
which is nonetheless ‘commercially reprehensible’ in section 6 proceedings. 
Ferris J held in that case that disqualification was not concerned solely with 
specific breaches of the Companies Act 1985 or the Insolvency Act 1986, 
but with a director’s conduct generally. On the facts of the case it had been 
held that a director had not granted a preference within the meaning of
the circumstances of each transaction should be considered in relation to the ‘unfitness’ of 
the director.
301 See for example Re ECM (Europe) Electronics Ltd [1991] BCC 268, where a director’s 
state of mind at the time of the transaction was given considerable importance in 
determining unfitness. See also Re New Generation Engineers Ltd [1993] BCLC 435.
302 Official Receiver v Sutton (Unreported, 31 October 1990).
303 Re Grayan Building Services [1995] BCC 554.
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section 239 but nonetheless it was held that his conduct demonstrated a lack 
of ‘commercial probity’ that indicated unfitness.
This approach cannot be attacked as erring from the objectives of 
section 6 because if a director takes advantage of his position to cause loss 
to creditors, then his conduct ought to be sanctioned regardless of whether 
that conduct is prohibited by specific legislation. However, courts should be 
cautious in adhering to the objectives of section 6 as sanctioning conduct 
that does not cause loss would produce no benefit. Whether, particular 
conduct does or does not cause loss however can only be determined on the 
facts of each case.
4.8.5 Other Instances of Loss Causing Conduct.
Similar conclusions to those reached above can be repeated in 
respect of many categories of unfit conduct included in schedule 1 or 
prominent amongst the reported cases. Misuse of company bank accounts305, 
for example, which often consists of allegations that cheques have been 
issued without regard to whether they could be honoured , is a form of 
misconduct that can have detrimental impact upon creditors, as are
304 [1998] 1 BCLC 110.
305 Mithani, A. Directors Disqualification (Looseleaf Publication) (London, Butterworths, 
1998), chapter 2 paras 579-592.
306 See for example Re Hitco 2000 Ltd [1995] BCC 161. Such conduct will be regarded as 
particularly unfit whereby cheques have been issued in order to induce the supply of goods 
and services.
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categories such as fraud and misrepresentations307, a failure to ‘provide 
goods paid for’ to customers308, and making unauthorised loans from the 
company to directors or connected persons contrary to section 330 of the 
Companies Act 1985309. The failure to co-operate with an Insolvency 
Practitioner of Official Receiver310 is also a form of misconduct that, in most 
cases, has been used by the courts to sanction conduct that can cause loss to 
creditors311. However, in some circumstances it seems that the category has 
been extend beyond its proper limits 
4.8.5.1 Phoenix Misconduct.
A further prominent type of misconduct sanctioned in section 6 cases 
is what is often referred to ‘phoenix’ misconduct. ‘Phoenix’ misconduct 
was particular concern of the Cork Committee and was a matter that
307 Following the guidelines set down in Re Sevenoakes Stationers Limited [1990] BCLC 
668, proven allegations of fraud and general dishonesty tend to attract a lengthy period of 
disqualification. See for example Re Moorgate Metals Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 503.
308 This category includes instances where directors permit a company to accept deposits or 
advance payments in circumstances where it is obvious that the company will not be in a 
position to supply the goods or services. See for example, Re Western Welsh International 
System Buildings Ltd [1988] 4 BCC 449. In such circumstances a director may also be open 
to an allegation of trading at the risk of creditors, see supra 4.81.
309 See for example, Re Tansoft Ltd [1991] BCLC 339.
310 The failure to co-operate with an office holder is a ‘relevant matter’ set out in paragraph 
10 of schedule 1, see also Mithani, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., chapter 2.
311 The sorts of failure to co-operate that have been cited as unfit conduct include, a 
sustained refusal to answer questions posed by an office holder (see for example Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry v McTighe [1997] BCC 224), knowingly misleading an 
office holder {Re Living Images [1996] BCC 112), swearing a false statement of affairs (
Re Moorgate Metals Ltd [1995] BCC 143), failure to restore company property to the 
liquidator {Re Probe Data Systems (No 3) [ 1991] BCC 428) and even wrongly claiming 
that property belongs to another director {Re Synthetic Technology [1993] BCC 549).
3,2 See for example Re Howglen, Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry v Reynard 
[2002] 2 BCLC 625, in which a director’s obstructive conduct during court proceedings 
was cited as evidence of unfitness.
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disqualification was specifically intended to address313. The Company Law 
Review Group has described the ‘phoenix’ phenomenon as:
“the continuance of a failed company by those responsible for the 
failure, using the vehicle of a new company. The new 
company.. .uses the old company’s assets, often acquired at an 
undervalue and exploits it good will and business opportunities. 
Meanwhile the creditors are left to prove their debts against an 
empty shell.”314
However, setting up a phoenix company does not represent 
undesirable use of limited liability per se, as it is perfectly possible that the 
rescue of a failed business (particularly where the failure was not caused by 
the directors actions) could benefit creditors and customers in the long term, 
provided of course that the business is successful the second time around. 
This has been recognised in disqualification cases where a distinction has 
been drawn between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ phoenix operations315. Bad phoenix 
companies have been described at those motivated by self-interest and 
which involve dishonest behaviour . However, given the strong 
condemnation of such companies in disqualification, it is surprising that 
there is no express statutory prohibition on taking-over the business of a 
failed company. The only control on such conduct is the prohibition on
313 Department of Trade and Industry, Report o f the Review Committee on Insolvency Law 
and Practice, (Chairman Sir Kenneth Cork) Cmnd. 8558 (London, HMSO, 1982), para 
1741.
314 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modem Company Law For a Competitive 
Economy, Final Report, Volume I, (London, DTI, 2001), para 15.55.
315 Official Receiver v Zwrin (26* July 2001, unreported).
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certain persons re-using a company’s name in section 216 of the Insolvency 
Act317.
Nevertheless, instances of ‘bad’ phoenix misconduct are obviously 
likely to result in loss to creditors and are rightly subject to a sanction. 
However, it is important to state that care should be taken to avoid applying 
disqualification too widely and there by deterring desirable (‘good’) phoenix 
operations. Where, for example, disqualification follows acts such as 
transferring assets from failed companies at an undervalue, or where they 
have been deliberately removed to defeat creditors’ claims318loss causing 
conduct has been sanctioned. However, in some of the cases, it is less clear 
that the distinction between good and bad phoenix conduct is respected. For 
example, it is often alleged that a phoenix operation is objectionable because
11Q
the new company has no ‘reasonable prospect of success’ , usually alleged 
where no material change is made in the conduct of the new business. Such 
broad allegations should be treated with caution and all relevant 
circumstances considered, including the cause of the original company 
failure, to avoid a ‘chilling’ effect on desirable activity that ultimately
316 Ibid. However, a director can still be disqualified in circumstances where his conduct is 
not dishonest, see, Re Linvale Ltd [1993] BCLC 654, where on the facts a director was 
disqualified for ‘honest’ but reckless phoenix misconduct.
317 Section 216 prohibits any person from being concerned in the promotion, formation or 
management of a company that bares the same name, or a similar name as an insolvent 
company with which that person was involved within the 12 months o f the insolvency. The 
prohibition lasts for five years, although leave can be obtained from it during this period. 
Section 217 provides that a person who acts in breach of the section 216 prohibition can be 
held jointly an severally liable for the debts of the company incurred whilst that person was 
involved in its management. The Company Law Review proposed reform of the section 
216 rule such that its focus would shift to assets transfers, see Company Law Review group, 
Final Report, paras 15.65 -15.72.
318 See, for example, Secretary o f  State for Trade and Industry v McTighe [1997] BCC 219 
and Re Keypak Homecare Ltd [1990] BCLC 440.
319 See for example Re Travel Mondial (UK) Ltd [1991] BCC 224.
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causes greater loss to creditors. However, the courts have demonstrated a 
willingness to consider each case on its merits and this should be 
welcomed320, but given the large amount of discretionary control over the 
interpretation of ‘unfitness’ that now lies in the hands of the Secretary of 
State, the use of disqualification to sanction phoenix conduct may be a 
potential barrier to effective use of disqualification .
Nonetheless, this and the other the categories of unfit conduct 
considered so far provide strong support for the contention that 
disqualification seeks to protect creditors from economic harm, even though 
some concerns over the use that is made of disqualification can be 
expressed. However, before it can be claimed that loss lies at the heart of the 
courts assessment of unfitness it is necessary to consider two very common 
forms of misconduct.
4.8.5 Disqualification for Breaching Publicity and Accounts 
Requirements.
Schedule 1, paragraphs 4 (f) and 5 of the Disqualification Act 
require a court to ‘have regard’ to a director’s failure to comply with a 
number of accounting, reporting and filing requirements, in determining 
whether a person is ‘unfit’ to be concerned in the management of
320 See for example Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd [1988] Ch 477, where a director 
successfully demonstrated that despite being a phoenix company with a similar modus 
operandi to the failed company the new business did have reasonable prospects for success. 
Unfortunately for the director, he was disqualified on other grounds.
321 See further chapter 7 below.
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companies322. In accordance with the Act the failure to comply with 
‘accounting and disclosure’ obligations is a prominent form of 
misconduct323.
In general terms, the accounting and disclosure provisions of the 
Companies Act have been described as a ‘shield’ protecting members and 
creditors from corporate mismanagement324. The provisions are, as was 
discussed in chapter 2325, one of the main regulatory responses to the 
division of ownership and control, but they are of use to creditors in so far as 
they help creditors to assess the risk of dealing with limited liability 
companies and therefore limit their exposure to risk.
As far as disqualification is concerned, the Court of Appeal has held 
that the publicity and information provisions were “introduced by 
Parliament to raise standards” of responsibility and that those who make use 
of limited liability “must be punctilious in observing the safeguards set 
down by Parliament for those who deal with their companies [my 
emphasis]”326. As such, persistent327 lapses in fulfilling those obligations 
have been held to display a lack of commercial morality sufficient to justify
322 For example, it was held in Re Bath Glass Ltd [1988] 4 BCC 130, that a failure to 
comply with sections 242-244 of the Companies Act (requiring that accounts be delivered 
to the registrar of companies within set times) could be cited as evidence of unfitness even 
though these sections are not mentioned in Schedule 1.
323 Mithani, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
324 Davies P, Gower and Davies Principles o f Modem Company Law, 7th Edition, (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), page 533. See also J. Freedman and M. Godwin, The Statutory 
Audit and the Micro Company -  An Empirical Investigation [1993] JBL 105.
325 See 2.3 , supra.
326 Nicholls V-C in Re Swift 736 Ltd [1993]BCC 312 at 315.
327 Isolated lapses are not generally sufficient to justify disqualification, see ibid and 
Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry v Hickling [1996] BCC 678 at 693. However, 
much depends upon the circumstances of the case, see Re CSTC [1995] BCC 173, where a 
single lapse was held to be sufficient evidence of unfitness. Failure to comply with
disqualification328. The importance of the protection of creditors in this 
category of misconduct is therefore clear, for the unfitness in not complying 
with disclosure requirements lies in the harm that it can cause to ‘those who 
deal with companies’. The implication being that creditors are more at risk 
of harm (which must mean financial loss as the relationship between debtors 
and creditors is financial) where accounting and disclosure requirements are 
persistently not complied with. Thus, this particular category of misconduct 
also seeks to sanction conduct that can inflict economic harm on creditors.
4.8.6 Crown Debts.
Disqualification for non-payment of Crown money, or for ‘trading to 
the detriment of the Crown’, is a prominent type of unfit conduct that can, 
prima facie, can present certain problems within the context of the 
essentially economic goals of disqualification, or at least with the goals so 
far outlined. This category of misconduct involves allegations that a director 
caused debts to the Crown to increase because of insolvent trading, or that 
the director caused ‘transactions to the detriment of the Crown’, such as 
repaying loans to some creditors in preference to debts owed the Crown329. 
The substance of these allegations is however the same, i.e. that the Crown 
was not paid revenue due to it for one reason or another. The term ‘Crown
disclosure requirements may also be excusable if  it is due to factors beyond a directors 
control, see Re ECM (Europe) Electronics Ltd [1992] BCLC 814.
328 Some decisions however, suggest that in circumstances where the preparation and filing  
of accounts would not have been beneficial to creditors a failure to prepare such accounts 
should not be treated seriously in disqualification proceedings, see Re Cargo Agency Ltd 
[1992] BCLC 686. In contrast a director, who was also a chartered accountant was 
disqualified in the case Re Caldrose Ltd [1990] BCC 11 for failing to compile accounts 
even though they would have been of no practical use to creditors.
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debt’ has therefore been described by Lord Justice Dillon in Re Sevenoaks 
Stationers Ltd330, as a ‘term of art’ that: “denotes debts due from the 
company to the Crown in respect of PAYE, national insurance contributions 
and VAT, but not debts due to the Crown in respect of other matters (such as 
development grants)”.
Non-payment of tax obviously causes direct financial Toss’ to be 
incurred by a creditor of the company i.e. the Crown. However, the Crown 
is not like most other creditors of the company because the company’s 
obligations to the Crown are imposed and not, as the case with other 
creditors (save tort creditors), voluntarily assumed. Therefore given that the 
focus of disqualification appears to be on commercial creditors (as is evident 
from important aspects of section 6 such as the test of commercial 
morality331) the special nature of the loss inflicted on the Crown presents 
certain problems for ‘Crown debts’ as a matter of unfitness.
An awareness of the potentially uneasy relationship between the 
non-payment of tax and the broad thrust of section 6 has been recognised by 
the judges who have made clear efforts to reconcile the use of non-payment 
as evidence of unfitness with the general focus of protecting private 
creditors from loss.
Throughout, the late 1980’s the non-payment of Crown debts had 
been treated as more serious evidence of unfitness than non-payment of
329 See for example, Re Northstar Multimedia Ltd, 13* June 2001 (unreported).
33° [ i9 9 i] BCLC 325 at page 328. See also Re GSAR Realisations Ltd [1993] BCLC 409 
where Ferris J stated that “Crown monies....are sums due [to the Crown] in respect of 
unpaid PAYE, tax, and national insurance contributions and other sums due in respect of 
unpaid VAT”.
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ordinary creditor debts332. However, this trend was reversed in case of Re 
Sevenoakes333, in which Dillon LJ held that non-payment of Crown debts 
should be treated with the same degree of seriousness as non-payment of 
ordinary creditor debts and that, the existence of Crown debts was not 
evidence of unfitness per se. Rather, he held that there needed to be non­
payment as well as some aggravating factor to sustain an allegation of 
unfitness334. Since Re Sevenoakes, a number ‘aggravating factors’ have 
been identified which turn mere non-payment into sufficiently unfit 
misconduct. One well-established factor is evidence of a deliberate policy of 
not paying Crown debts to finance insolvent trading335. Another is evidence 
of a policy of preferring other creditors to the Crown by only paying 
creditors who press for payment . This type of conduct is equally 
applicable to ordinary creditors as well as the Crown, however, it is of 
particular relevance to Crown debts because a number of judges have been 
impressed by the argument that the Crown cannot, or does not, habitually 
‘press’ for payment in the manner that ordinary creditors may337. In such 
cases directors are often condemned for ‘taking advantage of the Crown’ or 
‘taking advantage of the Crown’s forbearance’. Other factors that have been
331 See, Re Dawson Print Group Ltd,[ 1987] BCLC 601.
332 See, Re Wedgecraft Ltd (7 March 1986, unreported), see also, Re Stamford Services Ltd 
[1987] BCLC 607 and Re Churchill Hotel (Plymouth) Ltd [1988] BCLC 341.
333 Re Sevenoakes Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1990] BCLC 668.
334 Re Sevenoakes, ibid.
335 R e J & B  Lynch (Builders) Ltd [1988] BCLC 376. Such conduct may be regarded as 
particularly serious where Crown debts make up a large proportion of the total: see, Re D J  
Matthews (Joinery Design) Ltd (1 9 8 8 ) 4 BCC 513. Nevertheless, there is no minimum  
period of non-payment necessary to sustain an allegation of unfitness: Re Verby Print for 
Advertising Ltd [1998] 2 BCLC 23.
336 Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry v McTighe [1987] BCC 224.
337 Ibid.
146
held sufficiently serious include, a deliberate decision not to pay VAT when 
the company is solvent338, negligence in ensuring that Crown debts were 
paid to a ‘marked degree’339 and a failure to adhere to an agreed schedule for 
the payment of arrears to the Crown340.
In so far as these extra elements indicate a general lack of 
competence or honesty by directors then the desire to protect commercial 
creditors from loss can be seen to lie at the heart of this category of conduct, 
for dishonest or negligent directors obviously pose a greater risk of making 
undesirable use of limited liability. However, the courts’ attempt to ensure 
that disqualification is not seen to be used by the State in a self-interested 
way is by no means completely successful. There is, for example, no 
guarantee that dishonesty in respect of the Crown’s imposed tax obligations 
indicates dishonesty in respect of freely assumed obligations. Further, if the 
aim of disqualification for not having paid tax is to sanction dishonesty or 
recklessness these matters could be sanctioned as other types of misconduct. 
Supposed ‘preferring’ of other creditors over the Crown, for example, can 
be sanctioned as a ‘transaction at a preference’ and not as ‘non-payment of 
Crown debts’. The fact that ‘non-payment’ is nevertheless included in these 
allegations indicates that the mere fact of non-payment does have some 
bearing upon a finding of unfitness, despite the emphasis on ‘extra 
elements’. Therefore, the justification that it is not ‘non-payment’ but 
‘dishonesty’ which is sanctioned in these cases is not wholly convincing,
338 Official Receiver v Dhiren Doshi (1st March 2001, unreported).
339 Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd, supra, note Error! Bookmark not defined..
340 See, for example, Re Park House Properties Ltd [1997] 2 BCLC 530.
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even though it supports this thesis’ contention that preventing loss is at the 
core of unfit conduct. However, , for present purposes it is sufficient to 
conclude that loss lies at the heart of the unfitness in a ‘Crown debts’ 
allegation. The further implications of the prominence of Crown debt 
misconduct will be considered below341.
4.9 Loss and Section 6.
It is therefore submitted that sufficient evidence can be cited to 
sustain the conclusion that the purpose of section 6 disqualification is to 
protect creditors from financial loss. This is clear from the schedule 1 list of 
‘relevant matters’ and from various judicial statements, some of which 
explicitly identify protection from loss as the purpose of section 6 and others 
that talk of ‘commercial morality’. Most importantly however, it is evident 
from the approach of the courts to unfitness. It is certainly the case there is 
no evidence to suggest that section 6 is used to foster socially desirable 
conduct of the sort associated with a pluralist interpretation of the public 
interest in corporate regulation. Rather, the perception of the public interest 
adopted in section 6 is broadly economic and is therefore not anomalous 
within a ‘shareholder-orientated’ system of company law. However, that is 
not to say that disqualification follows exactly the model of ‘public interest’ 
regulation in market orientated system of economic organisation. For, whilst 
there is clear market and private law failure where directors engage in
341 See 5.4.1, below.
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conduct likely to inflict uncompensated loss; disqualification does not 
attempt to exactly mimic market controls by sanctioning all instances where 
directors’ conduct presents a risk of loss to creditors. This is because limited 
liability relies on uncompensated transfers of risk, and therefore the risk of 
loss, to bring about an increase in risk taking. Consequently, disqualification 
is selective in the loss-causing conduct that it seeks to sanction.
The need for some level of blameworthiness on the part of the 
director for his conduct is the obvious method by which the State may seek 
to select certain conduct for sanction. Thus, loss-causing conduct 
accompanied by negligence, recklessness or dishonesty could be cited as 
undesirable. Although, there is some degree of conflict as to whether 
negligence is sufficient to justify disqualification, as Finch’s analysis shows. 
However, there is one simple characteristic of section 6 disqualification that 
has not been considered so far in this chapter but which is highly relevant to 
the economic nature of section 6 and, indeed, the way the State distinguishes 
desirable from undesirable conduct.
Whilst blameworthiness is relevant to the selective mimicking of 
market and private law controls on directors conduct, it is not the principle 
means by which the State distinguishes acceptable from unacceptable risk of 
loss. More important is the fact that the State only seeks to sanction 
directors’ conduct after an insolvency, i.e. after conduct is linked to a 
proven instance of economic harm. Indeed, the post-insolvency nature of 
section 6 disqualification serves to highlight the relevance of protecting 
creditors from loss to the sanction because insolvency almost invariably
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inflicts loss upon the company’s creditors. Disqualifying those whose 
conduct has contributed, if not directly caused, this harm is therefore a clear 
attempt to protect from future instances of such financial harm and deter 
conduct by other directors that can lead to same result.
The economic objective of section 6 disqualification therefore means 
that its success ought properly to be judged by the extent to which it reduces 
loss to creditors; in terms of protecting them from a repeat of conduct that is 
linked to an insolvency and the extent to which it deters such conduct 
amongst directors generally. Significant doubts will be expressed about the 
extent to which disqualification prevents or reduces loss. Furthermore, 
whilst it has been demonstrated in this chapter that the major categories of 
unfit conduct sanctioned in the cases studied demonstrate the importance of 
loss to unfit conduct, it does not necessarily follow that the pattern of unfit 
conduct sanctioned in section 6 cases equates to an effective disqualification 
regime. It will be argued instead that the actual benefit to creditors from the 
pattern of unfit conduct sanctioned, are open to doubt and that there are 
other features of section 6 that limit its effectiveness.
. Therefore, subsequent chapters of this thesis discuss, in cost-benefit 
terms, various aspects of the disqualification regime under section 6 in order 
to form a judgement as to the success of the sanction.
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Chapter 5: The Remedy of
Disqualification.
“Ensuring that the business community and consumers are protected from the 
activities of rogue directors is vitaf'.
Melanie Johnson MP, Competition and Consumer Affairs Minister, 
29th May 2003342.
5.1 Introduction: Why a Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Disqualification?
When ministers state that the aim of section 6 disqualification is 
‘protective’, they emphasise the essentially economic objectives against 
which the sanction should be judged343. For, ‘protection’ from the activities 
of rogue directors necessarily means preventing the harm, in the form of 
uncompensated financial loss, which undesirable conduct inflicts upon the 
public and the business world. The success of disqualification must 
therefore depend upon the amount of such loss that it prevents. This would 
not be the case if the objectives of disqualification included fostering 
socially desirable conduct or punishing errant conduct. For, in such cases 
section 6 would have a wider objective than merely reducing loss, such as
342 Department of Trade and Industry, press release “Crackdown of Directors who Deft 
Disqualification Orders”, 29th May 2003.
343 The same reasoning is evident in the National Audit Offices’ analysis of disqualification. 
See, National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Insolvency 
Service Executive Agency, Company Director Disqualification -  A Follow Up Report,, 
(House of Commons Papers, Session 1998-1999,424 ) (London, The Stationary Office, 
1998), para 3.2.
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retribution or an increase in ‘social welfare’. However, disqualification is 
not offered by the state as a means to punish directors, even though it has 
been described as ‘very nearly penal’344. Neither, is the sanction intended to 
foster socially desirable conduct amongst directors. Thus, reducing loss 
must the objective against which section 6 should be assessed. Of course, 
the view that an evaluation of a regulatory system in cost-benefit or wealth 
maximising terms can provide a definitive answer to whether a particular 
form of regulation is ‘good’ regulation has been disputed345. Many 
commentators assert than such ‘efficiency’ is one of several measures that 
should be used when evaluating whether a particular regulatory system is 
satisfactory346. However, given the clear aim of disqualification to protect 
the public from abuse of limited liability, which has a clear economic 
objective (i.e. loss reduction from misconduct), a quantitative analysis of the 
general efficiency347 of the disqualification regime must be an essential part 
of any critical analysis of the success of the regime.
It would be unrealistic to expect section 6 to eliminate all loss from 
undesirable conduct and, indeed, it would not be desirable to set this as its
344 Re Crestjoy Productions Ltd [1990] BCC 23 at page 26.
345 See, for example, R. Dworkin, Is Wealth Value?, (1980) 9 JLS 191; A. Kronman,
Wealth Maximisation as a Normative Principle, (1980) 9 JLS 227; R. Baldwin, Rules and 
Government, (Oxford, OUP, 1995). For a review of ‘efficiency’ in wealth maximising terms 
see, A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, (1970) 8 JLS 103.
346 For example Baldwin proposes that the efficiency of a regulatory system should be 
assessed by reference to a number of factors, such as whether the system is supported by 
legislative authority, whether it is accountable, whether it is ‘fair’ as well as a judgement as 
to whether the system is efficient. See, Baldwin, ‘Rules and Government’, ibid.
347 In die sense that the policy provides clear benefits over and above any loses which flow 
from the system. In this sense the analysis accepts basic principles of allocative efficiency,
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goal because as well as being impossible to achieve, the cost of attempting 
the total elimination of loss would be prohibitive. A more realistic and 
desirable goal would be to expect section 6 to deliver a benefit greater than 
its cost348 for it to be regarded as a successful form of regulation. By this 
measure section 6 would be regarded as successful if its aggregate benefit, 
in terms of reduced loss from undesirable conduct, were greater than its 
aggregate costs349. Such a cost-benefit analysis has been described as an 
“indispensable part of any rational regulatory policy making”350, and it is 
submitted that it is essential to any analysis of section 6 because section 6 
can only be beneficial if it brings about an increase in welfare.
The costs of section 6, like any form of regulation, are many and 
varied. The section will create ‘administrative costs’ in terms of the cost 
associated with formulating and applying the regulation. It will also create 
litigation costs in terms of the costs incurred in the course of legal 
proceedings to disqualify unfit individuals. Compliance costs will also be 
generated, in terms of the costs to directors of meeting the standard of 
behaviour expected by the regulation. Finally the section may have 
unwanted and unintended consequences and thereby create ‘indirect 
costs’.351
see generally, A. Ogus, Regulation Legal Form and Economic Theory, (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1994).
348 See generally A. Ogus, Regulation : Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford, 
Claredon Press, 1994), chapter 8.
349 Thus, this thesis adopts the ‘Kaldor-Hicks’ test of efficiency, see generally B.Cheffins, 
Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford, Claredon Press, 1997), page 15.
350 Ogus, supra note 348, at page 153.
351 See Ogus, supra, note 348.
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The balance between such costs and the benefit of disqualification 
will determine its effectiveness and, indeed, desirability. Therefore, the 
current and following chapters discuss the likely quantitative and qualitative 
costs and benefits of section 6 disqualification in order to form a value 
judgement about the desirability of the sanction. The current chapter begins 
this analysis by focusing on the cost benefit implications of the sort of 
regulation provided by section 6, the limitations of the benefit that the 
section is capable of providing and discusses cost-benefit issues raised by 
the previous chapter.
5.2 The Cost of Section 6.
5.2.1 Rules v Standard.
When policy makers decide to regulate a particular activity, they can 
do so either by proscribing a specific set of rules to control that activity or 
use a general standard352. Rules will be used where the regulator wishes to 
eschew specific undesirable acts and, as such, identify undesirable conduct 
with some precision. Standards, on the other hand, are more general and will 
be used where the regulator seeks to ensure that conduct matches some 
desirable level. The choice between regulating via a specific set of rules or 
general standard has cost implications for any regulatory regime and 
disqualification under section 6 is no exception to this rule. Each approach
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has different cost implications is because the two approaches differ, first, in 
the degree of certainty they provide, second, in the ‘scope’ of the regulation 
and third, in the flexibility of either approach.
5.2.1.1 Certainty.
Regulation of an undesirable activity by a specific set of rules has the 
advantage of bringing certainty to both the regulator and the regulated class 
that can reduce compliance and enforcement costs. The certainty provided 
for by rules reduces compliance costs for the class subjected to regulation 
because a set of rules which define undesirable acts in some detail will allow 
the regulated class to ascertain, and then avoid, undesirable acts easily and at 
a low cost. Consequently, compliance with the regulation is likely to be high 
where rules are used which, in turn, will lead to lower enforcement costs to 
be incurred by the regulator353. It has also been suggested that a specific set 
of rules is will bring reduced litigation costs because certainty will lead to 
increased out-of-court settlements, as the outcome of prosecutions would be 
easier to predict.
A standard based approach to regulation is unlikely to bring these 
benefits because of its generalist nature. The lack of certainty in a standard 
is likely to increase the cost to the regulated class of ascertaining and then 
avoiding undesirable conduct. Consequently, compliance with a standard 
will be lower than that which could be expected with a set of rules as some 
members of the regulated class may be deterred from adapting their conduct
352 On the choice between ‘rules’ and ‘standards’ see I. Ehrlich, & R. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis o f Rule Making, in A. Ogus, (ed), Regulation, Economics and the Law, 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001).
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by the cost of gathering information on prohibited conduct.354 As such, the 
frequency of litigation is likely be higher under a standard, as would the 
costs of litigation, because of a decreased incentive to settle cases before 
trial and indeed, because of the need for judges to determine the parameters 
of prohibited conduct.
5.2.1.2 Scope.
A further advantage of a set of rules over a standard is that rules 
could have fewer damaging side effects than standards i.e. bring fewer 
indirect costs. Standards that are set too wide or which have an unclear 
scope may have the effect of deterring desirable conduct as well as 
undesirable conduct, and therefore cause inadvertent costs to be incurred355. 
In the context of disqualification, a broad or undefined standard could have 
a ‘chilling effect’ on desirable business activity as well as undesirable 
activity. A specific set of rules would avoid this possibility by clearly 
separating undesirable conduct from desirable conduct and eschewing the 
possibility of sanction for desirable conduct.
5.2.1.3 Flexibility.
However, in terms of flexibility, standards have some cost 
advantages over rules. A problem with regulating through a set of rules is 
that rules are potentially rigid and inflexible. They are therefore less likely 
to provide a complete response to undesirable activity, as it is often 
extremely difficult and expensive to formulate a comprehensive set of rules
353 Ibid, page 262-266.
354 Ibid.
156
that specify all possible forms of undesirable conduct356. In the context of 
disqualification, all possible types of ‘unfit’ conduct by directors would be 
difficult to distil into a set of comprehensive rules, and attempting such a 
process would be very costly, requiring extensive inquiry into past, present 
and future conduct of directors. As such, any rule-based approach is likely to 
suffer from ‘underinclusion’357 because the cost of attempting to codify all 
forms of undesirable activity would be prohibitive in all but the simplest 
regulatory scenarios. Further, codification of undesirable conduct may not 
always be possible due to information deficiencies.
Therefore, a rule-based approach to regulation could only be 
expected to identify some of the most serious or common forms of 
undesirable conduct. In other words, it would attempt to reduce only some 
aspects of an undesirable activity, which could lead to sub-optimal 
regulation. A standard based approach, on the other hand, has the advantage 
of being flexible and capable of providing a ‘remedy’ for all forms of 
undesirable conduct. A further benefit of a standard is that the transaction 
costs to the regulator of formulating a standard would obviously be lower 
than in setting a complex list of rules. There are, of course, costs associated 
with fleshing out the standard through the higher number of contested 
enforcement proceedings, but these could be partly shifted on to private 
parties through cost rules in contested proceedings.
355 Ibid, page 263, See also R. Posner, An Economic Analysis o f Legal Procedure and 
Judicial Administration, (1973) 2 J.Leg. Stud. 399.
356 Ehrlich and Posner, supra note 352, page
357 Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis o f Legal Rulemaking, supra note 352, pages 
267-268.
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Standards also have a further advantage over rules in that they are 
capable of adapting to changes in attitudes towards undesirable conduct and 
therefore require less frequent revision than rules. However, the adaptability 
of standards can be over-stated because the flexibility of a standard depends 
upon the attitudes of the agencies charged with the task of enforcing it as
• o c omuch as it does upon the formulation of the standard itself . Therefore, 
conservative attitudes on the part of the enforcement agency to the 
interpretation of the standard could lead it to be just as inflexible as a rule. 
Indeed, general standards ultimately mean no more or no less than what 
enforcement agencies choose them to mean and are susceptible to 
manipulation in a way that rules are not. Misinterpretation is therefore a 
persistent danger in the use of standards, for if a legislature enacts a standard 
as the principle means of regulating some activity, control over that 
regulation is effectively given over to the body with responsibility for 
enforcing the standard359. Unless the regulator is made properly accountable 
for the exercise of its power, there is no guarantee that such a body will use 
the standard for the purpose it was originally intended.
5.2.2 The Best of Both Worlds: Section 6 and Schedule 1.
When enacting section 6, Parliament seemingly attempted to secure 
the benefits of a standard in terms of flexibility with some of the benefits of 
certainty that rules can bring. Thus, section 6 disqualification is a hybrid 
form of regulation that uses the very general standard of ‘unfit conduct’ in
358 See, further below and chapter 7.
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section 6 itself, which is then supplemented by the more specific schedule 1 
list of ‘relevant matters’.
However, if the intention of Parliament in enacting the schedule 1 
list was to reduce litigation and compliance costs, there is little evidence to 
suggest that it has been successful because the schedule itself often lacks 
clarity and is of only limited scope. For one thing, schedule 1 gives only a 
non-exhaustive list of the sort of conduct that a court may take into account 
in determining unfitness, should it wish to do so. Similarly, some of the 
matters listed in the schedule are vague and do not spell out the precise 
elements of conduct cited as relevant to unfitness. Paragraph 6 of schedule 
1, for example, merely states as a relevant matter “The extent of a director’s 
responsibility for the company becoming insolvent”. This is certainly more 
specific than the general standard of ‘unfit conduct’, but tells us nothing of 
the level of culpability for the insolvency on the part of the director 
necessary to justify disqualification. Other matters cited in the schedule are 
more specific such as paragraph 4, which cites the breach of several specific 
provisions of the Companies Act 1985 as relevant matters. Nonetheless, 
whilst the schedule may give some greater certainty than section 6, it is 
unlikely to have reduced the costs of the section 6 standard significantly 
because it is a non-exhaustive list of unfit conduct. Indeed, several 
prominent forms of unfit conduct are not mentioned in the schedule360 and 
have necessitated extensive judicial rule making. The schedule also provides
359 Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis o f Legal Rulemaking, supra note 352, pages
360Such as Crown debt misconduct, trading whilst insolvent to the detriment of creditors and 
taking excessive renumeration.
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no guidance as to the level of blameworthiness necessary to justify a 
disqualification.
Indeed, the wealth of precedents concerning the meaning of ‘unfit 
conduct’ is a testament to the high cost of the judicial rulemaking 
necessitated by the vague nature of the section 6 standard. As such, the 
compliance costs faced by directors who wish to comply with section 6 are 
high due to the need to understand a vast and fluctuation body of case law. It 
should be noted that the costs of litigation and compliance will have reduced 
as the higher courts have fashioned some degree of clarity as to the meaning 
of unfit conduct361, but they remain higher than would be the case under a 
rule-based approach to disqualification. These high litigation costs caused 
by the choice of standard is likely to have contributed to the State’s desire to 
reduce court involvement in disqualification proceedings. The Carecraft362 
procedure and the recent introduction of disqualification undertakings, for 
example, were reforms designed specifically to reduce the cost of 
disqualification under section 6 .
Furthermore, the generality of the standard in section 6 has allowed 
scope for conflicting approaches to unfitness to develop which must increase 
the likely costs of the sanction by increasing the frequency of litigation, 
making compliance more expensive and indeed increasing the cost of 
erroneous disqualification. The early judicial confusion over the treatment of
361 See, for example, Re Sevenoaks Stationers Ltd [1991] 3 All ER 578, Re Westmid 
Packing Services Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 124, Re Swift 736 Ltd [1993] BCC 312, Re Gray an 
Building Services Ltd [1995] BCC 554.
362 Re Carecraft Construction Co Ltd [1993] 4 All ER 499. See further 7.2 below.
363 See further chapter 7.2 below.
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‘crown money’ misconduct is a good example of such confusion. Similarly, 
the conflicting ‘rights’ and ‘privileges’ approaches364 are likely to have 
increased litigation costs and the ‘cost of error’. Not least, because where 
conflicting bodies of opinion develop over the correct interpretation of a 
standard the number of erroneous applications of the standard will be 
increased. Thus, if the ‘rights’ approach were to be the correct one then any 
disqualification made without evidence of culpability would be erroneous 
and represent a cost of disqualification due to ‘over-regulation’. If, on the 
other hand, the ‘privileges’ approach were to be correct, any instance where 
a negligent director was not disqualified would represent a cost caused by 
‘under-regulation’. Thus, whichever approach is correct, or indeed if some 
third approach were held to be correct, the fact that different approaches to 
the degree of blameworthiness necessary to justify disqualification exist 
increases the likelihood of error and its associated cost.
However, the adoption of standard as the basis for regulation has not 
been universally negative. It is certainly true, for example, that the section 6 
standard provides a flexible legal rule that is capable of sanctioning all 
instances of undesirable conduct and is therefore less likely to lead to under­
regulation and associated costs. Similarly, the cost to the State of 
formulating the section 6 standard will have been low. However, with the 
flexibility of section 6 and lower formulation costs of the section comes 
uncertainty that has necessitated expensive judicial rule-making.
364 Supra, chapter 4.3.
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Thus, on balance the costs of choosing to regulate undesirable 
conduct by directors by means of a standard are likely to have been high, 
certainly in terms of litigation costs and compliance costs in so far as 
inconsistencies and complex precedents prevent directors from discovering 
the nature of unfit conduct and avoiding it. Further, the lack of certainty in 
the standard has allowed conflicting approaches to disqualification to 
develop, which is likely to have increased the costs associated with 
erroneous decisions in disqualification cases. As such, it is essential that the 
section be capable of delivering clear benefits if the costs considered so far 
are to be justified.
5.3 The Benefits of Section 6.
Section 6 does not attempt to benefit creditors by compensating them 
for losses caused by undesirable use of limited liability. Thus, the section 
does not provide for the personal liability of those who have been found 
unfit and disqualified. Instead it provides what has been described as 
‘prohibitive remedial action’ , which is intended to protect creditors by 
preventing future instances of unfit conduct during the period of 
disqualification and through deterring unfit conduct by directors generally. 
As such, the benefits of disqualification are rather indirect because the 
sanction does nothing to reduce the losses that creditors suffer from 
misconduct. It relies instead upon future protection and general deterrence. 
Indeed, it must be noted that the most direct financial effect section 6 has on
365 By Lord Woolfe in Re Blackspur Group Pic [1998] 1 BCLC 676, at page 680.
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creditors is to impose a cost on them. This is because the costs incurred by 
office holders in fulfilling their statutory reporting obligation under section 7 
of the Disqualification Act are not reimbursed by the State, but form part of 
the office holder’s fee deducted from the company’s assets366. As such, the 
cost of reporting suspected unfit conduct is ultimately bom by creditors. 
Thus, disqualification imposes a direct cost on creditors yet provides them 
with no direct benefit. Therefore, as far as creditors are concerned section 6 
disqualification is a much less desirable sanction for ‘unfit’ conduct than 
other provisions of the company and insolvency law, which provide for the 
personal liability of directors who have committed undesirable acts .
5.3.1 Civil Recovery.
Many prominent forms of unfit conduct sanctioned in section 6 cases 
mirror acts for which personal liability can be imposed on directors under 
provisions introduced specifically to ‘protect’ creditors by increasing the 
assets available to settle their claims in insolvency. Undervalue and 
preference transactions368 are such examples, for sections 238 and 239 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 empower a court, on the application of a liquidator, to 
reverse such transactions. This can be either by ordering the return of
366 The guidance issued to Insolvency Practitioners state that no payment will be made to 
IPs in respect of the time taken to fulfil their statutory obligations to report. See Guidance 
Notes for the Completion o f Statutory Reports and Returns, (London, Insolvency Service, 
2001), para 5.3 .
367 E.G sections 213, 215, 245, 238 and 239 of the insolvency Act 1986.
368 Cited as evidence of unfitness in almost 15% of the disqualifications included in the 
survey of unfit conduct in 2000-2001, see chapter 4, supra, table 1.
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property to the company369, or by ordering the beneficiaries of such 
transactions to ‘make good’ any losses suffered by the company. The 
same is true of wrongful trading under section 214, where directors can be 
held personally liable for losses inflicted on creditors371. Similarly, any 
detriment inflicted on creditors by non co-operation with an office holder372 
can be remedied under section 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which gives 
a court extensive powers to order delivery of property to office holders and 
to direct the payment of any debt due. Furthermore, liquidators can rely 
upon other company law provisions, such as the ultra vires rule373 and 
fiduciary duties374 which, though not specifically designed to protect 
creditors, can be used to effectively recover loss inflicted on creditors by 
undesirable acts. Thus, from the point of view of the ‘protection’ of creditors 
of an insolvent company, civil recovery is more effective than 
disqualification under section 6, because it ‘protects’ them from loss to the 
extent that civil recovery can be made. However, it should be emphasised 
that civil recovery affords no protection from future instances of undesirable 
conduct other than through a deterrent effect375. Thus, it would seem that the 
best level of protection would be afforded to creditors when section 6 was 
used in conjunction with civil recovery provisions, because both present and
369 Section 241 Insolvency Act 1986. See for example National Westminster Bank v Jones 
[2002] 1 BCLC 55.
370 See, for example, Phillips v Brewin Dolphin Bell Lawrie Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 673.
371 See, for example, Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd (No 2) [1989] BCLC 520.
372 A matter of unfitness cited in almost 16% of the survey cases. See supra Chapter 4 table 
1.
373 See B. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford, Claredon 
Press, 1997), page 527.
374 See, West Mercia Saftywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250 and Re Halt Garage (1964) 
Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 1016.
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future protection would be assured. As such, it is extremely important that 
disqualification should not seen be as an alternative to civil recovery 
because any increase in disqualification and the expense of civil recovery 
would leave creditors with less protection.
There is no firm evidence to suggest that office holders view 
disqualification as an alternative to civil recovery. However, the fact that the 
costs of complying with reporting obligations under the Disqualification Act 
are not reimbursed by the State certainly make it conceivable that 
disqualification could have a detrimental impact on civil recovery in 
complex cases. For the costs incurred in fulfilling statutory duties to 
investigate and report unfit conduct could make civil recovery less likely in 
cases where cost considerations are significant to the decision to institute 
recovery proceedings.
5.3.2 The Civil Recovery Scheme.
The State has experimented with bringing civil recovery proceedings 
in cases where a disqualification order has been made, but where liquidators 
did not pursue civil recovery. The Forensic Insolvency Recovery Service 
established a pilot civil recovery scheme in July 2000 with the intention of 
seeking recovery against directors who had contributed to corporate failure 
“by their negligence, misconduct or misappropriation of corporate assets to
'1*1 (Lthe detriment of creditors”. The scheme brought together the Insolvency
375 See further 8.4 below
376 See the ‘Dear Insolvency Practitioner' letter, Issue Number 14, September 2003, chapter 
3, page 3.9. Available at http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/information/dearip/dearipmill/ 
fullissuel4.doc.
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Service, Insolvency Practitioners and solicitors. Participants in the scheme 
agreed to work on a conditional fee basis in order to maximise the benefits 
of the scheme for creditors377.
The scheme is undoubtedly a welcome attempt to marry the 
protective benefits of recovery and disqualification and it was extended 
following the conclusion of a 2 year pilot in 2003. However, if the results of 
the 2-year pilot are indicative, the scheme is unlikely to significantly 
improve the benefits which flow from section 6 disqualification. For, in the 
first two years of the scheme just thirty cases were identified as being 
suitable for civil recovery and in only 18 of those cases were recovery 
proceedings actually begun378. During the same period almost 3,000
-57Q
disqualifications were made under section 6. Therefore the benefits for 
creditors of insolvent companies from section 6 and State sponsored civil 
recovery are low. As such the benefits of section 6 disqualification remain 
limited to future protection from unfit conduct (for a specified period of 
time) and general deterrence.
The limitations on the benefit that section 6 is capable of providing 
to creditors are a result of the nature and construction of section 6 itself, not 
least because it is a purely post-insolvency sanction. Nonetheless, it is 
crucial that whatever benefits section 6 is capable of bringing can be 
practically demonstrated. Therefore, the worth of section 6 will depend upon
377 Ibid.
378 Ibid, chapter 3 page 3.11.
379 Companies in 2001-2002, (London, The Stationary Office, 2002), table Dl.
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the deterrent effect it has and the amount of unfit conduct it is likely to 
prevent.
An assessment of these benefits is the subject matter of the next 
chapter. However, before the practical benefits of disqualification are 
discussed it is useful to consider the implications of the use of the 
disqualification sanction. For, in addition to the limitations in section 6 
itself, its effectives is also undermined by instances where the sanction is 
applied in a manner that is unlikely to bring a significant benefit to creditors.
5.4 The Use of Section 6.
5.4.1 Crown Debts.
It will be recalled that the previous chapter that a common category 
of unfit conduct is the failure to discharge tax obligations,380 and that the 
courts have sought to reconcile this form of unfit conduct with the objective 
of ‘protecting consumers and the business community from loss’381. 
However, despite the fact that the courts have held that non-payment is a 
matter of unfitness only where it is accompanied by other conduct that could 
harm the economic welfare of (private) creditors, concerns about the use to 
which it is being put in practice can be raised due the elevated number of 
cases in which it is cited. For, there is some evidence that non-payment may 
be targeted as a matter of unfitness and general doubt as to the benefit to 
creditors of sanctioning non-payment.
380 See chapter 4, table 1, supra.
381 Supra, 5.4.7.
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5.4.1.1 The Treatment of Crown Money Misconduct in Section 6 
Proceedings.
The Insolvency Service guidance for Insolvency Practitioners (IPs) 
on the completion of statutory reports and returns contains a substantial 
section dealing with non-payment of Crown money. Section 4.1 of the 
Guidance Notes382 entitled “Schedule 1 CDDA -  Matters for determining 
unfitness of directors” specifically draws IP’s attention to Crown debt 
misconduct under the heading “Relevant matters if the company has become 
insolvent” 383, despite the fact that Crown debt misconduct is not mentioned 
in schedule 1 of the Act. Indeed, the decision to draw IPs’ attention to the 
existence of Crown debt in its own right is interesting in light of the decision 
in Re Sevenoaks that unfitness lies in finding dishonesty, recklessness or 
negligence rather than in simple non-payment of tax. Although, it should be 
noted that the Guidance Notes do advise IPs that the courts have held that 
non-payment of Crown debts is not in itself evidence of unfit conduct, and 
state that in order to make a specific allegation in relation to Crown debt the 
IP must demonstrate that ‘the Crown has been treated worse than the general 
body of creditors’ or ‘that the forbearance of Crown departments has been 
abused’. However, by way of encouragement for IPs, the Notes declare that 
the Crown is an ‘involuntary creditor’ and that an absence of pressure to pay 
on the part of the Crown ‘should not be regarded as a mitigating factor’384.
382 Insolvency Service, Guidance Notes for the Completion o f Statutory Reports and 
Returns, (London, Insolvency Service, 2001).
383 ibid, page 13.
384 Ibid.
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Thus, whilst the statement of the law is accurate, the notes appear to 
accord a degree of prominence to Crown debts, which is at best out of step 
with Schedule 1, and elements of the case law and at worst plainly 
misleading. For there is a clear implication in section 4.1 that Crown debt is 
a matter of unfitness in schedule 1, when this is not the case. Thus, the lay­
out of the notes indicates a desire by the State to draw IPs attention to the 
existence of Crown debts which is bound to have a positive effect on the 
number of Crown debt allegations made by IPs and therefore on the number 
of times it can be alleged in disqualification proceedings. As such, a subtle 
targeting of this for of misconduct is evident. Indeed, it is even conceivable 
that the generally accurate statement of the Crown debt ‘test’ could serve the 
State’s purpose by increasing the likelihood that IPs would produce good 
quality reports of Crown debs misconduct which would contain evidence 
sufficient to make out the allegation.
Thus, the Guidance Notes certainly demonstrate a desire to draw 
attention to the non-payment of Crown money as a matter of potential 
unfitness above that which is arguably justified by the Act. The result is 
likely to be a high number of reports from which can spring a high number 
of allegations in proceedings.
As far as more overt targeting of Crown debts by the Insolvency 
Service at the later investigation stage is concerned, we can be less certain of 
the approach adopted due to the lack of detail in the public domain about 
how the IPs’ reports are processed. All that can be said is that a high input of 
Crown debts allegations are encouraged. However, whether there is a
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creditors. However, due to the development of the Carecraft procedure 
and the introduction of disqualification undertakings, most section 6 cases 
do not result in contested disqualification proceedings. Thus, we cannot be 
certain that the approach outlined in Re Sevenoaks, is being adhered to and 
that Crown debts are only cited as a matter of unfitness where it has a 
detrimental impact on creditors. Thus, significant doubt surrounds the 
benefit that sanctioning such conduct brings.
The Secretary of State insists that Crown debts are only cited where 
the ‘test’ in Re Sevenoaks is complied with and that section 6 is not operated 
in a self-interested way as a tax enforcement measure . However, the 
subtle targeting of this form of conduct in the Guidance Notes and the 
elevated number of cases in which it was cited in survey, must cast doubt on 
these claims. If mere Crown debt were being cited in cases, it would bring 
little benefit in terms of loss reduction. However, even if it were not the 
actual benefit brought by citing this indirect form undesirable conduct is 
unlikely to deliver a great benefit to creditors and represents a drag on the 
efficiency of section 6 disqualification.
5.4.2 The Utility of Disqualification for a Breach of Accounting, 
Auditing and Disclosure Requirements.
In addition to doubt surrounding the benefit that sanctioning Crown 
debt is likely to bring, concern can also be expressed about the frequency
386 Re Carecraft Construction Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 172 . The Carecraft procedure allowed 
‘uncontested’ disqualification cases to be disposed of under a summary procedure. See 
further 7.2 below.
387 See the response to ‘Research Question Put to the Insolvency Service’, appendix 2.
171
with which a failure to comply with accounting and disclosure requirements 
are cited in section 6 cases. Because whilst those provisions are intended to 
benefit creditors, in practice they are likely to be of little use, especially in 
small companies which are exempt from many accounting requirements. As 
such sanctioning breaches of these requirements in section 6 is unlikely to 
bring any benefit to creditors, which is significant given the large number of 
cases in which it is cited as evidence of unfitness.
Accounting and attendant disclosure obligations have long been an 
integral part of UK company law388. In the specific context of creditors (the 
aspect with which disqualification appears most concerned) effective 
disclosure requirements ought to reduce information asymmetries by 
increasing the amount of information available to creditors and therefore 
reduce the transactions costs of information gathering. This would enable 
creditors to better equate the terms on which they advanced credit to 
companies/directors with the risk of default they posed. In short, disclosure 
ought to lead to less uncompensated transfer of risk.
However, in reality the provisions of the Companies Act are likely to 
be of limited use to creditors, for they require disclosure of only limited 
financial information about the company and limited biographical 
information about directors389. Such information is only one aspect of the
388 See generally, Cheffins, supra note 373 pages 508-512.
389 Aside from accounting requirements directors are required to submit an accurate register 
of members (section 356) and directors (sections 288 & 289), copies of directors contracts 
of service (section 318), and directors dealings in the companies securities (section 325). 
Although not required to be registered with Companies House, directors are obliged under
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information gathering that creditors need to undertake when bargaining with 
directors, particularly owner-managers. The Companies Act does not, for 
example, require disclosure of directors’ past appointments and the fate of 
companies in which they were held, which is equally important to accurate 
risk pricing by suppliers of credit. Thus, disclose does not remedy all 
information asymmetries and, it must be noted, neither does it eliminate 
transaction costs. For even the information disclosed is only available from 
Companies House after the payment of a fee390.
The utility of the Companies Act provisions is further weakened by 
the generous amount of time permitted for the filing of accounts. Section 
244, for example, allows private companies a period of 10 months from the 
end of their accounting period in which to lay annual accounts before 
members and then file them with the registrar. The period for public 
companies is seven months, although the stock exchange listing rules 
require listed companies’ accounts to be published within period of 6
m i
months . Nevertheless, the financial information which is available to 
creditors is often out-of-date and therefore of limited use, particularly in the 
case of private companies. For example, a random sample of 50 private 
companies undertaken in July 2004 showed that financial information 
relating to the year 2002 was the most recent information available in
section 234 to prepare a directors report in accordance with Schedule 7 of the Act. Which 
increasingly contains non-financial information.
390 See www.conqjanies-house.gov.uk
391 Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules (London, FSA, 2003), paras 12.40 & 12.42.
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respect of 26 companies392. The Company Law Review Group has proposed 
reducing the period given to private companies to 7 months , but this is 
only likely to have a small impact on the worth of the information available.
Another area of concern is the exemption from certain accounting 
and publicity requirements given to small and medium sized companies394, 
as sanctioned by the EC’s fourth Company Law Directive. Small companies 
are, for example, exempted by section 246(5) from the obligation to deliver 
profit and loss accounts and a director’s report to the registrar. Further, 
section 246 and schedule 8 modify the requirements of schedules 4 and 7, 
permitting small companies to compile less detailed accounts for disclosure 
than is normally the case. The C.L.R. proposed the abolition of these 
abbreviated accounts , but nonetheless proposed to continue with different 
accounting regimes for small and medium sized companies396 and it 
proposed to expand small companies’ exemption from the auditing 
requirements of the Companies Act by raising the exemption thresholds, a 
recommendation that has now been implemented397.
392 This small survey was undertaken using information publicly available on the 
Companies House web site: http://ws6info.companieshouse.gov.uk/info/
393 See: Company Law Review, Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final 
Report (London, DTI, 2001), para 4.39.
394 The criteria for small and medium sized business is set down in section 247 CA 1985. 
To qualify for the exemption a company must have met the conditions specified in the 
current and previous financial years.
395 Company Law Review Group, Final Report, supra note 393, para 4.38.
396 Ibid, para 4.28.
397 Ibid, para 4.45. The CLR’s recommendation was accepted by the government and 
following consultation (see Department of Trade and Industry, Raising The Thresholds: 
Consultation Document on Proposals to Increase the Audit Exemption Threshold and the 
Threshold Defining Medium Sized Companies, (London, DTI, 2003)) the exemption 
thresholds in section 249A of the Companies Act were raised. The turnover threshold was 
raised from £lmillon to £5.6 million (the maximum permitted under EC law and the 
balance sheet total from £1.4 million to £2.8 million. See: The Companies Act 1985 
(Accounts of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and Audit Exemption) (Amendment)
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Therefore, the net effect of the exemptions given to small and 
medium sized companies is to render the ‘accounting and disclosure’ 
requirements of marginal utility to creditors who wish to assess the potential 
costs of contracting with a particular company or director. The DTI 
statistical publication Companies in 2003-2004398 shows, for example, that 
full annual accounts comprised only 12.9% of those registered during 2003- 
2004 and that audit exempt accounts accounted for 56.9% of all those 
registered399. Therefore, only limited and often out-of-date information is 
available in relation to most companies and it is only available after the 
payment of a fee to Companies House. That is to say nothing of the fact that 
company accounts can be easily falsified. This a particular risk with unfit 
directors and in small companies where internal checks and balances on 
directors are absent400.
It is surprising then that the latest edition of Gower and Davies 
Principles o f Modern Company Law401 should boldly state that “There is no 
doubt that members and creditors (actual or potential) are afforded ample 
opportunities to obtain a great deal of financial and other information about 
the companies concerned. What is questionable is whether they make the 
best use of this information...”402. This statement may be true for members 
of large companies, however, it is certainly not true for creditors of small
Regulations 2004, (SI 2004/16) rule 4. The qualification thresholds for small company 
exemptions from certain accounting requirements were likewise raised, (see rule 2 SI 
2004/16).
398 (London, The Stationary Office, 2004).
399 Ibid, table F2.
400 See chapter 2 supra.
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companies who are actually afforded little opportunity to obtain full 
financial information about most companies. The situation for shareholders 
may be a little improved, but in owner-managed companies disclosure to 
shareholders is a futile exercise.
However, Davies’ claim is leant some support by Cheffins, who 
actually argues that the accounting and auditing requirements in the UK are 
too strict and that policy makers ought to consider abolishing such 
requirements in relation to small companies403. His argument is predicated 
on the contention that there is only ‘meagre’ evidence that creditors suffer 
from information deficits and that the cost of accounting and disclosure 
obligations are therefore not justified404. However, Cheffins' arguments are 
difficult to justify given the significant opt-outs granted to small companies 
and the clear need for rigorous disclosure in small companies. For, it is clear 
from the discussion of limited liability in chapter 3 that creditors do suffer 
from a lack of information and that this exposes them to increased risk of 
moral hazard in small companies with limited liability. As such I would 
argue that the watering down of disclosure and accounting obligations is 
particularly dangerous and exactly the opposite approach to which should be 
adopted. For, it inhibits effective bargaining by creditors who are widely 
recognised as being at most at risk of misconduct405.
401 P. Davies, Gower and Davies Principles o f Modem Company Law, 7th Edition, (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2003).
m Ibid, page 561-562.
403 Cheffins, supra note 373, pages 508-521.
404 Ibid, pages 515-20.
405 See for example F. Easterbrook, and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure o f Corporate 
Law, (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1991), page 56 and P. Halpem, M.
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What then does the weakness of the accounting and disclosure 
requirements say of the frequency with which disqualification is used to 
sanction a breach of ‘accounting and disclosure’ obligations? In short it 
would seem unlikely that sanctioning breaches of these provisions in section 
6 cases brings a significant benefit to creditors. For, whilst this particular use 
of disqualification may be bome of a desire to protect creditors, the 
accounting and disclosure requirements are likely to be of little use to 
creditors in assessing the risks associated with particular companies. 
Therefore, sanctioning such breaches is unlikely to provide a great benefit to 
creditors, because even absolute compliance with the Companies Act would 
not greatly benefit a creditor of the typical small companies. However, that 
is not to say that a benefit could never be achieved from using 
disqualification to enforce disclosure requirements, just that enforcing the 
weak provisions o f the Companies Act 1985 is not likely to produce any 
benefit. The situation with an effective set of accounts and publicity 
requirements (e.g. one that imposed tough requirements on small 
companies) may well be different.
Instances where disqualification is used to sanction ‘accounting and 
disclosure misconduct’ do not, therefore, represent a particularly beneficial 
use of the sanction. That is not to say that disqualification delivers no benefit 
in either case, just that the benefits are likely to be low and certainly be 
lower than is the case with other matters of unfit conduct that have a more
Trebilcock and S. Turnbull, An Economic Analysis o f Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 
(1980) 30 U. Toronto L.J. 117.
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direct detrimental impact on creditors, such as trading whilst insolvent. As 
such, disqualification is likely to be a more effective sanction if investigative 
resources were concentrated upon conduct that has a more obvious negative 
impact upon creditors.
5.5 Concluding Remarks.
The first stage of our cost-benefit analysis has revealed that the costs 
associated with section 6 are likely to have been high and that the benefits it 
is capable of delivering are limited. The high number of precedents in 
disqualification stands testament to the cost of fleshing out the general 
standard in section 6 and is likely to have caused high compliance costs to 
be incurred by directors who wish to comply with the section. A further 
consequence of the vagueness of the standard has been to allow the 
development of conflicting approaches to disqualification, which has 
significant cost implications, most notably in terms of erroneous 
disqualifications. However, on the positive side the standard in section 6 
provides flexible regulation that is capable of adapting to all possible 
permutations of undesirable conduct. Similarly, the cost to the State of 
formulating the standard will have been low, although it will have incurred 
litigation costs due to the need to flesh it out through contested proceedings. 
The cost of litigation to the State may not however, have been high as the 
cost has been partially shifted on to private parties through the application of 
the normal ‘loser pays all* rule to section 6 cases.
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Nonetheless, the significant costs associated with the section makes 
it very important that it delivers clear and significant benefits if it is to be a 
successful form of regulation. The benefits that section 6 delivers come from 
a protective and a deterrent effect; however, the actual benefits that the 
section is capable of delivering are limited, particularly in terms of 
protection. This is because the section can only be applied after an 
insolvency, therefore it is capable of providing only future protection and 
does nothing to ‘protect’ creditors from a first incidence of unfitness, either 
by pre-emptive regulatory intervention or by seeking to restore losses 
incurred by creditors due to unfitness. In this respect disqualification 
provides less of a benefit to creditors than other legal provisions, which 
allow for direct recovery of loss from directors who commit undesirable 
acts. Indeed, the only effect that disqualification has on creditors of an 
insolvent firm is to impose a cost upon them because it is they who 
ultimately bear the costs incurred by ‘office holders’ in fulfilling their 
statutory reporting obligations.
In addition to the limitations in the benefits associated with 
disqualification under section 6, concerns as to the practical benefits that are 
likely to flow from disqualification can also be expressed. For, concerns 
over the benefit that is likely to flow from sanctioning two common forms 
of unfit conduct can be expressed. In terms of ‘Crown debt’ the advice given 
to DPs in the Guidance Notes, and the frequency with which it is cited in 
disqualification cases raises questions first about the extent to which the 
‘correct’ approach to this form of misconduct is being followed and second
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about the practical benefit to creditors of sanctioning this particular form of 
misconduct. In respect of ‘accounting and disclosure’ misconduct it has 
been argued that despite the fact disqualification is predicated on a desire to 
protect creditors, it is unlikely to bring any practical benefit to them due to 
the weakness of the provisions that relate to the small owner-managed 
company of the average disqualification. Thus, in addition to its general 
limitations, section 6 is often used in a manner that provides little benefit to 
creditors either in terms of future protection or general deterrence.
Therefore, having noted the limitations on the benefits section 6 can 
provide and discussed some significant costs of the sanction, the next 
chapter will discuss the practical benefits and costs of the sanction drawing 
upon empirical research carried out by the National Audit Office for its 
‘follow-up’ report.
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Chapter 6: The Efficiency of the
Disqualification Regime.
“There are direct financial benefits from disqualifying directors. ”
National Audit Office: Report by the Auditor and Comptroller General, 
Company Director Disqualification -  A Follow Up Report. Page 37.
6.1 Introduction
In its second report into the disqualification system, the National 
Audit Office (NAO) claimed that disqualification under section 6 produced 
direct financial benefits for creditors by preventing future instances of unfit 
conduct406. In addition to this saving, the report concluded that 
disqualification benefited the public by deterring unfit conduct and that it 
therefore fulfilled its purpose of promoting confidence and risk taking “by 
assuring those who do business with limited liability companies that 
directors who are unfit will be disqualified”407. The report’s conclusions 
represented a significant vote of confidence in the State’s use of 
disqualification, suggesting as they did that the sanction was succeeding in
406 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Insolvency 
Service Executive Agency, Company Director Disqualification -  A Follow Up Report,, 
(House of Commons Papers, Session 1998-1999,424) (London, The Stationary Office, 
1998) para 3.2.
407 Ibid. For a similar statement about the purpose of section 6 see Lord Woolfe in Re 
Blackspur Group Pic [1998] 1 BCLC 676, who declared at page 680 that: “The purpose of 
the [Company Directors Disqualification Act] 1986 is the protection of the public by means 
of prohibitory remedial action, by anticipated deterrent effect on further misconduct and by 
the encouragement of higher standards of honesty and diligence in corporate 
management...”.
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meeting it’s goals through the provision of future protection and general 
deterrence408.
The report based its conclusions on the results empirical research 
into the operation and likely effect of disqualification conducted specifically 
for the purpose of the NAO’s investigation of section 6, and given the 
experience of the NAO in evaluating the performance of regulatory 
mechanisms such as disqualification, (not to mention the resources at its 
disposal to investigate the effect of such a statutory provision), the report’s 
positive conclusions about the effect of section 6 disqualification might 
reasonably be taken as establishing the success of the statutory regime set up 
by the Disqualification Act. The NAO appeared to believe that the section 6 
regime was capable of reducing actual an potential loss to creditors from the 
abuse of limited liability, and its research was presented as proof that it did 
so in practice. However, despite the bold conclusions of its report, the 
NAO’s research raises as many questions about the efficiency of 
disqualification as it answers and, indeed, there is a strong case to be made 
that the report’s conclusions are not supported by the evidence it cites..
Much of the analysis that follows is therefore made within the 
context of the empirical research carried out in disqualification by the
408 See also Lord Woolfe in Re Blackspur Group Pic [1998] 1 BCLC 676; “The purpose of 
the [Company Directors Disqualification Act] 1986 is the protection of the public by means 
of prohibitory remedial action, by anticipated deterrent effect on further misconduct and by 
the encouragement of higher standards of honesty and diligence in corporate 
management.. at page 680.
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NAO409 and is intended as a critique of the NAO’s conclusion in so far as 
the evidence produced by its research does not support those conclusions.
However, the chapter begins by discussing the retrospective 
approach of the courts to disqualification discusses the impact that their 
approach has on the protective benefits of disqualification. It then analyses 
NAO’s attempt to quantify the protective benefits of disqualification , which 
play a central part in the reports claim that ‘significant’ benefits that flowed 
from the current disqualification system. It is argued that the NAO did not 
follow the logic of a formal cost-benefit analysis of the current 
disqualification regime when evaluating the results of its research and that, 
had it done so, it’s conclusions may have been very different.
6.2 Protecting the Public, Commercial World and Promoting 
Confidence and Risk Taking in the Market.
6.2.1 Protecting Whom?
Post insolvency disqualification of the sort provided by section 6 is 
only capable of protecting the public from ‘unfit directors’ where it 
prevents a future instance of misconduct that would have caused loss to 
creditors. Where no misconduct is prevented, or where misconduct would 
not have caused loss, disqualification provides no direct protective benefit. 
The likelihood of a person subject to disqualification proceedings repeating 
harmful (i.e. loss-causing) misconduct should therefore be central to the
409 National Audit Office, ‘Follow Up ’ Report, supra, note 406.
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decision to disqualify. Any other approach to unfitness would not maximise 
the protective benefits of disqualification, because, where there is no 
prospect of future harmful misconduct, there is no need for the protective 
effect of disqualification and no benefit would flow from its imposition.
Unfortunately this logic has not been grasped by the courts, who as a 
general rule, do not take into account evidence of the likelihood of a director 
engaging in future harmful misconduct when deciding whether to 
disqualify410. The approach adopted has been described as a ‘tunnel 
vision’411 approach whereby the court must consider whether the director’s 
conduct fell short of the standard required by the legislation and disqualify if 
it did. As such, the unfitness test looks to the past and not to the future.
The ‘tunnel vision’ approach may be permissible within the wording 
of section 6 (1), which states that a person shall be disqualified where his 
conduct “makes” him unfit to be a director. However, it does not accord 
with the protective intention behind disqualification because to ensure that 
disqualification provides protection, the likely future conduct of a director 
should be an equal consideration to his past acts. The ‘tunnel vision’ 
approach in short, is not conducive to an effective disqualification regime 
because it results in disqualification where there is no need of protection.
410 Re Pamstock Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 716 where the court held that it would be obliged to 
disqualify a director “.. .even though the misconduct may have occurred some years ago 
and even though the court may be satisfied that the respondent has since shown himself 
capable of behaving responsibly” at page 737. See also Re Grayan Building Services Ltd 
[1995] 1 BCLC 276. However, evidence of extenuating circumstances, or evidence that 
misconduct is not likely to be repeated can be taken into account by a court when setting a 
period of disqualification. See Re Barings Pic [1998] BCC 358
411 Re Pamstock, ibid.
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The courts willingness to take into account evidence that misconduct 
will not be repeated at the stage where a disqualification period is set only 
highlights the problem. It has been held, in the words of Sir Richard Scott, 
that such evidence “goes to the question of the extent to which the public 
needs protecting against his acting [as a director]”412. However, if the 
evidence shows that unfit conduct is unlikely to be repeated then there is no 
need for disqualification in the first place. Therefore, the period for which 
the public need to be protected is zero. In short, Sir Richard’s claim that 
evidence of future good conduct is not relevant to the decision to disqualify, 
but is relevant to a period of disqualification, is highly illogical and does not 
focus disqualification on the sort of case that would enable it to most 
effectively fulfil its protective goal.413
Of course, the rejection of future conduct as a relevant factor in the 
decision that a person ought to be disqualified, but its acceptance as relevant 
to the period of the disqualification order raises questions as to whether the 
real intention behind disqualification is exclusively protective. However, the 
State does not offer disqualification as a measure to punish directors,414.. 
Indeed, instance where it is used more as a means of punishment than 
protection could be a significant cause of the low protective benefit 
indicated by the NAO report.
412 Re Barings Pic [1998] BCC 538 at page 590. The statement was approved by Lord 
Woolfe MR in Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 124 at page 133-134.
413 The punitive effect of disqualification under section 6 is discussed further at 8.1, below.
414 See, for example, the evidence of the then Minister for Competition and Consumer 
Affairs to Standing Committee B when it was considering amendments to the 
Disqualification Act proposed by the Insolvency Bill 2000. The Minister declared “The 
main purpose of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 is to provide the public
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6.2.2 The Amount of Future Protection Secured by Section 6.
The research carried out for the NAO as part of its ‘follow-up’ 
report, estimated that 15% directors who are involved in one corporate 
failure are likely to be involved in another415. As the NAO itself commented, 
this finding suggests that a clear need for protection from the activities of a 
group of directors who are involved in multiple insolvencies exists, at least 
where those insolvencies are caused, in whole or in part, by ‘unfit conduct’. 
However it is equally clear that any regulation intended to protect the public 
from ‘serial rogues’ should be carefully targeted, because the vast majority 
of directors of insolvent companies do not appear to go on to be involved in 
a second insolvency, and as such, do not need to be subject to ‘protective’ 
measures. In this way the pitfalls of the ‘tunnel vision’ approach are 
demonstrated because the backward focus of the test will obviously not 
concentrate disqualification on the 15% of directors from whom protection 
is really required. The emphasis on past conduct is far to general to do this. 
Therefore, assuming that the 15% statistic is applicable to disqualified 
directors (as the NAO did416), the approach of the courts to disqualification 
could reasonably be expected to have given rise to a situation where only a 
minority of disqualifications bring any protective benefit, Indeed, according 
further research carried out by the NAO fewer than 15% of disqualified
with protection against those who abuse the privilege of limited liability”. See: Hansard 
[HC], (Session 1999-2000), Standing Committee B, 7th November 2000, col 119.
415 To reach this conclusion the NAO examined the Insolvency Service’s database of 
400,000 directors who had been involved in a business failure between 1990-1997 and 
recording the number of directors who had been involved in two or more insolvencies 
during the period. ‘Follow Up Report’, supra note 406, paras 3.8 -3.9.
416A s the NAO felt it was, see ibid appendix 2, para 17.
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directors are actually prevented from being involved in another insolvency 
by disqualification.
As part of its study of the record of directors of insolvent companies, 
NAO complied statistics on the period after an initial insolvency when 
directors were most likely to be involved in a subsequent corporate failure. 
This research revealed that the likelihood of a director being involved in a 
further business failure is at its highest in the 2 years following an initial 
insolvency417. However, the report noted that very few directors were 
disqualified during this high risk period as, at the time of the report, it took 
an average of 3 years to disqualify a director. The average duration of a 
disqualification order at the time was 5 years. Therefore, at the time of the 
report the NAO concluded that the ‘average’ disqualification only prevented 
those insolvencies that would have occurred between 3-8 years after a first 
insolvency418. Consequently, the NAO’s concluded that only 6% of 
disqualified directors (those who would have been involved in subsequent 
business failure during the 3-8 year period) were prevented from so being by 
disqualification. As such, the NAO estimated that the 1,267 disqualifications 
in 1997-98 prevented only 75 future insolvencies419, with each single 
disqualification in 1997-1998 preventing only 0.06 insolvencies420.
This finding suggests that the actual amount of protection from, 
harmful misconduct secured by post-insolvency disqualification is low and 
directly contradicts the report’s own conclusion, which was largely, though
417 See ibid, fig, 31.
418 Ibid, appendix 2, para 21.
419 Ibid, para 3.10.
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somewhat bizarrely, based on the figures stated above. Of course, the 
NAO’s calculations, if accurate, certainly show that disqualification 
achieves some benefit, i.e. in the 6% of disqualification cases where future 
misconduct is prevented (although we must assume that such misconduct 
would be harmful, which is by no means certain) . However, that benefit 
from a minority of disqualifications should be balanced against the loss of 
potentially successful entrepreneurs caused by the many unnecessary 
disqualifications. Because, of the 94% of disqualified directors who would 
not go on to be involved in a future business failure during the period of 
their disqualification, it is likely, although the NAO did not analyse the 
point, that several would have gone on to be involved in a successful 
business. The precise percentage can only be speculated upon, but the cost 
of disqualifying such individuals should be balanced against the benefit 
achieved from disqualifying the 6% of ‘re-offenders’. The NAO however, 
failed to note the losses from over-regulation that disqualification causes. 
Of course, the apparent inefficiency of disqualification that this analysis 
appears to revile rests on the correctness of the NAO’s statistics. However, 
given that the NAO derived its figures from the study of a database 
containing records of over 400,000 insolvencies, the results of its research 
cannot easily be dismissed, especially as the database is not available for 
public inspection and no other comprehensive survey of it, or of directors 
involved in serial insolvencies, has been conducted.
420 Ibid, para 3.9.
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The most obvious ground for challenging the conclusion reached 
above is therefore not on the validity of the statistics regarding ‘serial 
rogues’ but their applicability to ‘unfit’ directors. Indeed, although it 
proceeds on the basis that its statistics are applicable to this class of director, 
the report does suggest that instances of directors being involved in multiple 
insolvencies is likely to higher amongst those deemed unfit than it is 
amongst directors generally. This argument has a strong logic behind it and I 
am in no position to challenge it. However, even if we were to assume that 
disqualified directors were four times as likely to be involved in future 
insolvencies (a proposition for which no evidence known to the author 
exists), then only 24% of disqualifications would produce a protective 
benefit . Even an eight-fold increase in the likelihood of subsequent 
insolvency amongst ‘unfit’ directors would still mean that only a minority of 
disqualifications produced protective benefits (and then only if every 
subsequent insolvency was caused by misconduct). In short, fancifully and 
completely unsupported assumptions are needed to produce a scenario in 
which even a bare majority of disqualifications produce real protection. 
Therefore, the NAO’s conclusion that only a small minority of 
disqualifications protect the public, based on extensive empirical research, is 
a reasonable basis on which to cast doubt upon the extent to which 
disqualification fulfils its objectives. Furthermore, the contradiction between 
the evidence produced by the NAO and the conclusion it sought to draw 
from it is an entirely legitimate basis for analysis given that the NAO report 
sought to prove the worth of disqualification.
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6.2.3 The Direct Benefits to Creditors from Disqualification.
The miss-match between the evidence produced by the report and 
it’s conclusions is further illustrated by the NAO’s attempt to quantify the 
protective benefits of section 6. In order to produce an accurate estimate of 
the savings from the insolvencies disqualification produced, the NAO 
studied the debts left by failed companies where there had been unfit 
conduct in 1997-98 and calculated that the average debt left was 
£150,000421. Assuming that similar debts would have been left in subsequent 
insolvencies, the NAO estimated that the cost saving to creditors from the 
75 insolvencies prevented by 1,267 disqualifications was £11 million422. 
This conclusion is cited in the report as further evidence of the ‘significant 
benefits’ that flow from post-insolvency disqualification.
However, elsewhere in its report the NAO noted, with great acclaim, 
that the Insolvency Service had spent £22 million securing the 1,267 
disqualifications423. Surprisingly, the NAO failed to compare its estimated 
saving with the cost of the disqualification system and draw the obvious 
conclusion that the disqualification system is completely inefficient on a 
simple cost-benefit analysis. £22 million spent to achieve benefits of only 
£11 million leaves a deficit of another £11 million and hardly looks like a
421 According to the NAO’s follow up report no comprehensive source of data was available 
as to the average debt left by insolvent companies. The NAO therefore conducted its own 
research to come up with the £150,000 figure. It did so by randomly selecting 88 
insolvencies (42 compulsory and 46 voluntary) out of a pool of 450 companies that failed in 
1997-98. See ‘Follow Up Report’ , supra note 406, Appendix 2 paras 10 -13. The veracity 
of the statistics is discussed further below.
422 ''Follow Up Report’, supra note 406, paras 3.10-3.11.
423 Ibid, paras 1.13-1.14.
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sensible use of public funds, yet the National Audit Office failed to draw 
this rather obvious conclusion.
Furthermore, the actual cost of disqualification would be even higher 
than the NAO figures suggest if the losses from over-regulation were taken 
into account. It would take only small number of successful businesses to be 
stifled by disqualification to significantly reduce or wipe out the supposed 
£11 million creditor saving - another rather obvious conclusion that the 
NAO failed to draw from its own calculations.
The failure to even note the obvious imbalance between the NAO’s 
own calculation of the costs and benefits of disqualification is troubling and 
indicative of a short-sighted approach to section 6 in the report. However, 
drawing wider conclusions as to benefit of disqualification from the report 
depends up an acceptance of the NAO’s calculations.424 As the NAO states, 
no comprehensive pool of data was available at the time of the report as to 
the debts left by insolvent companies. The same is true today. The NAO 
drew its figures from a pool of 88 insolvencies that occurred during 1997- 
98 425 survey is not large so caution should be exercised in drawing too 
wide a conclusions from it426. However, the survey result was thought 
sufficiently accurate to be used by the NAO (a body with some experience
424 The ‘direct cost’ of the sanction in terms of the publicly disclosed Disqualification Unit 
annual budget is less open to doubt, although there many other costs of disqualification not 
included in this figure.
425 See note 421, supra.
426 The same note of caution should also be sounded about the NAO’s conclusions as to 
likelihood a person being involved in 2 or more insolvencies. However in so far as the 
NAO’s calculations in this respect are the result of the examination of 400,000 directors on 
the Insolvency Service database it is suggested that the NAO’s conclusions as to the 
likelihood of a person being involved in subsequent insolvencies are more reliable than 
those relating the to average debt left by insolvent companies.
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in assessing the benefits brought by various government policies) and in so 
far as the figure is used by the NAO as a basis for its claim that there are 
‘direct’ benefits then it is submitted that it a legitimate form of analysis to 
comment that on the NAO figures section delivers no direct benefit and 
indeed those figures cast significant doubt on the general worth of 
disqualification under section 6.
6.2.4 The Current Picture on the NAO Measure..
According to the calculations made by the NAO, the cost 
inefficiency of the disqualification regime has persisted to the present day. 
In 2003-04, for example, 1,367 directors were disqualified under section 6, 
either by a court or by offering an undertaking427. The average length of 
disqualification in that year had increased to 5.5 years and the time lag 
between insolvency and disqualification had fallen to an average of 2
a j qyears , largely due to the introduction of disqualification undertakings in 
2001. These improvements have caused an increase in the relative protective 
effect of each disqualification (according to the NAO measure). For 
example, the percentage of directors prevented from being involved in an 
insolvency during the period of their disqualification has increased from 6% 
to 8%429. This improvement is largely due to the shortening of the time it 
takes to secure a disqualification order. The protective effect of each single 
disqualification has consequently risen to 0.08 insolvencies prevented per
427 Companies in 2003-2004, (London, The Stationary Office, 2004), table D1 .
428See Insolvency Service, Annual Report and Accounts 2002-2003, (House of Commons 
Papers, session 2002-2003, 846).
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disqualification. Thus, according to the NAO model it can be estimated that 
disqualification in 2003-2004 prevented 109 (0.08 x 1,367) future 
insolvencies. To obtain a realistic estimate of the creditor saving from these 
disqualifications it is necessary to adjust NAO figure of £150,000 average 
debt per insolvency where unfit conduct is evident for inflation, which 
would be approximately £170,000 at today’s prices430. Consequently, the 
estimated creditor saving from disqualification in 2003-04 (on the NAO 
measure) is £18.5 million. However, this is still a smaller sum than that 
spent on securing the 1,367 disqualifications, which stood at over £25 
million431.
The introduction of disqualification undertakings and other 
improvements in the system are likely to account for the increased savings 
from disqualification, but, on the strength of the NAO’s calculations, it 
remains cost inefficient. Furthermore, according to the NAO’s figures, over 
90% of directors disqualified during 2003-2004 are still not likely to have 
been involved in another business failure during the period of their 
disqualification. Therefore, whilst the improvements in the disqualification 
system are to be welcomed, the protective effect of disqualification remains 
low and the claim that disqualification provides ‘direct’ savings to creditors 
continues to be risible (again, according to the NAO measure). For the 
supposed ‘direct’ saving produced by section 6 disqualification is less than
429 According to the NAO research (see, '‘Follow Up Report’, supra note 406, fig. 31), 8% 
of directors would be involved in a business failure 2-7.5 years after an initial insolvency.
430 Using RPI index annual inflation rates from 1998-2003. Office for National Statistics, 
Consumer Prices from 1750 -  2003, (London, ONS, 2003).
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the direct cost of its administration. Furthermore, the small number of 
insolvencies prevented by disqualification shows that it has an extremely 
marginal impact on the losses that the commercial world suffers from 
insolvency. For example, in 2003-2004 over 15,700 insolvencies were 
recorded in England and Wales432. Therefore the benefit of a sanction that is 
likely to prevent as few has 109 insolvencies, representing less than 1% of 
all insolvencies recorded, must be questioned.
The system is, however, less inefficient than it was at the time of the 
last NAO report, and given the positive gloss put on the ‘benefits’ of 
disqualification then, it is likely that the NAO and others would be even 
more enthusiastic about the system today. However, the truth is that 
according to NAO’s own model disqualification remains hopelessly 
inefficient in providing tangible protection, and what is more could cause 
further (‘secondary’) loss by stifling potentially successful entrepreneurs 
(i.e. those who would not be involved in secondary insolvencies). However, 
in terms of the latter, it must be noted that the Act contains a mechanism, in 
the form of leave of disqualification orders or undertakings, by which such 
losses could be stemmed. Thus, conclusions as to the amount of secondary 
loss caused by disqualification cannot be made without consideration of the 
effect o f ‘leave’.
431 Insolvency Service, Annual Report and Accounts 2003-2004, (House of Commons 
Papers, session 2003-2004, 812).
432 Companies in 2003-2004, supra note 427, table Cl.
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6.3 Leave of Disqualification and the 'Cost’ of Section 6.
It was noted at the outset of this thesis that disqualification under 
section 6 is not unilateral in so far as section 1(1 )(a) of the Act provides only 
that a person subject to a disqualification order ‘may not be involved in the 
promotion, formation or management of a company unless he has leave to 
do so,433. Leave granted in accordance with the provisions of section 17 of 
the Act therefore has the potential to alleviate some of the problems that 
arise where individuals are disqualified even though they would not have 
gone on to be involved in subsequent business failure. The justification that 
is often made for the power to grant leave however tend to focus on the loss 
that can flow from the wide nature of the prohibition in section l(l)(a), 
rather than on the ‘chilling’ effect where individuals who pose no risk to the 
public are disqualified434. Nonetheless, both aspects of disqualification can 
lead to secondary loss, and leave is a potential remedy for each.
In terms of section 1(1 )(a) itself, the argument that the nature of the 
prohibition imposed could lead to loss stems from, the fact that following 
the case of Re Polly Peck International (No2)435 and the amendment of 
section 1 by the Insolvency Act 2000436, the section does not allow for
433 Leave of section 1(1 )(b)( the prohibition on acting as an insolvency practitioner) would 
not, however appear to be possible due lack of similar wording in the sub-section.
434 Ibid, para 3.
435 [1994] 1 BCLC 574. Prior to this case it was thought that courts were free to impose 
‘partial disqualification orders, See for example Re Rolus Properties Ltd (1998) 4 BCC 4 
4 6 The original version of section 1(1) read:
(1) In the circumstances specified below in this Act a court may, and under section 6 shall, 
make against a person a disqualification order, that is to say an order that he shall not, 
without leave of the court -
(a) be a director of a company; or
(b)be a liquidator or administrator of a company; or
(c)be a receiver or a manager of a company’s property; or
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partial disqualification orders in the sense that an individual can be banned 
from undertaking certain aspects of corporate management. Thus, a person 
subject to a disqualification order is prohibited from being a director, 
receiver of a company’s property or from taking part, in any way, in the 
promotion, formation or management of a company whether he poses a 
danger to the public in all of these capacities or not.
The consequences for disqualified individuals of the wide prohibition 
imposed on the by the Act have been described as “drastic” 437 and its 
potential mischief is clear. In short, it is likely that in many cases 
disqualification proscribes a remedy for misconduct that goes far beyond the 
that necessary to protect the public from the particular danger that a director 
poses. The power to grant leave, however is an important way in which the 
harsher side-effects section 1 can be mitigated. The potential flexibility that 
leave brings in cases where there is only a need to protect the public from 
certain aspects of an individuals’ conduct is clear and as such it has the 
potential to enhance the effectiveness of disqualification. If there were no 
provision for leave the court or Secretary of State, for example, could often 
be faced with the difficult choice between imposing a disqualification order 
that goes beyond the measures necessary to protect the public, or not
(d)be in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part in the
promotion, formation or management of a company, 
for a specified period beginning with the date of the order.
The amended section removes any possibility of partial disqualification by 
combining each of the grounds (a)-(d) in the single sentence “he shall not be a director of a 
company act as receiver of a company’s property or in any way, whether directly or 
indirectly, be concerned or take part in the promotion, formation or management of a 
company,”
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disqualifying the individual and leaving the public exposed to ‘unfit’ 
conduct. However with leave, it is possible to strike a balance as the 
individual can be disqualified in order to secure protection, but given leave 
if he wishes to fulfil a role in which he does not pose a danger. Thus, 
protection can be secured but the costs of ‘over-regulation’ avoided .
Leave is also a potentially useful device to prevent disqualification 
creating loss by stifling successful entrepreneurship by the majority of 
directors who would not go on to be involved in an insolvency during the 
currency of their disqualification. As such, it could be argued that the 
disqualification system has, in the form of leave, an in-built mechanism to 
prevent disqualification creating the sort of collateral loss described in this, 
and the previous, sections of this thesis. Of course, the case for leave as the 
‘saviour’ of the disqualification system should not be overstated. The many 
instances, for example, where disqualified individuals would not have gone 
on to cause, in whole or in part, loss to creditors must still be seen as 
examples of the failure of the disqualification regime to meet its policy 
objective. The resources spent on securing such disqualifications will still be 
wasted in so far as they do not protect the public from loss. All that leave 
applications have the potential to do is prevent further loss by creating the 
possibility that an individual will be allowed to participate in beneficial 
activity despite disqualification.
437 See for example, Mithani, Directors Disqualification, part VI paras 3-8.
438 For an example of a disqualification order being used in just such a way see Re Gibson 
Davies Ltd [1995] BCC 11, where an individual was granted leave but prevented from 
being involved in the financial side of company management by a number of conditions or 
‘safeguards’ being set in the leave order.
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Nonetheless it is clear that leave can, and does, have a role to play in 
reducing the further loss that could flow from stifling successful 
entrepreneurial activity by directors from whom the public does not need 
protecting439, and indeed, potential loss from the absolute nature of the bar 
imposed by section 1(1)440. And the ‘flexible’ approach of the courts (who 
have held that the discretion to grant leave is “unfettered by any statutory 
condition or criteria”441 and that it would be “wrong for the court to create 
such fetters or conditions”442), would appear to strengthen the case for the 
benefits of leave. However, the extent to which leave mitigates the loss that 
flows from this particular failing of disqualification can be doubted.
6.3.1 Costs, Evidence the Incidence of Leave.
A real drawback with leave of a disqualification order is that it can 
only be granted in relation to specific activities and specific companies. This 
is made clear in section 1(1) of the Act which states that an individual shall 
not act in any of the prohibited capacities “unless {in each case) he has the 
permission of the court [my emphasis]”. ‘Universal’ leave to act in any of 
the capacities in section 1, in relation to any company, cannot therefore be 
granted. Indeed, if it were, it would rather make a mockery of the fact of 
disqualification. Disqualified individuals who wish to act in a prohibited 
capacity must therefore seek leave for each company in which they wish to
439 See for example, Re Furniture Integrated Telephony Pic [2002] All ER (D) 106.
440 Re Gibson Davies Ltd, supra note 438
441 Re Dawes and Henderson (Agencies) Ltd (No 2) [1999] 2 BCLC 317.
442 Ibid. The primary factor that the courts consider in leave cases is whether leave is 
compatible with the goal of public protection {Re Dawes and Henderson). See further note 
446 below.
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be involved and the cost and laboriousness of the leave application process 
must limit the extent which disqualified individuals are able to seek leave.
The Disqualification Act states that every application for leave of a 
disqualification order or undertaking must be made to a court, as (even in 
the case of undertakings) the Secretary of State has no power to grant leave 
himself443. Furthermore the Act obliges The Secretary of State to appear at 
each leave application “and call the attention of the court to any matters 
which seem to him to be relevant” to the application444 . He may also call 
witnesses or himself give evidence445. Not only are applicants for leave 
therefore required to submit to the court details of the company in which 
they act, the role they wish to fill and demonstrate that they would not pose 
a danger to the public in such a role446, but they may also incur the cost of 
responding to the Secretary of State, which, should he chose question the 
application, could be considerable. The potential time and expense involved 
in making an application for leave must therefore act as a strong disincentive 
for making leave applications. Indeed, the practical considerations of
443 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, section 17(3).
444 Ibid, section 17(5).
6^ I b i d 'The protection of the public interest is the overriding concern of the courts in leave 
cases, Re Dawes & Henderson (Agencies) Ltd (No 2) [1999] 2 BCLC 317, Re Barings pic 
(No 4) [1999] 1 BCLC 262. In order to obtain leave from a court the applicant therefore has 
to demonstrate to the court either that he poses no danger the public in the particular role he 
wishes to fulfil (e.g. Re Dawes & Henderson, supra), or that protection can be secured by 
means of imposing conditions on the activities of the director ( see for example, Secretary 
of State v Palfreman [1995] 2 BCLC 673 or Re Majestic Recording Studies Ltd [1989] 
BCLC 1. In both cases leave was granted subject to the condition that a solicitor and an 
‘independent chartered accountant’ were respectively appointed as directors to supervise the 
activities of the ‘disqualified’ director). It was thought that as well as satisfying the court 
that leave could be granted whilst satisfying the goal of public protection, applicants for 
leave also had to establish a ‘need’ from them to be granted leave. Following Re Dawes & 
Henderson and Re Barings it would now appear that ‘protection’ is the only condition that 
must be satisfied for leave to be granted.
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applying for leave must undermine the notion that it is a remedy in all 
instances where disqualification stifles desirable entrepreneurial activity.
6.3.1.1 Williams’ 2000 Survey.
Empirical evidence from a survey of the disqualified directors 
register carried out by Williams447 provides persuasive support for this 
contention by demonstrating that leave is rarely granted. Williams studied 
the register of directors disqualified during 1999-2000 held by Companies 
House. The register contains an entry for every person subject to a 
disqualification order giving biographical details of the disqualified 
individual, the period of his disqualification and the details of leave orders 
applicable to him (if any)448. Williams’ survey showed that out of 1,704 
directors disqualified during the year only, 69 (representing only 4.05% of 
the total number of disqualified individuals) had been granted a significant 
period of leave within the period of 6-18 months after their disqualification.
Of the 69 individuals who obtained leave, 49 were given leave to act 
for the whole period of the remaining period of their disqualification at the 
time leave was granted. The remaining 20 were granted leave for a lesser 
period. Williams argues that a number of those who obtained ‘partial’ leave 
orders were likely to go on to obtain leave for the whole period of their 
disqualification due to the practice of granting an ‘interim’ leave order 
followed by a longer order after review by the court of the director’s
447 R. Williams, An Analysis o f Empirical Research into Aspects o f the Disqualification o f  
Company Directors, LL.M Thesis 2000. Cardiff University, chapter 5.
448 The database is available on line at <www.companieshouse. gov.uk/ddir/>.
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conduct449. However, other cases of short leave periods appeared to be 
examples of interim leave being granted to directors at the start of their 
disqualification to give them a period of grace in which to make alternative 
arrangements for the management of their companies450. In such cases leave 
was granted for a very short period, typically 6 weeks, and as such they 
cannot be regarded as meaningful instances of leave. Thus, in truth fewer 
than 69 individuals were granted a true exemption from their 
disqualification order. However Williams’ 2000 survey does not include 
sufficient data to conclude the number of cases in which significant periods 
of leave were given. In order obtain more data in relation to this issue, and 
more generally to provide up-to-date information451 on the frequency of 
leave, a survey similar to that undertaken by Williams was repeated for the 
purposes of this thesis.
6.3.1.2 The New Survey.
For the purposes of this thesis a random sample of 1,704 
disqualification records were selected from the Companies House 
database452. Unlike Williams’ original survey the records included for this
449 This practice was referred to by Rattee J in Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry v 
Barnett [1988] 2 BCLC 64. His Honour noted that if a court had reservations about granting 
leave it could set a probationary period of leave, then review the director’s conduct, and if 
satisfied grant a more substantial period of leave (often for the remainder of the period of 
disqualification). Williams note that 14 of the cases where full leave had been granted at the 
time of the survey were examples of this procedure of, probationary, then ‘full’ leave, see 
Williams, supra note 447 chapter 5.
450 See for example ReAmaron [1998] BCC 264.
451 Williams original survey was undertaken before the introduction of disqualification 
undertakings by the Insolvency Act 2000, therefore I was thought important to undertake 
research into leave as it currently is use to determine if the introduction of disqualifications 
had lead to changes in the use of leave.
452 The records were accessed via the Companies House online database (address supra note 
448). The database is searchable by typing in the surname of disqualified individuals. If a 
single letter (e.g. ‘A ’)is entered as search criteria the database returns records of all
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thesis were not linked to any particular year, but all of the records included 
related to ‘live’ disqualification orders. The survey of the Companies House 
records carried out for this thesis produced remarkably similar results the 
those of Williams’ 2000 survey, indicating no significant change in the use 
of leave.. Study of the selected records showed that a total of 71 (4.17%) of 
the 1,704 disqualified individuals had obtained leave of their disqualification 
order under section 17. Of those 71 directors who had obtained leave, 44 
were granted leave by a single order that covered the whole outstanding 
period of disqualification from the date it was granted453, 16 were granted 
leave for the reaming period of their disqualification but in the form of 
probationary and supplementary orders454 and 11 had been granted an period 
of leave that did not cover the outstanding period of disqualification. Thus a 
total of 60 individuals were granted leave for the whole of their period of 
disqualification. Indeed, of those 60 individuals 55 were granted leave for 
the entire period of disqualification i.e. leave was granted at the same time 
as disqualification and ran for the whole period of disqualification455.
disqualified directors with surnames beginning with that letter. Therefore, the sample of 
records for the survey was taken by entering each letter of the alphabet into the database 
and randomly selection 60-65 records from each letter to be included until a total of 1,704 
records were obtained. Each record was printed from the database and entries showing a 
leave order were collected and analysed. An example of a record showing a leave order is 
contained in appendix 1 to this thesis.
453 Of which, 27 individuals were granted leave in relation 1 company and 17 granted leave 
to act in relation to 2 or more companies. Williams’ 2000 survey revealed 35 of 69 leave 
orders were granted for the whole period of disqualification. 20 of the 35 individuals 
obtained leave in relation to 1 company and 15 for 2 or more companies.
454 The number was 14 in Williams 2000 survey, see Williams, supra note 447.
455 Section 1 of the Act provides for a 21 delay in the commencement of disqualification 
orders. As such any leave orders (or combination of probationary and subsequent orders) 
commencing with 21 days of the start of disqualification and continuing in force until the 
end of the period of disqualification were counted as running for the entire length of 
disqualification.
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Of the 11 directors granted leave for a period that did not extend to 
the end of their disqualification, 4 were granted very short periods of leave 
(ranging from 1 week to 3 months), and would appear to be clear examples 
of interim leave of the sort illustrated in the case of Re Amaron456. In a 
further 3 cases directors had been granted longer, but expired, periods of 
leave. In one case leave had been granted for a period of 7 months, in 
another for a period of 1 year and in the final case for a period of 1.5 years. 
The periods in these cases would appear to be rather long to fit into the 
category of interim leave and the most likely explanation would be that 
probationary457 periods of leave were granted, but not extended. In the 
remaining 4 cases directors had been granted leave for limited periods which 
had not expired at the time of the survey. In all of these cases the period of 
leave granted was significant ( 7, months 9 months, 13 months, 18 months) 
and they would appear to be current examples of probationary periods of 
leave. The number of leave orders that can discounted as examples of 
interim leave do not, therefore appear to be large458.
Both the 2000 and the current surveys raise significant questions in 
themselves as to the effect of disqualification, aside from the issue of
456 Supra, note 450. In all of the 4 cases the period of leave had expired at the time o f the 
survey.
457 See note 449, supra and accompanying text.
458 It is, however, likely that instances of ‘interim’ leave were higher at the time of Williams 
survey, since the original version of section provided that disqualification orders were to 
commence on the day which they were made. Section 5(2) of the Insolvency Act 2000 
however, inserted a new section 1 providing for a 21 day delay in the commencement of a 
disqualification order or undertaking. The purpose of the amendment was the same as that 
of ‘interim’ leave, i.e. to allow directors a period of time in which to make alternative 
arrangements for the management of any companies the may direct at the time of 
disqualification and as such it is likely that the number of interim leave orders granted will 
have fallen since the amendment came into force in 2001.
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whether leave is an effective remedy for secondary losses . The fact, for 
example, that a majority of directors who obtained leave in both the current 
and 2000 studies of leave were granted a single leave order covering the 
entire period of their disqualification suggests that in the majority of leave 
applications the ‘protection of the public’ is secured very easily without the 
need for a blanket ban on involvement in the management in companies. 
Indeed, one could go as far as to suggest that in such cases the public cannot 
need much, if any, protecting from disqualified individuals if the court is 
happy to grant leave for the entire period of disqualification without any 
element of review459. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the new 
survey revealed that 20 individuals obtained leave of the whole period of 
their disqualification in relation to 2 or more companies460and that two 
individuals obtained leave to act in relation to four companies, with no 
probationary period of leave. In these cases it is difficult to conceive the 
disqualified individuals posed much danger to the public. The fact that they 
were disqualified despite their evident ability to manage companies 
satisfactorily indicates that, as suggested above, individuals who pose no 
danger to the public are being disqualified. Leave cases therefore indicate 
the pitfalls of the ‘tunnel vision’ approach.. Similarly the fact that in 16 of 
the 18 cases where ‘probationary leave’ was granted directors were allowed 
leave for the remainder of their period of disqualification suggests that even
459 According to the NAO’s research no protection is necessary from 94% of those 
currently disqualified.
460 Of which 17 obtained multiple leave orders covering the whole remainder of their 
disqualification, and which 3 obtained following a probationary periods of leave.
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where there is some doubt about a director’s fitness, many disqualified 
individuals are able to conduct themselves perfectly satisfactorily.
Nonetheless as well as confirming doubts about the effectiveness of 
disqualification, both studies also appear to demonstrate the positive 
attributes of leave, i.e. that it introduces a degree of flexibility into the 
disqualification system which can prevent the sanction from stifling 
successful entrepreneurial activity. The issue therefore must be whether the 
frequency with which leave is granted is sufficient to remedy the apparent 
loss caused by disqualification. In answer to this question perhaps the most 
significant finding of both surveys lie.
6.3.2 The Impact of Leave.
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from both studies is that leave is 
rarely granted and therefore that (in practical terms) it does not play a 
significant role in reducing the ‘secondary’461 loss caused by 
disqualification. The reason why leave is so rarely granted is, however, less 
easy to identify. The small number of leave cases is not explicable because 
of a restrictive approach by the courts when considering leave cases; the 
‘flexible’ approach outlined above would seem to exclude this possibility462. 
Much more likely a cause is either ignorance of the possibility of obtaining 
leave on the part of directors, or a reluctance to make leave applications.
461 By which I mean loss caused where disqualification prevents successful entrepreneurial 
activity, either because an individual would not have been involved in an insolvency during 
the period of his disqualification or because he could have usefully discharged a limited 
function in the management etc., of a company.
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Ignorance of leave is however, an explanation that is difficult to sustain 
given that the guidance material on disqualification supplied to individuals 
subject to proceedings under the Act refer quite explicitly to the possibility 
of obtaining leave463. Much more likely a cause of the low instance of leave 
is a reluctance to apply for leave as the cost and evidential implications o f 
making an application (as outlined above) simply cannot be ignored. Costs 
is an issue that is widely recognised as being a significant determinant o f a 
director’s response to an initial disqualification application464 and must also 
be relevant to leave. Indeed if a director is unable to contest an original 
application be he cannot afford to do so, it seems unlikely that he will be 
able to make an application for leave either465. Of course it should be noted 
that leave applications can be made at any point during the currency o f a 
disqualification, and as the financial circumstances of disqualified 
individuals improve leave applications may become more practical. 
However, the low incidence of leave appears to suggest that this does not 
have a significant impact and, indeed, it is hardly satisfactory that leave 
should only be available to the rich.
462 Analysis of the leave cases cited by Mithani in his encyclopaedic work “Directors 
Disqualification”(supra note) appears to confirm that the courts are sympathetic to leave 
applications; that in most cases leave was granted
463 Copies of the materials supplied are available at: 
www.insolvency.gov.uk/directordisqualificationandrestrictions
464 For example in Re Barings Pic [1998] 1 BCLC 18, Sir Richard Scott expressed 
‘concern’ that directors were not contesting disqualification applications simply because 
they could not afford to do so. Hoffman J expressed similar concerns in Re Swift 736 
[1992] BCC 93, which were repeated (extra-judicially) by the then Lord Hoffman, see The 
Fourth Annual Leonard Stainer Lecture (1997) 18 Comp. Law. 194.
465 See further Chapter 7, below which discusses the costs issue more full. The reasoning 
outlined relates to the ability of directors to contest applications but is also applicable to 
their ability to make a leave application.
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Therefore whilst leave may have the potential to alleviate a limited 
amount of the potential loss caused by the disqualification regime its role is, 
for whatever reason, not significant. Thus leave is no way transforms the 
rather drastic failures of disqualification to deliver effective protection that 
the NAO suggests. It should not be forgotten that, according to NAO 
research, 94% of disqualifications bring no protective benefit, may stifle 
successful business activity, and are (in terms of protection) wasted. Leave, 
(in any case only capable of providing a remedy to stifled activity) is 
applicable to only 4% of directors and is unlikely to significantly reduce the 
costs of over-regulation. It cannot, therefore, significantly alter the 
disappointing picture painted by the NAO.
6.4 Long-term Protection.
All the available empirical data therefore indicates that 
disqualification fails to meet it goal of ‘protecting’ the public from unfit 
directors, and indeed is likely to inflict loss on them. However, before the 
analysis moves on to consider whether disqualification is more successful in 
meeting its other declared goal, i.e. deterring unfit conduct, it is worth 
noting one last protective failure of the section 6 regime.
In addition to its other deficiencies, disqualification under section 6 
provides little in the way of long-term protection, even where it prevents 
secondary insolvencies. This is because those who have been subject to 
disqualification are not subject to any restrictions after the end of their 
disqualification. They are not, for example, required to undertake any
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training in good stewardship of companies nor prevented from becoming 
sole directors. Therefore, whatever ‘protection’ is afforded by 
disqualification is temporary. This is a particularly important aspect of 
disqualification given that the vast majority of section 6 disqualifications are 
for a period of less than 11 years466, with about half being for less than a 5- 
year period467. It is of course true that the average length of a
Af&disqualification has risen in recent years , and this has had a positive effect 
on the level of protection, but 5 years is still a relatively short space of time.
The NAO, advocated longer periods of disqualification as a way to 
increase the protective effect of the sanction469 and its justification for its 
view has an appealing logic, for it would appear that longer disqualifications 
mean a longer period during which the public will be ‘protected’ from a 
rogue director. Therefore it might be thought that more ‘protection’ (i.e. 
loss-reduction) can be secured from longer disqualifications. However, it 
would appear that longer disqualification only marginally increases the 
number insolvencies prevented by disqualification.
The NAO’s research showed that the likelihood of a director being 
involved in a 2nd or 3rd insolvency is very low 7 or 8 years after the a first 
insolvency470. Therefore, longer disqualifications are not the best way of
466 See: Insolvency Service Executive Agency, General Annual Report for the Year 2002, 
(London, DTI, 2003), table 5.
467Companies in 2002-2003, supra note 427, table A3.
468 See the Insolvency Service’s General Annual Reports published between 1998 and 
2002, (London, The Stationary Office, 1998, 1999,2000, 2001 and 2002).
469 See also A. Hicks, Director Disqualification: Can it Deliver [2001] JBL 433, at page 
446.
470 4.5% of directors are likely to be involved in a second insolvency within one year, 2.2% 
in the second year and 2% in the third but only 0.2 and 0.1% in the 7th and 8* years 
respectively; see National Audit Office, ''Follow Up Report', supra note 406.
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improving the protective effect the sanction. An increase of two years on the 
average disqualification, for example, would prevent only an extra 0.2% of 
directors being involved in another failed business. Thus if the average 
length of disqualification in 2003-2004 had been 7.5 years instead of 5.5, 
only 3 extra insolvencies would have been prevented. Furthermore, there are 
limits to extent that disqualifications can be made longer without making 
disqualification periods disproportionate to the misconduct committed471.
Unfortunately, the focus of disqualification is on short-term 
‘protection’ with little attention paid to what happens once disqualification 
is over. At the present time, the long-term effectiveness of post-insolvency 
disqualification relies upon the hope that directors will have Teamed by 
their mistakes’, which is hardly a guarantee of good conduct. Apart from 
this the only factor that may prevent a repeat of misconduct is caution 
exercised by creditors in dealing with ex-disqualified directors472.
There is therefore little evidence to suggest that the benefits from 
disqualifying directors are in any sense ‘significant’. The evidence from the 
NAO report indeed indicates quite the contrary, for it would appear that not 
only is the disqualification sanction often not applied to loss causing 
conduct, but that even when it is, it delivers few real benefits. There is also a
471 In Re Sevenoaks Stationers. [1991] Ch. 164 the Court of Appeal provided guidelines to 
determine the length of a disqualification under section 6 of the Act according to the 
seriousness of the unfit conduct shown. In so doing the court also divided the mandatory 2- 
15 years period of disqualification into three brackets. The brackets were stated as follows:
■ Eleven to fifteen years’ disqualification should be reserved for a particularly 
serious case of unfit conduct. This might be in the case of a second disqualification 
or breach of an earlier order.
■ Six to ten years for cases not involving conduct meriting the highest band.
■ Two to five years for less serious cases.
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significant risk of over-regulation causing loss. Leave may have the 
potential to alleviate some such loses but it is so rarely used (probably dues 
to cost considerations) that its impact is not significant. However, before 
reaching a final judgement about the worth of the current disqualification 
regime, it is necessary to consider whether the supposed ‘deterrent’ effect of 
disqualification under section 6 is likely to produce a more significant 
benefit.
6.5 Deterring the Unfit.
The deterrent effect of disqualification plays a significant part in the 
supposed facilitation of confidence the market that the sanction brings473. 
However, there are sound reasons for doubting that disqualification has a 
significant impact in deterring unfit conduct and therefore, reducing losses 
from unfit conduct.
6.5.1 Disqualification as a ‘Personal’ Sanction.
The use of disqualification as a means to deter unfit conduct is 
premised on the belief that ‘personal’ sanctions are an effective way of 
securing directors’ compliance with proscribed standards of behaviour. 
However, recent evidence from a study by Robert Baldwin474 casts doubt 
upon whether such personal sanctions effectively motivate directors to 
comply with regulatory requirements. As part of his inquiry into the
472 However, it should be noted that directors who are disqualified for a second time face a 
longer period of disqualification, see Re Sevenoakes, ibid.
473 The NAO stated that disqualification had a significant role in ‘the fostering of improving 
standards of company stewardship, without inhibiting genuine enterprise and 
entrepreneurial management’. See NAO ‘Follow Up Report’, supra, note 406, para 1.5.
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response of directors of FTSE companies to punitive regulation, Baldwin 
studied the main ‘drivers’ behind director’s efforts to manage regulatory 
risks. His survey revealed that ‘corporate’ as opposed to ‘personal’ concerns 
were the most important factors motivating compliance with regulatory 
standards. For example, 90% of the directors questioned for Baldwin’s 
survey cited ‘concern for their company’s reputation’ as the most important 
driver of their conduct, compared to only 36% of directors who cited the 
fear of personal sanctions.475.
Baldwin’s research would suggest that the effectiveness of 
disqualification as a deterrent to unfit conduct is therefore based on a false 
assumption and is limited. However, it should be emphasised that Baldwin’s 
research was limited to directors of FTSE companies. Disqualification, 
however, is a sanction largely applied to directors of small owner-managed 
companies whose attitudes are likely to be different from directors of public 
companies. It is possible that directors of owner-managed companies would 
have greater regard for personal sanctions, given that they are often the only 
actors behind the company and are more exposed to such sanctions than a 
director of a public company who shares responsibility with several fellow 
directors and managers. Nevertheless, Baldwin’s research does challenge the 
assumption that directors behave in a rational and therefore compliant way 
when faced with personal sanctions.
474 Baldwin R., The New Punitive Regulation, (2004) 67 MLR 351.
415 Ibid.
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However, aside from the general question of whether personal 
sanctions encourage compliant behaviour, certain factors specific to the 
disqualification regime raise doubts about the efficiency of post-insolvency 
disqualification as a deterrent mechanism.
6.5.2 Knowledge of Disqualification.
At the time of their first report into disqualification under section 6, 
the NAO carried out a survey that tested, amongst other things, awareness of 
the disqualification legislation amongst directors. The results of the survey 
showed that awareness was relatively low, with 58% of directors questioned 
claiming to be unaware of the legislation476. The low level of awareness of 
the legislation found was explicable due to the low number of 
disqualifications that were made prior to 1993 and the scant publicity that 
the sanction attracted. However, a similar survey that was carried out for the 
NAO’s follow up report in 1998, actually showed an increase in ignorance 
of the legislation; 66% of directors then claiming no knowledge of the 
sanction477. The apparent increase is surprising given that between the 1993 
and 1999 the number of section 6 disqualifications had tripled, increasing 
from 399 in 1993-4 to 1,284 in 1998-99. If this research is accurate, grave 
doubt is cast on the on the policy of increasing the number of
476 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General: The Insolvency 
Service Executive Agency, Company Director Disqualification (House of Commons Papers, 
Session 1992-1993, 907), para 2.47.
477 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Insolvency 
Service Executive Agency, Company Director Disqualification -  A Follow Up Report, 
(House of Commons Papers, Session 1998-1999, 424), para 2.49. There was also an 
increase in the number of director who felt that disqualification was unsuccessful at 
deterring unfit conduct. See note 498, below.
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disqualifications as a way to enhance the deterrent effect of disqualification. 
If anything, the figures suggest a negative correlation between the number of 
disqualifications and awareness of the legislation.
In the five years since the last NAO report the annual number of 
disqualifications has continued to rise478, but it would seem unlikely that this 
has increased awareness of the legislation. However, the limited knowledge 
of the disqualification legislation shown in the second NAO survey would 
not appear to be unique. In Baldwin’s survey 479, for example, only 38% of 
directors claimed that they were aware of ‘company law’ regulatory risks. 
Given that Baldwin’s survey was concerned with knowledge of regulatory 
risks amongst the professional class of directors, there seems to be little 
indication that the findings of the NAO will have significantly changed.
In any case, the deterrent effect of disqualification rests upon more 
than mere knowledge of the sanction. In order for disqualification to 
effectively prevent loss-causing conduct it is not only necessary that 
directors are aware of the possibility of being disqualified, but also that they 
are aware of what conduct is ‘unfit’. For, if directors do not know what 
unfit conduct is, how can they be deterred from carrying it out? Therefore, 
given the low awareness of the existence of disqualification, it is unlikely 
that more than a few directors have any knowledge of the elements of unfit 
conduct.
478 Between 1997-1998 and 2002-2003 the annual number of disqualification increased in 5 
out of 6 years. The number of disqualifications is now approximately 22% higher than at 
the time of the last NAO report; see, Companies In 2003-2004, supra note 427.
419Supra, note 474.
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In this respect one of the costs of settling upon a general standard as 
opposed to a set of rules in disqualification are apparent. The compliance 
costs associated with the ‘unfitness’ standard or the courts’ formulation of ‘a 
breach of commercial morality’ or ‘negligence to a marked degree’480 are 
high, especially to a director who is unfamiliar with the law. Indeed, there 
are so many precedents and potentially unfit acts that it would be extremely 
time-consuming and costly to be aware of them all. The complexity of the 
precedents and the notorious insistence by the judges that unfitness is 
essentially a ‘jury question’ is a substantial impediment to reducing creditor 
loss through compliance or deterrence . Furthermore, the remote 
possibility of becoming subject to disqualification proceedings is likely to 
persuade directors that the cost of complying with the standard (if it were 
possible) is greater than the likely benefit.
6.5.3 Post-Insolvency Deterrence.
The formal insolvency requirement for disqualification under section 
6 does not help to increase its deterrent effect because only the relatively 
small number of directors whose companies are subject to formal insolvency 
proceedings fall within the purview of the system. For example, directors of 
solvent companies who commit misconduct, and those of companies that are 
simply dissolved and struck off the register, largely fall outside the
480 For example as per Brown-Wilkinson v-c in Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd [1988] 1 
Ch 477 at 486. “Ordinary commercial misjudgement is in itself not sufficient to justify 
disqualification. In the normal case the conduct complained of must display a lack of 
commercial probity, although I have no doubt that in an extreme case of gross negligence or 
total incompetence disqualification could be appropriate”
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disqualification system482. This makes disqualification a remote prospect for 
most directors.
In 2003-04, for example, 154,300 companies were struck off and 
dissolved whereas only 15,700 were subject to insolvency proceedings 
before being removed from the register483. Therefore, the chances of a 
director falling within a post-insolvency disqualification system are limited. 
As such, compliance with the disqualification standard is likely to be a 
marginal factor in the mind of a director immersed in day-to-day decision 
taking. For, whilst a company is in good financial health, post-insolvency 
measures aimed at deterring unfit conduct will not present the kind of 
immediate danger to a director that would deter him from carrying out 
‘unfit’ acts. The cost of complying with the sanction is therefore likely to be 
much higher than the obvious benefit. It is only when the prospect of 
insolvency is a real and pressing possibility that compliance with the 
disqualification standard is likely to be a rational course of action, by which 
time unfit conduct may well have taken place.
However, even if a company enters formal insolvency proceedings, 
the likelihood of becoming subject to disqualification proceedings is low 
and, indeed, very arbitrary. Much rests on the Insolvency Practitioner (IP) or
481 See For example Dillion LJ in Re Sevenoakes Stationers Ltd, supra note 471, who 
condemned attempts to paraphrase the disqualification standard through judicial precedents.
482 Hicks, Directors ’ Disqualification, supra, note 469. As Hicks notes, the Victoria Law 
Reform Committee, recommended reform of the Australian disqualification provisions to 
remedy exactly this weakness. See: Parliament of Victoria Law reform Committee, Second 
Report o f the Law relating to Directors and Managers o f Insolvent Companies, (Victoria, 
Parliamentary Papers, 1995), para 3.16.
483 Companies in 2003-2004, supra, note 427, table Cl.
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Official Receiver (OR) who is appointed to the company484. This also
weakens the deterrent impact of disqualification.
6.5.4 IP Discretion in the Reporting Process.
In a study carried out in 1992-93, Sally Wheeler485 discovered 
significant variations in the nature and quality of IPs compliance with their 
reporting obligations under the Disqualification Act. Wheeler discovered 
that IPs were often unclear as to when their reporting obligations arose 
under the Act, that many undertook only a very cursory investigation into 
possible unfitness and that several filed inadequate reports to the Secretary 
of State486. The varying quality of reports was one factor that was thought to 
explain why at the time of the survey, 81% of unfit conduct reports received 
by the Insolvency Service were not pursued.
Since the first NAO report and Wheeler’s study, the Insolvency 
Service, in conjunction with the Insolvency Practitioner Compliance Unit
484 IPs and Ors are placed under an obligation by Section 7(3) of the Disqualification Act to 
report unfit conduct to the Secretary of State if it appears to him that the conditions 
mentioned in section 6(1) are satisfied in respect of a person who is or has been a director of 
the company, the office holder is obliged to report the matter to the Secretary of State. In 
reliance upon this provision a two-stage reporting process has been established whereby the 
Secretary of State is notified of the potentially unfit conduct of directors.
In accordance with section 7(3) and rule 4 of the Insolvent Companies (Reports on Unfit 
Conduct of Directors) Rules 1996(SI 1996/1909), an office holder has to make an interim 
return under s7(3) within six months of him coming to office if he feels the matters in 
section 6(1) are satisfied. This initial report is to be made on a form set out in the schedule 
1 of the 1996 statutory instrument and is called a D2 ‘Interim Return’. When an office 
holder submits an interim report he falls under an obligation to submit a final and full report 
on unfit conduct, called a ‘D l’ form. It has now become the practice of the Insolvency 
Practitioner Control Unit (I.P.C.U). to notify the office holder of the date by which he is 
expected to submit a final report. In general an office holder is expected to submit a final 
return within nine months of having filed an interim report.
485 S. Wheeler, Directors Disqualification: Insolvency Practitioners and the Decision 
Making Process, [1995] Legal Studies 283.
486 The same matter was highlighted by NAO’s first report in to disqualification. It noted 
that in 34% of all reports submitted to the Insolvency Service were incomplete. See,
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(IPCU), has made significant efforts to improve both the number and quality 
of reports submitted by IPs. These efforts have produced positive results. 
The NAO follow-up report noted a significant rise in the recording and 
reporting of unfit conduct by ORs between 1992 and 1998 and the same is 
likely to be true of IPs. IPs compliance with their statutory obligations is 
now subject to a sophisticated monitoring regime with each IP’s reporting 
profile monitored by the IPCU487. IPs who routinely do not submit reports to 
the Insolvency Service where they should, or who submit late reports, can be 
subject to disciplinary proceedings488. The Insolvency Service has helped to 
improve IP’s recording and reporting profile by producing guidance on 
statutory reporting obligations. The Guidance Notes for the Completion o f 
Statutory Reports and Returns**9, for example, explains IPs reporting 
obligations under the Act, how to complete ‘D l’ and ‘D2’ reports and 
returns as giving guidance about various types of unfit conduct.
However, whilst significant advances have undoubtedly been made 
in improving the timeliness, nature and quality of IP reports, variations in 
the quality of the investigations carried out into unfit conduct continue to be 
a concern. The follow-up report noted that the variation in the number of Dl 
reports made by OR offices had narrowed to between 4% and 14% in 1998, 
compared with of 0.3% to 10% in 1992. Similarly the variation in recorded
National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, supra, note 466, 
para 3.10.
487 See, Insolvency Service, Dear Insolvency Practitioner Letter: Millennium Edition 
(London, Insolvency Service, 1999), chapter 10. Available at
http://www. insolvency.gov. uk/information/dearip/dearipmill/chapterl O.htm
488 See: Insolvency Service, Enforcement Concordat, April 1999. Available at 
www.insolvency.gov.uk/information/iparea/ipguide.htm
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unfit conduct (D2 forms) narrowed to a range of between 25% and 65% in 
1998 compared with 2% to 56% in 1992490. However, whilst the 
improvement in consistency between official receivers is welcome, it is 
obvious that significant variations in levels of reporting between ORs offices 
exist. The recent case of Official Receiver v Jones491 shows that defective 
investigations by ORs are far from being a thing of the past and it remains 
likely that some of the variations in recording and reporting between ORs 
can be put down to the type of differing investigation strategies that 
Wheeler492 discovered in relation to IPs. Indeed, it is still the case that fewer 
than half of all reports made to the Insolvency Service are pursued, which 
suggests that reporting is still far from perfect493.
However, perhaps more concerning is the difference between the 
number of recorded instances of unfit conduct and official reports received 
by the Secretary of State. In 2002, for example, reports of unfitness were 
only submitted in 36% of cases where it had been recorded (i.e. where prima 
facie evidence of unfitness was found)494. The 2002 figures show an 
improvement on 1998, when only 19% of D2 records reports lead to a D1 
report, however the fact that almost two-thirds of recorded instances of unfit 
conduct do not proceed to the formal reporting stage raises the prospect that 
several cases of unfitness are falling through the disqualification net. Of
489 (London, Insolvency Service, 2001).
490 NAO, Follow Up Report, supra, note 406, fig. 12.
491 [2004] EWHC 2096.
492 Supra note 485.
493Insolvency Service. Insolvency: General Annual Report for the Year 2002, (London, The 
Stationary Office, 2003).
494 Ibid.
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course, it is inevitable that in some cases where prima facie evidence of 
unfitness is found, sufficient evidence to file a full report will not be 
forthcoming, however, the variation between the recording and reporting of 
unfit conduct is large and not readily explicable.
The variation between D1 and D2 reports could be due to over­
cautious recording of unusual conduct by directors because of the pressure 
on IPs and ORs to identify unfit conduct, or it is could be due to a reluctance 
to carryout a detailed investigation into suspected unfit conduct due to the 
costs and time involved, a particular concern in companies which have few 
assets. Whatever, the reason may be, the limited number of cases that 
proceed from the D2 to D1 stage hardly increases the deterrent effect of 
disqualification.
What is certain is that the reporting decision vests a lot of discretion 
in the hands of IPs and ORs which causes uncertainty as to whether unfit 
conduct, if discovered, will be reported. Put simply, the obligation to report 
unfit conduct arises when there is sufficient evidence that a director’s 
conduct makes him or her unfit to be concerned in the management of a 
company495. This reporting test is simply a replication of the test that the 
court must apply when deciding whether to disqualify. It therefore requires 
IPs or ORs to exercise the same value judgement about a director’s conduct 
as the courts. As such, it is little wonder that empirical evidence from Hicks’ 
survey of IPs in 1997496 suggests that IPs are confused as to when their
495 As set out in the Guidance Notes, supra note 489, pages 3-4.
496 A. Hicks, Director Disqualification: Can it Deliver? [2001] JBL 433, page 436.
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reporting obligation arises. Each IP and ORs decision must depend 
ultimately on his or her knowledge and appreciation of the law and correct 
application of the test would require and encyclopaedic knowledge of 
disqualification precedents. Inconsistency in decision making is therefore 
hardly surprising.
However, the lack of certainty that surrounds the reporting of unfit 
conduct and its subsequent investigation does significant harm to the 
deterrent effect of disqualification. Taken together with the ‘narrowing’ 
effect of the insolvency requirement, the actual level of deterrence achieved 
by post-insolvency disqualification is likely to be low even for a director 
who believes his company will become insolvent.
Rational deterrence assumptions497, dictate that a director will weigh 
the expected costs and benefits of non-compliance with a behavioural rule 
before deciding whether to comply. A rational director who undertook such 
an exercise when considering compliance with the disqualification standard 
may well conclude that non-compliance was the rational course of action 
given the slight chances of becoming subject to a post-insolvency 
disqualification regime and the limited chances of being disqualified if he 
did. Even when insolvency is a real prospect the odds are stacked against 
disqualification, and given that directors probably are not purely rational 
actors it is doubtful whether the current disqualification regime would have 
a positive effect even in these circumstances.
497 Baldwin, supra, note 474.
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Therefore, it is probably unrealistic to expect a post-insolvency 
disqualification to be an efficient means of deterring unfit conduct. 
Empirical evidence from surveys of directors and IPs seem to back up this 
conclusion. For example; 64 % of directors questioned for the NAO in 1998 
felt that the disqualification regime was unsuccessful in deterring unfit 
conduct and 61% felt the disqualification regime was unsuccessful at 
‘disqualifying those who need to be disqualified’498. In a similar survey 
carried out by Andrew Hicks, two-thirds of IPs felt that disqualification did 
not influence directors’ behaviour499.
6.5.5 Other Relevant Factors.
Several other factors also limit the impact of disqualification. The 
lack-lustre enforcement of disqualification orders is a debilitating factor on 
the legislation as a whole. The annual number of convictions obtained for 
breaches of a disqualification is low, only 16 being obtained in 2002500. In 
order to be as effective as possible it is necessary for disqualifications to be 
properly enforced, otherwise any deterrent or protective effect that the 
sanction may produce will be undermined501. Indeed, a survey carried out
498 See NAO Follow Up Report, supra, note 406, fig 27. It is also interesting to note that the 
percentage of directors who felt that the disqualification legislation was unsuccessful in 
deterring unfit conduct had actually increased compared to the results of a similar survey 
carried out for the first NAO report in 1993.
499 Hicks also questioned 20 disqualified directors as to whether their knowledge of the 
possibility o f disqualification had influenced the way they had run their companies. None of 
the 20 said that it had. This finding is noted by the NAO; see Follow Up Report, supra, note 
406 para 3.35.
500 Insolvency Service, Insolvency: General Annual Report for the Year 2002, (London, The 
Stationary Office, 2003), table 4.
501 See: Hicks, Directors’ Disqualification: Can it Deliver?, supra note 469 and S. Griffin, 
The Disqualification o f Unfit Directors and the Protection o f the Public Interest, (2003) 53 
NILQ 207.
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for the NAO report showed that 72% of directors felt that the 
disqualification legislation was not enforced vigorously enough . Recent 
initiatives such as the ‘Disqualified Directors Hotline’ have been 
launched in attempt to increase the enforcement effort, or at least give the 
impression of an increased effort, but the results are disappointing.
However, the actual extent to which disqualification orders are 
breached is difficult to gauge. A small survey of 34 disqualified directors 
carried out by Andrew Hicks for the ACCA504, showed evidence that 6 of 
the 34 were acting in breach of their disqualification orders. If this research 
were accurate and representative of all directors then breaches of 
disqualification orders would appear to be relatively common and the 
enforcement effort woefully inadequate.
6.5.6 The Current System.
Therefore all the available evidence suggests that the current 
disqualification system is manifestly inefficient. Most disqualifications 
provide no protection from loss-causing conduct and all empirical evidence 
indicates that the sanction has a low deterrent impact. However, there 
appears to be no sign of a change in the policy of using post-insolvency 
disqualification to ‘protect’ the commercial world. Indeed, ministers appear 
to believe, in spite of the evidence that clearly exists, that disqualification is 
working. The new system of undertakings and the ‘record number’ of
502 NAO, Follow Up Report, supra, note 406, para
503 The hotline was set up in 1998 for the public to report persons who they suspect of 
acting in breach of a disqualification order.
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disqualifications it has brought are cited as evidence of the success of the 
policy505. Ironically, it is the NAO follow-up report which praised the 
‘effectiveness’ of the higher-numbers-equals-success strategy, which is 
partly responsible for the continuation of the policy.
However, much of this inefficiency is specific to post-insolvency 
application of disqualification, for in such circumstances the success of 
disqualification is wholly reliant upon preventing a repeat of misconduct and 
the losses that may flow from it. Therefore, given the apparently low 
incidence of ‘re-offending’ and the limited opportunity to tackle misconduct 
presented by a post-insolvency system, it should be unsurprising that 
disqualification struggles to produce clear benefits. However, a pre­
insolvency disqualification regime would not suffer from such disabilities.
Therefore, in the following section I discuss whether a pre­
insolvency disqualification regime would provide a more effective 
mechanism to protect the public from rogue directors. I also offer some 
observations as to why a post-insolvency regime was chosen over a pre­
insolvency one. I do not seek to demonstrate that a pre-insolvency regime 
would be perfect or even that it is necessarily desirable; merely that it 
affords the opportunity to secure greater loss reduction than the current 
system.
504 See A. Hicks, ACCA Research Report 59, Director Disqualification; No Hiding Place 
for the Unfit?, (London, ACCA, 1998).
505 For example, see the DTI press release “Fast Track Disqualification Results in Record 
Bans ” 2nd January 2002. See also Griffin, The Disqualification o f Unfit Directors and the 
Protection o f  The Public Interest, supra, note 501.
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6.6 Pre-Insolvency Disqualification.
6.6.1 Advantages - Protection.
Pre-insolvency disqualification has the potential to overcome, or 
significantly reduce, many of the protective failures of post-insolvency 
disqualification. The most attractive feature of disqualification before 
insolvency is that it provides the possibility of preventing the losses from an 
initial insolvency that are untouched by a post-insolvency disqualification. 
Of course, the success of pre-insolvency regime in this respect would 
depend upon the regulator’s ability to target disqualification at cases where 
unfitness was likely to lead to business failure, however, even partial 
success in this respect would be preferable to a situation where no attempt is 
made to prevent insolvencies before they occur. However, such a regime 
would most likely be more complex than the current.
6.6.2 A Pre-Insolvency Regime.
One of the major advantages that the post-insolvency disqualification 
regime may be thought to have over a pre-insolvency system is that 
insolvency proceedings provide a steady stream of information to the 
Secretary of State from IPs and ORs at no cost to the tax payer. There is no 
such obvious source of information on misconduct before insolvency that 
the Secretary of State could access. As such, a pre-insolvency regime would 
be likely to be reliant upon reports of misconduct from creditors and the 
public the public at large. This obviously creates a risk that many instances 
of unfit conduct would not be reported. Creditors, for example, may be
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reluctant to report suspected misconduct for fear of getting a ‘bad name’ in 
their trade and scaring off business partners. The time and expense of 
reporting may also discourage them. The general public may be less 
concerned about getting a ‘bad reputation’ from reporting, but may be put 
off by other factors, such time and expense. That said the experience of the 
Companies Investigation Branch of the DTI does not demonstrate undue 
reluctance on the part of the general public to report suspected corporate 
misconduct. In 2003-2004, for example over half of the requests received 
for investigations under Part XIV of the Companies Act were received from 
the public, or their representatives (e.g. MPs).506 However, the pubic and 
creditors are not the only potential sources of information on apparent 
unfitness, as the example of investigations under part XIV shows. The DTI 
itself and other government departments already hold a substantial amount 
of information concerning some of the most common types of misconduct 
that could be used to start investigations. Indeed in the case of part XIV the 
second major source (20%) of requests for investigations came from 
divisions and agencies within the DTI508. Other government agencies, such 
as the Director of Public Prosecutions’ office, the Police, other departments 
of State, as well as bodies such as the Financial Services Authority were also
506 Companies in 2003-2004 (London, The Stationary Office, 2004) page 18, table 3.
507 For example, Companies House holds information concerning a failure to submit 
accounts and returns and information regarding a failure to pay crown debts should be held 
by the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise. If this information was pooled it could be 
used to highlight cases of potential misconduct, if this is the sort of conduct the DTI wishes 
to target. However, this takes nothing away from my assertion that targeting such 
misconduct should be discontinued as an inefficient application of the disqualification 
standard. See Chapter 4 , ibid.
508 Companies House was a significant source of requests for investigation, see Companies 
in 2003-2004, supra note 506 tables 3 and 4..
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significant sources of information. Of course, such disparate sources of 
information may not provide as complete a picture of director’s conduct as 
is available from a single IP or OR investigation and report but at the very 
least the experience of part XIV investigations shows that several sources of 
information on misconduct pre-insolvency exist, as the Insolvency Service 
itself has commented509. Thus, investment in co-ordinating information 
received from government agencies, combined with an investment in 
providing the opportunities for creditors and others to report suspected 
corporate misconduct, could provide sufficient sources of information for a 
pre-insolvency regime to function. However, a note of caution should be 
sounded. For whilst the experience of part XIV investigations by the DTI 
shows sources of information pre-insolvency exist, it must be noted that 
only a small proportion of the requests for investigation under that are 
received under that part proceed past the initial vetting stage of 
investigation.510.^  2003-2004, for example the Secretary of State received 
4,732 requests for the investigation of the affairs of a company, of which 
2,644 were not accepted or referred elsewhere, 858 formally considered for 
further investigation, 200 actually investigated and 618 formally refused.511 
Therefore whilst there would seem to be no shortage of information, very
509 See ‘Guidance Notes’, supra note 489, page 13.
510 The Secretary of State has discretion as to whether to pursue requests for investigation. 
All requests received are therefore vetted to see if grounds for suspicion of wrong doing can 
be established. Even then the Secretary of State has discretion whether to pursue the 
complaint, eliminate it or redirect it to another government agency. See Companies in 2003- 
2004, supra note 506, page 16.
511 Companies in 2003-2004, ibid, page 17 table 1.
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little of it would seem to be sufficiently strong to merit formal
512investigation .
In addition to problems concerning gathering of information, a 
system that relied upon pre-emptive investigation by the Secretary of State 
would inevitably involve greater costs than is the case under the current 
system, where the cost of the initial investigation of unfit conduct is borne 
by IP’s and OR’s and ultimately by creditors513. As such it is likely that 
fewer disqualifications would be made unless the resources that were 
devoted to disqualification were to be substantially increased. However, this 
is not necessarily a disadvantage because most post-insolvency 
disqualifications provide no protection, indeed the over-regulation of the 
current system is likely to lead to loss. Therefore, a smaller number of 
targeted pre-insolvency disqualifications could have no less a protective 
effect than the current number of post-insolvency disqualifications. Indeed, 
if they prevented an initial insolvency the protective effect could be greater. 
Therefore the impact on the cost-benefit of disqualification from pre­
insolvency disqualification is likely to be at least neutral if not positive.
The protective benefits of pre-insolvency disqualification could 
therefore be much greater than post-insolvency disqualification, provided 
that directors who are an insolvency ‘risk’ were properly the target of 
disqualification applications. However, in addition to preventing loss
512 This could be a particular concern with information received from the public which may 
be incomplete, or simply wrong. Malicious reporting where there is no genuine evidence of 
wrongdoing could also be a problem that diverts resources from investigation of genuine 
reports of wrongdoing.
513 See 5.5, supra.
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caused by insolvency where a director’s conduct has been unfit, a pre­
insolvency regime could also provide more effective future protection. For, 
one of the major criticisms that can be levelled against post-insolvency 
disqualification is that it fails to provide protection from unfit directors 
during the period in which they are most likely to be involved in a second 
corporate failure, i.e. the first two years after an initial insolvency514. Pre­
insolvency disqualification, on the other hand, could easily neutralise this 
high-risk period by removing the unfit before the first insolvency and 
preventing them from being involved in a second for a number of years. 
Thus, the potential protective effects of a disqualification can be greatly 
enhanced.
The potential benefits of pre-insolvency disqualification can be 
demonstrated in a hypothetical example that combines NAO calculations 
with some conservative assumptions about a pre-insolvency regime.
A pre-insolvency regime that succeeded in disqualifying just 300 
individuals whose unfitness would have lead to insolvency would bring 
substantial cost savings to creditors. Because, assuming that the average loss 
to creditors from the insolvencies prevented would have been the same as in 
the NAO model (£170,000)515 the net benefit to creditors of 300 pre­
insolvency disqualifications would be some £51 million516. If this small 
number of disqualifications could be achieved with the current 
Disqualification Unit budget of around £25 million, the cost-benefit analysis
514 See, National Audit Office, Follow-Up Report, supra note 406, fig. 31.
515 Adjusted for inflation using the headline retail price index figures from 1999-2004. See 
Office for National Statistics, Consumer Prices from 1750 -  2003, (London, ONS, 2003)
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of disqualification is dramatically turned around. Indeed the Disqualification 
Unit would only need to prevent 150 insolvencies through pre-insolvency 
disqualification to produce a cost efficient disqualification regime.
The benefits of pre-insolvency over post-insolvency disqualification 
increase still further if the likely benefits in terms of prevented second 
insolvencies are considered. To estimate the likely benefit here the average 
length of a pre-insolvency disqualification was assumed to be the same as a 
post insolvency disqualification, i.e. 5.5 years. The NAO’s research on the 
likelihood of director’s being involved in a second insolvency were also 
used as the basis for the calculations. If it were assumed that in an ideal pre­
insolvency disqualification system a director would be disqualified 1.5 years
c i  7
before insolvency would have occurred , disqualification would prevent 
further insolvencies that would have occurred within 4 years of an initial
C I O
insolvency. The NAO research estimated that 10% of directors would be 
involved in a further corporate failure during this period. Therefore, again 
assuming 300 insolvencies were prevented by disqualifying 300 directors, 
30 of those directors would have gone on to be involved in a further 
corporate failure during their period of disqualification. Assuming average 
debts of £170,000, pre-insolvency disqualification would add a further £5.1 
million of creditor savings to the £51 million already secured. Thus, the total
516 170,000 x 300 = 51,000,000.
5171.5 years was thought to be a reasonable figure for an effective pre-insolvency regime as 
it would provide ample time for a business to be turned around before insolvency became 
inevitable.
518 The NAO’s research suggested that 6.7% of directors would be involved in another 
insolvency with a year of first, 3.6%% in the second, 2.6% in the third and 1.3% in the 
fourth. See the ‘Follow Up Report’, supra, note 406, fig 31.
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creditor saving from just 300 pre-insolvency disqualifications could be as 
much as £56.1 million. This compares with the £18.5 million saving from 
1,367 post-insolvency disqualifications. Indeed just 150 pre-insolvency 
disqualifications could achieve a benefit of over £28 million.
Therefore, in terms of cost-benefit efficiency, a pre-insolvency 
disqualification system is potentially more efficient than the post-insolvency 
disqualification. For, even a substantial increase in the Disqualification 
Unit’s budget to achieve 300 pre-insolvency disqualifications could be 
absorbed. However, the existing Disqualification Unit budget of £25 million 
to achieve just 300 disqualifications would seem a generous allocation as 
over 5 times the resources could be put into each disqualification compared 
to the current system.
6.6.3 Remaining Problems.
Nevertheless, many of the difficulties with post-insolvency regime 
would also be applicable to pre-insolvency disqualification, and as was 
stated at the outset, most of the benefits that could flow from such a system 
rest upon it being efficiently and properly administered. Therefore it is far 
from guaranteed to be efficient. However, even if we assume that the 
system was operated in an effective way, the long-term effectiveness of even 
a pre-insolvency disqualification can be doubted if directors are still 
permitted to re-enter the world of limited liability without any safeguards 
after their disqualification has ended. As with the post-insolvency model, a 
pre-insolvency disqualification system is also likely to disqualify individuals
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who may have gone on to run a successful second business even if their first 
had failed (up to 90% of directors may not ‘re-offend’ according to NAO 
statistics). Therefore, some of the cost benefit is likely to be lost through 
over-regulation. However, the benefit of preventing the initial insolvency 
goes some way to mitigating such disadvantages, and certainly represents an 
improvement on the current post-insolvency system where the loss of the 
initial insolvency is neither prevented nor recovered. Indeed on an efficiency 
measure, the worst-case scenario pre-insolvency disqualification system 
could not be more inefficient than the current post-insolvency regime.
However, a further practical problem that would undoubtedly be 
thrown up by a pre-insolvency regime would be what to do with companies 
which were left with no effective management due to disqualifications (i.e. 
where all the active directors were disqualified). In this situation the choice 
must be between allowing such companies to continue in existence with the 
same management as an unincorporated entity without limited liability, 
ordering the compulsory winding up the company, or allowing it to continue 
with new management. It would be difficult to chose a universal rule from 
these options that would provide a satisfactory outcome in all cases. Rather 
it would be best for the disqualifying authority to have regard to the rights of 
all those affected by the disqualification (e.g. the company’s employees, 
creditors and the disqualified director) and direct an outcome that balances 
those rights effectively. In some cases it may be better for the company to 
continue trading because of the interests of employees. In others there may 
be few or no employees and winding up may be the best outcome for the
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principle interest group, i.e. the creditors. Thus, the most satisfactory 
solution to this problem would for a flexible approach to be adopted, thereby 
limiting the ‘losses’ that could flow is companies left without directors were 
simply wound up.
6.6.4 Deterring the Unfit.
A pre-insolvency disqualification system could have a greater
deterrent effect than the post-insolvency system because of the removal of 
the insolvency precondition for disqualification. Pre-insolvency 
disqualification would not be limited to a narrow class of unfit conduct i.e. 
that associated with business failure, and is a sanction that could be applied 
soon after unfitness occurs.
Directors also stand to suffer greater personal loss from 
disqualification during solvency than they do from disqualification after 
insolvency. Pre-insolvency disqualification would deprive a director of his 
current earnings as well as future opportunity. Post-insolvency 
disqualification, on the other hand, is only guaranteed to deprive a director 
of future opportunity, given that he will have lost his current earnings at the 
time of insolvency. This greater personal loss is likely to give pre­
insolvency a prominence in the minds of directors that post-insolvency lacks 
and consequently increase its deterrent effect519.
However, pre-insolvency disqualification would not, for instance, 
provide a guarantee that unfit conduct would lead to disqualification. The
519 Although doubt would be cast on this by Baldwin’s study. See Baldwin, The New 
Punitive Regulation, supra note 474.
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chances of being disqualified would still depend upon many variables, such 
as government agencies passing on information on suspected rogues, 
creditors or customers reporting corporate misconduct etc, in the same way 
as the current system rests on IP and OR discretion. Thus, there are still 
likely to be gaps in the system that let much unfit conduct go unchallenged. 
However, in the context of an existing approach to the regulation of 
directors that suffers endemic flaws, pre-insolvency disqualification has 
arguably fewer flaws than post-insolvency disqualification. On rational 
deterrence assumptions therefore, pre-insolvency disqualification is likely to 
be more effective than post-insolvency disqualification. The removal of the 
insolvency precondition would make the likelihood of being subject to 
disqualification greater and the risk of losing a current salary increase the 
costs associated with the sanction. Consequently the benefit of complying 
with the standard is increased. However, whether the increased benefit 
would be sufficient to out-weigh the cost of compliance would remain open 
to question given the complexity of the unfitness standard.
Nonetheless reform may be desirable because of a very simple point, 
namely, that the current system constrains the Secretary of State to re-act to 
the aftermath of supposed corporate misconduct and it limits her to 
responding to ‘unfitness’ only in the small number of companies who enter 
formal insolvency proceedings. Pre-insolvency disqualification would at 
least afford the Secretary of State the opportunity to act pro-actively, 
tackling misconduct before it leads to insolvency and wherever it was 
evident.
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6.6.5 The Use of Pre-insolvency Disqualification.
Given that pre-insolvency disqualification could be a more effective 
response to supposed misconduct than the current system, it is surprising 
that greater use of the pre-insolvency disqualification provisions already in 
the Disqualification Act has not been strongly advocated.
The Disqualification Act actually provides several opportunities for 
directors to be disqualified for unfitness before insolvency. Sections 3 and 5 
of the Act, for example allow for pre-insolvency for persistent breaches of 
the companies legislation and upon summary conviction respectively. 
Disqualification for general unfitness is not limited to post-insolvency 
situations either. Section 8 of the Act allows disqualification for unfitness 
without the need for insolvency following an investigation ordered under the 
Companies Act 1985 or the Financial and Services Market Authority Act 
2000520. However, a clear preference for section 6 has consistently been 
shown. Over the period 1998 -2003 disqualifications under section 6 
accounted for between 86% and 91% of all the disqualifications made under 
the Act in each year, whereas section 8 only accounted for between 0.008% 
and 0.02% of the total number521 of disqualifications. Other provisions of
520Disqualification under section 8 of the Act, like section 6, is premised on a director’s 
unfitness to be concerned in the management of companies. It occurs as a result of an 
application to court by the Secretary o f State (or his accepting an undertaking) following a 
DTI investigation o f  the company o f which the person against whom the disqualification is 
sought is a director. A DTI investigation under section 8 is any report made under section 
437 of the Companies Act 1985 (or section 94 or 177 of the Financial Services and Market 
Authority Act 2000) or information or documentation obtained under section 447 or 448520 
of the same Act.
521 See, Companies in 2002-2003, supra, note 427.
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the Act allowing pre-insolvency disqualification on grounds other than 
general unfitness are also rarely used .
The number of disqualifications made under section 8 of the Act is 
remarkably low when the potential pool of cases is considered. In the year 
2002-2003 for example, section 359 investigations were completed under 
section 447523 of the CA 1985 alone524, yet only 17 disqualifications were 
made under section 8525. Given that a section 447 investigation is only one 
of several sources that can lead to a section 8 disqualification; the figure of 
17 disqualifications looks very low indeed . However, the excessive 
secrecy that surrounds section 447 investigations makes it difficult to judge 
whether a sufficient number of disqualification cases are being brought on 
the evidence uncovered , but a reluctance to bring section 8 cases, and
522 Disqualifications under section 3, 4, 5 and 10 can be made pre insolvency however the 
account for fewer than 1% of all disqualifications made. See, Companies in 2002-2003, 
ibid.
523 Sections 447 and 448 of the Companies Act 1985 allow the Secretary of State to direct a 
company to produce to herself, or an officer appointed by her, any such documents as may 
be specified (section 447(3)), with a view to investigation the affairs o f the company. The 
Secretary of State is empowered to issue such directions ‘whenever she thinks there is good 
reason to do so’. Judicial review of the Secretary of State’s power is difficult, as it has been 
held that a section 447 investigation is an administrative act to which the rules of natural 
justice do not apply: Norwest Holst Ltd v Secretary o f State [1978] Ch. 201. ‘Fairness’ must 
however be observed: R v Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry ex Parte Perestrello 
[1981] 1 Q.B. 19.
24 Companies in 2002-2003 (London, DTI, 2003), table 2, page 19.
525 Ibid, table Dl.
526 The number of investigations actually started by the DTI is also low when compared to 
the number of requests received. For example in 2002-2003 5,256 requests for 
investigations were received by the DTI of which only 419 were accepted. Given that 66% 
of the requests were received from agency who can assume would not make frivolous or 
unfounded requests , such as other parts of the DTI itself, the Police, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, the Financial Services Authority, the Bank of England, the London Stock 
Exchange and other government departments, it would appear it is the policy of the DTI 
that limits the potential o f section 8 by pursuing so few investigations.
527 It is the Secretary of State’s practice not to publicise s 447 investigations. The reason for 
this is that “to do so would undermine the effectiveness of the inquires and could damage 
the business of the company concerned without any evidence of wrong doing” (Companies 
in 2002-2003 (London, The Stationary Office, 2003), para 10). Similarly the conclusions 
and reports under s447 are not routinely published.
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indeed initiate section 447 investigations, does appear to be evident from the 
statistics.
Following the coming into force of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 the Financial Services Authority has taken on the role of 
primary enforcer of those parts of the new legislation applicable to section 8 
applications and it is foreseen by the DTI that the Secretary of State’s 
powers to order company investigations under sections 431, 432 and 442
• 528will only be exercised where it is inappropriate for the FSA to do so . 
Thus, it remains to be seen whether the FSA will be more prolific in turning 
up potential unfitness than the DTI has been. Whatever evidence is laid 
before the DTI, however, the decision to initiate section 8 proceedings will 
still lie with the Secretary of State and there are no signs of a policy shift in 
favour of greater use of pre-insolvency disqualification.
6.6.6 The Implications of a Pre-Insolvency Regime.
A shift towards a predominantly pre-insolvency disqualification 
regime would certainly require a more interventionist policy towards the 
regulation of companies and their directors than is currently evident. 
Contemporary policy is apparently directed towards fostering an ‘enterprise 
culture’529 which encourages greater entrepreneurship, particularly in the 
small business sector. Free access to limited liability is an integral part of 
this policy. Within this general policy approach, the preservation of the
528 Companies in 2002-2003, supra, note 524 pages 21-22.
529 See for example, DTI press release “New Drive to Encourage Tomorrows ’ Entrepreneurs 
Today”, 17 th December 2002.
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current corporate governance rules seems secure530. Despite bold claims 
from ministers such as, ‘there is no hiding place for those who abuse the 
privilege of limited liability’531 the disqualification system is a not highly 
interventionist form of regulation. For, whilst disqualification is novel in 
that it seeks to address the risks that creditors face from the ‘abuse’ of 
limited liability, it avoids direct interference in the management of 
companies by applying ex-post facto standards in a very limited spectrum of 
cases. Greater use of pre-insolvency disqualification would be out of step 
with this policy approach. A pre-insolvency system would put the DTI’s 
reputation as an effective regulator at greater risk than is the case under the 
current post-insolvency regime, because if instances of gross misconduct 
were not picked up before leading to insolvency then the DTI would be 
likely to be severely criticise. Whether such considerations have an impact 
on policy, however, can only be a matter of speculation.
Application of the ‘morality’ standard in disqualification cases is 
often justified by reference to a director ‘showing’ himself to be unfit by 
being involved in an insolvency and concession-type theory is used to
530A change to the general shareholder-orientation of corporate governance rules was 
considered and rejected by the Company Law Review Steering Group. See: Company Law 
Steering Group, Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy. Completing the 
Structure, (London, Department of Trade and Industry, 2000), chap 3.
531 pj'pj ministers of the of both the present and previous government have been fond of 
talking up disqualification as the weapon that is used to purge the commercial world of the 
unfit director. The Conservative minister John Taylor was quoted in The Times (22nd 
August 1996) as saying that ‘There will be no hiding place for those who abrogate or 
neglect their responsibilities’
More recently and, somewhat more provocatively, the former Labour minister Nigel 
Griffiths, declared in a DTI press release “Griffiths goes Gunning after Cowboy Directors ” 
5th June 1997, “Let there be no doubt -  war has been declared on the cowboy director”.
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justify withdrawing the ‘privilege’. Without insolvency the foundation upon 
which the regulation appears to be built disappears. Nevertheless whilst it 
may be more interventionist regulation it is more likely to be effective 
regulation.
6.7 Concluding Remarks.
The post-insolvency regime that the State has developed to protect 
creditors from abuse of limited liability is most unlikely produce a benefit 
greater than its cost, according the research carried out by the NAO. The 
fact that disqualification is not a restitutionary remedy places a significant 
limitation on its success, which makes it all the more important that those 
benefits which it is capable of delivering are maximised. Unfortunately, the 
post-insolvency regime does not go anywhere near achieving this. One of its 
greatest limitations is that it precludes any preventative use of 
disqualification, at least in terms of preventing an initial insolvency. This 
leaves only future protection and general deterrence to deliver a benefit and 
the NAO’s research indicates that it delivers very little of either. Indeed, the 
‘direct’ benefits from protection are actually less than the amount spent by 
the Insolvency Service on disqualification each year. Similarly the number 
of future insolvencies it prevents is derisory. There is also little evidence to 
suggest that disqualification has a significant deterrent effect, Awareness of 
the legislation is low and the chances of being subject to the post-insolvency 
regime are slight. However, perhaps more damning for disqualification is 
the fact that it is likely to have ‘chilling effect’ on desirable business activity
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that imposes costs on the ‘commercial world’. Thus, the focus on the 
number and length of disqualifications by the government and others is 
entirely wrong, for more disqualifications may actually reduce the benefit of 
disqualification if care is not taken to avoid erroneous disqualifications. 
However, in this instance the courts must bear some of the responsibility for 
the inefficiency of disqualification because the ‘tunnel vision’ approach that 
looks to past conduct not future risk, is bound to lead to a significant number 
of disqualifications that do not protect the public from abuse of limited 
liability. The state has not helped reduce the chilling effect of erroneous 
disqualification though by its ready acceptance that more disqualifications 
equal a more successful sanction.
Some of the low benefit and high cost of the post-insolvency regime 
may apply to a pre-insolvency disqualification regime of the sort in section 8 
of the Act. Therefore, a move to pre-insolvency regime could increase the 
efficiency of disqualification. The main benefits of such a system could be 
prevention of initial insolvencies and greater deterrence. However, its 
success would rely entirely upon it being correctly targeted at cases of 
misconduct that were likely to lead to insolvency and therefore it is far from 
guaranteed to be successful, indeed in the best case scenario a pre­
insolvency system may only be less inefficient than the post insolvency 
regime, rather than ‘efficient’.
Therefore, all of the available evidence suggests that disqualification 
manifestly fails to meet its objectives. Indeed, the benefits of 
disqualification are so obviously low that this raises questions about whether
239
the true intent behind disqualification is punitive. However, disqualification 
continues to be defended as a measure to ‘protect the public’ and not to 
‘punish directors’ and given that there is a definite need to protect the 
public, disqualification ought to be judged against its stated goal, which, in 
short it fails to meet.
However, it should be noted that disqualification has undergone a 
significant reform since the publication of the NAO report which I have 
used in this chapter as the basis for much of my analysis. This reform was 
the introduction of disqualification undertakings, which was canvassed as a 
means to secure cheaper and speedier disqualifications, which it was 
presumably thought would increase the effectiveness of the regime. My 
analysis has hopefully demonstrated that this is a flawed logic as the 
deficiencies of post-insolvency disqualification are more fundamental 
questions of speed and administrative cost. However, the ‘undertakings’ 
reform is unlikely to have increased the benefits from disqualification 
because it has made the disqualification system significantly more unjust 
than was the case at the time of the NAO report. Therefore, it is to an 
analysis of the new system that the next chapter turns.
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Chapter 7: Disqualification
Undertakings.
“We see no good reason why the Secretary of State should not be able to accept a
disqualification undertaking from a director...if he considers it expedient in the
public interest that the director should be disqualified...”
Dr Kim Howells MP, Competition and Consumer Affairs 
Minister, 7th November 2000532.
7.1 Introduction.
The new regime of disqualification undertakings came into effect in 
April 2001 and has since become the usual procedure by which a 
disqualification is obtained under section 6. In 2003-2004, for example, 
some 80% of disqualifications obtained by the Secretary of State were made 
in the form of undertakings. The essence of the undertaking procedure is 
disqualification by administrative action rather than court order. Before the 
introduction of undertakings, the power to disqualify a person for unfitness 
lay exclusively with the court and the Secretary of State was obliged to 
proceed to a evidential hearing of each case whether the respondent to the 
application intended to defend the case against him or not. This aspect of 
disqualification was, rightly or wrongly, blamed for much of the delay in 
obtaining disqualifications singled out for criticism by the NAO and the
532 Evidence to standing Committee B, when considering clause 6 of the Insolvency Bill 
2000 that proposed the introduction of disqualification undertakings. Hansard [HC], 
Standing Committee B, 7th November 2000, col 119.
533 Companies In 2003-2004, (London, The Stationary Office, 2004), table D l.
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Committee on Public Accounts. Indeed, significant moves away from the 
‘judicial model’ of disqualification had already been made by the time 
undertakings were introduced. Nonetheless, the reform represents a much 
more radical shift in the nature of disqualification than that which had 
hitherto been seen.
During the passage of the undertaking reforms through Parliament, 
the minister responsible for the Bill that proposed the necessary amendments 
to the Disqualification Act534 identified two benefits that the introduction of 
undertakings would bring. First, he claimed that the introduction of an 
undertakings procedure would lead to a reduction in the time taken to 
disqualify an ‘unfit’ person, thereby increasing the protective benefit of 
disqualification and, second, he claimed that the procedure would reduce the 
cost of disqualification535.
The argument that a reduction in the time taken to obtain a 
disqualification has been borne out to the extent that the reduced time lag 
between insolvency and disqualification has lead to an increase in the 
relative protective effect of each disqualification in recent years. However, 
that rise has been slight. In respect of the second proposed benefit of the 
reform, a reduction in the cost of disqualification would be a desirable goal 
given the quantitative analysis of section 6 above. However, it is unlikely 
that any cost savings from the introduction of an undertakings procedure
534 Insolvency Bill [Lords] (Session 1999-2000).
535 See evidence to Standing Committee B (Commons) by Dr Kim Howells, Minister for 
Competition and Consumer Affairs during the Committee’s consideration of clauses 6 and 
7 of the Insolvency Bill. See; Hansard [HC], Standing Committee B, 7* November 2000, 
col 118.
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would be sufficient to overcome the imbalance between the direct costs of 
section 6 and its direct benefits, to say nothing of the cost of the many other 
flaws on disqualification, such as the cost of erroneous disqualifications. 
Thus, it is likely that the undertakings procedure, could only marginally 
improve the effectiveness of section 6, or perhaps it is more accurate to say 
that an undertaking procedure is only likely to make section 6 marginally 
less inefficient. However, it is unlikely that the undertakings system brings 
even this marginal ‘benefit’, because there are significant costs associated 
with its operation that are likely to reduce and not increase, the effectiveness 
of disqualification.
Therefore in this chapter analyses the likely effect of the new 
procedure on the efficiency of disqualification. It begins with an outline of 
the gradual move away from a ‘judicial’ disqualification system to the 
‘administrative’ system now in place before discussing the specific 
problems with the undertaking procedure.
7.2 Moving to Administrative Disqualification -  The Carecraft
Procedure.
The mandatory nature of disqualification for unfitness under section 
6 of the Act has always marked the provision out from other forms of 
disqualification. However, whilst disqualification is mandatory where 
unfitness has been found, the section obviously gives discretion over the 
factual finding of unfitness. Under the original Act this discretion lay with 
an impartial court, which held the power to disqualify. During the time that
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there were relatively few disqualification cases brought by the Secretary of 
State, this procedure was relatively uncontroversial. However, following the 
rapid rise in the number of disqualification cases after the NAO and Public 
Accounts Committee reports the requirement that each disqualification case 
had to be brought before a judge for a full hearing came to be seen as a 
barrier to the creation of an effective disqualification system For, the more 
time each disqualification took and the more money it cost, the fewer 
disqualifications were likely to made. Therefore, as the number of 
disqualifications obtained by the Secretary of State was seen as a key 
measure of the sanction’s success, ‘judicial’ disqualification came to be seen 
as something of a problem536.
Ever willing to help a regulator with a problem, the courts appeared 
sympathetic to the argument that the requirement for each disqualification 
application to proceed to a full hearing was inhibiting the Secretary of 
State’s efforts to make disqualification a more effective solution. Thus, in 
the case of Re Carecraft Construction Co Ltcf31 a new procedure for dealing 
with ‘uncontested’ disqualifications was outlined to speed up the disposal of 
uncontested applications under section 6. The use of the Carecraft 
procedure, as it came to be known, was confirmed in the subsequent 
Practice Direction No. 2 o f 1995 . Under Carecraft, a disqualification
536 See for example comments made by Sir Richard Scott in Practice Direction No. 2 of 
1995 [1996] 1 All ER 442, see further below. See also the NAO follow report which noted 
that when parliamentary time allowed it was the government’s intention to legislate for an 
undertaking proceed and commented that: “This arrangement would save court time ..
See NAO, Follow up Report, supra note 406, para. 2.34.
537 [1994] 1 WLR 172.
538 Ibid.
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could be made without a full hearing of evidence if the respondent to a 
disqualification application so agreed. Where a disqualification was dealt 
with under the Carecraft procedure, the Secretary of State or Official 
Receiver, was required simply to submit a written statement to the court 
containing the material facts of the ‘unfit conduct’ that was agreed, or at 
least ‘not disputed’, by the respondent director. The statement was required 
to specify a ‘bracket’ period of disqualification into which the parties had 
agreed the case fell. The court was then ‘invited’ to make a disqualification 
within that bracket539. The usual practice was for a limited form of plea- 
bargaining to take place between the Secretary of State and director. Usually 
the Secretary of State would suggest a 1-year discount on the period of 
disqualification in Carecraft cases as an incentive for directors to agree to 
dispose of their case under the procedure.540
The effect of the Carecraft procedure was therefore to transfer 
effective control over the decision to disqualify from the court to the parties. 
For even though it was the court that had to nominally exercise the power to 
disqualify, the courts rarely departed from the agreement reached by the 
parties.
The significant transfer of power in Carecraft cases from the court 
was justified by the claim that Carecraft could only be used where a 
respondent to a disqualification application consented to its use. Thus, if a 
person did not consent to be disqualified or could not reach agreement with
539 See Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch. 164.
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the Secretary of State, it was argued that his right to have his case 
determined by a judge was absolute. Consequently, the risk of inaccurate or 
disproportionate disqualifications being forced from directors by the 
Secretary of State was not seen by the sate as a hazard under Carecraft. 
However, whilst consent was the justification for Carecraft, precisely what 
is meant by ‘consent’ was unclear. The fact that the statements of unfit 
conduct annexed to Carecraft applications were described as something 
which directors ‘did not dispute’ implies that varying degrees of consent 
were in play541. The nature of consent under Carecraft was, however, 
important because if consent was less than freely given then the use of 
Carecraft could have significant implications for fairness and efficiency of 
the disqualification system.
However, despite some concerns about the nature of consent542 the 
Carecraft procedure was perceived to have successfully eliminated many of 
the delays and wasteful practices associated with the original 
disqualification process. The courts’ time was saved, as were some of the 
Secretary of State’s resources and it was even argued that the procedure also 
had advantages for the directors because it enabled them to curtail
540 A policy that has been applied to disqualification undertakings. See the response of a 
Chief Examiner in the Disqualification Unit of the Insolvency Service to question number 3 
of the ‘research questions’ put to the service in appendix 3 below.
541 Again the practice of describing schedules of unfit conduct in cases disposed of 
‘consensually’ has been extended to the new undertakings procedure, See response 
‘research question 5’, appendix 3 below.
542 For example in Re Barings Pic [1998] 1 BCLC 18, Sir Richard Scott noted that directors 
who whished to contest a disqualification faced potentially ruinous costs and may have little 
option other than to ‘give in’ to disposal of their case under Carecraft. See also Re Swift 
736 [1992] BCC 93, where Hoffman J (as he then was) expressed similar concerns.
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potentially expensive and stressful legal proceedings.543 It came to be widely 
used in the years before the introduction of disqualification undertakings, 
when it accounted for approximately one-third of all disqualifications544. 
However, from the Secretary of State’s point of view, Carecraft was 
evidently not as successful a measure at reducing perceived wasteful 
practices as it might have been because one of the arguments made for 
further reform of the system was that even with Carecraft, over half of all 
section 6 disqualification cases were simply uncontested545, i.e. the director 
neither agreed to Carecraft nor offered any evidence in court546. In such 
cases the Secretary of State was obliged to proceed to a full evidential 
hearing of the case, despite the fact that the respondent offered no evidence 
in response to the Secretary of States case. Only some 10% of all cases were 
actually contested547.
The perceived failure of Carecraft to remove all wasteful practices 
seems to have increased desire for a more radical procedure that completely 
abrogated court involvement in the disqualification process. Such a desire 
appears to have been shared by at least some members of the judiciary, such 
as Sir Richard Scott, who called for the institution of a practice whereby 
agreed disqualifications could be disposed of between the Secretary of State
543 It was the Secretary of State’s practice to pursue costs against directors who contested 
disqualification proceedings and lost.
544 This data was presented to Standing Committee B (Commons) by Dr Kim Howells,
Minister for Competition and Consumer Affairs during the Committee’s consideration of
the reforms proposed to the Act in the Insolvency Bill. See; Hansard [HC], Standing
Committee B, 7th November 2000, col 118.
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and the director without any court involvement at all548. Sir Richard 
considered that the Carecraft procedure was nothing more than a judicial 
rubber-stamping exercise, where even the limited discretion left to the judge 
in fixing the period of disqualification was rarely exercised. Much better, he 
argued, not to waste the court’s time by requiring it to approve a ‘done deal’ 
but to let the parties determine the period of disqualification in ‘agreed’ 
cases and give legal effect to that agreement.
The argument for reform beyond Carecraft was accepted with the 
introduction of disqualification undertakings by the Insolvency Act 2000. 
The new undertakings procedure came into force on the 3rd April 2001 and 
has largely replaced the old Carecraft procedure as far as section 6 
disqualifications are concerned. Like Carecraft, the undertakings system is 
described as a procedure for dealing with non-contested cases that saves 
time, money and stress for all parties in a disqualification application.
7.3 Shifting Control -  Undertakings and the new ‘Administrative
System’.
7.3.1 Disqualification undertakings -  Section 1A.
The Insolvency Act 2000 inserted a new Section 1A into the 
Disqualification Act, providing that, in the circumstances set out in amended 
sections 7 and 8, the Secretary of State may accept from an individual an
548 Comments made as part of Practice Direction No 2 o f 1995 [1996] 1 All ER 446. 
However, Sir Richard did appear to temper his enthusiasm in later years, see Re Bearings
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undertaking that he will not act in any of the capacities set out in section 
1(1)549. There is no court involvement in the undertaking procedure and 
disqualification occurs when the Secretary of State accepts an undertaking 
from a person subject to disqualification proceedings.
There are essentially three stages in the undertaking process. The 
first stage is the same as that under the ‘judicial’ procedure, i.e. for the 
Secretary of State to form the opinion that it is expedient in the public 
interest that an individual be disqualified following the investigation of a 
report of unfit conduct.550 The second stage occurs when the Secretary of 
State informs the individual that she intends to seek a disqualification order, 
at which point the individual must decide whether he wishes to offer an 
undertaking to the Secretary of State that he will not act as a director or 
whether he wishes to contest the application. A draft undertaking including 
the period of disqualification that the Secretary of State feels is appropriate 
to the case is included with the ‘section 16’ letter notifying an individual 
that the Secretary of State intends to apply for a disqualification order 
against him551. If a director decides to offer an undertaking, the third and 
final stage of the procedure is reached where the Secretary of State is
Pic, supra, note 542.
549 Which are repeated in slA(l)(a). On the undertaking procedure, see generally A. 
Walters, Bare Undertakings in Directors Disqualification Proceedings: The Insolvency Act 
2000, Blackspur and Beyond (2001) 22 Co. Law. 290.
550 Section 7(1).
551 When the Secretary of State has decided that it is expedient to seek a disqualification 
order against an individual he writes to the said individual informing of this. As part of the 
notification the Secretary of State has developed the practice o f informing the director that 
he can give a disqualification undertaking and avoid court proceedings. The Secretary of 
State also notifies the individual o f the period for which he feels it would be ‘appropriate’ 
for the director to offer the undertaking. An example o f a “Notification of the Secretary o f  
State’s Intention to Seek a Disqualification Order” letter is contained in appendix 2.
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required to evaluate whether, in his opinion, the conditions mentioned in 
section 6(1) of the Act are met and that it is expedient in the public interest 
that she accepts the undertaking552. Thus, in the undertaking process it is the 
Secretary of State who must determine unfitness and all judicial discretion 
over the decision to disqualify passes to him.
Once the Secretary of State has accepted a disqualification 
undertaking it can only be varied or set aside by a court, as the Secretary of 
State has no power to do either of these things himself. Consequently, the 
Act provides that if a person subject to an undertaking wishes to have it set 
aside or seeks a reduction in the period for which the undertaking is 
enforced, that person must apply to court553. If such an application is made 
the Secretary of State must appear and call the court’s attention to any 
matters that she feels are relevant to the application554.
The widespread use of the undertaking procedure has therefore 
caused a significant change in the nature of section 6 disqualification. This 
is because it is now the Secretary of State who effectively controls the 
power to disqualify and, as such, it is she who determines what constitutes 
unfit conduct.
Thus, there is a likelihood that the new procedure will lead to the 
creation of a parallel administrative jurisprudence over the nature of unfit 
conduct and the possible ‘misinterpretation’ of the disqualification standard. 
As such the new power must create a danger that the Secretary of State will
552 Section 7(2A).
553 Section 8A.
554 Section 8A(2).
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seek to obtain disqualifications in circumstances where they would not be 
ordered by an impartial court.
However, the Secretary of State contends that the consensual nature 
of the undertaking procedure is a sufficient safeguard against such concerns 
because directors will offer an undertaking only when they believe that a 
court would find them unfit555. Thus, as was the case with the Carecraft 
procedure the need for a director to consent to the disqualification by 
undertaking is seen as a potent safeguard against ‘abuse’ of the system by 
the Secretary of State. In essence consent is seen to legitimise and justify the 
transfer of power from the court to the Secretary of State by the new 
procedure.
However, the, notion that undertakings can only be obtained 
consensually is even more problematic in undertaking cases than it was 
under Carecraft, for the simple reason that the bargaining strength of the 
Secretary of State and most of those subject to disqualification applications 
is very unequal. And any legal process that relies on the idea of a consent for 
its legitimacy can be questioned in a situation where the parties to that 
process are not of equal bargaining power. This was true with Carecraft and 
is true of the undertaking process because the practical effect of transferring 
the power to disqualify to ‘the parties’ in undertakings has been to empower 
the stronger party (the Secretary of State in most cases) at the expense of the
555 See the Secretary of States response to the Trade and Industry Committee’s comments 
on the proposed introduction of disqualification undertakings, Trade and Industry Select 
Committee, 4th Special Report, Government Observations on the First and second Reports 
from the Trade and Industry Committee, (House of Commons Papers, Session 1999-2000, 
237), paras 17 and 18, discussed at 7.4 below.
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weaker (usually the director). This is because the bargaining power of the 
Secretary of State, or the Insolvency Service who act on his behalf, cannot 
be compared to that of the average ex-director of a small private company 
who is the subject of disqualification proceedings. The Insolvency Service 
has a multi-million pound budget, expertise in disqualification proceedings 
built up over 20 years, high staffing levels and easy access to IPs and their 
reports. It is unrealistic to suppose an individual with limited resources and 
no experience of disqualification can in any way ‘bargain’ on equal terms 
with such an organisation. The likely outcome of any ‘bargain’ is for terms 
to be proposed to a director that he has little option other than to accept. This 
is a particular risk if the individual does not have sufficient resources to 
contest the case against him. However, the potential for oppression in 
undertaking cases is more acute than that which flows from a simple 
inequality of bargaining power because the Secretary of State manipulates 
the very practical concerns of people subject to disqualification proceedings 
in order to extract the offer of an undertaking from them.
7.4 Consent and Disqualification Undertakings.
7.4.1 Costs
The potential for oppression in disqualification because of cost 
considerations has been recognised on several occasions556. The root of the
556See, Re Bearings Pic, supra note 542. See also Address to the Chancery Bar Association 
by Sir Richard Scott, (2000) 21 Comp. Law. 91, The Fourth Annual Leonard Stainer 
Lecture, given by Lord Hoffman, (1997) 18 Comp. Law. 194. However, in Re Pamstock 
Ltd [1996] BCC 341, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that special cost rules 
should apply to disqualifications proceedings.
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problem lies in the application of the traditional civil cost rules to 
disqualification applications557. The result of the rule is that a person who 
wishes to contest a disqualification application runs the risk of incurring 
potentially ruinous liability should his defence not succeed..
This danger is particularly acute as persons subject to disqualification 
applications will usually have been involved in a corporate insolvency that 
may have resulted in personal financial loss. As such, the threat of heavy 
costs is likely to be a major factor in a person’s response to a 
disqualification application and often be an incentive for a director to 
‘agree’ to dispose of a disqualification application by offering an 
undertaking, even if he feels the allegations made against him are unfounded 
The response of directors to disqualification applications before the 
introduction of undertakings certainly suggests that many felt unable to 
resist the Secretary of State’s case. The fact that only 33% of persons 
agreed ‘not to dispute’ the case against them under Carecraft suggests that a 
majority of directors did dispute the case and were not prepared to agree to 
be disqualified even when a discounted period of disqualification was 
offered. Indeed, the fact that over half of directors did nothing in response to 
an application suggests an inability to defend cases may have been a 
significant factor in determining a person’s response to an application under 
section 6.
557 In accordance with section 51 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the court in a 
disqualification case has discretion over the award of costs. Thus the award of costs 
depends upon the circumstances of each case -  either party could bear full or partial 
responsibility for the others costs.
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The Secretary of State is obviously conscious of the impact that costs 
have on a director’s response to a disqualification application and has used it 
to his advantage in the new undertakings process. For, as an incentive to 
secure the offer of a large number of undertakings, the Secretary of State has 
adopted a policy of offering to waive all costs against a person subject to an 
application if he offers an undertaking within a set period of time. The offer 
is made in the letter notifying directors that the Secretary of State intends to
r r o
apply for a disqualification order against them . However, the letter also 
states that if an undertaking is not offered before the specified date, but at 
some later time, the Secretary of State will seek to recover her costs up to 
the date that the undertaking was offered. Should a director decide to contest 
the Secretary of State’s application, the letter informs them that the 
Secretary of State will seek to recover all of her costs if her application is 
successful. The letter further states the costs that the Secretary of State has 
incurred in dealing with the case to the date of the letter.
From the Secretary of State’s point of view this policy appears to 
have been successful, as the 80% of all disqualifications that are made as 
undertakings represent a significant improvement on the take up of the 
Carecraft procedure. The policy of offering to waive costs if an undertaking 
is offered promptly is justified by the Secretary of State on the ground that 
the offer encourages quick settlement of cases and secures the protective 
‘benefits’ of disqualification earlier than may otherwise be the case559. The
558 See appendix 2.
559 See response to question 3, appendix 3 below.
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idea that prompt settlement increases the benefit of disqualification has 
some justification560. However, it is not a sufficient justification for the 
policy because in truth it is simply a device to pressure directors into 
offering undertakings. For, the threat to pursue costs if an undertaking is not 
offered and the curious statement of the costs that have been incurred in 
dealing with case to the date of the letter ,can only be serve to increase a 
person’s perception of the risk associated with contesting an application, and 
therefore increase his incentive to ‘settle’. In short, the policy is an overt 
attempt use pre-existing problems with cost to the Secretary of State’s 
advantage.
However, the possibility that the Secretary of State would use the 
costs issue in this way to extract the offer of an undertaking from directors 
was entirely foreseeable, and indeed was entirely foreseen. Sir Richard 
Scott, for example, seemed to temper his enthusiasm for an undertakings 
procedure because of the potential for the costs issue to lead to oppression 
disqualification proceedings when he noted ‘concern’ that some directors 
appeared to be accepting disqualification under Carecraft simply because 
they could not afford to contest an application.561 He suggested that to avoid 
this possibility the criminal rules for applying costs should be used in 
disqualification cases. The Trade and Industry Select Committee noted the 
same concerns in its report into the proposed amendments to the
560 The NAO’s research suggests that directors are most likely to be involved in an second 
insolvency in the two years following in an initial insolvency. Therefore, a reduction in the 
time taken to secure a disqualification ought to increase its relative protected effect. 
However, that increase is limited, see chapter 6, supra .
561 Re Bearings Pic, supra note 542.
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Disqualification Act562. As such, the committee suggested that procedures 
should be put in place to “avoid any suspicion of the DTI either doing 
directors a favour” by agreeing to waive costs if an undertaking was offered 
or “bearing down on individuals unduly harshly, using the threat of 
expensive legal proceedings to force a director to give an undertaking” 
The Secretary of State rejected the committee’s concerns, merely citing the 
consensual nature of the undertaking process564 as a safeguard against such 
fears. However, the consent argument of the Secretary of State is surely 
irrelevant to the committee’s concerns because the committee expressed 
anxiety that ‘consent’ may not be freely given in undertaking cases. The 
Secretary of State’s response to these concerns appears to be that there is no 
danger of ‘consent’ being obtained by coercion because consent can only be 
obtained by.. .consent. The argument is circular and absurd for if consent is 
extracted by coercion, the fact of ‘consent’ cannot be safeguard against 
coercion, for the apparent consent is not truly consent at all.
In the event, the committee’s concerns have been borne out by the 
practices of the Secretary of State. Because the unavoidable message 
conveyed by the Secretary of State’s use of the costs issue is precisely that 
she is ‘doing directors a favour’ by offering to waive costs if an undertaking 
is offered within the set period of time. This message is re-enforced by 
stating the costs already incurred, thereby giving the impression that the
562 Trade and Industry Select Committee, 2nd Report. Draft Insolvency Bill. (House of 
Commons Papers, Session 1998-1999, 112), para 42.
563 Ibid.
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Secretary of State is prepared to ‘let the mater go’ if an undertaking is 
quickly offered. However, with the apparent carrot comes the stick: the treat 
of expensive proceedings if an undertaking is not offered within the defined 
period.
It is therefore regrettable that the concerns of the select committee 
were not pursued during the passage of the Insolvency Bill through 
Parliament565. The fact that they were not can only have indicated to the 
Secretary of State that the requirement for consent justified the sort of 
practice criticised by the committee. However, is not only unfair and an 
arguable abuse of power for Secretary of State to use the cost issue to 
encourage settlement of applications, but it is also misguided if it is an 
attempt to increase the effectiveness of disqualification. For, if directors are 
left with no alternative other than to give an undertaking it is likely that the 
‘chilling’ effect of inaccurate or disproportionate disqualifications will be 
increased. This would render disqualification less efficient at protecting the 
public, not more, because allowing directors a reasonable opportunity to 
challenge a disqualification application ultimately leads to a more efficient 
system because any disqualification that comes about from it is more likely 
to reflect the misconduct committed.
564 Trade and Industry Select Committee, 4th Special Report, Government Observations on 
the First and second Reports from the Trade and Industry Committee, (House of Commons 
Papers, Session 1999-2000, 237), paras 17 and 18.
565 During it passage thorough Parliament it was suggested that the Insolvency Bill be 
amended such that that the Secretary of State be required to publish guidelines as to the 
circumstances in which she would accept an undertaking and, further, that she only be 
allowed to accept an undertaking for four years of less. These amendments did not directly 
address the issues raised by the Select Committee, but may have made the undertakings 
process a little fairer and more transparent. In the event none of the amendments were
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The impact of the costs issue is therefore highly significant. It has an 
unarguably (negative) effect on a director’s ability to resist a disqualification 
application, which has knock-on effects for the efficiency of 
disqualification. However, the costs incentive to submit to the undertaking 
procedure is re-enforced by the evidential barriers which directors face if 
they wish to contest an application.
7.4.2 Evidence.
Allegations made in disqualification applications tend to be 
complicated and relate to events that occurred several years before a 
disqualification application is made. This puts directors at a significant 
disadvantage because unless they possess very detailed records of board 
meetings etc., it may be very difficult for them to mount a defence to the 
allegations made by the Secretary of State. This compounds the pre-existing 
advantage that the Secretary of State has over directors (in terms of her 
expertise an resources) and must further increases her ability to force the 
offer of a disqualification undertaking. The Secretary of State has the 
greatest advantage in terms of gathering evidence in respect of many of the 
most common allegations made in section 6 cases, such as a failure to pay 
crown debts or to comply with accounting and disclosure requirements566. 
For example, the Secretary of State has ready access to records from the 
Inland Revenue or HM Customs and Excise that can be used as evidence of
accepted. See, Hansard [HC], Standing Committee Debates, Insolvency Bill [Lords], 7th 
November 2000, coll 115-120.
566 See chapter 4, table 1.
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non-payment of tax, which a director, deprived of detailed records, may find 
difficult to rebut. Similarly, records from Companies House that show that 
returns and accounts were not filed can be used as evidence of misconduct. 
Again, it would often be difficult for a director to show that he took all 
reasonable steps to comply with the requirements of the Companies Act in 
the absence of detailed records. In short, without such records it would be 
difficult to demonstrate that a director’s actions were reasonable in the 
context within which they were taken. Indeed, this is not only true of 
allegations linked to government departments. It is, for example, relatively 
easy for the Secretary of State to show that debts to creditors were not paid, 
yet it is more difficult for a director to explain why non-payment was 
reasonable. Of course, the burden of proof rests on the Secretary of State to 
show his case on the balance of probabilities, but this is often of little 
significance because if a director can offer no firm evidence to challenge the 
Secretary of State’s case the burden is more easily discharged and, in any 
case, the nature of the burden of proof in most disqualification cases is of 
largely academic concern because most section 6 applications never reach 
court.
Of course, the impact of evidential difficulties will vary from case to 
case. In larger companies they are likely to be less significant. However, as 
the majority of disqualifications concern small companies where detailed 
record keeping is not the norm, evidential considerations are likely to have a 
significant impact on a director’s response to a disqualification application 
and most likely, increase the incentive to settle by offering an undertaking.
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Evidential considerations also feed into the costs issue for a lack of evidence 
will increase the cost of mounting a defence. Which, in turn, increases the 
temptation for a director to ‘cut his loses’ and accept the Secretary of State’s 
offer of a cost free undertaking.
Therefore, the argument that undertakings are given consensually, 
and that this prevents possible abuse of the system by the Secretary of State 
is unconvincing as very practical considerations are likely to leave directors 
with little option other than to offer an undertaking, whether they agree to 
the terms of the undertaking proposed by the Secretary of State or not. 
Furthermore, the oppressive conduct of the Secretary of State means that 
consent in many cases is likely to be far from free.
Such concerns are significant in themselves and increase the 
likelihood of erroneous disqualifications being obtained. This is especially 
so as there is a distinct lack of procedural safeguards in the disqualification 
system to protect the rights of persons who offer an undertaking. If 
undertakings were consensual this may not be a significant concern, 
however, if they are less than consensual, this is likely to increase the cost of 
disqualification.
7.5 The Undertakings Process and Rules of Natural Justice.
7.5.1 The Two Decisions in the Undertaking Process.
Under the original system, a section 6 disqualification could only be 
made after the Secretary of State had taken the decision that it was 
‘expedient in the public interest’ that a disqualification order be made
260
against a person and the court decided that the that person was unfit to be a 
director. The latter decision was obviously a judicial decision. The new 
procedure retains this basic structure, i.e. a disqualification can only come 
about after the same two decisions have been taken. The difference is that 
where an undertaking is offered it is the Secretary of State who takes both 
decisions. The decisions, however, remain distinct and in the words of the 
Court of Appeal, “have not been elided into a single condition in the case of 
a disqualification undertaking” . The judicial decision to disqualify for 
unfitness is transferred to the Secretary of State by section 7(2A) of the Act, 
which states that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the conditions 
mentioned in section 6(1) are met before she can accept an undertaking. 
The effect of section 7 (2A), again in the words of the Court of Appeal is 
that “where a disqualification undertaking is offered the arbiter of unfitness 
is the Secretary of State rather than the court”568. The implications for the 
fairness and efficiency of disqualification of this change are far reaching 
because it transfers the decision to disqualify from an impartial tribunal to a 
person who is closely involved in the investigation and ‘prosecution’ of 
disqualification cases. Obvious concerns regarding the compatibility of the 
new procedure with principles of natural justice can therefore be raised. Two 
matters are of particular importance. First, the new procedure does not give 
directors an obvious opportunity to make representations to the Secretary of 
State before she exercises his judicial power to accept an undertaking
567 Per Chadwick LJ in Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry v Eastaway [2001]
EWCA Civ 1595 at para 19, [2002] 2 BCLC 236.
568 Ibid.
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(which can be contrasted with the original procedure where such a right was 
always available). And second, there is obvious scope for bias on the part of 
the Secretary of State when taking his judicial decision under section 7 (2A). 
These concerns are significant in themselves, however given the scope for 
oppression in undertaking cases they are particularly troubling.
7.5.2 The Right to a Fair Hearing.
The wide-ranging principle that those who are entrusted with a legal 
power cannot validly exercise it without first hearing the party who will 
suffer from its exercise is well established in the common law569. The 
common law protection is now supplemented by article 6 (1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. At common law the right has been 
jealously protected and has often been implied to exist in many cases where 
statute has not specifically provided it. Thus, it was stated in Cooper
cnr\Wandsworth v Board o f Works that:
“...a long course of decisions...establish that although there are no 
positive words in a statute, requiring that a party shall be heard, yet 
the justice of the common law shall supply the omission of the 
legislature”.
The leading case on the right to a fair hearing is Ridge v Baldwin511. In 
subsequent cases it has been held that there is a presumption that an 
administrative decision maker must act fairly to those whom his decisions
569 Bagg’s Case (1615) 11 Co. Rep 93b, R v University of Cambridge (1723) 1 Str 557.
570 (1863) 14 CB (NS).
571 [1964] AC 40.
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effect572 and the principle has been applied to instances of ‘judicial’, ‘quasi- 
judicial’ and ‘administrative’ decisions573. The courts have, however, 
adopted a flexible approach to the rules of natural justice in administrative 
cases, holding that its requirements should depend upon the circumstances 
of each case and take into account factors such as the nature of the power 
exercised and the subject matter to be dealt with574. However, that the ‘right 
to be heard’ should apply to the Secretary of State’s decision to accept a 
disqualification undertaking is clear.
The Court of Appeal has recognised that where a disqualification 
undertaking is offered, the Secretary of State is the “arbiter of unfitness”575 
and therefore the judicial nature of his decision is clear. Indeed, all the 
undertaking process does is to substitute the Secretary of State for the court; 
the nature of the decision to be taken remains the same. Therefore there can 
be little argument against the proposition that the Secretary of State acts 
judicially when determining whether to accept an undertaking. The Act 
reinforces this by specifically stating that the Secretary of State can only 
accept an undertaking when she is satisfied that the conditions in section 
6(1) are satisfied, which is the same test applied to the court. That ministers 
need to afford an affected party the right to be heard in such cases is clear. 
The Privy Council, for example, has stated:
572 R v Commission for Racial Equality, ex parte Hillingdon LBC [1982] AC 779.
573 See generally; W. Wade and C. Forsythe, Administrative Law 9th ed (2004, O.U.P. 
Oxford,), pages 480-494.
574 R v Gaming Board for Great Britain ex parte Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 QB 47, Re 
Pergamon Press Ltd [1971] Ch 388.
575 Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry v Eastaway, supra note 567.
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“...the Minister was a person having legal authority to determine a 
question affecting the rights of individuals. This being so it is a 
necessary implication that he is required to observe the principles of 
natural justice when exercising that authority.”576 
However, despite the clear analogy with the Secretary of State’s 
power to accept an undertaking, the amended Disqualification Act does not 
require the Secretary of State to give affected persons the opportunity to 
make representations to her before she exercises her judicial power under 
section 7(2A). Neither is she under an obligation to consider any 
representations that may be made. However, it should be noted that the 
Secretary of State has followed her previous practice of informing directors 
that they may make representations to her legal team , however, this offer 
is entirely voluntary and she is under no duty to consider any representations 
made. Thus, this practice cannot be regarded as a sufficient opportunity for 
directors to make representations in the undertaking process. This is 
especially so given that the practice is not specific to the undertaking 
process but is routine part of all section 16 notices. It is, in short, an offer 
made by the Secretary of State in her role as the ‘claimant in civil 
proceedings’ and not as the ‘arbiter of unfitness’.
Thus the absence of an appropriate opportunity for persons who offer 
an undertaking to make representations to the Secretary of State would 
appear to be a clear breach of established principles of natural justice.
576 A -G v Ryan [1908] AC 718.
577 Section 16 letter, appendix 2.
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However, the breach has been accepted because the undertaking process is 
apparently consensual and not coercive, as can be seen in the Secretary of 
State’s argument that any deficiencies in the undertaking process are 
remedied by consent578. However, the significant scope for oppression in 
undertaking cases must undermine this justification.
Nonetheless, the common law, has been willing to accept that in 
some circumstances ‘consent’ can remedy instances where the normal rules 
of natural justice are not observed. Consent, however cannot give a public
C 7 Q
authority more power than it lawfully possess and a distinction has been 
drawn between jurisdictional and procedural matters; the general rule being 
that a person may waive procedural rights at common law but not
f O A
jurisdictional rights . However, there are some exceptions. So for example, 
it has been held that if a biased person takes part in an adjudication, but the 
bias is known to the affected party and he raises no objection at the outset of 
the case, he is taken to have waived his right to object to the tribunals 
finding. This example suggests that the Secretary of State’s universal 
argument that deficiencies in the undertaking process are remedied by 
consent may have some sound basis in law. However, on closer examination 
the basis for the consent argument at common law falls away because within 
the undertaking process itself persons are not given the option of waiving 
procedural or jurisdictional rights, because they are actually accorded none. 
For, ‘consent’ is only a relevant consideration at the stage where a director
578 Response to the Trade and Industry Select Committee’s second report, supra note 564.
579 Essex Congregational Church v Essex County Council [1963] AC 808.
580 Wade and Forsyth, supra note 573.
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decides to given an undertaking. This consent then seems to be taken as an 
ongoing waiver of procedural rights throughout the subsequent process. This 
may be acceptable where a director’s consent is freely given, however, to 
assume that this will be the case in all instances is highly unrealistic and 
unsatisfactory as ‘consent’ is likely to be less than free in many cases. A 
‘pause for thought’ provision whereby the Secretary of State was required to 
re-evaluate the case against a director and consider any representations he 
may wish to make in mitigation would substantially increase fairness within 
the system. Because, despite the fact that a director offers an undertaking on 
specific terms (i.e. to be disqualified for X years because of A,B,C acts) this 
does not mean that that those terms are appropriate to the case. It is likely 
that many directors will offer an undertaking where they do indeed dispute 
the case against them but lack the resources to do so in court. In such 
circumstances a director may possess evidence indicating that the period of 
disqualification in the draft undertaking is not appropriate to his conduct and 
the Secretary of State should be required to review that evidence. Of course 
the Secretary of State may voluntarily consider any representations but the 
point is that under the current process she is not required to do so.
Of course, it should be noted that even where the Secretary of State 
considered evidence from a director, that director may still agree to offer an 
undertaking for a period of time he feels is in appropriate, or indeed offer an 
undertaking where he does not agree that his conduct makes him unfit. This 
could obviously happen if the director was unable to persuade the Secretary 
of State of case but lacked the resources to contest the application or period
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of disqualification in court. Nonetheless, the situation for directors where 
the Secretary of State refuses to consider any evidence (which she is 
perfectly entitled to do) would be unusual and unfair, especially where they 
are effectively forced to give undertakings. However, even in cases where 
undertakings are not given because of coercion, surely ‘consent’ should no 
more deprive a person of a right to make representations in mitigation than a 
guilty plea does in criminal cases.
However, not only is it true that directors should be given an 
opportunity to be heard to ensure fairness in undertaking cases, but it is also 
because it is necessary to ensue that disqualification holds on to whatever 
vestiges of efficiency that it has. A disqualification period that is too long, 
for example, could have a chilling effect on desirable business activity, 
increasing collateral losses from disqualification. A disqualification 
undertaking that is too short, on the other hand, provides sub-optimal 
protection from unfit conduct and a disqualification that should not have 
been made provides no benefit at all to the public, only losses.
The point is therefore that disqualifications that are made after 
representations from a director are considered are likely to better protect the 
public interest from unfit persons. That is not to say that all representations 
should be taken at face value, for some are likely to be false or of 
insufficient strength to answer the Secretary of State’s case. I merely suggest 
that a disqualification that comes about through some real element of 
‘bargain’ between the Secretary of State and a director is likely to be more
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accurate and therefore more efficient than one which comes about through 
the imposition of terms on a weaker party by a stronger party.
However, it is doubtful that any efficiency gain could be made in the 
undertaking process if directors were merely given the right to make 
representations to the Secretary of State without it being combined with 
further reform of the undertaking system. This is because the success of the 
right, both in terms of fairness and efficiency gain, depends upon any 
representations being considered impartially. However, such a fair hearing is 
almost impossible in the undertakings process because of the presence of 
obvious bias on the part of the Secretary of State.
7.5.3 The Rule Against Bias.
Concern over bias in the undertaking system arises from dual role of 
the Secretary of State in undertaking cases, in that she acts as prosecutor 
when she takes the decision under section 7(1) that it is ‘expedient in the 
public interest’ that a disqualification order be sought against a person and 
as judge when she decides whether to accept an undertaking under section 
7(2A). The clear danger is that the judicial decision under section 7(2A) is 
determined by the decision already taken under section 7 (1). Indeed, the 
Secretary of State is most unlikely to decide not to accept an undertaking 
under section 7 (2A), when she has already decided that a disqualification 
order should be made. For, there can be little question that when the 
Secretary of State comes to determine whether she feels the conditions 
mentioned in s 6(1) have been satisfied she will be influenced by the
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decision she already taken under section 7(1) that it is ‘expedient in the 
public interest’ that a person be disqualified. The result of the second 
decision must be rendered a forgone conclusion by the first.
Concern over this aspect of the proposed undertakings system was 
again expressed by the Trade and Industry Select Committee when it noted 
that the Secretary of State would be granted unchecked powers to act as
c o  1
investigator, prosecutor and judge in undertaking cases . Its concerns, 
however, received a curt response from the DTI and were not successfully 
pursued during the Insolvency Bill’s passage through Parliament. The DTI’s 
response to the committee merely stated that “the new provisions...will not 
be mandatory. They will not deprive directors of the right to a fair trial. It 
will remain a matter for the director to decide if he wishes to contest a 
disqualification application.”582 However, this response is simply not 
satisfactory given the scope for oppression in many undertaking cases. The 
committee was fully justified in raising concerns about the conflicting roles 
of the Secretary of State in the undertaking process for it increases the 
likelihood of unfair and inefficient disqualifications and runs counter to well 
established legal principles. For example, if, in the case of a motorist 
convicted for dangerous driving, the decision of a panel of magistrates can 
be invalidated for bias because the magistrate’s clerk was a an employee of 
a firm involved in civil proceeding related to case583, it hardly needs to be 
said that the Secretary of State would be regarded as a biased judge at
581 Trade and Industry Select Committee, Second report, supra note 562, para 42.
582 Trade and Industry Select Committee, Fourth Special Report, supra note 564.
583 R v Sussex Justices Ex parte Me Carthy [1924] 1 KB 256.
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common law. The motorist’s case is clearly a case of judicial bias, not 
administrative bias and given that the Secretary of State acts judicially when 
deciding to accept and undertaking584 the judicial analogy is the correct one. 
Nonetheless, it is well established that the same rules apply to administrative 
decisions585 and, given the strong possibility of actual bias in a case where a 
prosecutor also acts as judge, it would hardly matter how the section 7(2A) 
decision is classified.
Nonetheless, the Secretary of State’s case that consent is a 
justification for the prima facie deficiencies in the disqualification system
CQ£
would appear to have some basis in common law. For the argument is 
essentially that a director is aware of the Secretary of State’s bias when he 
offers an undertaking. Indeed, it could conceivably be argued that it is the 
director who effectively ‘disqualifies himself by offering an undertaking to 
the Secretary of State, in which case the issue of a biased judgement would 
not arise. This argument has an appealing logic, but does not sit easily with 
the Disqualification Act, for if Parliament intended directors to disqualify 
themselves by offering an undertaking, it would not have required the 
Secretary of State to consider whether the conditions mentioned in section 6 
(1) were met before she could accept an undertaking. The fact that 
Parliament requires the Secretary of State to take a separate decision under 
section 7(2A) shows that disqualification moves from her and not the
584 Official Receiver v Jones, supra note 568, Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry v 
Eastaway, supra note 567.
585 See for example, R v Secretary o f State for the Environment, ex parte Kirstall Valley 
Campaign Ltd [1996] 1 All ER 304.
586 Moore v Gamgee (1890) 25 QBD 244.
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director. Similarly the fact that the decision to disqualify under section 
7(2A) is separate from that under section 7(1), indicates that Parliament 
intended the Secretary of State to consider the case afresh before accepting 
an undertaking. Indeed, the structure of the Act adds weight to the argument 
that the Secretary of State should be required to consider representations 
from a director before accepting an undertaking. However, it does seem that 
Parliament was rather confused as to exactly what was required of the 
Secretary of State. For whilst the Act clearly suggests she must review a 
case before accepting an undertaking the fact of obvious bias on the part of 
the Secretary of State, renders such an exercise rather pointless. A matter 
that cannot have escaped anything other than the most inept scrutiny of the 
reforms.
Therefore, a challenge to the undertaking system, citing its practical 
incompatibility with long established principles to combat bias would be 
highly desirable. And given the post-human Rights Act legal culture we 
might expect any change to the legitimacy of the undertaking procedure to 
be brought primarily in relation to the convention. Thus, consideration of the 
compatibility of the undertaking process procedure with article 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights is useful.
7.5.3.1 The European Convention on Human Rights.
Article 6(1) of the convention guarantees citizens of contracting 
states the right to have their civil obligations determined by an independent 
and impartial tribunal. It has been established that disqualification is a
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procedure that determines civil obligation under article 6587 and so the ‘civil’ 
protection of the convention applies to the undertakings system. The 
convention tests bias both objectively and subjectively in a manner akin to 
the common law rule that justice ‘must not only be done but must be seen to 
be done’. And as with the common law, the undertaking procedure appears 
to be a clear breach of the convention’s test of subjective bias.588 However, 
the DTI’s argument that directors retain the right to have their case 
determined by the court may be persuasive in the context of the convention.
For, in order to accommodate administrative decision making, the 
European Court of Human Rights has held that prima facie non-compliance 
with convention can be cured by ‘access to a court of full jurisdiction589’. 
Following this principle, a recent case in the House of Lords upheld the 
decision of a local authority housing officer (acting in a appellate role) 
despite the fact that she was not ‘independent’ within the meaning of article 
6 (l)590. It was held that the prima facie breach of art, 6 was cured because a 
right of appeal existed from the decision to a fully independent court, even 
though an appeal could only be made on a point of law591. Therefore, it 
would seem likely that the Secretary of State’s argument that directors have 
the ‘right’ to have their case determined by court would be accepted as a 
cure to the actual (or subjective) bias of the Secretary of State in undertaking
587 EDC vUnited Kingdom [1998] BCC 370, affirmed in DC, HS and AD v United Kingdom 
[2000] BCC 710 and most recently in Eastaway v United Kingdom, application 74976/01, 
20th July 2004.
588 The conventions subjective test is a test of actual bias. See Wade and Forsyth, supra 
note 573, page 453.
589 Wade and Forsyth, ibid, page 448.
590 Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets L.B.C. [2003] UKHL 5, [2003] 1 All ER 731.
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cases. The Secretary of State’s case may be further strengthened by the fact 
that a director is free to seek the variation or revocation of an undertaking 
after it has been accepted592.
However, in practice the fictional nature of consent in many 
undertaking cases undermines the notion that the breach of art. 6 can be 
cured. The right to seek the variation or removal of an order, which is akin 
to a right of appeal, is also an unsatisfactory cure. For, if cost and evidential 
considerations preclude a person from challenging the original application it 
is likely that they will also preclude an appeal. Of course, as the matter has 
not been litigated it is possible that a UK or European court may recognise 
the reality of the undertaking process and declare it incompatible with article 
6, or indeed common law rules. Any such decision would be very welcome, 
however given the English court’s readiness to accept that incompatibility 
with the convention can be cured rights of appeal, it does not seem likely.
7.5 The Impact of the Undertakings System on Disqualification.
One positive consequence of the lack of procedural fairness in the 
undertakings system is that it certainly ought to reduce the cost to the 
Secretary of State of obtaining a disqualification, however is likely that 
this reduction in the cost of disqualification is more than offset by an
591 Runa Begum, ibid. See also R v Secretary o f State for the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions [2001] 2 All ER 929.
592 Section
593 Seethe response to question 3, appendix 3 below where a chief examiner in the 
Disqualification unit if directors offer an undertaking promptly it “prevents the need for 
protracted discussions (including meetings and correspondence over many weeks) the 
public are protected earlier at a reduced cost to the public purse. ”
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increase in the costs of erroneous disqualifications. For, the combination of 
obvious bias on the part of the Secretary of State, the lack of opportunity for 
directors to make representations to him and, most importantly, the scope 
for oppression in the system, increases the likelihood of disqualifications 
being obtained where they are not merited and for periods that do not 
accurately reflect the need to protect the public.
The incentive for directors to settle for a slightly shorter 
disqualification rather than contest the case against them is especially likely 
to increase the costs of erroneous disqualifications. Of course, this danger is 
not unique to the undertakings system because it existed under the old 
Carecraft procedure; however, it is certainly exacerbated by the 
undertakings system. For under Carecraft there was some independent 
review of the case by a judge when the agreed statement was laid before a 
court, which at least reduced the likelihood of erroneous disqualification, 
even if the possibility of a judge rejecting an agreed statement was remote. 
Furthermore, judicial discretion over fixing the period of disqualification in 
Carecraft cases must have at least reduced the likelihood inaccurate period 
of disqualification being handed down. To a limited extent these arguments 
could also be made as far as instances where directors did not agree to the 
Carecraft procedure but offered no defence to an application by the 
Secretary of State are concerned, for again, there was at least some impartial 
review of the Secretary of State’s case even if the court did not benefit from 
full adversarial proceedings. This should have at least partially reduced the
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likelihood of erroneous disqualification, even if that likelihood remained 
high.
However, the undertakings system removes any possibility of 
independent review of both the decision to disqualify and the fixing of the 
period of disqualification and must be more likely to lead to erroneous 
disqualification than either Carecraft or uncontested cases. Consequently, 
the likelihood of an increase in erroneous disqualifications being brought 
about by the undertakings system further reduces the already low protective 
benefits of disqualification and, indeed, increase its costs. For, the more 
inaccurate disqualifications that are made, the lower the number of future 
insolvencies prevented by disqualification will be. Consequently, the public 
and commercial world will be protected from even less loss than was the 
case at the time of the NAO follow up report. Also the reduction in desirable 
business activity brought about by erroneous disqualification will be 
increased and thus collateral losses caused by section 6 will rise. 
Disqualification can ill afford such a reduction in its efficiency, or more 
accurately, an increase in its inefficiency.
In addition to concerns about the accuracy of disqualifications 
obtained under the new procedure, the undertaking process increases the 
likelihood of misinterpretation (if not misuse) of the section 6 standard. For, 
in giving the Secretary of State control over the decision whether a 
director’s conduct amounts to unfitness under section 6, the undertaking 
process presents him with the opportunity to sanction conduct that is of 
particular concern to government, but which inflicts little harm on creditors.
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The non-payment of tax is a perfect example. The courts as, discussed in 
chapter 5, have made efforts to confine the instances in which non-payment 
of tax can be cited as evidence of unfitness to cases where it has some 
bearing on a director’s honesty or competence. However, there is no 
guarantee that Secretary of State will follow the courts line, and despite 
declarations to the contrary594, she certainly has an incentive not to. Further, 
it is the Secretary of State who will now decide the fitness of novel forms of 
delinquency and there is every reason to suppose that as time passes she will 
develop a parallel jurisprudence of unfitness that may diverge from that in 
the courts. As the courts appear to have been attentive to the economic goal 
of disqualification, the reduction in their involvement in the process must 
increase the likelihood that it the practical application of the sanction will 
diverge from its economic goals. Any such divergence would further 
weaken the benefits of disqualification in terms of both protection and 
deterrence.
Thus, it is highly likely that the introduction of disqualification 
undertakings has made for a less effective system than that which operated 
at the time of the NAO follow up report. However, that is not to say that 
similar concerns could not be expressed about the Carecraft system then in 
operation. For if the myth of consent in undertaking and Carecraft cases is 
exploded, the whole case for them collapses. This is particularly true in the 
case of undertakings where court involvement in the disqualification process
594.The Secretray of State does not publish the criteria by which she decides whether to 
accept an undertaking. She merely cites the test in Section 7(2A), see response to questions 
3 and 4, appendix 3 below.
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is completely abrogated. Thus whilst the widespread use of the undertakings 
procedure may lead to slightly quicker disqualifications and reduce the costs 
of the Secretary of State, the courts and even directors (in that they can 
escape liability for the cost of proceedings), the costs associated with the 
increase in erroneous disqualifications it is likely to bring are most probably 
far greater.
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Chapter 8: Punishment and
Reform.
8.1 The Inefficiency of Section 6
Section 6 disqualification is not a successful form of regulation in 
the sense that it brings about a net increase in the welfare of ‘the public and 
commercial world’, on the contrary it is likely to reduce it. The high 
compliance and litigation costs that the sanction brings are compounded by 
costs from erroneous disqualifications. These costs can be contrasted with 
the low benefit of the section in terms of its derisory direct savings to 
creditors and weak deterrent effect.
Much of this inefficiency has been apparent since the NAO 
published its follow-up report in 1998595, yet the state has continued to put 
its faith in disqualification as a desirable method of ‘protecting’ the public 
interest from abuse of limited liability, as the introduction of disqualification 
undertakings shows. Therefore the fact that the state has continued to pursue 
a policy of disqualification in light of clear evidence that section 6 is 
unlikely to deliver any real benefit raises questions about the true motivation 
of the state in seeking to disqualify directors. For, whilst the stated aim of 
disqualification is to protect the fact that the section actually provides little
595 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Insolvency 
Service Executive Agency, Company Director Disqualification -  A Follow Up Report,
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protection leaves nothing but punishment as the outcome of the state’s 
policy. For where a director who will not repeat his misconduct is 
disqualified the only effect that disqualification can have is to punish 
wrongdoing by withdrawing the privilege to be involved in the management 
of limited liability companies. The question then is whether this outcome is 
accidental or deliberate.
8.2 Punishment Effect.
Several authors and judges596 have favoured the view that 
disqualification involves a strong penal element. As such there has been 
some debate in the academic literature as to whether the courts follow purely 
protective principles in their decisions under section 6. In terms of the 
judicial approach to the section it is clear that some judges treat 
disqualification as a punitive sanction,597 that some treat is as a protective 
civil sanction598 and that others sit on the fence599. The punitive approach 
can be seen in particular in the line of authority which holds that directors 
must be disqualified when conduct has fallen short of the standard laid down
(House of Commons Papers, session 1998-1999,424) (London, The Stationary Office, 
1998).
596 See for example Balcombe LJ in Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry v Langridge 
[1991] Ch 402, who noted at page 412 that a disqualification could be restrictive of a 
person’s liberty..
97 See for example Hoffman J (as he then was) in Re Swift 736 Ltd [1993] BCLC 1 who at 
page 3 described a section 6 application as “penal Proceedings”.
98 See for example Morritt LJ in R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte 
McCormick [1998] BCC 329.
599 Browne- Wilkinson v-c, for example, commented in Re LoLine Electric Motors [1988] 1 
Ch A ll  (at page 486) that “The power [to disqualify] is not fundamentally penal. But if the 
power to disqualify is exercised, disqualification does involve substantial interference with 
the freedom of the individual”.
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by Parliament, i.e. those who adopt the tunnel vision approach in Re 
Pamstock Ltcf00.
Some judges have followed the logical conclusion of the punitive 
approach and appear to regard disqualification as a quasi-criminal if not 
criminal sanction. This approach manifests itself in a number of ways, from 
the emphasis placed on blameworthiness by judges who adopt Finch’s rights 
approach601 to judges who use the language of the criminal courts in 
disqualification cases602. Those who treat it as akin to a criminal sanction 
appear to do so because of the ‘substantial interference with the right of the 
individual’ that disqualification entails. However, to be contrasted with 
judges who view disqualification as a punitive sanction are the many cases 
where the protective objectives of section 6 have been stressed, such as in 
the case of R v Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry, ex parte 
McCormick603. Janet Dine604 has discussed these conflicting approaches and 
argues that disqualification contains many elements of a ‘criminal 
provision’. Dine therefore argues that confusion as to the classification of 
disqualification under section 6 ought to be resolved to “prevent an erosion 
of the rights of those accused of misbehaviour”605. Vanessa Finch606 has also 
considered the civil-criminal dichotomy that section 6 gives rise to and
600 [1994] 1 BCLC 716. See 6.2.1 supra.
601 See, V. Finch, Disqualifying Directors: Issues o f Rights, Privileges and Employment 
(1993) 22 Industrial Law Journal 35 and chapter 4, supra.
602 See for example the case of Official Receiver v Jones [2004] EWCA 2096 where Weeks 
J consistently referred to allegations of unfit conduct as “charges”.
603 [1998] BCC 379.
604 Dine, J Punishing Directors [1994] JBL 325.
605 Dine, ibid at page 337.
606 V. Finch, Disqualification o f Directors: A Plea for Competence (1990) 53 MLR 385.
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appears to favour the view that disqualification is operated along punitive 
lines in many instances.
However, the issue that must be addressed is whether instances 
where section 6 is used punitively means that that section itself can be
f X Y lcharacterised as punitive. It is certainly true, as Dine argues , that a 
disqualification contains many of the elements of a punitive sanction. 
However it does not follow that section 6 is punitive, because 
notwithstanding its punitive characteristics a disqualification is capable of 
being protective if it is applied with intention to protect and its scope does 
not exceed that necessary to secure protection. As such it is submitted that 
the classification of a particular disqualification can only be determined by 
an assessment of the desire that motivates its imposition. Thus, if a 
disqualification is imposed with the intention of punishing, then its 
‘interference with the freedom of the individual’ can quite properly be 
regarded as a punishment. However, if a disqualification is imposed with the 
intention of providing protection it will not be punishment even if certain 
characteristics of the sanction may look punitive provided that the scope o f 
the disqualification does not stray beyond that needed to ‘protect\ 
Therefore, the fact that disqualification may demonstrate certain features of 
a punitive provision does not mean that it constitutes a punishment if it can 
be justified according to protective principles. Thus, whilst the practice of 
handing down longer disqualification periods to dishonest directors608 could
607 Dine, supra note 604.
608 Re Sevenoaks Stationers Ltd [1991] Ch. 164.
281
be viewed as involving a penal element (i.e. the desire to punish a culpable 
wrongdoer), it can just as easily be justified by protective goals in that 
dishonest directors pose more of a risk to the public, which needs the 
maximum possible protection. Therefore, provided that such a 
disqualification is motivated by a desire to protect then it will not be 
punitive. However, if a disqualification were to go beyond protective aims 
in that a period of disqualification ordered was over and above that needed 
to protect, then that disqualification would become partially punitive. This 
situation has undoubtedly arisen many times. Finch gives the example of Re 
Cladrose Ltcf09 where a chartered accountant was disqualified for a longer 
period than an ‘ordinary’ director even though both were found to be unfit 
because of a failure to file returns and produce audited accounts. In this case 
the ‘extra’ period of disqualification was handed down to the chartered 
accountant director because the court regarded his failure as more culpable 
that that of the other director. Such a disqualification can properly be 
regarded as punitive because it went beyond the period of disqualification (if 
any) necessary to protect the public interest because of a desire to ‘punish’ a 
culpable wrongdoer.
However, whilst the intention to punish is evident in many reported 
cases it must be emphasised that the objective o f section 6 is to protect and 
not to punish. Therefore any disqualification or disqualification period that 
is motivated by as desire to punish ought to be condemned as an inefficient 
use of disqualification. As such, instances where the courts have used
609 [1990] BCC 11.
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disqualification to punish and not to protect ought not to be cited as 
evidence that section 6 is a punitive sanction. On the contrary, they should 
simply be condemned as instances of judicial error. Similarly, the ‘tunnel 
vision’ approach, which looks exclusively to past conduct in the 
disqualification process, is also out of step with the stated purpose of the 
section. For, whilst there are many reported cases under section 6 that 
involve punitive considerations, there is ample authority for the protective 
approach to the section, not least from the Court of Appeal in R v Secretary 
o f State for Trade and Industry, ex parte M cCorm ick. As such it is 
relatively easy to condemn individual cases where a court is shown to have 
disqualified out of a desire to punish (such as Finch argues was the case in 
Re Cladrose).
However, the total failure of section 6 to fulfil its protective aim 
raises questions not about the role of the courts in section 6 cases but rather 
about the state’s motivation in continuing to pursue a policy of 
disqualification. For, if the state were aware that disqualification provided 
no real protective benefit (as the NAO follow-up report clearly showed) then 
logic would dictate that the desire to protect cannot be the only motivation 
behind the state’s continued use of the sanction.
8.3 A Desire to Punish?
When assessed against the objective of protection, the state’s 
approach to section 6 is puzzling, if not bizarre. To take the recent
6X0Supra, note 603.
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introduction of disqualification undertakings as an example, any reasoned 
analysis of the reform must conclude that the lack of procedural safeguards 
built into the undertaking system are highly likely to increase error in the 
disqualification process and make the disqualification system less efficient. 
In terms of the conduct cited in section 6 cases, the state’s conduct also 
appears to be at odds with the objective of protection in certain respects, 
such as its preference for citing the failure to fulfil accounting and disclosure 
obligations as evidence of unfitness. Just as puzzling was the continued 
drive to increase the number of disqualifications post-1998, when the NAO 
follow-up report had showed that only 15% of disqualified directors were 
likely to be involved in further business failure611. Surely, if the state’s 
desire were really to protect the ‘public and commercial world’ this finding 
ought to have generated a policy focused on the quality and not quantity of 
disqualification?
However, whilst the state’s approach often makes little sense in 
terms of a desire to protect it makes somewhat more sense in light of a 
desire to punish. For, in terms of punishment, none of the criticisms of 
advanced above would reduce the success of disqualification. Thus, the fact 
that only 15% of disqualifications result in protection is irrelevant of the 
state really intends to use section 6 to punish undesirable conduct. Because 
every disqualification punishes a perceived wrongdoer. Similarly, the 
frequent citing of accounting and disclosure misconduct would be a 
perfectly rational way of punishing those who digress from rules set down
611 See 6.2.2 supra.
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by the state. And the state’s cavalier attitude to procedural safeguards in the 
undertaking process is at least understandable, if not legitimate, within the 
context of a punitive sanction. Indeed, the previous cost benefit analysis of 
section 6 would not apply if its benefits were intended to include 
punishment. On the quantitative level the £11 million deficit found by the 
NAO is based on an analysis of disqualification as a protective measure. 
However, if its objectives included punishment the cost-benefit deficit 
would likely be reduced if not extinguished by the benefit of punishing those 
who abuse limited liability, whatever that benefit may be.
Therefore, in terms of a desire to punish errant conduct much of the 
state’s approach to disqualification is a good deal more logical than it is in 
relation to a desire to ‘protect the public and commercial world from abuse 
of limited liability’. And it should be noted that a desire to punish 
undesirable conduct does not necessarily conflict with apparent purpose of 
section 6, which as I have argued in previous chapters is to support 
‘confidence in the market’ (i.e. free access to limited liability) by 
sanctioning those who are seen to ‘abuse the system’. The state can promote 
such confidence by punishing errant directors just as easily as it can by 
seeking to protect creditors from them, even if (as is argued below) 
punishment is ultimately of less value to creditors.
612 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Insolvency 
Service Executive Agency, Company Director Disqualification -  A Follow Up Report,, 
(House of Commons Papers, session 1998-1999,424) (London, The Stationary Office,
1998), which stated at page 1 that “[t]he disqualification arrangements are intended to 
promote confidence and risk-taking in the market, by assuring those who do business with 
limited liability companies that directors who are unfit will be disqualified”. See chapter 3, 
supra.
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Nonetheless, whilst the state’s conduct makes more sense in terms if 
a desire to punish, it cannot be emphasised strongly enough that punishment 
is not the stated objective o f section 6. Its stated objective is to protect, and 
is an objective that has been repeated many times by the state itself613, the 
courts614 and bodies such as the NAO615. Therefore any punitive use of 
section 6 by the state must be condemned as strongly as any punitive 
approach by the courts. However, that is not to say that a desire to punish 
directors for errant conduct is undesirable per se, but rather that it is 
undesirable within the context of a measure which aims to protect and which 
accordingly makes use of the rules of civil procedure.
Nonetheless, despite the logic of the state’s approach to section 6 in 
terms of a desire to punish, there is no direct evidence that a desire to punish 
motivates the state. All that can be stated is that a desire to punish is a 
logical inference that can be drawn from the state’s continued use of the 
section. However, given its frequent reiteration of the protective aims of 
section 6616, it would appear that either the state is acting in a highly 
duplicitous fashion in its use of section 6 or that it misguidedly believes that 
section 6 does afford effective protection. In which case the actual punitive
613 See: Hansard [HC], (Session 1999-2000), Standing Committee B, 7th November 2000, 
col 119.
614 See Dillon LJ in Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch 164, who stated at page 
176 that “It is beyond doubt that the purpose of section 6 is to protect the public, and in 
particular potential creditors of companies, from loosing money through companies 
becoming insolvent when the directors of those companies are unfit to be concerned in the 
management of companies”
615 See, National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Insolvency 
Service Executive Agency, Company Director Disqualification -  A Follow Up Report, 
supra note 612, which stated at page 1 that disqualification existed to “protect the public 
and commercial world from those who abuse limited liability status”
616 See note 613 and generally chapter 1, supra.
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effect of the many disqualifications that provide no protection would be 
unintended. However, if the state were acting duplicitously, it would equate 
to a gross abuse of power, with the state deliberately deceiving in order to 
take advantage of the more relaxed civil procedure rules to enforce a 
‘criminal’ sanction.
8.3.1 Protection is the Most Desirable Goal.
Whatever the true motivation of the state may be, ‘protection’ is the 
most desirable goal for section 6 to follow. The sort of activities that the 
state seeks to sanction through its use of section 6 are, as has been discussed 
in earlier chapters, activities that inflict economic harm on the public and 
commercial world and a protective sanction is most likely to bring about a 
net reduction in economic harm and therefore provide the greatest ‘benefit’ 
to the public. This is because protective measures are necessarily intended to 
reduce the number of instances where harm (be it economic or otherwise) is 
inflicted upon a certain class of persons. As such, reducing effective ‘harm’ 
is the core objective of a protective measure. Measures that are intended to 
punish do not have such a reduction in harm as their primary aim, because 
punishment primarily involves satisfying a desire for retribution. That is not 
to say that bringing about a reduction in harmful conduct is irrelevant to 
punishment, for punitive sanctions often seek to reduce harm through a 
deterrent effect as well as to satisfy a desire for retribution. Thus, the 
mandatory life sentence for murder, for example, is justified by both 
retributive and protective principles. The severity of the sanction imposed is
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said to reflect society’s abhorrence for murder and therefore satisfy its desire 
to seek retribution against those who commit murder, but also to act as a 
deterrent to murder and therefore to protect society from harmful conduct. 
However, the protection afforded by punitive sanctions is not always 
‘optimal’, to use the economic jargon. This is because the retributive 
element in punitive sanctions can limit or reduce the benefit that can be 
derived from protection by extending the sanction for undesirable conduct 
beyond that necessary to achieve protection. In which case some, if not all, 
of the benefit of protection will be lost. Thus, in the context of section 6 
disqualification some of the protective benefit of disqualification will be lost 
where disqualification is used to punish undesirable conduct.
Let us take for example the hypothetical case of a professional 
director disqualified for 10 years, where the judge estimates that a 5 year 
disqualification would satisfy protective goals but nonetheless hands down a 
10 year disqualification to satisfy the goal of punishing culpable conduct. 
On a superficial level this disqualification brings both retribution and 
protection, in that the public interest in punishing culpable conduct is 
satisfied and the public is protected from a repeat of the misconduct by both 
the lengthy disqualification and deterrent effect it may have on misconduct 
by other directors. However, the actual protective benefit from such a 
disqualification will be reduced to the extent that that the 10 year 
disqualification ‘over-protects’ and prevents the individual from being 
involved in desirable business activity during the 6th to 10th years of his 
disqualification, which according to protective principles are unnecessary
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years of disqualification. The same basic outcome results from the more 
extreme case where a disqualification is made for punitive motives where no 
need to protect exists, for in such a case disqualification will prevent 
potentially desirable business activity.
As such, punitive disqualification tends towards ‘over-protection’, 
which inflicts its own type of harm on the public and commercial world. 
Therefore it is likely to bring less of a ‘benefit’ in terms of reducing harm 
than purely protective disqualification. Consequently, purely protective 
goals are by far the most desirable in terms of regulation that is aimed at 
economic harm resulting from ‘abuse of limited liability’.
Therefore, whatever may motivate the state, and indeed the courts, in 
their approach to section 6, the stated protective aim is the correct one given 
its context. Unfortunately, however, the condemnation of any punitive uses 
of section 6 that this necessitates leads to the condemnation of the whole of 
the section 6 regime. Because, be it by accident or design, the actual effect 
of most section 6 disqualifications is only to punish and in so doing it 
actually inflicts a cost on the groups it is intended to protect from loss. 
Therefore, given sections 6’s clear failure to bring about a net reduction in 
economic harm to creditors, reform of the states approach to ‘abuse of 
limited liability’ is highly desirable if effective protection is to be secured.
8.4 Personal Liability.
A potentially more effective way for the state to protect the public 
and commercial world from unfit conduct would be to replace
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disqualification with personal liability as a sanction for unfit conduct, the
617benefits of which have been discussed in an earlier part of this thesis . 
Such a personal liability provision could take the form of either a new 
provision rendering unfit directors liable for debts related to their unfit acts, 
or a provision allowing civil recovery to be made under existing provisions 
where unfitness has been found.
The protective benefits of either form of personal liability over 
disqualification rely essentially on the greater protective effect of personal 
liability for the victims of errant conduct and upon it having a greater 
deterrent effect. To elaborate a little further, personal liability could provide 
much greater protection from unfit conduct because it would insulate 
victims of unfit conduct from suffering loss, at least in so far as it increased 
the likelihood that they would be paid sums owed to them because of unfit 
conduct. As such, it would afford victims of ‘abuse of limited liability’ 
much greater protection from its harmful effects than is the case with the 
current remedy of disqualification, which can only provide future protection 
for an unknown class of potential creditors.
The more certain benefit of a personal liability remedy would also be 
advantageous because it is unlikely to give rise to a large number of wasted 
instances of regulatory intervention as occur under the current 
disqualification system. For, each instance of civil recovery ought to provide 
at least some direct and quantifiable protective benefit to victims of unfit 
conduct. As such the situation where up to 85% of regulatory interventions
617 See 5.3, supra.
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provide no direct protection should to be avoided. This feature of personal 
liability is consequently likely to lead to fewer interventions with only a 
punitive effect, even if the motivation behind the intervention were 
protective. However, that is not to say that personal liability provisions 
cannot be used to fulfil punitive goals, because they most certainly can. 
Dine618, for example, cites the case of Re a Company (1988)619 to illustrate 
the punitive use of a personal liability provision. In that case a director was 
ordered to pay £131,420 by way of compensation for fraudulent trading 
under section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 along with £25,000 by way of 
punishment for the same conduct. However, what does seem likely is that so 
long as the principle of protection is adhered to, personal liability would 
lead to fewer wasted interventions producing only punitive effects. Which 
(as has been argued above) are likely to produce costs and therefore not 
secure the maximum possible benefit for the ‘public and commercial world’.
A further benefit of a personal liability remedy could be an increased 
deterrent effect from the sanctioning of unfit conduct, relative to that 
secured by disqualification. Such an increase could flow from the incentive 
to avoid unfit conduct created when directors are required to pay its cost, 
which has an arguably greater impact on the director than disqualification620. 
For whilst disqualification can have a financial impact upon a wrongdoer by 
depriving him of his living, the financial consequences of disqualification
618 Dine, supra note 604 at page 325.
619 [1991] BCLC 197.
620 Essentially, personal liability provisions restore directors to a position of unlimited 
liability if  the commit prohibited acts. Therefore, provided directors know which acts are 
prohibited, the treat of personal financial loss ought to be an effective deterrent.
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can be mitigated by entering a partnership or conducting a business as a sole 
trader. With personal liability, however, the financial impact of unfit 
conduct could not so reduced as once a liability order had been made an 
unfit director would be obliged to satisfy it, unless discharged after 
bankruptcy. As such the incentive to avoid potentially ruinous liability 
would be high with a personal liability sanction. Consequently, awareness of 
potential liability for the harm inflicted by unfit conduct is likely to weigh 
much more heavily on the mind of a director contemplating unfit acts than 
the prospect of a disqualification.
8.4.2 Limits of Personal Liability: Asset, Sanction and 
Enforcement Insufficiency.
However, despite its potential advantages over disqualification as a 
remedy for unfit conduct, personal liability provisions are fraught with 
difficulties . For one thing a personal liability sanction for unfit conduct is 
likely to suffer from similar difficulties to those that it has been argued limit 
the effectiveness of enterprise liability provisions (i.e. where corporations 
not individuals are held liable for wrongdoing). Thus, asset insufficiency622 
where directors lack assets to satisfy a liability order is an important factor 
restricting the success of personal liability sanction because where a 
director’s personal assets were less than their liability, the remedy would fail
621 For a discussion of the benefit that the main civil recovery provisions can deliver to 
creditors see S. Wheeler, Swelling the Assets for Distribution in Corporate Insolvency 
[1993] JBL 256.
622 V. Finch, Personal Accountability and Corporate Control: The Role o f Directors and 
Officers Liability Insurance (1994) 57 MLR 880. See also R. Kraakman, Corporate 
Liability Strategies and the Cost o f Legal Controls, (1984) 93 Yale LJ 857.
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to protect creditors from the full harm of unfit conduct. Asset insufficiency 
would be a particular problem for a personal liability provision that could 
only be applied post-insolvency because directors may already have had 
their assets depleted, especially in the case of entrepreneurs who have 
personally guaranteed some corporate debt. Sanction inefficiency , 
whereby judges were unwilling to impose ruinous liability on directors 
whose conduct was not culpable, is another potential drawback to both the 
protective and deterrent effect of personal liability. For any reluctance by the 
courts to impose full liability on a negligent director, for example, because 
of concerns that the financial impact on the director would be 
disproportionate to his ‘blameworthiness’ would prevent creditors from 
being fully protected from unfit conduct. Sanction insufficiency could also 
have an adverse impact on the deterrent effect of personal liability if judges 
were either reluctant to order liability for directors who were not 
blameworthy or if they limited any liability order they did make. However, 
at the other end of the spectrum, deterrence could also suffer if directors 
were made liable for the full cost of unfit conduct on purely protective 
principles because under such an approach dishonest and fraudulent 
directors would not suffer greater penalties for their extra culpability than 
negligent or incompetent directors, in which case it could be argued that 
dishonest and fraudulent conduct may become more likely.
623 Finch, ibid. See generally J. Coffee, No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem o f Corporate Punishment, (1981) 79 Mich. LR
386.
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A further drawback with personal liability is enforcement 
insufficiency624, which occurs when an insufficient number of ‘offences’ are 
detected and prosecuted for a rule to achieve its goals. The experience of the 
pilot civil recovery scheme between 2001-2003 certainly indicates that 
enforcement insufficiency could be a concern with a personal liability 
provision, for that 2 year scheme resulted in only 18 actions for personal 
liability625. However, enforcement insufficiency would not only harm the 
actual protection delivered by a personal liability sanction but could also 
reduce its deterrent effect. However, it should be noted that if the resources 
currently put into disqualification were diverted to civil recovery, the 
number of recovery actions would be likely to rise significantly. Indeed, 
caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions from the lack of success 
of the pilot recovery scheme because that scheme was conducted on a 
conditional fee basis and relies on the participation of private practitioners
f/yf.
who may well have been reluctant to take up risky cases
624 Finch, ibid.
625 See 5.3, supra.
626 The ‘Dear IP’ letter requesting expression of interest from practitioner to participate in a 
national civil recovery scheme suggests that a reluctance to take up risky cases without 
charging a fixed fee had been encountered during the pilot scheme. The letter stated that 
“Whilst it is accepted that civil recovery trustees/liquidators would charge a premium on 
normal fees from recoveries, to cover its risks of funding cases, it would not be acceptable 
for recoveries to be swallowed up to a large extent by fees and disbursements”. See the
‘Dear Insolvency Practitioner’ letter, Issue Number 14, September 2003, chapter 3, page 
3.9. Available at http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/information/dearip/dearipmill/ 
fullissuel4.doc.
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8.4.3 The Limits of Personal Liability: Future Protection and 
Deterrence.
A further significant limitation of the effectiveness of personal 
liability is the fact that it provides no future protection from unfit conduct by 
directors. This could be a particular drawback in light of asset and 
enforcement insufficiency because in cases where the protective impact of 
personal liability was limited by these factors, the total benefit of a personal 
liability sanction could be low. Of course, personal liability also brings the 
benefit of deterrence as well as protection but its effectiveness in this respect 
has also been doubted. Finch notes evidence from North America that the 
deterrent effect of personal liability may be ‘scant’ and that judging the
f f i Q
deterrent effect of personal liability is difficult in any case . The UK 
experience with personal liability provisions certainly does not support the 
view that the deterrent effect of personal liability is strong. The personal 
liability sanction for wrongful trading under section 214 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986, for example, certainly does not seem eradicated insolvent trading 
if the disqualification cases are anything to go by . However, whether this 
is due to problems with section 214 itself630, problems with its enforcement 
or a lack of deterrence from the sanction is unclear.
627 Finch, supra note 622 page 885.
628 See Dewees and Trebilcock, The Efficacy o f the Tort System and its Alternatives: A 
review o f Empirical Evidence, (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall LJ 57, cited in Finch, ibid, note 24.
629 ‘Trading whilst insolvent’ was a matter of unfitness found in almost 43% of the 
disqualification cases included in the empirical research carried out for this thesis. See 
supra 4,7.1, table 1.
630 See generally F. Oditah, Wrongful Trading [1990] LMCLQ 205. Oditah notes the 
benefits that section 214 is capable of providing but also discusses problems with the way
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It is however clear that a personal liability sanction for unfitness 
would suffer from many of the same drawbacks as disqualification. 
Evidence from Baldwin’s study of directors that personal sanctions are not 
the most effective ‘drivers’ of compliance with a regulatory standard would 
apply as equally to personal liability as it does to disqualification . Post­
insolvency sanctioning of unfit conduct would also limit the deterrent effect 
of personal liability if it were to simply replace disqualification without 
more fundamental reform of section 6. That said, the deterrent impact of 
personal liability would depend upon the number of liability orders made 
and the extent of the liability imposed. If liability were seen by directors to 
be frequently imposed then the risk of personal financial harm may well 
come to exercise significant influence over the minds of directors. Indeed, 
for this reason it has been argued that personal liability provisions can 
actually lead to ‘over-deterrence’ whereby people are deterred from 
becoming directors because of the risk of personal liability . This concern 
is often expressed in relation to large companies where the financial risk of 
personal liability is greatest , but could also apply to the owner-manager 
directors against whom disqualification is most often applied. As such, 
personal liability provisions run the risk of imposing a cost in terms of 
desirable business activity prevented by the rule. In terms of those people 
who are prepared to act as directors it is further contended that personal
the section is drafted and uncertainty over who will benefit from it. See also Wheeler supra 
note 621.
631 Baldwin R., The New Punitive Regulation, (2004) 67 MLR 351, see further 6.3.1 supra.
632 Finch, supra note 622
633 Finch, ibid.
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liability may make them excessively risk-averse634. Directors’ liability 
insurance has been offered as a solution to such concerns, but its operation is
/ r - i r
not without problems
8.5 Conclusion.
Therefore, whilst personal liability may bring the advantage of 
protecting some victims of unfit conduct from harm, it is far from being a 
guaranteed way to fulfil the desirable goal of ‘protecting the public and 
commercial world from abuse of limited liability’. As such, it is not 
possible to say that would be a more effective sanction for unfit conduct 
than disqualification, even though disqualification under 6 is clearly 
ineffective. A similar conclusion, it will be recalled, was reached earlier in 
this thesis in respect of a pre-insolvency disqualification regime636. 
Consequently there would seem no obvious way in which effective 
protection from unfit conduct by directors can be secured. However, the 
failure of section 6 and the other methods of regulation considered should be 
taken as leading to this conclusion. For, in truth the alternative regulatory 
strategies that have been discussed are all set within the broad approach to 
regulating unfit conduct laid down by section 6, i.e. regulation that attempts 
to provide protection from unfit conduct after it has occurred. This ex post 
strategy is obvious in section 6, in personal liability provisions and indeed in 
pre-insolvency disqualification, for even in that instance disqualification
634 Finch, ibid. See also M. Jensen, & W. Meckling, Theory o f the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, (1976) J. Financial Econ. 305.
635 See Finch, ibid.
636 See 6.4, supra.
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would occur after unfit conduct has been committed (although before 
insolvency).
The emphasis on ex post strategies in current regulation in bom of a 
desire to maintain free access to limited liability for entrepreneurs yet at the 
same time provide effective protection from its abuse. What the inefficiency 
of section 6 shows is that the current attempt to do so is a failure. However, 
the question marks over alternative regulatory strategies seem to point to 
inherent limitations in the ability of ex post strategies to deliver effective 
protection. Therefore, if the state wishes to provide effective protection from 
unfit ‘abuse of limited liability’ ex ante strategies which prevented the unfit 
from being in a position to commit acts of abuse would be far more 
desirable.
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Chapter 9: Limiting Limited
Liability.
“We are not aware of any evidence suggesting that the ease of 
incorporation [in the UK] (which is cheaper and quicker than almost anywhere else 
in Europe) has lead to unusually high levels of failure or abuse by the standard of 
international comparison"
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for 
a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework, (London DTI, 
1999) at para. 5.2.12.
9.1 Introduction.
The State acknowledges that free access to statutory limited liability 
creates a need for regulation to control undesirable conduct by directors. 
This is obvious from the fact that section 6 is applied only against unfit 
persons who ‘benefit from limited liability’. In the early part of this thesis it 
was shown that regulation is necessary because in the real market place 
statutory limited liability leads to ‘loading’ of risk on to some creditors who 
are unable to protect themselves from the effects of the rule. It was argued 
that this created a ‘need’ for regulation that is most acute in relation to 
owner-managed companies because risk-loading creates a particular moral 
hazard (i.e. incentive to engage in undesirable acts) in these companies, 
which disqualification is intended to control. Disqualification is intended to 
do this in order to preserve the benefit of increased entrepreneurial activity
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that state sees free access to limited liability as bringing. As such, the policy 
of allowing free access to limited liability and disqualification go hand in 
hand. It is not an exaggeration to say that disqualification is necessary to 
legitimise this policy. It exists to re-assure creditors that undesirable 
individuals will not be allowed to transfer excessive risks, and more 
importantly, to prevent the ‘benefits’ of limited liability being wiped out by 
the ‘costs’ of undesirable activity.
However, the net reduction in wealth that section 6 actually brings 
means that it is an inefficient method of controlling undesirable activity that 
ought to be scrapped. The question then would seem to be what alternative 
form of regulation should be put in its place to ensure that the benefits of 
limited liability are not lost through undesirable conduct. However, it is this 
thesis’ argument that the most desirable response to undesirable use of 
limited liability is not to install an alternative form of regulation to replace 
section 6 but rather to address the root cause of the need to regulate directors 
i.e. free access to limited liability itself. For, the failure of section 6 makes it 
doubtful whether allowing free access to limited liability brings any benefit. 
Therefore, little would be lost by restricting access to limited liability in a 
way which removed the ‘problem’ of undesirable conduct by incorporated 
individuals and hence the ‘need’ for regulation.
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9.2 The Choice Presented by the Failure of Disqualification.
Andrew Hicks’ survey of disqualified directors in his ACC A 
report637 provided empirical support for a matter obvious to anyone 
acquainted with section 6 disqualification, i.e. that the vast majority of 
disqualified individuals were owner-managers. This focus on incorporated 
entrepreneurs cannot be ignored when discussing alternative strategies to 
resolve the regulatory problem to which section 6 disqualification is 
addressed. For, section 6’s focus on this issue can only really be taken as a 
comment upon limited liability in such companies.
The State promotes a policy of free access to limited liability 
because it perceives it to bring the benefit of increased entrepreneurial 
activity and therefore an increase in the country’s wealth. However, as was 
discussed in chapter 3, creditors’ demands for compensation will limit the 
actual increase in entrepreneurial activity (and hence wealth) brought by the 
rule. As such, entrepreneurship will only increase where uncompensated 
transfers of risk can be made. However, this apparently beneficial risk 
transferring comes at a cost; that cost being losses resulting from the moral 
hazard that uncompensated risk transferring brings.
To deliver a real benefit therefore limited liability would have to 
bring about an increase in wealth through more entrepreneurial activity that 
exceeded losses from the undesirable activity that the rule creates. However, 
in so far as disqualification under section 6 is a failed attempt by the State to
637 A. Hicks, Disqualification o f Directors: No Hiding Place for the Unit? (London,
Certified Accountants Educational Trust, 1998), see chapter 1, supra.
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control losses from ‘moral hazard’, it can be doubted how far the policy of 
allowing individuals access to limited liability brings any benefit, regardless 
of the costs imposed by section 6. The fact that the State feels the need to 
regulate in order to reduce losses caused by unfit conduct indicates that the 
costs of allowing free access to limited liability are at unacceptable levels. If 
the benefits of the policy were seen to be greater than its costs the regulation 
to reduce cost would be unnecessary if not irrational. Thus, it can be 
assumed that either those costs exceed the benefit brought by limited 
liability or at the very least that an unacceptable portion of those benefits is 
cancelled out by losses such that the benefits of the rule are slight. As such, 
this thesis contends that the ‘problem’ of undesirable conduct by directors 
presents the State with a simple choice.
It is submitted that the State should determine whether its bare policy 
of allowing free access to limited liability is desirable or not according to the 
costs and benefits of the policy. If the State concludes that that policy is 
desirable because it brings benefits greater than its costs638, then the State 
should simply accept the cost of undesirable conduct as an unwelcome but 
inevitable consequence of a desirable policy and disqualification ought to be 
scrapped. However, if the State decides that costs are greater than benefits, 
then the policy itself should be reformed as the most desirable way to 
control undesirable activities by unfit individuals. Disqualification is an 
attempt to avoid this choice by controlling cost through regulation. However 
its existence indicates that the cost of the policy is greater than its benefits,
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in which case methods of preventing risky individuals from obtaining 
limited liability should be considered.
9.3 The Case for Reducing Access to Limited Liability.
The argument for removing limited liability as the most desirable 
response to the ‘problem’ disqualification fails to solve is strong. For not 
only does the existence of disqualification suggest that granting 
entrepreneurs limited liability bring no increase in wealth, but it is also true 
that granting owner-managers statutory limited liability brings none of the 
other benefits which have been claimed for the rule.
Such benefits have become prominent in the literature favouring 
limited liability because of the problems presented for the ‘increased risk- 
taking’ argument by Posner’s ‘compensation model’. For, as was made clear 
earlier in this thesis, if creditors were able to demand compensation in the 
manner claimed by Posner, limited liability would not result in increased 
risk-taking. Posner’s thesis has presented adherents to the contractual 
analysis of the company with a problem, for their instinct to favour the 
entrepreneur over other groups makes then pre-disposed to favour a rule 
which benefits him. As such, they have been forced to develop alternative 
arguments in favour of allowing shareholders to oust normal market rules 
and invoke statutory asset partitioning.
Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, concede that a rule of limited 
liability is unlikely to lead to more or less risk taking than a rule of limited
638 ‘Cost’ in this instance could include economic and/or social costs.
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liability639. They make this concession when seeking to rebuff the argument 
that limited liability leads to ‘socially excessive risk-taking’ and are quite 
correct to make this point, as under Posner’s model ‘moral hazard’ ought to 
be the same under both limited and unlimited liability640. Nonetheless, they 
assert six ‘rationales’ for limited liability, and assert rather weakly, that “[i] f  
limited liability were not the starting point in corporate law, firms would 
create it by contract”641. Their assertion is, however, unsupported by 
empirical evidence and impossible to sustain. Firms may want to create 
limited liability through contract, but it is far from certain that they would be 
able to create it, because to do so they need the agreement of creditors. And 
it is fanciful to state without any supporting evidence that creditors would 
always agree to create limited liability. Rather, under a statutory position of 
unlimited liability, limited liability would only be created to the extent that 
creditors were induced to create it. And creditors’ willingness to create 
limited liability through contract would depend upon a number of variable 
factors, such as the creditworthiness of a firm and the compensation offered.
However, despite their obvious enthusiasm for the rule Easterbrook 
and Fischer accept that none of the six ‘rationales’ for limited liability apply 
to owner-managed companies642 and that it brings an incentive to engage in 
overly risky activity. They do not however, go so far as to advocate the
639 Easterbrook and Fischel The Economic Structure o f Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass, 
Harvard University Press, 1991), page 52.
640 See 3.3 supra.
641 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 639, page 41.
642 See also, P. Halpem, M. Trebilcock, and S. Turnbull, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, (1980) 30 U. Toronto. L. J. 117 who concludes that unlimited liability is 
likely to be a more efficient rule for owner-managed firms.
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removal of limited liability from owner-managed firms. Rather, they only 
note that piercing the veil reduces the extent to which creditors bear the 
costs of undesirable conduct643. However, given the restrictive approach to 
the courts of to piercing the veil644 this is hardly a satisfactory response to 
the problem that entrepreneurs with limited liability present. Others appear 
less ready to concede the point645.
Easterbrook and Fischel are quite correct to conclude that limited 
liability brings few benefits. For example, the assertion that limited liability 
decreases monitoring costs because it reduces shareholders incentive to 
monitor directors646 and fellow shareholders is clearly inapplicable to 
entities where there is complete unity of ownership and control. Monitoring 
is not only unnecessary, but also impossible in such circumstances. The 
argument that limited liability reduces the monitoring costs of creditors is 
similarly inapplicable to owner-managed companies.
In larger companies with many shareholders, a rule of unlimited 
liability could increase overall monitoring costs by creating an incentive for 
creditors to monitor the wealth of a large and fluctuating body of
643 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 639, chapter 2.
644 In Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch. 433 the Court of Appeal comprehensively 
rejected attempts to establish a broad doctrine allowing the courts the freedom to disregard 
the corporate veil where the merely felt that it would be just to do so, such as that favoured 
by Lord Denning in DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v Tower Hamlets LBC. [1976] 1 WLR 
852. Rather, the court favoured a narrow definition of the circumstances in which the veil 
could be lifted. See chapter 2, supra.
645 For example, Hansmann and Kraakman claim that statutory limited liability “can play a 
valuable contracting role even in situations where a corporation has a single shareholder 
who does not require the corporate form to raise equity capital...” See: Kraakman, Davies, 
Hansamnn, Hertig, Hopt, Kanda and Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative 
and Functional Approach, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), chapter 1. See also R. 
Posner, The Rights o f Creditors o f Affiliated Corporations, (1967) 43 U. Chi. L.R. 499.
646 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 639, page 41-42.
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shareholders647. This, however, is not the case with limited liability where 
creditors only need to monitor the assets of the corporation and, as such, less 
monitoring will take place. However, with owner-managed companies the 
difference in monitoring costs under both limited and unlimited liability 
would not be great, as in both situations creditors only need to monitor a 
fixed pool of assets. Thus, unlimited liability may be just as efficient as 
limited liability648 for small owner-managed companies. It is even 
conceivable that unlimited liability in owner-managed firms may decrease 
monitoring costs because the greater security of creditors may reduce their 
incentive to monitor. Conversely, the response of risk-minimising creditors 
to statutory limited liability may well be to increase monitoring of an 
entrepreneur if they have been unable to secure compensation for increased 
risk because of the skewing effect of the statutory rule. In such a situation 
general monitoring is the only weapon a creditor has to protect his position, 
even if monitoring alone would not be a particularly effective weapon649.
Furthermore, the argument that limited liability promotes the free 
transfer of shares which in turn increases managers’ incentive to act 
efficiently650 is also inapplicable to owner-managed companies because 
shares in such companies are not freely transferable. Thus, there will be no 
market for shares to reflect the value of the firm and the threat of take-over
647 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 639, Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull, supra, note 
642.
648 Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull, ibid.
649 Aside from exerting moral pressure on the entrepreneur, there would be little that an 
unsecured creditor could do to prevent harmful conduct even if he became aware of it. In 
order to prevent wrongful trading a creditor could partition the court to wind up a company
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for inefficient management will not arise. Manne’s assertion that limited 
liability permits efficient diversification651 in investment portfolios is also 
inapplicable to owner-managed companies, for they are not primarily 
vehicles for investment. Thus, they do nothing to allow investors to spread 
risk by investing in a range of different companies.
The argument that statutory limited liability for entrepreneurs 
reduces the transaction costs associated with bargaining between owners and 
their creditors has some mileage in it. However, it is not a strong argument 
because the supposed reduction in transaction costs assumes that individuals 
who currently benefit from the rule would create limited liability through 
contract if the rule were abolished. However, this is not necessarily so as 
they would only create it to the extent that creditors consented to its 
creation. In any case, it is unclear whether a rule of limited liability would 
reduce transaction costs as compared to a rule of unlimited liability. For, a 
rule o f statutory limited liability brings its own transaction costs because 
where creditors seek to contract around imposed limited liability; transaction 
costs will be incurred in negotiating away from limited liability, the same as 
they would be in negotiating away from unlimited liability under the 
alternative rule. The particular legal rule used (limited or unlimited liability) 
is irrelevant to transaction costs unless parties never seek to depart from the
under section 122 of the Insolvency Act. However, such action would be unlikely to help 
unsecured creditors.
650Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 639, page 42
651 See Manne H, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, (1967) 53 Va. L. R. 
259. See also B. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Practice (Oxford, 
Claredon Press, 1997), page 499 and L. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories o f the 
Corporation (1991) MLR 80, page 99-102.
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rule, and some parties are likely to seek to transact away from either rule. 
Therefore, the ‘saving’ of statutory limited liability is more imagined than 
real and, what is more, comes at significant cost to creditors.
9.3.2 The Abolition of Limited Liability.
Thus, there would seem no reason why limited liability for 
undercapitalised, owner-managed companies should not be abolished as the 
most preferable method of preventing directors from ‘abusing the privilege 
of limited liability’. For, preventing such persons from obtaining limited 
liability in the first place would remove at a stroke most of the problem that 
necessitates regulation. It is not therefore submitted that reducing access to 
limited liability for entrepreneurs would eradicate all loss from undesirable 
use of limited liability, merely, that it would reduce the greater portion of 
the loss that the State sees as necessitating regulation. Thus, this argument 
only seeks to demonstrate that restricting access to limited liability would be 
an effective method of addressing the regulatory problem that 
disqualification is aimed at. It is not claimed that limited liability for firms 
that are not owner-managed is a necessarily desirable rule. There may be 
arguments for further restriction of that rule to address other regulatory 
problems, as will be made clear at the conclusion of this chapter. However, 
the case for the abolition of statutory limited liability is strongest in relation 
to owner-managed companies.
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9.4 Methods of Restricting Limited Liability.
9.4.1 A Minimum Shareholder Requirement
The goal of restricting access to limited liability as the most desirable 
method of preventing unfit conduct by directors is easier to state than to 
achieve in practice.
An obvious method of attempting to prevent high-risk individuals 
from incorporating could be by means of a rule that required companies to 
have minimum number of shareholders, say for example 10 shareholders. 
Such a rule could prevent individuals from incorporating and where 
incorporation was possible, allow some scope for shareholder monitoring of 
directors to control undesirable activity (assuming at least some 
shareholders would not also be directors).
Such a reform is most unlikely to be successful however. History 
teaches us that such a rule could be easily circumvented, as the example of 
the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 and the facts of Salomon v Salomon652 
shows. And indeed it unlikely that ‘nominee’ shareholders would be 
effective monitors due to family ties and general passivity .
A rule denying limited liability to de facto owner-managed firms 
could be one way around the use of nominee shareholders. However, such a 
rule could run into definitional problems and prove difficult and expensive 
to enforce, which is likely to restrict its effectiveness. For example, such a 
rule would be likely to lead to disputes as to the true role of non-
652 [1897] A.C. 22
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management shareholders with ‘entrepreneurs’ seeking to show that some 
shareholders were ‘independent’. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that 
greater diversity in the ownership of firms would prevent excessive risk 
shifting, moral hazard and unfit conduct. Part-managers and ‘independent’ 
shareholders may be just as likely effect excessive risk transfers as single 
entrepreneurs.
9.4.2 A Minimum Capital Requirement.
The imposition of a minimum capital requirement for private limited 
companies is a potentially more attractive reform to reduce ‘abuse’ of 
limited liability. Minimum capital requirements are commonplace in 
continental jurisdictions where they are seen as an important method of 
protecting creditors from abuse of limited liability654. They have not, 
however, proved popular in the Anglo-American legal tradition655, and the 
rules relating to minimum capitalisation in the UK apply only to public 
companies. The combined effect of section 11 and 118 of the Companies 
Act 1985 is that a public company cannot commence trading unless it has 
allocated at least £50,000 of capital, although only one-quarter of that
653 See chapter 2, supra.
654 See J. Freedman, Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms (2000) 63 
MLR 317. Freedman notes at pages 335-336 that there has been some relaxation o f capital 
requirements and they are not universally accepted as a successful method of creditor 
protection.
655 The extent to which free access to limited liability has welded itself to notions o f free 
enterprise is evident in the 7th edition of Gower and Davies ’ Principle o f Modem Company 
Law which states that one risk associated with introducing a minimum capital requirement 
into UK would be that it was set at too high a level, which would “simply reduce 
competition (by discouraging new entrants into the field [of limited liability]”. P Davies, 
Gower and Davies ’ Principles o f Modem Company Law, 7th Edn, (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2003), page 229.
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amount need be paid-up656. In addition to the requirement that public 
companies have minimum capitalisation, the Act proscribes that if a 
company’s net assets fall below one-half of its capital, the company must 
convene a shareholders meeting to consider whether any steps should be 
taken657. Private companies however, are not subject to this provision.
The issue of extending the minimum capitalisation requirement to 
private companies was discussed by the Company Law Review Steering 
Group as part of its recent review of UK company law. The Steering Group 
rationalised rules regulating share capital as mechanisms of creditor
/'CO
protection . However the group’s work focused on how current rules 
regulating the raising and maintenance of capital659 could be reformed to 
meet this objective and it did not encourage consultees to advocate the 
introduction of any restrictions on access to limited liability660. The notion 
of extending minimum capitalization requirements was, unsurprisingly, 
reject by the group but was favoured by a number of respondents to the 
Review Group’s consultation exercise661.
In the academic literature the notion of minimum capital 
requirements as an effective method of creditor protection has been widely
656 Section 101(1) Companies Act 1985. On the Companies Act requirements, see 
generally E. Ferran, Creditors Interests and ‘Core’ Company Law (1999) 20 Co Law 314.
657 Ibid section 142.
658 Company Law Review Steering Group, The Strategic Framework, (London, DTI 1999) 
page 81.
659 The Strategic Framework, ibid, chapter 5.4. For the groups final recommendations on 
regform o f the capital maintenance regime see. Company Law Review Steering Group, 
Completing the Structure, (London, DTI, 2000, chapter 7.
660 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modem Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: The Strategic Framework (London, DTI, 1999). The group posed the question to
consultees ‘is it agreed that it is not desirable to restrict access to limited liability? If not, 
then what constraints should be considered?
311
criticised662. Instead the rule is discussed simply as a mechanism for 
restricting access to limited liability, as, indeed, it was by the Company Law 
Review Group663.
The argument that minimum capital requirements are, in themselves, 
effective mechanisms to protect creditors from loss must always have been 
more illusory than real because to be effective a capital requirement would 
have to vary according to the riskiness of the business664, equal the 
company’s highest expected level of debts665 and would have to 
accompanied by rules preventing the loss of capital through trading. As 
Cheffins comments, the mere fact that a company’s memorandum states that 
it has a certain level of capital is no guarantee that the stated sum will be 
available if the company is in financial distress666.Thus it is easy to see why 
a simple capital requirement is viewed as an unattractive form of regulation 
if the objective of policy is to protect creditor’s interests.
It is for this reason that rationalisation of minimum capital 
requirements tends towards their benefits as methods of restricting access to 
limited liability. This benefit is particularly useful to questions presented in
66'See Freedman, supra note 654, page 336.
662 See for example, Freedman, supra note 654, Easterbrook and Fishcel, The Economic 
Structure o f Corporate Law, (Cambridge, Mass, 1991) Chapter 2, H. Hansmann and R. 
Kraakman, Towards Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, (1991) 100 Yale 
LJ 1879, B.Ceffins, Company Law: Theory Structure and Operation (Oxford, Claredon 
Press, 1997) and J. Armour, Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for  
Modem Company Law (2000) 63 MLR 355..
663 The Strategic Framework, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., chapters 5.1 -  
5.6.
664 P. Davies, Gower and Davies ’ Principles o f  Modem Company Law, 17th Edition, ( 
London, Sweet and Maxwell 2003) page 229.
665 Easterbrook and Fischel, ibid, page 60
666 B. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory Structure and Operation (Oxford, Claredon Press, 
1997, page 531. See also Gower and Davies, supra note 664, pages 229-230, Freedman, 
supra note , page 337
312
response to the failure of disqualification. However, before this aspect of a 
minimum capital requirement is considered, it is intuitive to consider other 
benefits that such a rule could bring..
9.4.2.1 Corporate Prospects and Moral Hazard.
The undercapitalisation of private companies has been an area of
•  • (\( \1  concern noted by several inquires into UK company law . The danger
posed by such undercapitaliastion is essentially twofold, depending upon the
precise definition of ‘undercapitalisation’ adopted. In the first instance
‘undercapitalisation’ can refer to a company in which insufficient capital is
injected to give the business a realistic chance of success . ‘Capital’ in this
sense would include, share capital, loan capital and any other source of
finance put into the business as it’s inception. In essence, therefore such a
company can be described as having insufficient capital. Lending to a
company with insufficient capital will be significantly riskier than lending to
companies with adequate capitalisation,. In the second incidence
undercapitalisation can refer to a company which has a small amount o f
share capital. These two aspects of undercapitalisation are in no way
exclusive, indeed they will often go hand in hand. A company, for example,
which has insufficient capital for its business needs will often have very
little share capital and in all cases will have insufficient share capital. That
said, it is possible for a company to have very little share capital, yet not be
667 See, for example, Report o f  the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, 
(Chairman Sir Kenneth Cork), Cmnd 8558, (London, HMSO, 1982), which proposed 
reforms to designed to penalise those who abuse the privilege o f limited liability by 
operating behind one-man, insufficiently capitalised companies”, (ibid, para 1815). See
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undercapitalised in so far as it has adequate capital fro other sources to meet 
its business needs.
Nonetheless, both aspects of undercapitalisation pose a danger to 
creditors, in the case if insufficient capital through increased risk of failure,
/T/TO
and in the case of small share capital from acute ‘moral hazard’ . The 
moral hazard problem where shareholders limit their liability to a nominal 
investment is, as has been noted in previous chapters, a particular concern 
in the UK where the overwhelming majority of companies having £100 or 
less of capital669.In terms of whether this statistic demonstrates a large 
number of companies with insufficient capital, however, we must be 
cautious not to conclude that all such companies have insufficient capital. It 
is likely that in many small companies share capital is seen primarily as a 
device to limit liability and bares little relation to the money actually 
injected in the business670. As such many, apparently undercapitalised 
companies will actually have received a significantly higher injection of 
cash in the form of loan capital671. Nonetheless even if such companies are
also, Company Law Committee Report (Chairman Lord Jenkins) Cmnd. 1749 (London, 
HMSO, 1967),
668 Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull, An Economic Analysis o f Limited Liability in 
Corporation Law, (1980) 30 U. Toronto L.J. 117. On moral hazard generally, see T. Baker, 
On the Genology o f Moral Hazard, (1996) 75 Texas LR 237; E. Bele Posner and Moral 
Hazard, (2000) 7 Conn. Ins. LJ 81; S. Chandler, Visualising Moral Hazard, (1995) 1 Conn, 
Ins. LJ 97; G. Goble, The Moral Hazard Clause o f the Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 
(1937) 37 Columbia L. Rev 410. For a slightly different view of moral hazard see D. Stone, 
Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as a Moral Opportunity (1991) 77 Cornell Law Rev. 
1099.
669 Companies in 2003-2004, (London, DTI, 2004), table A7, chapter 2, supra.
670 J. Freedman and M.Godwin, Incorporating the Micro-Business: Perception and 
Misperceptions, in A.Hughes and D. Story, Finance and the Small Firm, (London, 
Routledge, 1994).
671 Freedman and.Godwin’s survey o f incorporated and unincorporated businesses, (ibid). 
found that borrowing from banks and trade creditors were the largest sources of finance for 
incorporated businesses and that capital ‘invested by the owner’ was cited as the ‘most
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not at the increased risk of insolvency associated with insufficient capital, 
the moral hazard associated will small share capital is certainly an acute 
danger.
The Jenkins Committee felt that the introduction of a minimum 
capital requirement for private companies would help ensure that companies 
had some ‘financial substance’ to be of benefit to creditors. However, whilst 
the committee’s report ‘reluctantly’ declined to recommend the institution of 
a minimum capital requirement because of the ease with which it could be 
evaded, the idea was taken up by the 1973 White Paper of company law 
reform672.
Minimum capitalization certainly has the potential to address both 
the problems of insufficient capital being contributed to companies and that 
of ‘moral hazard’ in companies with particularly small amounts of share 
capital, and in so far as disqualification is intended to tackle both problems 
(especially moral hazard) its institution could be an attractive form of 
substitute regulation. A rule ensuring that companies were sufficiently 
capitalized before they began trading, for example, ought to reduce chances 
of business failure and in so doing benefit creditors, as well as addressing 
the ‘moral hazard’ problem by preventing incorporators from shifting the 
risk of their businesses activities to their creditors to the extent that they are 
currently able do. In short increased investment should increase the
important source of finance’ in substantially fewer incorporated companies than was the 
case in unincorporated firms (21.6% citing self-finance as ‘most important’ in companies 
compared to 70.5% in unincorporated firms), ibid, page 259.
672 Department of Trade and Industry, Company Law Reform White Paper, Cmnd 5391 
(London, HMSO, 1962), para 27. The reforms, were however, never implemented.
315
incentive for owner-managers to behave responsibly and, therefore, reduce
f . n ' i
moral hazard .
However, to be effective in reducing both problems it would be 
necessary that the any capital requirement was related to the riskiness of 
each individual business. In terms of the problems of insufficient capital, 
they can, rather obviously, only be eradicated by ensuring that companies 
have an amount of capital that is suited to the particular needs of their trade 
or business. In order to be regarded as adequately capitalised, some 
businesses, such as those with high start-up costs, would require relatively 
high levels of capital. Some businesses on the other hand, such as a 
company incorporated to obtain tax advantages for it incorporator and which 
has no plans to grow, would need relatively little capital. In short, what 
constitutes ‘sufficient’ capital is an entirely subjective matter, and the more 
risk that is associated with a particular business the more capital it would 
need. Therefore a uniform minimum capital requirement (such as that 
applied to public companies) is most unlikely to resolve problems associated 
with insufficient capitalisation. Under such a rule some companies would 
certainly remain insufficiently capitalised (although perhaps to a lesser 
degree than they would be without a minimum capital rule) and other 
companies would be required to invest too much capital.674 Much the same 
problem arises with a minimum capital requirement as a solution to the 
problem of ‘moral hazard’, although perhaps to a lesser degree.
673 A. Gnmdfest, The Limited Future o f Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets 
Perspective, (1992) 102 Yale LJ 387 at page 421.
674 Gnmdfest, ibid, and Easterbrook and Fischel supra note 664, Freedman, supra note 654.
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The ‘moral hazard’ that exists where entrepreneurs invest a minimal 
amount of capital in a company is determined by the entrepreneur’s 
incentive to maximise his own welfare at the expense of others. The extent 
of that incentive (and hence the ‘moral hazard’) will itself be determined by 
the characteristics of each entrepreneur. The economic definition of ‘moral 
hazard’ has tended to eschew the ‘moral’ element of the incentive to engage 
in risky conduct, at least in so far as criteria such as honesty are 
trustworthiness are relevant . Instead economists focus exclusively on the 
‘rational’ economic incentive maximise welfare. Nonetheless, the economic 
‘moral hazard’ recognises variation in incentives between different 
individuals676. Thus, whether it be because of greater honesty of varying 
incentives to maximise welfare, the ‘moral hazard’ accompanying limited 
liability will vary in each individual case. Therefore, if a minimum capital 
requirement, were to effectively tackle ‘moral hazard’ it too would have to 
vary according such characteristics. Thus, the more likely an individual was 
to exploit moral hazard, the higher his required investment should be in 
order to of-set this temptation.
However, whilst variable capital requirements would be necessary to 
effectively address the problems of moral hazard and business failure, they 
are likely to be highly impractical, if not impossible, rules put into law. Such 
rules would be complex to formulate, apply and administer; requiring 
exhaustive inquiry into hundreds of business sectors and modes of
675 See generally T. Baker, On the Genealogy o f  Moral Hazard, (1996) 75 Texas LR 237
676 Baker ibid.. See also K. Arrow, The Economics o f Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 
(1968) 58 American Economic Review 537.
317
entrepreneurial conduct in order to formulate appropriate benchmarks to be 
applied to each business and individual. In addition, a complicated statutory 
formulation of different capital requirements would be needed. Lastly, and 
perhaps most importantly, a burdensome administrative procedure would be 
necessary if the law where to be effective, whereby each company and 
entrepreneur was assessed by the registrar to ensure that an appropriate 
capital requirement was set and complied with. Furthermore, if such rules 
were to provide meaningful protection to creditors in the long-term, 
capitalisation would have to be kept under review as companies grew and 
their business diversified.
The practical hurdles to an effective (variable) capital requirement 
are therefore significant and likely to defy attempts to easily overcome them. 
A capital requirement that varied simply with a company’s turnover, for 
example, would be relatively crude and ineffective as turnover is not a 
reliable indicator of the risk of the business or indeed the entrepreneurs 
dispensation to exploit moral hazard. Indeed, turnover is a difficult criterion 
to use as minimum capital would have to be set at incorporation when 
turnover could only be projected. Actual turnover may prove to be very 
different from that envisaged before trading. The necessity for variability in 
minimum capital requirement for them to be effective, but the problems 
inherent in such a regime, therefore make the rule an unattractive method of 
creditor protection.
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9A.2.2 A Minimum Capital Requirement and the Diversification of 
Shareholding.
An appropriately high minimum capital requirement could also 
reduce the likelihood of undesirable conduct by reducing the number of 
owner-managed companies, thereby making the model of shareholder 
monitoring a more realist strategy to control directors’ conduct. To achieve 
this goal the capital requirement would have to be set at a level that made it 
unlikely that individuals would be able to incorporate alone and therefore 
made it necessary to attract outside investment. The consequential increase 
in diversification of ownership that this would cause would increase the 
prospects of monitoring by risk-minimising investors677 and therefore 
decrease the risk of ‘abuse of limited liability’. However, as I have 
previously stated, diversified shareholding is only likely to reduce unfit 
conduct to the extent that shareholders are willing and able to monitor 
managers. It should also be recognised that a capital requirement is not 
certain to increase diversification in ownership of all companies. For, 
whatever the level at which the requirement was set, some individuals would 
still be able to incorporate. However, even with these drawbacks the capital 
requirement would still have the advantage of forcing those individuals who
677Some authors have claimed that increased monitoring would lead to wasteful transaction 
costs, see, Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull, An Economic Analysis o f Limited Liability in 
Corporation Law, supra note 642, and Jensen and Meckling, Theory o f  the Firm: 
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, (1976) 3 Journal of 
Financial Economics 305. The claim has been made in response to the proposed upsurge in 
monitoring that unlimited liability would bring about, but would be equally applicable any 
to increase in monitoring brought about by a diversification in the ownership of firms. In 
either context the claim that increased monitoring leads to increased transaction costs can 
hardly be a disadvantage if  it reduces mismanagement and moral hazard.
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incorporated to bear more risk and increase their incentive for responsible 
management.
9.4.2.3 Restricting Access to Limited Liability.
As a vehicle to prevent the regulatory problem that disqualification 
fails to resolve, perhaps the main advantage of a minimum capital 
requirement is simply that it would form a barrier to incorporation 
preventing the riskiest of entrepreneurs from obtaining limited liability 
For, assuming that risky individuals would find it hard to attract outside 
investment and be reluctant to invest significant sums of their own money in 
the company, unfit individuals would be less likely to incorporate. Of course 
this depends on Banks and other potential suppliers of capital being able to 
identify ‘rogues’. Indeed, it was for this reason that the Jenkins Committee 
originally proposed the introduction of a minimum capital requirement in 
the UK679. Freedman also claims that a minimum capital requirement would 
prevent ‘frivolous’ incorporations . However, it is submitted that to be 
successful in significantly reducing use of limited liability by ‘unfit’ 
individuals and by definition reducing the ‘abuse’ of limited liability at 
which disqualification is targeted, a minimum capital requirement would 
essentially have to mimic the idealised perfect market with unlimited
678 See Kahn-Freud who argued that minimum capital requirement would make 
incorporation more difficult and expensive thereby restoring limited liability companies to 
their ‘original function’, O. Kahn-Freund, Some Reflections on Company Law Reform 
(1944) MLR 54.
679 Company Law Committee Report (Chairman Lord Jenkins) Cmnd 1749 (1962). The 
white paper following the report proposed a £1000 capital requirement as a method of 
reducing ‘frivolous’ incorporations (see Company Law Reform white Paper, Cmnd 5391 
(1973). The proposal however was not pursued following the general elections of 1974.
680 Freedman, supra, note 654.
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liability, i.e. prevent individuals who could not obtain limited liability in the 
market from incorporating.
A consequence of the introduction of a successful minimum capital 
requirement would therefore be a decrease in the number of firms with 
limited liability. For, entrepreneurs who could not attract sufficient capital 
would not gain limited liability and be subject to the full force of the market 
in their dealings with creditors. Any notion that this decrease in limited 
liability would be undesirable because it reduced ‘competition’681 and by 
implication, wealth creation, would be misconceived. Generally, 
businessmen with unlimited liability are more likely to strike welfare- 
maximising bargains with their creditors. Unlimited liability for the 
individual is, indeed, preferable to a situation of statutory limited liability 
where the entrepreneur is able to oust the market from his dealings with the 
creditor with the harmful consequences that disqualification tries (and fails) 
to resolve through regulation. Further, individuals denied statutory limited 
liability are also likely to be more efficient risk takers because as Eucken
f.O'y
notes , unlimited liability creates incentives for the unincorporated 
entrepreneur to take more care of his business by bearing the risk of his 
activities and to learn about responsible management through his bargaining 
with creditors.
681 Davies, supra note 664.
682W. Eucken, The Foundations o f Economics (Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1992), cited in D. 
Campbell and S. Griffin, ENRON and the End of Corporate Governance, in S. MacLeod 
and J. Parkinson, (eds), Global Governance and the Quest for Justice, vol 2, (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2004). See also Kahn-Freund, supra note 678.
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Of those entrepreneurs who could not initially obtain statutory 
limited liability, only those whose businesses grew successfully under 
conditions of unlimited liability, or who were able to meet the capital 
requirement by way of a loan, would be able to avail themselves of limited 
liability once they had amassed sufficient capital to incorporate. 
Consequently, the likelihood of abuse of limited liability by those who 
obtained it would be much reduced compared to the current situation where 
an entrepreneur is able to avail himself of limited liability ab initio and shift 
risk even if he has no experience of managing a business.
A potential problem with a minimum capital requirement however is 
that its ability to prevent undesirable individuals from obtaining limited 
liability depends upon it being set at an appropriate level. The difficulty in 
finding such a level is a common ground for criticism of minimum capital
/tot
requirements and have been noted in an earlier part of this discussion. 
However, where a capital requirement was used simply restrict access to 
limited liability, (as opposed to solving the problem of insufficient capital or 
‘moral hazard’), it could be argued that there is a less pressing need to 
ensure that capital varies according to risk of the venture or the 
characteristics of the individual entrepreneur. All that would appear to be 
required is that the capital rule was set at such a level as to prevent 
incorporation by risky individuals. In essence the function of the minimum 
capital requirement would be to restore market transactions to the
683 Easter brook and Fischel, supra note 664, H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, Towards 
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts (1991) 100 Yale LJ 1879.
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acquisition of limited liability, i.e. limited liability could only be obtained 
through transacting with creditors. The major difference, however, is that 
under a default rule of unlimited liability multiple transactions specifically 
creating limited liability are needed, whereas with a capital requirement only 
a single (or small series of) credit transactions are needed. Therefore an 
advantage of a minimum capitalization requirement would be that it restored 
some market control over the acquisition of limited liability, whilst saving 
the transaction costs associated with multiple bargaining.
However, as the acquisition of limited liability under a regime with 
minimum capital requirements would rely upon the actions of creditors, the 
same criticisms discussed in earlier parts of this thesis apply, namely that 
transaction costs and information deficits will in many cases prevent the 
market from excluding rogues. However, in so far as entrepreneurs would 
need to produce minimum capital at the point of incorporation, a major 
source of credit to meet a minimum capital requirement is likely to be Banks
fJ O A
and similar suppliers of credit . In so far as Banks are more successful at 
accurately adjusting their terms of credit to characteristics of entrepreneurs
f . O C
and their businesses , a minimum capital requirement could be an effective 
at preventing ‘unfit’ directors from obtaining limited liability. On the other 
hand, the Banks still suffer from some information asymmetry and 
transaction costs when making decisions and some unsuitable individuals 
may obtain limited liability whilst others, who are ‘suitable’ would not. And
684 Trade creditors, for example would not be a viable source of finance as they tend not to 
loan ‘cash’ that could be used to meet capital rules.
685 See 3.3 above.
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it hardly need be said that some ‘unfit’ individuals would always be able to 
satisfy a minimum capital requirement without the need for credit.
A more fundamental criticism of the notion that Banks would be 
effective gatekeepers for limited liability is that their bargaining with 
entrepreneurs will be self-interested, and as such, be of little benefit to other 
creditors. Where an entrepreneur sought a loan from a Bank to meet a 
minimum capital requirement, the Bank’s objective would be to protect
f.Of.
itself by taking security over corporate and personal assets as well as
/ o 7
adjusting interest payments to risk . The Bank would not be concerned 
with ensuring that limited liability was only obtained by ‘responsible’ 
individuals. Where the Banks’ welfare goals could be satisfied they would 
be likely to advance credit, thereby allowing the acquisition of limited 
liability and there is no guarantee that the self-interested bargain of the bank 
would exclude unfit individuals and therefore protect creditors. Indeed, very 
risky individuals may find it easy to obtain the necessary credit to 
incorporate if, in return, they are prepared to give a charge over their 
personal property that guarantees that the Bank will be able to recoup its 
credit (e.g. a mortgage on property of a value greater than that of the loan). 
In such a scenario the Bank will be happy but other creditors left in exactly 
the same situation as exists under the current law, i.e. contracting with a 
risky individual who has unilaterally invoked limited liability. Therefore, the 
notion that Banks and similar creditors will be effective ‘gatekeepers’ of
686 Freedman and Godwin, supra note 670.
687 R. Posner, The Rights o f Creditors o f  Affiliated Corporations, (1967) 43 U. Chi. L.R.
499.
324
limited liability under a minimum capital regime is rather simplistic. In 
some cases the need to attract capital before investment may exclude the 
‘unfit’, but it is by no means guaranteed to do so and Banks as will, quite 
naturally be self-interested in their bargaining.
Indeed, the self-interested nature of bargaining in credit transitions 
makes it quite likely that a minimum capital rule could be counter­
productive for creditors. If a minimum capital requirement led to an increase 
in borrowing in the manner described above i.e. borrowing secured by
/ • Q O
charges on corporate and personal assets , then creditors who cannot or 
have not obtained similar security would be severely disadvantaged in 
insolvency proceedings. The increased ability of Banks to protect 
themselves with sophisticated security devices means that the sort of 
creditor who are likely to suffer from the rule would be exactly those whom 
it was designed to protect (e.g. trade creditors). Of course, the extent to 
which lending increased because of a capital requirement would depend 
upon the level at which the capital requirement was set. If the level were 
relatively low then there is unlikely to be a significant increase, at least in so 
far as the level is lower than the level of credit that entrepreneurs would 
have sought to finance the business in any case. However, in this scenario 
the capital requirement would not fulfil its purpose of deterring 
incorporation (at least in cases where Banks were indifferent to risk because 
of security devices). Rather, if it is to be effective in deterring incorporation,
688 E.g Banks, which tend to take security for their debt, see Freedman and Godwin, supra 
note 670 .
325
the requirement would have to be set at a level that forced entrepreneurs to 
seek more credit than they otherwise would (i.e. to a point where risk was a 
controlling factor because security devices no longer provide a guarantee of 
repayment). Thus, to be effective at ‘protecting’ creditors from unfit 
directors with limited liability the requirement would have to increase the 
necessity to borrow, however, the more borrowing that were required the 
more disadvantaged unsecured creditors would become.
The introduction of a minimum capital requirement is not therefore, 
an attractive strategy by which to limit access to limited liability. In short it 
is plagued by significant practical barriers, doubts over the ability of 
creditors to exclude rogues from incorporating, problems of evasion and 
even the potential to harm certain groups of creditors.
Another strategy to reduce the moral hazard associated with statutory 
limited liability is liability insurance. Insurance has sometimes been 
discussed as an alternative measure to a minimum capital requirement or 
other devices for restricting access to limited liability. However, there is no 
reason why liability insurance should be an alternative to such a system, for 
a precondition of liability insurance would be some legal rule to modify 
access to limited liability. In so far as one option is to abolish limited 
liability completely it can be viewed as an alternative to a capital 
requirement, which would merely restrict access to limited liability. 
However, my discussion is focused on the problem of limited liability in 
owner-managed companies and as such is not concerned with whether 
limited liability should be abolished for all companies; rather it is concerned
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with preventing the excessive moral hazard that accompanies 
undercapitalised incorporated individual. In this context insurance is not an 
alternative to a minimum capital requirement. A minimum capital 
requirement could be used as a mechanism to deny individuals access to 
statutory limited liability but insurance could have a role in providing 
limited liability for individuals according to market principles.
9.4.4 The Role of Liability Insurance.
The compensation model of statutory limited liability implies that far 
from allowing entrepreneurs to transfer risk to creditors, the rule actually 
obliges them to purchase a form of insurance from creditors. This 
‘insurance’ is purchased in the form of the higher price for credit that must
iTOQ
be paid for the benefits of limited liability . However, the phenomenon is 
perhaps more accurately described not as debtors purchasing insurance but 
as creditors ‘self-insuring’, for creditors are forced into a position of risk by 
the statutory rule from which compensation is their only escape. However, it 
is clear that higher charges for credit will not always protect creditors from 
the effects of statutory limited liability. An alternative approach that could 
afford greater protection to creditors would be to replace statutory limited 
liability with a compulsory insurance requirement for entrepreneurs who 
wished to incorporate, thus leave the liability status of entrepreneurs to be 
determined by an insurance market. In such system only those who were
689 One author attributes the existence of statutory limited liability to the failure of insurance 
markets. See Arrow, Essays in the Theory o f  Risk Bearing, (1971), cited in Halpem, 
Trebilcock and Turnbull, supra note 668, page 128.
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able to obtain liability insurance would benefit from limited liability and be 
able to incorporate their business. Those who could not obtain liability 
insurance would not be able to incorporate and only benefit from limited 
liability to the extent that they were able to create it through bargaining with 
their creditors. Liability insurance could help prevent unfit persons from 
obtaining limited liability status because the market for insurance ought to 
exclude high-risk individuals.
In a properly functioning insurance market the conditions upon 
which an insurer were prepared to supply insurance to an entrepreneur 
would depend upon the insurer’s assessment of the risk that the entrepreneur 
would default on his obligations. In assessing this risk the insurer will 
consider the same factors that creditors should consider when deciding on 
their terms of credit, such as the experience of the entrepreneur; i.e. the 
likely success of the business venture and the likely conduct of the 
entrepreneur. The insurance premium offered to the entrepreneur (if any) 
would reflect the insurer’s assessment of these factors. Entrepreneurs who 
pose the greatest risk of default would therefore pay high premiums for 
liability insurance or may not be able to obtain insurance at all if the 
insurer’s assessment of the risk of default is so high that he is unwilling to 
assume responsibility for the entrepreneur’s actions. As such, it is likely that 
certain individuals who are currently able to obtain limited liability would 
not be able to do so under an insurance regime.
A regime of liability insurance could therefore have certain 
advantages for creditors as compared to a regime of statutory limited
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liability. However, so would the simple abolition of limited liability. For, 
under both rules risky individuals would be prevented from obtaining 
limited liability without paying appropriate compensation for the transfer of 
risk it would cause. The question then is whether a regime of compulsory 
liability insurance would have any advantage for creditors over the simple 
abolition of statutory limited liability.
9.4.4.1 Transaction Costs.
If limited liability were simply abolished, entrepreneurs who were 
able to benefit from it could only do so by negotiating with each of their 
creditors to limit their liability. However, creating limited liability through 
multiple negotiations with creditors has transaction cost implications690, 
even if it ultimately leads to a more desirable outcome from creditors than 
statutory limited liability. A regime of liability insurance, on the other hand, 
has the potential to reduce these costs by replacing multiple liability 
transactions with a single transaction, whilst still subjecting the 
determination of limited liability to market forces. As such it could lead to 
greater efficiency.. In the context of liability insurance this argument is 
persuasive because the saving would not come, as is the case with statutory 
limited liability, at the price of ousting market transactions691. For, the 
entrepreneur’s ability to obtain liability insurance would depend upon a 
bargain with insurers and therefore would be subject to the market.
690 Reducing such transaction costs have been one reason cited in support of statutory 
limited liability. See for example Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 639 chapter 2.
691 See chapter 3, supra.
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9.4.4.2 Contracting Around Liability Status and Information 
Gathering.
A further advantage of liability insurance would be to reduce the 
incentive for creditors to bargain away from an entrepreneur’s liability 
status because liability insurance ought to provide greater security that their 
debts would be paid without the need to adjust interest charges to risk or to 
take security over corporate and personal assets. Indeed, the fact that an 
entrepreneur obtained insurance under market conditions could reduce 
information gathering and ex post monitoring by creditors in so far as 
indicated that indicate that the risk associated with advancing credit to the 
entrepreneur was not excessive. Instead of costly inquires into the 
creditworthiness of entrepreneurs creditors would only need to check that 
the firm had an adequate insurance policy in place to pay his claim in the 
event of insolvency.
However, whilst liability insurance may reduce transaction costs for 
creditors, it has been claimed that liability insurance would not bring about a 
reduction in overall transaction costs692, but instead merely transfers them 
from creditors to an insurer. It has even been argued that liability insurance 
could increase transaction costs693. The contention that insurance increases 
transaction costs is based on a claim that it is often cheaper for creditors to 
gather information than an insurance company. Halpem Trebilcok and 
Turnbull give the example of employees who are familiar with a company’s
692 Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull, supra note 668, page 139.
m Ibid.
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financial situation is given to support their view that ‘creditors’ will often 
find it easier to obtain information due to their frequent contact with the 
company694. However, even in the given example, it is far from certain that 
transaction costs facing creditors would always be lower than those faced by 
insurers, much must depend on the degree of familiarity employees have, 
the completeness of their knowledge as to the future direction of the 
company, and the ability to interpret any information they have. However, 
even if it was accepted that such creditors were efficient gathers of 
information, employees who are ‘in the know’ are likely to be only one 
small group of creditors amongst many not least other employees who are 
not so privileged with their access to information. The majority of a 
company’s creditors without detailed financial knowledge will be forced to 
incur transaction costs information gathering, in spite of the savings of 
knowledgeable employees. In short, the low transaction costs incurred by 
one narrow and privileged class of creditor simply does not demonstrate that 
overall transaction costs under a regime of liability insurance would rise. 
Indeed, it is much more plausible to state that transaction costs would be 
reduced information gathering was restricted to a single entity (i.e. the 
insurer) rather than where it is carried out by many creditors. For, the overall 
costs of information gathering are bound to be higher where the same 
information gathering tasks are repeated, which is likely because in the real 
(imperfect) market, individual trade creditors, banks, employees and 
consumers are not able to pass information freely between themselves. This
694 Ibid.
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is likely to lead to wasteful repetition of information gathering. Where 
market insurance is purchased however, a single entity -  the insurer- is 
responsible for information gathering and consequently wasteful repetition 
should be eliminated. Similar savings could also result in the monitoring of 
entrepreneurs conduct post-contract.
9.4.4.3 Moral Hazard.
Despite its potential advantages in terms of transaction costs a 
potential drawback with liability insurance, is the moral hazard that is likely 
to give rise to i.e. that once liability has been limited the entrepreneur has an 
incentive to engage in unforeseen risky activities, increasing the probability 
that the insured event will occur695. Insurers would therefore be faced with 
the task of controlling moral hazard through contract and monitoring696. In 
term of their ability to control moral hazard through monitoring, Halpem, 
Trebilcok and Turnbull imply that insurers are in a less advantageous 
position than ordinary creditors due to the fact that they are unlikely to be in
f r \ - J
daily contact with the insured entrepreneur and therefore incur costs of 
yet more information gathering. However, whilst this may be true in some 
cases, many creditors will not be in such daily contact. As such the overall 
cost of monitoring could still be lower under a regime of insurance where 
monitoring is undertaken by single an insurer rather than many creditors, 
some of whom may be close to the company and therefore incur relatively 
small coats but many others who will not. In any case insurers are likely to
695 Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull, supra note 668 pages 140-141, Freedman, supra note 
654, page 340.
696
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develop a degree of expertise in monitoring and are also able to monitor 
conduct when renewing insurance contracts and are likely. Indeed, the 
necessity to renew insurance creates an incentive for insured entrepreneurs 
not to exploit moral hazard, in so far as unforeseen conduct under one 
insurance contract leads to an increase in premiums under a subsequent one. 
Insurers could maximise this potential control on moral hazard by insisting 
short contracts, especially in the case of individuals who are largely 
unknown to them.
In terms of contractual controls on moral hazard, insurers, unlike 
creditors on the receiving end of statutory limited liability, can easily create 
incentives for entrepreneurs not to engage in unforeseen risky activity by 
including a clause in the insurance contract excluding reckless, negligent,
/ 'Q O
dishonest activity from the insurance cover . Such uses of contractual 
terms to limit to exclude ‘moral hazard’ are widespread in many areas, such 
as home and motor insurance contracts. However, whilst such clauses in 
liability insurance contracts would benefit insures and create an incentive 
not to engage in risky conduct, any limitation on insurance cover would act 
as an incentive for creditors to continue monitoring director’s behaviour, to 
ensure that their activities were within the terms of their insurance. As such 
any exclusion clause in an insurance contract is likely to give rise to 
repetitious creditor monitoring, thereby reducing monitoring cost savings. 
Insurers obviously have a strong incentive to exclude excessively risky (or
697 Ibid, page 141,
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unforeseen) conduct and it is likely that complex exclusion clauses would be 
routinely included in liability insurance contracts699. Therefore, the extent to 
which liability insurance could reduce monitoring costs is likely to be 
limited.
9.4.4.4 Risk.
The difficulty in predicting the risk involved in liability insurance for 
entrepreneurs is another ground upon which such a regime could be 
criticised. Finch has noted that a difficulty in predicting risk has been a 
perceived problem with the market for directors’ liability insurance700 and 
similar problems in relation to liability insurance could lead to insurers 
simply declining to offer liability insurance or problems associated with 
‘adverse selection’ i.e. insurers charging set premiums to certain classes of
• 701creditors that may over, or under-estimate risk in individual cases. Where 
adverse selection leads insurance premiums to be too high, desirable 
entrepreneurial activity may be stifled, whereas when it is too low excessive 
risk taking may result.
The challenges faced by insurers in assessing risk stem from the 
same information deficits and transaction cost considerations that afflict
698 Freedman supra note 654 , page 340, V. Finch, Personal Accountability and Corporate 
Control: The Role o f Directors and Officers Liability Insurance, (1994) 57 MLR 880, page 
888. Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull, supra note 670, page 140.
699 See Finch ib id , who notes the problems caused by exclusion clauses for directors’ 
liability insurance in the US.
700 Finch, supra note 622 , page 894. On adverse selection generally see T. Baker, 
Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk classification (2003) 9 
Conn. Ins. LJ 371 and S. Chandeler, Visualising Adverse Selection: an Economic approach 
to the Law of Insurance, (2002) 8 Conn Ins. LJ. For a critical view see P. Sieglerman, 
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, (203) 113 Yale. LJ 1223.
701 Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull supra note 668, pages 141-142.
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709ordinary creditors, and which have been considered above . However, 
whilst information asymmetry and the impact of transaction costs will 
undoubtedly be of relevance to insurers, their concerns would not be of the 
same magnitude as those of ordinary creditors.
The practice of dealing with many similar firms means that insurers 
are likely to quickly develop a degree of expertise in interpreting the 
information obtained from firms in a manner that ordinary creditors 
cannot703. In developing the ability to turn raw information into an accurate 
assessment of risk, insurers are also aided by having greater resources to 
spend on information gathering than individual creditors and through having 
the ability to pass on such cost through the insurance premium. Significant 
benefits must also derive from one organisation holding information of 
companies’ trading histories. In addition to the benefits associated with 
dealing with many firms and having better resources insurers, as suppliers of 
a valuable commodity to entrepreneurs who wish to incorporate, would be 
more likely to obtain the disclosure of information than individual creditors, 
for the same reasons that banks are able to obtain disclosure of information 
under the current system of statutory limited liability704. Insurers are also 
more likely to be efficient at sharing information amongst themselves. 
Therefore, compared to a disparate group of creditors, insurers are likely to 
be more efficient estimators of risk.
702
703 Finch notes the ability of insurers to develop their expertise and information sources. 
Finch, supra note 622, page 890.
704 See 3.3 supra.
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I do not, however, argue that a regime of liability insurance would 
always secure optimal allocations of risk. Some adverse selection, for 
example, is bound to occur in an imperfect insurance market. All I seek to 
demonstrate is that information asymmetry would be less of an obstacle to a 
single insurer than a group of creditors. Consequently insurers could be 
more efficient than individual creditors at forcing entrepreneurs to pay 
appropriate compensation for the privileges of limited liability. Thus, in an 
insurance system the riskiest entrepreneurs are more likely to be excluded 
from limited liability. Therefore, the growth of a market for insurance 
liability for firms with a default status of unlimited liability could be a 
desirable occurrence.
9.4.4.5 ‘Market Failure’.
Several authors have commented on the fact that liability insurance 
would create barriers to incorporation for small companies, especially where 
entrepreneurs have no record of running a business on which an insurer 
could rely . However, the fact that many owner-managed companies 
would fail to obtain liability insurance under market conditions is not, as 
some have claimed706, an example of the failure of insurance markets. 
Rather it is evidence of their success. For, where insurance markets would 
not provide limited liability it is likely that creditors would not grant 
companies limited liability either, if they were given the choice.
705 Freedman, supra note 654, page 340, Easterborrok and Fischel, supra note 664 page 61.
706 See, Halpem, Trebilcock and Turnbull, supra note 668, page 143.
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There are essentially two reasons why an entrepreneur may fail to 
obtain liability insurance. First he may not obtain it because insurer refuses 
to insure. This may occur either because the risk associated with his venture 
was too high for the insurer, or because insufficient information exists for 
the insurer to accurately price risk. Secondly the entrepreneur may fail to 
obtain insurance because he unable to afford the premium demanded. In 
either scenario there is no market failure because individuals will not obtain 
limited liability because the risk of assuming responsibility for their actions 
it is greater than its likely benefit, i.e. the risk of them defaulting is greater 
than the compensation they can pay. Were liability to be assumed in such 
circumstances, an uncompensated transfer of risk would result in sub- 
optimal risk taking. The situation indeed, is the same as that which would 
exist under a system of unlimited liability between entrepreneurs and 
creditors. For there also entrepreneurs would not obtain limited liability 
where the risk to the creditor from it was greater than the compensation that 
could, or would, be paid. Therefore there is no market failure where 
entrepreneurs would not obtain limited liability in an insurance market, on 
the contrary there is a market success because individual are prevented from 
affecting an uncompensated transfer of risk. There is however, a clear 
failure caused by statutory limited liability that permits entrepreneurs to 
invoke limited liability without risk pricing ever becoming relevant.
9.4.4.6 Problems with Insurance Markets.
However, whilst insurance liability affords the prospect of more 
efficient allocation of risk, formidable drawbacks to the operation of an
337
insurance market are likely to be encountered. Many factors may prevent 
insurance from being a more efficient mechanism to determine liability 
status than individual negotiation. For example, insurers may seek to limit 
their exposure to risk by offering only short-term insurance contracts to 
entrepreneurs, which would lead to considerable uncertainty for creditors707. 
The creditors of an entrepreneur who is unable to re-new his insurance, for 
example, would find themselves bearing a sudden and uncompensated risk if 
the removal of liability insurance in so far as a claim on an entrepreneurs 
assets is less secure than a claim on an insurance company. In most cases 
assets of the entrepreneur are likely to be less than those of the insurer and 
as such creditors would be exposed to greater risk by the ending of the 
insurance contract. Assuming that liability insurance could be terminated, 
creditors would have an incentive to make contingency for a change in 
insurance status, at the time of contracting with the entrepreneur but in 
doing do would be compelled to undertake the information gathering as to 
the creditworthiness of the entrepreneur without insurance. In which case, 
insurance would not greatly reduce the transaction costs incurred by the 
creditor (as compared with simple regime of unlimited liability). In the event 
that the parties had not made contingency for the ending of an insurance 
contract, creditors are likely to attempt to renegotiate their terms of credit in 
line with the new level of risk, causing costs to be incurred by all parties.. 
The likely operation of an insurance market therefore suggests that the
707 Finch notes that short term cover has been a problem in the market for directors and 
officers’ liability insurance in the US and Canada, Finch, supra note 622, page 893.
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apparent transaction cost savings of a liability insurance regime would be 
illusory. Similarly the possibility that an insurance contract would be ended 
would create an incentive for creditors to monitor entrepreneurs’ conduct, 
reducing another apparent benefit of insurance. Thus, an insurance system 
could prove just as costly for creditors as individual liability negotiations.
Finch’s study of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance highlights 
other problems with insurance markets, such as the instability of such 
markets and their vulnerability to shocks and uncertainties, both 
domestically and globally708. Indeed, cyclical increases in corporate 
insolvencies would be likely to cause increases in insurance premium, 
leading to more pressure on small businesses and increased uncertainty for 
creditors (in that some firm may lose their insurance due to an inability to 
pay increased premiums). This would be particularly dangerous during in 
periods of the economic cycle where insolvencies tend to increase for the 
consequent rise in insurance premiums could force more companies into 
insolvency thereby magnifying a slow down.
Therefore, a compulsory insurance requirement is not certain to be 
more advantageous than the simple removal of limited liability from high 
risk individuals which are currently allowed to incorporate and at which 
disqualification is aimed. However, that is not to say that is should be 
discounted, but it would be unwise to suggest that a compulsory insurance 
requirement is the most desirable method of reducing unfit conduct. Rather, 
liability insurance may have some benefit but it would be unwise to compel
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entrepreneurs to obtain it. Thus, it is merely contended that within a system 
that required more entrepreneurs to have unlimited liability, insurance could 
provide an advantageous mechanism by which some entrepreneurs could 
obtain limited liability more cheaply than through negotiation with 
individual creditors. However, the development of an insurance system must 
ultimately develop without compulsion.
9.6 Statutory Limited Liability and Companies that are not
Owner-Managed.
Throughout this chapter I have considered the modification of the 
current approach to limited liability as a desirable method to reduce unfit 
conduct by owner-manager directors. I have not directly addressed the 
question of limited liability and unfit conduct in larger companies with 
diversified ownership and control709. I have not done so because the main 
regulatory problem addressed by disqualification is unfitness in small 
owner-managed companies. Nonetheless, as it is clear that disqualification is 
as unsatisfactory a remedy for undesirable conduct in larger companies, as it 
is in small companies the issue of how best to deal with unfit conduct by 
directors of larger companies cannot be ignored.
708 Finch, supra note 622, page 896.
709 Research carried out by Andrew Hicks suggests that around 25% of disqualified 
individuals were directors of companies that could not be characterised as owner-managed. 
See Hicks, ACCA Report, Disqualification o f Directors: No Hiding Place for the Unit? 
(London, Certified Accountants Educational Trust, 1998).
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9.6.1 Larger Companies and Limited Liability.
The different nature of unfitness in larger companies necessitates a 
different form of regulation to that in owner-managed firms. Directors of 
companies that are not owner-managed do not benefit directly from limited 
liability. It is therefore incorrect as a matter of fact to describe unfitness in 
large companies as an ‘abuse of limited liability’ because directors who do 
not own the companies they manage do not benefit from limited liability per 
se. Directors of such companies benefit only from separate corporate 
personality, because it is that which protects them from personal 
responsibility for their acts, not limited liability. Limited liability protects 
shareholders in insolvency; it does not benefit directors (unless they happen 
to be shareholders as well). Thus, the recurring claim that disqualification is 
meant to address ‘abuse of limited liability’ only demonstrates its focus on 
owner managers. As far as directors of companies that are not owner- 
managed are concerned, any regulation directed against them should 
properly be termed regulation to prevent ‘abuse of office’ or ‘abuse of 
separate personality’. Therefore, reform of limited liability would not be an 
effective strategy in larger companies, as it is not directly relevant to the 
problem of unfit conduct whether limited liability was, or was not, to remain 
for shareholders. Although it should be noted that the removal of limited 
liability would increase shareholders’ incentive to monitor directors, more 
effectively710. However, the transaction costs of monitoring may limit the
710 See D. CampbelLand S. Griffin, ENRON and the End o f Corporate Governance, supra 
note Error! Bookmark not defined..
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actual monitoring that takes place. Nonetheless, it is clear the issues raised 
by the failure of disqualification in larger companies is whether separate 
corporate personality rules can be reformed to eschew undesirable conduct.
9.6.2 Separate Corporate Personality.
The effect of corporate personality in larger firms is very similar to 
the effect of limited liability in owner-managed firms in that both are 
statutory interventions that divest corporate controllers of personal liability 
for their actions. As such, both interventions oust market forces that may
711prevent excessively risky conduct , which in the words of Adam Smith can 
lead to ‘negligence and profusion’712. However, controlling the moral 
hazard created by the intervention is central to the prevailing model of the 
company, as has been shown earlier in this thesis. Thus, the conduct of 
directors in large companies is subject to the control of shareholders, 
through fiduciary duties and directors’ contracts of employment that are 
supported by many company law rules. Thus, the likelihood of unfit conduct 
occurring and going unremedied is less for directors of larger companies 
than it is for owner-manager directors. However, where private controls fail 
to protect shareholders (and indeed creditors) from misconduct, some form 
of public regulation may be needed. Disqualification’s attempt to respond to 
this need can be seen from the disqualification cases that resulted from the
711 Ibid.
712 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations, R. H. 
Campbell, and A.S, Skinner (eds). (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976).
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collapse of Bearings Bank713 and PollyPeck714 amongst others. Thus what is 
needed in place of disqualification in larger companies is a measure that 
effectively protects the ‘public and commercial world’ from unfit conduct 
where other control mechanisms fail.
A possible way to achieve this objective that follows the approach 
advocated for small companies would be to again remove the statutory 
intervention that creates scope for unfit conduct, which in this case is the 
separate personality of the company from its directors. However, removing 
the intervention would require directors to be personally liable for all of 
their acts and would be a disproportionate response to the problem of 
unfitness in larger companies, especially as there are devices built in to the 
structure of larger companies and various legal rules that ought to reduce the 
likelihood of unfit conduct. It would also be an undesirable response as it 
would make the risks of directing any reasonably large company exceed its 
likely benefits by far and would seriously compromise the legal personality 
of the company. However, whilst wholesale personal liability would not be a
n 1 c t #
desirable response to unfit conduct , it could be a more effective sanction 
than disqualification in circumstances where reform of limited liability is not 
a viable option. Because personal liability would at least restore a measure 
of market control over directors’ conduct and create disincentives for them 
to exploit their position. A personal liability provision would also be more
713 Re Barings Pic (No. 3) [1999] 1 All ER 1017, Re Barings Pic (No. 4) [1999] BCC 960 
and Re Barings Pic (No. 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433.
714 Re PollyPeck Pic (No. 3) [1996] 2 All ER 433.
715 See 8.4.2, supra.
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valuable to shareholders and creditors as it would allow them some
71 f\opportunity to recover money lost through reckless or negligent conduct
Therefore it is submitted that if the State wishes to effectively 
‘protect’ from unfit conduct in larger companies is should develop a system 
that allowed the Secretary of State to seek personal liability orders on 
directors whose conduct is unfit and who have caused loss to creditors. 
Personal liability is likely to have a much more beneficial effect for creditors 
and avoid the waste of disqualifying individuals who are unlikely to commit 
future misconduct.
However, it must be emphasised that unfitness in owner-managed 
companies is the primary concern of disqualification and that the more 
radical reform proposed to deal with that problem is the most desirable way 
to protect the public for the sort of activity that section 6 disqualification 
currently tries, and fails, to do.
9.7 Concluding Remarks.
The removal of limited liability from owner-managers is the most 
desirable way to remedy the problem of unfit conduct that disqualification 
fails to resolve. However, stating that limited liability is the cause of ‘the 
problem’ and that it should be removed from owner-managed companies is 
the simple conclusion that can be reached from this study of section 6 
disqualification. Much more difficult is suggesting how limited liability 
should best be denied to such companies.
716 As discussed in chapter 8 above.
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An appropriately high minimum capital requirement is one way in 
which owner-managers could be prevented from obtaining limited liability, 
how the success of a capital requirement depends on it being set such an 
appropriate level. If it were set too low, high-risk individuals would still be 
able to obtain limited liability. If it were set too high it could prevent 
desirable enterprises from obtaining it. Therefore, no precise figure for such 
a minimum capital requirement could be suggested without extensive 
empirical research.
An alternative strategy would be to replace statutory limited liability 
for owner-managed firms with a mandatory liability insurance requirement 
for owner-managed firms. Insurance would bring the benefit of market 
determinations of liability status but significant question marks over the 
efficient operation of liability insurance make it unwise to conclude that 
compulsory insurance is a desirable path to proceed down. A workable 
definition of owner-management that brought the sort of firms that 
disqualification currently deals with within the insurance regime could also 
prove costly to formulate and indeed, to enforce.
Nonetheless, it is clear that reform of statutory limited liability, 
which prevented the sort of firms that characterise disqualification cases 
from obtaining limited liability, is needed. Whilst none of the methods of 
preventing undesirable firms from obtaining limited liability considered in 
this chapter is clearly favourable, it is submitted that if the State is serious 
about ‘cracking down’ on unfit directors the time and money to establish a
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regime of limited liability that reduced losses from unfit conduct could be 
found.
346
Conclusion.
The Purpose o f Section 6.
Through its use of disqualification under section 6, the State seeks to 
regulate the moral hazard created by its policy of allowing free access to 
limited liability. It does so to prevent confidence in limited liability being 
undermined by the losses inflicted on creditors by ‘unfit’ persons. The 
objective of the sanction is therefore economic because it seeks to protect 
creditors from loss by the disqualification of persons whose conduct in the 
management of a limited liability company is likely to cause such loss.
The Need for Disqualification and Its Focus on Owner-Managed 
Companies.
Section 6 is a sanction that focuses on ‘unfit’ conduct in owner- 
managed companies, because such companies lack effective control 
mechanisms on directors which, combined with the limited liability, gives 
rise to a particularly acute hazard for creditors. Of course, problems with 
shareholder monitoring and market regulation can also arise in larger 
companies, in which case public regulation through section 6 may also be 
needed. However, other forms of regulation such as disclosure regulation 
and promoting the effectiveness of institutional investors and independent 
directors remain the focus of effects to prevent dishonest, reckless or 
negligent conduct by directors of larger companies.
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Regulatory mechanisms that have traditionally been viewed as 
methods of controlling directors’ conduct are based on a model of the 
company that simply does not apply to where there is absolute unity of 
ownership and control. Shareholder monitoring, either ex ante through 
contractual bargaining or ex post, through on the job monitoring, for 
example, is a monitoring strategy that simply does not apply to companies 
where the shareholders and directors are the same people. The control of 
various markets, such as the market for corporate control and the market for 
directors also do not apply to such entities because they do not seek capital 
from the public, have no tradable shares and do not seek to purchase the 
services of outside directors. However, the failure of these monitoring 
mechanisms creates a regulatory problem that is different to the ‘problem’ 
that which has traditionally preoccupied commentators in the field. For, the 
majority of monitoring devices are primarily aimed at controlling the agency 
problem that can a arise between directors and shareholders. However, in 
the sort of owner-managed company with which disqualification is 
preoccupied this ‘agency problem’ will not arise because there is unity of 
ownership and control. Therefore the pressing ‘need’ for regulation created 
by the failure of monitoring in owner-managed companies (and the 
consequent increased likelihood of undesirable conduct that it brings) does 
not arise because undesirable conduct may reduce the welfare of 
shareholders. Rather it arises because undesirable conduct in owner- 
managed companies can significantly harm the welfare of creditors.
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The Importance o f Limited liability to Section 6.
The harm that can be inflicted on creditors because of the absence of 
controls on the conduct of owner-managers is magnified by limited liability. 
The lack of monitoring of in owner-managed companies creates scope for 
self-interested conduct that harms the welfare of the business and it 
creditors, however, limited liability exacerbates this problem by allowing 
the entrepreneur to shift the risk of financial loss from such conduct to his 
creditors. Limited liability is therefore central to the need for 
disqualification, as evidenced by the fact that section 6 is described as a 
measure to ‘protect creditors from abuse of limited liability’ and the fact that 
disqualification does not prevent a person from managing an unincorporated 
business.
As such it is clear that section 6 is made necessary because of 
limited liability and that it focuses on owner-managers because the State’s 
policy of allowing entrepreneurs to freely invoke statutory asset partitioning 
creates enormous scope for creditors to suffer loss from the combined effect 
of a lack of control on the conduct of incorporated entrepreneurs and their 
right to shift virtually all of the risk of their activity on to creditors. The 
State, however, regulates not because it views limited liability as 
undesirable, rather it does so for precisely the opposite reason, i.e. because it 
views it as a desirable method of wealth creation and regulates to prevent 
confidence in limited liability being undermined through the spectre of loss 
inflicted by unfit persons. However the State’s belief that limited liability 
creates wealth by stimulating increased entrepreneurial risk-taking can be
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challenged, if as Richard Posner has argued, it is accepted that creditors will 
not passively accept transfers of risk affected by limited liability. Because if 
creditors reacted to limited liability by demanding compensation that is at 
least equivalent to the risk transferred to them by the rule then limited 
liability would not lead to significantly higher levels of entrepreneurial risk- 
taking than unlimited liability. However, if Posner’s thesis were correct 
there would also be no need of disqualification because creditors would be 
able to effectively control the activities of directors through their demand for 
compensation or contracting around limited liability. In which case, no 
moral hazard would arise from statutory limited liability. However, it is 
precisely because Posner’s thesis does not apply exactly as envisaged in the 
real market place that some form of regulation is necessary. Nonetheless, 
that does not mean that the thesis is worthless because there is strong 
evidence to indicate that, where they are able, creditors will do exactly as 
Posner suggests, i.e. demand compensation from limited liability 
entrepreneurs that reflects the extra risk of transacting with them. The 
propensity of the banks to demand higher charges for credit and to contract 
around limited liability indicates this. It is only creditors who lack 
contractual muscle (such as trade creditors, customers and employees) who 
will not demand compensation for the effect of limited liability or who will 
demand insufficient compensation.
Therefore the amount of risk-taking stimulated by the State’s policy 
of allowing free access to limited liability is likely to be limited by powerful 
creditors’ demands for compensation or contracting around the rule. The
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only ‘extra’ risk-taking that is likely to result from the policy is therefore 
that which comes at the expense of creditors who are unable to demand 
compensation. However, whilst this loading of risk onto creditors may 
stimulate some increased risk taking, it also creates the moral hazard that 
disqualification under section 6 is intended to control.
Therefore, it is clear that limited liability is responsible for the need 
for disqualification under section 6 and, as such, it is the harm that results 
from abuse of limited liability that the sanction needs to protect the public 
from if it is to be successful. However, the fact that limited liability creates 
this need whilst only stimulating a limited amount of risk taking must raise 
questions about the benefits of the current approach, because the price is a 
significant moral hazard for creditors, which regulation is then necessary to 
control.
The Objective o f Section 6.
However, taking the control of this moral hazard as the objective of 
section 6 it is clear that the harm disqualification must seek to reduce if it is 
to protect the public is financial loss. The argument that disqualification is 
intended to go beyond this economic goal is not bom out by any coherent 
body of evidence. And despite some judicial sentiment suggesting that 
disqualification is intended to eschew conduct that is socially undesirable, it 
is clear that loss lies at the heart of the judicial understanding of ‘unfitness’, 
even if it is sometimes expressed in pluralist language.
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The disqualification cases show that the standard of ‘unfit conduct’ 
is used to condemn act that harm the economic welfare of creditors and that 
in some instances, the courts gone to some lengths in order to justify 
sanctioning certain forms of conduct by reference to economic goals. The 
breach of accounting and disclosure obligations, has for example been 
treated as evidence of unfitness because the rules are seen as ‘safeguards set
7 1 7down by Parliament’ for the protection of those who deal with limited 
liability companies. Similarly, the Court of Appeal has held that misconduct 
on relation to the Crown can only be cited as evidence of unfitness when 
accompanied by evidence of some aggravating factor indicting unfitness, 
such as insolvent trading at the crowns expense or preferring other creditors 
over the Crown.
Therefore given the clear economic focus of section 6 on protecting 
‘the public and commercial world’ from loss, the section must at least afford 
the prospect of producing a benefit, through reduced loss, which is greater 
than any costs its generates to be regarded as successful. However, in terms 
of both a qualitative and quantitative analysis this is something that the 
section manifestly fails to do.
The failure o f Section 6.
The vagueness of the standard used to sanction undesirable conduct 
in section 6 has generated high litigation because the courts have been 
required to determine the exact parameters of unfit conduct. This has
717 Re Swift 736 Ltd [1993JBCC 312
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inevitably led to judicial u-tums and conflicting lines of authority, which can 
only increase the costs of the section. The vagueness of the standard will 
also have lead to higher compliance costs for those who wish to comply 
with it because of the need to study numerous, and sometimes conflicting, 
precedents. The list of ‘relevant matters in schedule 1 of the Disqualification 
Act is unlikely to have significantly reduced the cost of the standard.
However, the choice of the unfitness standard in section 6 has not 
had a wholly negative impact, for the standard is flexible and capable of 
application to all possible instances of conduct that results in loss. However, 
that said, the flexibility of the standard could give rise to misinterpretation, 
if not misuse of the standard. This is a particular concern in the age of 
disqualification undertakings where the Secretary of State has gained control 
of the power to determine unfitness in a system that provides for few 
safeguards against the rather obvious scope for bias on her part. Indeed, the 
results of the empirical research carried out for this thesis indicates that the 
standard was most frequently to sanction conduct that does not impose great 
loss on creditors even before the Secretary of State gained control of the 
determination of unfit conduct in most cases.
The effectiveness of sanctioning a breach of disclosure and 
accounting obligations in almost a half of all disqualifications, for example, 
can be questioned because the provisions ‘enforced’ are so weak in that they 
are likely to be of little use to creditors. Consequently, greater compliance 
with them would bring little protective benefit to creditors. Similarly, the 
non-payment of tax is a matter of unfitness that was cited in almost two-
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thirds of disqualifications, but which may be of dubious utility to creditors. 
There is evidence to suggest that the court’s effort to limit disqualification 
for not paying tax to instances where mere ‘non-payment’ is accompanied 
other conduct that could cause loss is not being strictly adhered to. 
Therefore any ‘misuse’ of section 6 to sanction conduct that does not cause 
loss because it is of interest to the State would harm the effectiveness of 
disqualification because it will bring no ‘benefit’ to the public from reduced 
loss. Indeed, it will only bring costs from wasted resources spent on the 
disqualification and possible desirable business activity prevented by an 
erroneous disqualification.
Therefore the costs generated by the choice of a general standard in 
section 6 are likely to be high. However, in addition to the high costs of the 
section, the analysis of the conduct sanctioned in the disqualification cases 
shows that even where conduct that causes more direct loss to creditors is 
sanctioned, the only benefits of disqualification under section 6 are future 
protection and general deterrence. Section 6 disqualification brings no 
direct benefit to the victims of unfit conduct in terms of recovering losses 
caused by unfit conduct. Therefore, disqualification affords less protection 
to creditors than the civil recovery sanctions contained in the Insolvency Act 
1986, for example, which provide for the direct recovery of loss imposed on 
creditors by many types of ‘unfit’ conduct. Indeed, the most direct financial 
impact that disqualification has on creditors is to impose a cost on them 
because it is they who bear the costs incurred by Insolvency Practitioners 
and Official Receivers in fulfilling their reporting obligation under section 7
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of the Disqualification Act. Therefore, it is essential that disqualification 
produces real benefits from future protection and general deterrence that 
outweigh not only the qualitative costs of the section but also its quantitative 
costs if it is to be regarded as a successful form of regulation.
Unfortunately for section 6, the research carried out for the NAO’s 
‘follow up’ report indicates that it actually produces very little in terms of a 
benefit from either future protection or general deterrence. The ‘direct’ 
savings to creditors from disqualification that the NAO was so eager to 
emphasise, actually accounted for only one half of the ‘direct’ costs of 
administering the disqualification, which hardly indicates that 
disqualification is an efficient piece of regulation. Indeed, if the costs 
imposed upon creditors by statutory reporting obligations were taken into 
account, the direct costs of disqualification would be even higher than the 
figure cited by the NAO. There is no evidence to suggest that the direct cost- 
benefit inefficiency of disqualification has significantly changed since the 
NAO’s follow up report and if the calculations of the NAO are repeated 
using today’s disqualification figures, the direct costs of section 6 to the 
State remain higher than its estimated benefits.
The reason why the direct costs of disqualification are higher than its 
direct benefits to creditors is largely because most disqualifications under 
section 6 appear to be erroneous and wasted in that they do not prevent 
future insolvencies and therefore provide no direct protective benefit. 
Indeed, the estimated number of future insolvencies from which the public is 
protected by disqualification is derisory when compared to the annual
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number of insolvencies. In 2003-2004, for example, over 15,000 
insolvencies were recorded in England and Wales yet disqualification under 
section 6 in that same year is only likely to have prevented 109 future 
insolvencies, according to the NAO measure. Still more detrimental to the 
success of disqualification is the fact that the 85% or so of disqualifications 
that provide no protective benefit may stifle potentially beneficial 
entrepreneurial activity. Leave of disqualification orders has the potential to 
limit loses which flow from disqualifying individuals who could go on to 
rum successful businesses, however empirical research shows that leave is 
rarely granted. The costs caused by procedural constraints on leave 
applications are likely to explain the low incidence of leave, but under the 
current statutory framework where all leave applications have to be made to 
court, there would seem to be little prospect of increasing the number of 
leave orders. As such, section 6 disqualification remains likely to bring 
significant collateral costs. Therefore, not only does disqualification produce 
more direct costs than it brings in benefits, but it is also likely to impose 
significant costs through erroneous disqualifications.
In terms of its deterrent effect, it is also highly unlikely that 
disqualification brings significant benefit. A survey carried out for the NAO 
‘follow up’ report showed that knowledge of disqualification was low (and 
in fact that it had declined since the first report). This low awareness of 
disqualification itself, let alone the precise sorts of conduct that are 
classified as unfit, is likely to be a consequence of the general vagueness of 
section 6 and the high compliance costs faced by directors who wish to
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comply with it. Nonetheless, the low awareness of the section means that it 
is unlikely to have a significant deterrent effect. However, the deterrent 
effect of the section could also be explained by the fact that, as a post­
insolvency measure, the chances of a director becoming subject to section 6 
are slight. On rational deterrence assumptions directors are only likely to 
take note of disqualification when insolvency is a real and pressing prospect; 
by which time much ‘unfit’ conduct may have already been committed.
Therefore, disqualification is unlikely to be a successful remedy due 
to its high costs and low benefit. And the recent introduction of 
disqualification undertakings is only likely to have increased this 
inefficiency. Despite the fact that it was offered as a way to lower the 
‘direct’ cost of disqualification and increase its benefits through speeding up 
the disqualification process, it is likely that any increased efficiency has 
been more than offset by an increase in the indirect costs of disqualification. 
The oppressive conduct of the Secretary of State combined with pre-existing 
problems which directors faced in resisting a disqualification application, 
and the lack of procedural fairness in the undertakings system are all factors 
that are likely to increase the number of erroneous disqualifications. 
Therefore, the ‘benefits’ of the undertakings system are likely to have been 
bought at the expense of an increase in disqualifications that provide no 
protective benefit.
Consequently, there are fundamental weaknesses in disqualification 
under section 6 which mean that it is most unlikely to successfully ‘protect 
the public’ from unfit conduct in terms of producing a benefit from reduced
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instances of such conduct, over its costs. Similarly, it is unlikely to deter 
instances of ‘unfit conduct’ due to the limitations inherent in post­
insolvency disqualification, which may indeed explain why awareness of 
disqualification amongst directors is low.
Punishment and Reform.
The manifest failure of disqualification under section 6 means that 
reform of the State’s policy of using disqualification to ‘protect’ creditors 
from abuse of limited liability is highly desirable. However, as well as 
making a pressing case for reform, failure of the section to meet its declared 
goal also raises questions about the motivation of the State in its use of 
section 6 that cannot be ignored. Whilst the State’s continued faith in section 
6 makes little sense in terms of the declared objective of protecting 
creditors, it makes rather more sense in terms of a desire to punish directors. 
Nonetheless, whilst it is logical to infer that the State is not motivated by a 
desire to protect in its use of the section, there is little hard evidence that 
State is motivated by a desire to punish directors. In any case, the economic 
nature of the harm inflicted by ‘abuse of limited liability’ means that 
protection is the most desirable goal for any regulatory measure designed to 
combat it. Therefore, despite the logic of the State’s approach to section 6 in 
terms of a desire to punish, the success of the section ought to be judged 
against the goal the State professes to follow (i.e. protection) and any 
reformed method of regulation should also have protection as its objective.
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Given the failure of disqualification for unfitness under section 6 to 
deliver any direct benefit to the victims of unfit conduct, replacing 
disqualification as the sanction for unfit conduct with a personal liability 
provision could be thought of as a desirable reform. However, whilst 
personal liability could be more a more effective way to protect the victims 
of unfit conduct by directly reducing uncompensated loss, the success of the 
sanction could be limited by several factors, such as assets insufficiency on 
the part of directors and problems of enforcement. Personal liability would 
also be likely to suffer from similar problems to disqualification due to the 
fact that it too would be an ex post control on the conduct of directors that 
attempted to deal with the aftermath of unfit conduct. As such the failure of 
section 6 would seem to call for more radical reform of the State’s approach 
to abuse of limited liability.
Reform o f Limited Liability.
The failure of section 6 disqualification only highlights difficulties 
surrounding the State’s policy of allowing free access statutory limited 
liability. The policy creates only limited scope for increased risk-taking at 
the cost of moral hazard for creditors on whom risk is loaded and the 
regulation that is intended to control this hazard fails spectacularly. 
However, not only does it fail to prevent the destruction of wealth by abuse 
of limited liability, it is actually likely to increase it. Therefore, the failure 
of section 6 must raise questions about the utility of allowing entrepreneurs 
free access to limited liability, particularly in respect of owner-managed
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companies where the chances of undesirable conduct occurring are greatest. 
In short, the policy appears to bring limited benefits but significant risk and 
costly regulation. In essence the policy creates a lottery of risk taking played 
at the expense of creditors. Each individual entrepreneurial ‘gamble’ may or 
may not pay off, much will depend upon the characteristics of the gambler. 
However, the fact that regulation to control undesirable gambles is felt 
necessary, indicates that the lottery creates an unacceptable amount of loss.
The failure of disqualification ought therefore to necessitate a review 
of free access to limited liability. In short free access to statutory limited 
liability creates the need for regulation of directors of ‘undercapitalised’ 
owner-managed companies that disqualification fails to satisfy. Therefore, 
the most effective and efficient way to protect creditors from abuse of 
limited liability would be to restrict access to it is such a way as to prevent 
unfit individuals from obtaining its benefits. Statutory limited liability brings 
few benefits in owner-managed companies and if there were no limited 
liability for owner-managers there would be no risk loading on to creditors 
creating a moral hazard and hence, the need for expensive (and failed) ex 
post regulation.
There are various ways in which access to limited liability could be 
restricted in order to prevent unfit individuals from obtaining limited 
liability, such as a minimum capital requirement or replacing statutory 
limited liability with insurance liability for incorporated individuals or small 
groups of individuals. However, neither of these methods is guaranteed to be 
successful as significant practical problems in their operation are likely to be
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encountered (especially in the case of liability insurance). However, I have 
not sough to demonstrate in this thesis that either approach would be 
guaranteed to operate successfully, rather I have merely sought to 
demonstrate that alternative approaches to limited liability could have the 
benefit of returning many of the undercapitalised owner-managed 
companies, which bring such risk of loss to creditors to the natural state of 
unlimited liability where regulation to ‘protect the public’ from unfit 
conduct is apparently unnecessary.
Ultimately the failure of disqualification under section 6 presents the 
State with a straightforward choice. Because if, as the prominence of section 
6 suggests, it believes that the risk loading and moral hazard brought by free 
access to limited liability creates unacceptably high losses, then the policy 
itself ought to be reviewed as the only sure way to ‘protect the public and 
commercial world’ from abuse of limited liability. If however, the State 
believes that ‘free access to limited liability creates more wealth than it 
destroys, then loss from ‘unfit abuse’ ought to be accepted as an unwelcome, 
but inevitable, side effect of a generally desirable policy. The current 
attempt to reduce loss through ex post regulation fails to bring any real 
benefit. Therefore, it is simply untenable for the State to continue to press 
ahead with a policy that manifestly fails to fulfil its objective of protecting 
the public and commercial world from loss due to undesirable use of limited 
liability.
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18/08/2003 18/11/2003
18/11/2003 20/08/2006
Tell Us
► Are you satisfied with our service?
► Have you got a question?
Top
Company
Number
04687817
04687817
/i-4 Contact Centre : + 4 4  (0 )8 7 0  3 3  33  6 3 6  t x  - 02920331245 08:30 to 13.00 (UK time) Mon-Fn Email: 
enquiries@companies-house.gov.uk
Appendix 2
SECTION 16 ‘NOTIFICATION OF PROCEEDINGS’ LETTER.
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL Disqualification Unit
PO B ox  203  
21 Bloom sbury Street 
LO NDO N  
W C1B 3QW
DX address : 120875 Bloom sbury  
6D X
Fax: 020 7636 4709
Direct 020  72916816  
Line:
Our Ref:
Your Ref: 19 June 26X11
Date:
Dear Madam 
RE:
NOTICE PURSUANT TO SECTION 16 OF THE COMPANY 
DIRECTORS DISQUALIFICATION ACT 1986 (“CDDA”) OF 
INTENTION TO COMMENCE PROCEEDINGS TO DISQUALIFY YOU
I g ive you notice that the Secretary o f  State for Trade and Industry' (“Secretary o f  
State’-), intends to apply to the Court for a disqualification order to be made 
against you.
This proposed disqualification application is based upon your conduct as a 
director o f the following company:
X Limited -w h ic h  went into liquidation on 16 D ecem ber 1999 
Further Information on Enclosures
For your information there is enclosed with this notice the following:
•  Guidance produced by The Insolvency Service entitled “Information for 
defendants in proceedings under section 6 o f  the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986”.
•  Details o f the procedure and the information required on any application 
for permission to act.
•  Information setting out the effect o f  a disqualification order or 
disqualification undertaking.
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• Outline disqualification undertaking and accompanying schedule.
Matters of Unfit Conduct
A  summary of the conduct that the Secretary of State intends to rely on in support 
of his disqualification application is set out in the schedule to this letter at Annex 
1.
Action You May Wish to Take
•
•
•
•
You may wish to seek professional advice on receipt of this letter.
If there are any matters that you want the Secretary of State to consider 
you should contact Ms Lowther (tel. 0870 903 1000) of Wragge & Co, the 
solicitors acting on behalf of the Secretary of State.
Instead of a disqualification order being made against you it is possible 
for you to offer the Secretary of State a disqualification undertaking 
which, if and when accepted, would have the same effect as a 
disqualification order being made against you. An outline disqualification 
undertaking is enclosed.
If  you want to make any representations or offer a disqualification 
undertaking you should contact the solicitors acting on behalf of the 
Secretary of State no later than 1 June 2001. If you fail to contact them 
w ithin this time, the disqualification application will proceed against you 
and the claim form, together with the supporting evidence, will be served 
on you in due course.
Period of Disqualification
If a disqualification undertaking is offered by you and is accepted by the 
Secretary of State prior to the issue of disqualification proceedings then, and 
on the basis of his current information, the Secretary o f State considers a 
period of disqualification of nine years would be appropriate.
•  If the disqualification application is contested by you and the Court 
makes a disqualification order, the period of disqualification will be 
that which the Court considers appropriate.
C osts
• If the disqualification proceedings are issued against you and, after 
issue, you wish to offer a disqualification undertaking or otherwise 
settle the disqualification proceedings, the Secretary7 o f State will 
determine what is, in his view, the appropriate period of 
disqualification in the light of current information at that time 
including any matters raised in evidence by you.
•
•
If a disqualification undertaking is offered by you and accepted by the 
Secretary of State prior to the issue of proceedings, the Secretary of State 
will not usually seek to recover any costs from you.
Once proceedings are issued, the award of costs is at the discretion of the 
Court. Costs are usually awarded against the unsuccessful party.
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• If you offer a disqualification undertaking after the issue of proceedings, 
the Secretary of State will usually ask the court to order that you pay the 
Secretary’ of State’s costs associated with the disqualification proceedings.
• For your information, costs already incurred to date  total £X.
Publicity
It is the Secretary’ of State’s usual practice to issue a press release upon the 
making of a disqualification order. This practice will also be followed with a 
disqualification undertaking. The disqualification undertaking together with the 
agreed schedule will be a public document in the same way as a Court Order .The 
press release will be based on their contents. Both the schedule and the 
disqualification undertaking will be available to the Court if you were to make 
any application for permission to act following disqualification or to vary7 the • 
period of the disqualification undertaking. It is only the Court that can give you 
permission to act or vary your disqualification undertaking.
Acknowledgem ent o f Receipt
Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by signing and returning the enclosed 
receipt form as soon as possible.
Yours faithfully
MARK BRUCE 
Chief Examiner
30.04.01
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Appendix 3
Response to Research Questions put to the Chief Examiner of 
the Disqualification Unfit of the Insolvency Service.
(The questions put to the Service are in normal type; the responses received
are in italics)
0 . 1 The Vetting Procedure.
Are limits imposed on the amount of time DU staff can devote to the initial 
vetting of unfit conduct reports?
If so, how much time is allocated?
There are no enforced time limits during the initial vetting procedure o f 
submitted D l Reports from IPs. That is to say that a vetting examiner in the 
Case targeting Team stationed in Birmingham does not have to stop reading 
submitted documents once they have reached 2 hours. However, the time 
spent is monitored and experience indicates that an average o f 2 hours is 
devoted to each case in order to make the Secretaiy Of State’s decision 
whether to target the case for further investigation. Some Dl are so bereft o f 
valuable information that a rejection can be decided fairly swiftly. At the 
other extreme some Dl reports are excellent and it is fairly obvious that 
further investigation is required. The cases that demand the most time are 
those ‘at the margins'. With these it is often a requirement to gather further 
brief information, either from the IP or third parties, in order to make the 
decision.
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O. 2 Undertakings.
(i) In respect of a particular case, would the Secretary of State differentiate 
between the disqualification period she would be prepared accept if an 
undertaking was offered and that which she would seek if the case was 
contested?
(ii) Does the Secretary of State offer to waive all costs against a director if 
he/she offers an undertaking within a set time period?
If so, how strictly is the time limit enforced?
If not, what is the Secretary of State’s policy in regard to costs if a director 
offers an undertaking?
In short, yes. However, in practice it does not come down to a ‘credit 
scoring guide' approach. Basically, once the investigation is complete and 
the SoS is in a position to determine the allegations she wishes to put to the 
director in a section 16 notice an assessment o f the appropriate period is 
made by the Chief Examiner responsible for the decision. Whilst the SoS can 
never be certain that the court would ratify the period sought at court, a 
nominal ‘discount ’ o f one year is made to that period (Z2 year for 3 or 4 
year cases). This is based on the premise that, i f  the director offers an 
undertaking for that period fairly quickly and prevents the need for 
protracted discussions (including meetings and correspondence over many 
weelcs) the public are protected earlier at a reduced cost to the public purse. 
Those directors who make representations as to why certain allegations 
shoidd be withdrawn and consequently require a reduction in 
disqualification period are also able to avail themselves o f the original 
discount unless they are successful in having the period reduced. Where 
these directors are at a disadvantage is in costs. An undertaking accepted 
without much fuss will basically ensure that the director is not required to 
pay any o f the SoS’ costs. Those that cause extra work to be done by the SoS
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will have an assessment done on whether a proportion o f the post s i 6 costs 
should he charged. It is not a science but an art!
Those cases that do not attract the offer o f an undertaking from the director 
and which proceed to trial will not have the benefit o f the discount. In effect, 
SoS will attempt to persuade the court to attach the original period assessed 
i f  successful on all counts
O. 3.
Since the introduction of disqualification undertakings, has the Secretary of 
State been stricter in the allegations of unfitness she includes in affidavits 
given that her role has changed from prosecutor to de facto arbiter of 
unfitness in most cases.
I think I  will need to have a brief discussion with you as to what you mean 
by ‘stricter' here. The SoS does not have a crystal ball and cannot be sure 
which director is likely to offer an undertaking although we have naturally 
built up some experience here. The SoS decided during the discussions prior 
to the enactment o f the Insolvency Act 2000 that any disqualification 
investigation would have to be completed before undertakings were 
negotiated. As such, all potential allegations are thoroughly investigated. I f  
a director ‘offers ’ an early end to an investigation by suggesting a period 
(even 15 years) they will be told that the investigation must be concluded 
before a decision on period is made. Early acceptance o f a low period 
would be wrong i f  an investigation would have uncovered serious unfitness 
demanding a lengthy period whereas acceptance o f the maximum would 
also be wrong, in the public interest. The latter would leave upon the chance 
o f a later appeal or a section 8A application to vary the period. I f  the SoS 
has not conducted a full investigation she would be unable to inform the 
court o f the basis on which 15 years was appropriate.
As I said, you may wish to call me to discuss this one further i f  I have 
misinterpreted your question.
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O. 4. Crown Debts.
Would it be possible to supply a statement of the ‘test’ that the Secretary of 
State applies when deciding whether to allege non-payment of Crown debts 
as evidence of unfitness?
We abide by precedent case law, in particular, Sevenoaks Stationers and 
Structural Concrete. In true lawyer-speak, we treat each case on its own 
facts.
O. 4 Press Releases.
Would it be possible to confirm that the matters of unfit conduct stated in 
press releases are taken verbatim from court judgments in contested cases 
and from the schedule of ‘matters not disputed’ annexed to undertakings and 
Carecraft disqualifications?
That is certainly the policy. However, what actually ends up being produced 
by a particular newspaper is often subject to their editorial adjustment (at 
their peril!). It is important that the exact wording is used when we issue a 
press release and that the matters o f  unfitness are not admitted but ‘not 
disputed’ by the director fo r  the purpose o f  the undertaking.
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